There's not much I can add beyond what Yogi wrote. Though the term the Wisdom Tree uses on its page is "Distribution Yield", not current yield. The former typically means the average dividend payments over the last twelve months, i.e. TTM.
Checking what Wisdom Tree actually means would entail adding up the 12 divs, figuring out what price to divide by, and doing the calculation. Likely the divisor is the price on the day of calculation (2/7/25), but what price? High, low, last, average of high and low? How does that divisor compare with the divisor used for SEC yield?
Sometimes the distribution yield is lower than the SEC yield, sometimes higher. On May 24, 2024, the distribution yield was 12 basis points higher than the SEC yield (5.42% vs 5.30%). Here's the USFR page from May 25th.
https://web.archive.org/web/20240525082254/https://www.wisdomtree.com/investments/etfs/fixed-income/usfr

Part III: The deeper possibility, unthinkable to Wolf, is that free-market capitalism and liberal democracy may have nothing to do with each other—or may even contradict each other. Wolf calls economics and politics “symbiotic twins,” which shows a poor grasp of both symbiosis and zygosity; he goes on to describe capitalism and democracy—specific versions of economics and politics—as inhabiting a “difficult marriage.” But they proceed from entirely different premises. Democracy is predicated on formal, substantive equality: one person, one vote. Capitalism is not, and is incompatible with substantive equality, because it is composed of workers and owners, success and failure, rich and poor. Capitalism is about self-interest and private gain; democracy is about public interest and civic responsibility. Capitalism’s moral justifications revolve around deservedness, efficiency, and individual risk-taking, none of which are important justifications for democracy. Capitalism is predicated on atomized individuals, democracy on shared publics.
Even the idea of freedom, which Wolf takes as essential to both, is radically different in each case. Private property, which is at the core of capitalism, is fundamentally opposed to unfettered freedom, because property involves the ability to exclude all other human beings from some part of the world. I am not free to live in your house, or even perhaps to walk across your land. I am not free to eat your dinner, even if I am starving and you intend to throw it away—even if I cooked it. Hence the basic insight of Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze that famines can take place without anyone’s property rights being violated. Freedom in capitalist markets entails the freedom of property owners to use and dispose of their property, including the freedom of business owners to run their businesses as little dictatorships, not as representative polities. You do not elect your boss, let alone vote on your wages or working hours. The political scientists Corey Robin and Alex Gourevitch have argued that workplaces are fundamentally places of unfreedom—many workers do not even have enough individual liberty to decide when to go to the bathroom without their bosses’ permission.
The notion that capitalism and democracy are mutually harmonious is a relic of cold war ideology. Contrary to Wolf’s belief, nineteenth-century capitalism did not widely overlap with democracy: the British Empire and the United States were not places with egalitarian universal suffrage. Proponents of market liberalism from John Locke onward worried constantly that universal suffrage would simply mean poor people voting to expropriate the property of the wealthy. Little wonder that nineteenth-century opponents of capitalism referred to themselves as “social democrats.” They understood socialism as a project for expanding democracy beyond the artificially curtailed political sphere to the social and the economic. The enthusiasm with which the United States overthrew democratically elected leaders with even moderately socialist leanings in places like Guatemala, Iran, and Chile in the cold war era also seems to suggest that free markets were quite compatible with political dictatorship well into the recent past.
The marketization and globalization of the world since the 1970s is often referred to as the era of neoliberalism. The word “neoliberalism” appears once in Wolf’s book, to refer to how “freer markets” are described by their opponents. Scholars like Quinn Slobodian, Dara Orenstein, Amy Offner, Sam Wetherell, and Laleh Khalili have detailed at length the ways that neoliberal economic policies have worked to insulate property ownership from democratic politics in the postcolonial age. They have shown the reliance of globalized production on a variety of economic zones with laws, regulations, and systems of accountability different from those of their host polities and separated from democratic accountability. They have also followed the enthusiasm that free-market fundamentalists like Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman had for apartheid South Africa, colonial Hong Kong, Singapore, and other places that had little relationship to democracy or individual freedom.
If capitalism and democracy are not fundamentally dependent on each other, then there is no crisis “of” them as a coherent system. The capitalism part seems to be doing just fine. The problem is the threat that unfettered capitalism poses to democracy, and specifically, the inability of the ideology of political liberalism to contain that threat.
As the political theorist Brian Judge argues in his superb book Democracy in Default (2024), modern liberalism has constituted itself around a denial of the need for distributive conflicts. Instead of open conflict over resources and rewards (which is common to other forms of political ideology), liberalism puts its faith in things like education, technology, expertise, and, ultimately, market forces to indefinitely postpone those conflicts. As he puts it, “‘The market’ is a discursive construct operating within liberalism that reconciles the inherent tension between private property and universal consent.”
For decades now, the ideology of free-market liberalism has obfuscated the ongoing distributive conflicts of the world, but it has not blunted the material suffering of the people on the losing end. Since the 2008 crisis, the reality of ruthless distributive conflict has become impossible to ignore, but the failure of market liberalism to reconcile political equality and economic inequality has produced a global crisis of legitimacy and a growing constituency amenable to antiliberal figures like Trump, Orbán, Modi, and Bolsonaro. In his inability or unwillingness to see these contradictions, Wolf cannot reason his way out of the exact set of ideologies and policies that produced the crisis in the first place.
The substance of this book demands one kind of review, but it is not just any book on the predicaments of our moment. It was written by Martin Wolf, one of the most prominent advocates for the neoliberal transformation of the world. The book opens with the statement (drawn from his acceptance speech for a lifetime achievement award) that Wolf’s “opinions have altered as the world has unfolded.”
Rereading Why Globalization Works in light of The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism does not reveal many alterations of opinion. Both books have a preface entitled “Why I Wrote This Book,” and both prefaces set the stage with the story of Wolf’s parents fleeing the Nazis, which led them to cherish democracy and individual liberty. Both books maintain that states and markets are necessary for each other, and specifically that liberal democracy and market globalization are symbiotic, albeit also in constant tension. Both rely on a sketchy historical narrative involving canonical figures like Aristotle, Plato, Hobbes, and Locke to back up the claim that private property is the fundamental condition for political liberty. Both books conceive of Wolf’s opponents as a broad antimarket constituency of ill-informed utopian dreamers who would immediately become icy Stalinists upon gaining power.
Wolf has changed his mind on three main subjects: corporations, finance, and inequality. In 2004 he described critics of multinational corporate power as engaging in “a collective hysteria” and “a series of paranoid fantasies.” While he still thinks that “the ability and willingness of multinational companies to move their capital and know-how across frontiers” has on balance been a positive thing, he now concedes that it has been disadvantageous to workers. In 2004 he thought the purpose of corporations was to add value by using cheap resources (including people) otherwise outside of the global market economy. He now thinks that corporate liability needs to be strengthened and corporate political influence has gone too far, whereas in 2004 he argued that corporations had far less power than governments and that they merely represented one set of influencing forces among many. In 2004 he agreed that the frequency of financial crises in the preceding decade had imposed large costs and political setbacks on the project of globalization. But despite many blunders and painful experiences, he maintained that “emerging-market economies should ultimately plan to integrate into the global capital markets.” Today he notes that “the financial sector wastes both human and real resources. It is in large part a rent-extraction machine.” In 2004 he acknowledged that inequality had “apparently risen” in high-income countries, but thought that globalization’s contribution to this trend was unclear, and its main consequence had been poverty reduction. Today he notes that from 1993 to 2015 the top one percent captured over half of all increases in real pre-tax incomes, and he concedes that wealth is a source of power, through political influence, media ownership, philanthropy, and so on.

Part II:
Some of his other ideas are at least as utopian as a campaign speech by Bernie Sanders or Jeremy Corbyn. Take this one, intended to address the problem of tax havens: “If, for example, the US told its tech companies that the price of locating profits in countries with low corporation tax would be that they could no longer operate in the US market, this nonsense would stop overnight.”
Or consider his idea (adapted from his colleague Raghuram Rajan) that countries that emit more carbon than the global average should pay into a shared incentive fund that would be redistributed through cash transfers to countries in the Global South. Or the idea that executive compensation is likely to be “reconsidered” anytime soon, or that moderation and expertise will persuade employers to “treat their employees with dignity and respect.” He thinks it is essential that miners in the Democratic Republic of the Congo should share in the benefits of cobalt they mine, and be treated with care and respect by mining companies and elites alike, and he thinks there is a reformist way to achieve that. We might agree on the desirability of all these things, but it is hard to imagine the political process that ends with the American government credibly telling Google or Apple that they can no longer operate in the US market. What is the moderate, piecemeal path that leads to child slaves in the DRC being treated with dignity and respect? How do we get from here to a world where the US government pays into a global climate change fund that sends cash to sub-Saharan Africa?
Sure enough, the chapter that follows Wolf’s economic reform proposals is about politics, and the reader might well expect a practical, workable theory of political change, including some mechanism to explain who will do his piecemeal social engineering, and how. Wolf does not have one. He has a few equally unlikely ideas for political reform: maybe younger adults should have more votes than older ones, or, in a surprising convergence with the sweaty imagination of J.D. Vance, parents should get votes for their children, so that elections will better take the future into account. He likes the idea of an “appointed house of merit,” made up of “people of exceptional achievement” in the arts, business, sports, and various other pursuits, because “there can be great value in unelected senates, properly constructed and run. A second elected house seems far less useful.” The reader is left to speculate on the moderate process for abolishing the United States Senate and replacing it with an unelected body of superior individuals. At the very least, it is an unlikely plan for saving democracy from plutocrats.
This most disappointing moment of the book is also its most chilling, because what Wolf does instead of explaining a plausible theory of political change is spend eight pages describing and rebutting various criticisms of democracy itself, beginning with the notion that voters are tribalist, ignorant, and unaware of their own interests. This tells us something about who he believes his audience to be. Unlike other books about the sorry state of the world, most of which end with a chapter that attempts to think about how to obtain or access political power in order to effect economic change, Wolf’s assumes that his readers already have power, and that they need to be convinced that there is anything worthwhile about having democracy. The best he can do is the old Churchillian cliché: Democracy is the worst system, except for all the others. Churchill said that in a 1947 parliamentary debate against Labour’s proposed reform of the House of Lords. That was also the year of Indian independence—something Churchill spent decades opposing, claiming that democracy was impossible “East of Suez.”
Wolf’s true goal is moral exhortation. He has absolutely no interest in removing the current elites or replacing them with others, and certainly not in trying to create a society without elites, or with elites whose powers to do harm are systematically curtailed. Instead he hopes to encourage our profligate elites to more virtuous behavior. He would prefer that they follow the rule of law instead of exercising contempt toward regular people. He would like them to exhibit “a substantial degree of honesty, trustworthiness, self-restraint, truthfulness, and loyalty to shared political, legal, and other institutions.” He wants, in short, to awaken the conscience of the global bourgeoisie and to produce a virtuous class consciousness that will render it capable of solving the problems it has created for itself. He fears that it is unconsciously generating its own gravediggers, in the twin forms of resentful populist demagogues and a more efficient Chinese state capitalism.
It’s easy to agree with Wolf about what has gone wrong, but when did it happen? When did our decision-makers and opinion formers lose their moral bearings? Virtuous elites have long proved difficult to manufacture. The first attempt that comes to mind is that of Petrarch, who in the fourteenth century believed that the corrupt and unjust world around him was the result of a moral decline in Christendom. Specifically, he thought the medieval law schools of Bologna and Padua were teaching the worldly natural sciences and Aristotelian dogma instead of morality, so he argued for a new form of education, the studia humanitatis, or what we now call the humanities.
The subsequent long arc of elite moral education, from Renaissance humanism to Enlightenment public virtue, generated the kind of Burkean elites whom Wolf seems to miss. He calls 1870 the “dawn of the age of democratic capitalism,” an age of suffrage and good governance that came about because “market capitalism demanded a more egalitarian politics.” Those claims would no doubt come as a surprise to the disenfranchised women and unpropertied men of the late nineteenth century, let alone the millions of subjects in Britain’s colonial empire. The elites of the British Empire, universal holders of robust humanities education, presided over wars, famine, extractive colonial economies, and occasionally outright genocide. They may have had a shared loyalty to political and legal institutions, but those institutions were violent, unequal, and exploitative.
Wolf does not mention those things, but even his story of “professional government” consciously creating (since the 1870s) global markets in land and labor and developing systems of commercial competition and monetized economies hardly sounds like an example of piecemeal, targeted social change. The people who lived through the rise of democratic capitalism experienced it as a revolution, not moderate social reform. For Wolf’s historical account to work, a set of property-owning elites who spent centuries producing liberalism, democracy, and free markets had to collectively lose their moral compasses sometime in the past two decades.

https://nybooks.com/articles/2025/01/16/never-too-much-the-crisis-of-democratic-capitalism-wolf/
Never Too Much’
Trevor Jackson
If globalization has allowed elites to remove themselves from democratic accountability and regulation, is there any path toward a just economy?
January 16, 2025 issue
Reviewed:
The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism
by Martin Wolf
Penguin Press, 474 pp., $30.00
Illustration by Matt Dorfman
Something has gone terribly wrong. In his 2004 book Why Globalization Works, the economics journalist Martin Wolf wrote that “liberal democracy is the only political and economic system capable of generating sustained prosperity and political stability.” He was articulating the elite consensus of the time, a belief that liberal democratic capitalism was not only a coherent form of social organization but in fact the best one, as demonstrated by the West’s victory in the cold war. He went on to argue that critics who “complain that markets encourage immorality and have socially immoral consequences, not least gross inequality,” were “largely mistaken,” and he concluded that a market economy was the only means for “giving individual human beings the opportunity to seek what they desire in life.”
Wolf wrote those words midway through a four-decade global expansion of markets. Throughout the 1980s in Britain, the United States, and France, governments led by Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and François Mitterrand set about privatizing public assets and services, cutting welfare state provisions, and deregulating markets. At the same time, a set of ten policies known as the “Washington Consensus” (because they were shared by the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the US Treasury) brought privatization, liberalization, and globalization to Latin America following a series of sovereign debt crises. In the 1990s a similar set of policies, then known as “shock therapy,” suddenly converted the formerly Communist economies of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to free markets. Around the Global South, and especially in the rapidly industrializing countries of East Asia after the 1997 financial crisis, “structural adjustment” policies that were conditions for IMF bailouts again brought liberalization, privatization, and fiscal discipline. The same policies were enforced on the European periphery after 2009, in Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain, again, either as conditions for bailouts or through EU fiscal restrictions and restrictive European Central Bank policy. Today there are far more markets in far more aspects of human life than ever before.
But the sustained prosperity and political stability that these policies were meant to create have proved elusive. The global economy since the 1980s has been riven by repeated financial crises. Latin America endured a “lost decade” of economic growth. The 1990s in Russia were worse than the Great Depression had been in Germany and the United States. The austerity and high-interest-rate policies after the 1997 East Asia crisis restored financial stability but at the cost of domestic recessions, and contributed to political instability and the repudiation of incumbent parties in Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea, as they did again across Europe after 2009–2010. Global economic growth rates in the era of globalization have been about half what they were in the less globalized postwar decades. Around the world, violent racist demagogues keep winning elections, and although they all seem very happy with the idea of private property, they are openly hostile to the rule of law, political liberalism, individual freedom, and other ostensible preconditions and cultural accompaniments to market economies. Both democracy and globalization seem to be in retreat in practice as well as in ideological popularity. Or, as Wolf writes in his new book, The Crisis of Democratic Capitalism:
Our economy has destabilized our politics and vice versa. We are no longer able to combine the operations of the market economy with stable liberal democracy. A big part of the reason for this is that the economy is not delivering the security and widely shared prosperity expected by large parts of our societies. One symptom of this disappointment is a widespread loss of confidence in elites.
What happened?
Martin Wolf is probably the most influential economics commentator in the English-speaking world. He has been chief editorial writer for the Financial Times since 1987 and their lead economics analyst since 1996. Before that he trained in economics at Oxford and worked at the World Bank starting in 1971, including three years as senior economist and a year spent working on the first World Development Report in 1978. This is his fifth book since moving to the Financial Times. The blurbs and acknowledgments are stuffed with central bankers, financiers, Nobel laureates, and celebrity academics. The bibliography contains ninety-six references to the author himself.
Wolf’s diagnosis is impossible to dispute: “Neither politics nor the economy will function without a substantial degree of honesty, trustworthiness, self-restraint, truthfulness, and loyalty to shared political, legal, and other institutions.” But, he observes, those values have run into crisis all over the world, and, especially since about 2008,
people feel even more than before that the country is not being governed for them, but for a narrow segment of well-connected insiders who reap most of the gains and, when things go wrong, are not just shielded from loss but impose massive costs on everybody else.
He describes in detail the mistaken policies of austerity in the US and Europe, the rise of a wasteful and extractive financial sector, the atomization and immiseration of formerly unionized workers, the pervasiveness of tax avoidance and evasion, and the general accumulation of decades of elite failure.
Most people have accurately realized “that these failings were the result not just of stupidity but of the intellectual and moral corruption of decision-makers and opinion formers at all levels—in the financial sector, regulatory bodies, academia, media, and politics.” And thus his conclusion: “Without ethical elites, democracy becomes a demagogic spectacle hiding a plutocratic reality. That also is its death.” Forty years of the corruption of our plutocratic elites has now led to what he views as an alarming populist reaction. Voters, especially young ones in the core democratic capitalist countries, have lost faith in the power of markets and liberalism. Serious international rivals have also emerged, in the forms of “demagogic authoritarian capitalism” in places like Turkey and Russia, and “bureaucratic authoritarian capitalism” in China, and Wolf views these systems, unlike earlier systemic rivals like communism, as serious threats. Liberal democratic capitalism is in danger both from within and without.
It’s a grim picture, and one that nearly any reader of any political persuasion can agree with. But for Wolf, these epochal global crises do not require radical change. The motto of the book (as he puts it) is “Never too much,” and he maintains that “reform is not revolution, but its opposite.” He is consistently contemptuous of any sort of structural change, quick to invoke despotism as the inevitable outcome of utopian thinking and to cite Edmund Burke on the inhumanity and impossibility of rebuilding society around first principles.
Instead, he prefers “piecemeal social engineering,” an idea that he adopts from the unconventional libertarian philosopher Karl Popper, and that he takes to mean “change targeted at remedying specific ills.” His targeted solutions for the specific ills that constitute the global crisis of democratic capitalism run from the anodyne to the surreal. Examples of the former include the idea that “public sector cash-flow accounts should be complemented with worked-out public sector balance sheets and accrual accounts,” or the need for corporations to have “excellent accounting standards” and diligent, independent auditors. Both are very reasonable proposals, and perhaps, at the margin, they really would erode the grip of plutocracy.
Others are standard repressive-technocrat fare. He rejects free higher education because too many people would go to college, imposing too high a fiscal burden on governments, and he doubts whether taxpayers should have to guarantee tertiary education as a universal right. He thinks there should be “controls on immigration that recognize the potential economic gains while also being politically acceptable and effective.” He thinks that defined-benefit retirement plans should be replaced by large-scale defined-contribution plans run by trustees who “would be allowed to adjust pensions in light of investment performance.” It is difficult to imagine many people democratically choosing a system in which unelected trustees could cut their pensions when the stock market does poorly, and there are good reasons to think that education is advantageous to both capitalism and democracy.

I assume some saw this, from today:
https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/10/opinion/treasure-secretaries-doge-musk.html

Initially, “60%” traffics on China was imposed without specifying which goods. Then it went to “10%”. Now is “25%” on steel and aluminum. In the meantime, China is taking their case to World Trade Organization. In his previous administration, tariffs imposed on China resulted in small impact, and both sides saved faces in the end.
What is ironic is that Canada is the exporter to US on steel and aluminum, whereas China is a much smaller importer on these two metals. China has been eying to cut out all rare earth metals to US, which are important components of manufacturing high performance chipsets. We will se how this game plays out.
Agree that these tariffs are nothing more than empty threats or negotiating tactics to strong-arm the country.

While traditional Republicans (if there are any left) might relish the shuttering of the CFPB on principle (less regulation of financial institutions), Musk has a more immediate objective.
Senator Ed Markey (via X, formerly known as Twitter) writes:

Elon wants the CFPB gone so tech billionaires can profit from apps, like X, that offer bank-like services but don’t follow financial laws that keep people’s money safe. Musk wants to use the government to put more in his pockets. This is a blatant conflict of interest. https://t.co/i3QdKC2Xjj [NPR Feb 7]

FWIW, there's not a theological (belief in a god) or even religious (broader beliefs and practices) requirement in the Constitution, including the presidential oath of office.
"So help me God" is not in the official oath and was likely not added by any of the first 26 presidents.
https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/article-2/section-1/clause-8/
https://progressive.org/latest/god-out-of-presidential-oath-seidel-210119/
Swearing (or affirming) with a bible is likewise not required. Teddy Roosevelt did not use a bible in 1901. Nor did John Quincy Adams when he took the oath:

Although he was a devout Christian, John Quincy Adams took his presidential oath upon a “Volume of Laws” because, he wrote in a March 1825 diary entry, it was the Constitution he swore to preserve, protect and defend.

https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2009-jan-18-na-inaug-religion18-story.html
There you have it. Trump swore by the Constitution. Yeah, right.
Another bit of trivia. The VP oath does include the words "So help me God", but that's statutory and also not part of the Constitution.
https://www.inaugural.senate.gov/vice-presidents-swearing-in-ceremony/

Dana Emery, Chair and CEO of Dodge & Cox, will retire on 12/31/2025.
Dodge & Cox has thoughtfully planned for this transition.
David Hoeft will become the firm's Chair while continuing to serve as CIO.
Roger Kuo will succeed Ms. Emery as CEO and Chair of the fund board while continuing to serve as President.
Hoeft has been with Dodge & Cox for 31 years while Kuo has been with the firm for 26 years.
https://www.dodgeandcox.com/individual-investor/us/en/about-us/news-and-firm-updates/2025/dodge-and-cox-leadership-and-investment-committee-updates.html

”pursues its investment objective by investing under normal circumstances at least 80% of its net assets (plus borrowings for investment purposes) in equity securities of U.S. and non-U.S. companies that Tweedy, Browne Company … believes are undervalued, and where either the company’s “insiders” have been actively purchasing the company’s equity securities and/or the company is conducting “opportunistic share buybacks.” … the Adviser considers a company’s “insiders” to be corporate officers, such as the Chairman, Chief Executive Officer, President, Chief Financial Officer, Treasurer, and/or directors, or controlling shareholders, who would typically own 10% or more of the company's outstanding shares … “
Amazing the different “strategies” they can come up with. :)

Gosh, why would Dump want to remove consumer protections????
https://www.thedailybeast.com/more-than-800k-have-lost-2b-on-trumps-meme-coin/
"President Donald Trump’s cryptocurrency, called $Trump, has cost investors billions. Trump announced the launch of his meme coin—a type of cryptocurrency that features Internet memes or celebrity mascots—just three days before his inauguration. “Join my very special Trump Community. GET YOUR $TRUMP NOW,” he wrote on TruthSocial. The opening sale for one of the 5,971,750 tokens was just 18 cents, but it quickly surged to $75. Early traders who purchased the meme coins within minutes walked away with profits, with the earliest trader making a two-day profit of $109 million, according to an analysis by the New York Times. But the price of $Trump has since plummeted to about $17, costing a far larger group cumulative losses of $2 billion. As of the middle of the week, more than 810,000 crypto wallets have lost money on the bet, an examination by crypto forensics firm Chainalysis showed. Meanwhile, the Trumps have raked in over $100 million in trading fees as Trump makes moves to curb government efforts to regulate cryptocurrencies.
“The president is participating in shady crypto schemes that harm investors while at the same time appointing financial regulators who will roll back protections for victims and who may insulate him and his family from enforcement,” Corey Frayer, who recently left his job as a crypto adviser to the Securities and Exchange Commission, told the New York Times."

On August 24, 2015, exchange traded products (ETPs) experienced a real life stress test.
Curiously, less than two months earlier there was another real life stress test albeit a much smaller one. On June 29, 2015, the Greek banks and stock market were shut down for several weeks.
Two different ETFs tracking the Greek market responded differently. GRE, a European ETF, was closed while GREK, a US ETF, remained open. Perhaps there are (rare) times when ETFs can close even when they don't absolutely have to.

Global markets have plunged into the red as the Greek government has shut its banks and stock exchange, sending its citizens into a panic. As a result, Lyxor has temporarily halted creations and redemptions of its Greek equity ETF [GRE], casting doubt over whether its price reflects the underlying assets.
...
Lyxor has updated its website today to read: “Due to exceptional circumstances affecting the Greek market, including the closure of the Greek stock exchange, we have decided, in the unit holders’ interest, to temporarily suspend subscriptions and redemptions of the units of the Lyxor UCITS ETF FTSE ATHEX LARGE CAP […].”

https://www.etf.com/sections/news/lyxor-suspends-activity-greek-etf-amid-turmoil

Lyxor’s decision has come under particular scrutiny because Global X, a US manager, has allowed investors to continue to trade its $322 million Greek ETF [GREK]

https://www.cnbc.com/2015/07/05/lyxor-had-no-choice-in-closure-of-greek-etf.html

Immediately after the markets closed in Athens, Global X issued a new prospectus update changing how they were going to deal with the market disruption. Here’s a quote.
“During the closure of the Athens Exchange, the Fund will fair value its security holdings for which current market valuations are not currently available using fair value pricing pursuant to the pricing policy and procedures approved by the Fund’s Board of Trustees.”
...
GREK never officially closed for creations and redemptions (instead, moving the portfolio toward the best basket of liquid ADRs they could manage)

https://www.etf.com/sections/etfcom-analysis/greece-etf-grek-shines-during-turmoil

@Hank. + 1000. Sit tight.,,,, until markets settle down. Hell yes. The last ten days have been the longest year of my life. Might be a long wait.

"Here is the richest man in the world bragging about eliminating an agency that has delivered $21 billion back to working-class families since its inception," said Democrats on the House Committee on Financial Services, led by Ranking Member Maxine Waters of California. "Even most Republicans want the CFPB to continue protecting them from being ripped off by abusive big banks and predatory lenders."
https://www.commondreams.org/news/musk-cfpb-2671120924
"Here are the FACTS: 81% of voters, both Republicans and Democrats, support the CFPB and want the agency to continue its work," said Rep. Juan Vargas (D-Calif.), also a member of the committee. "Even so, Trump has moved to freeze the CFPB to take money out of YOUR pocket to line those of his billionaire friends."

@YBB. Thanks for your response. The 4.10% distribution I noted above is the annualized % on the day of last months distribution and at the same time the SEC yield is noted at 4.24%. So why the difference. Almost all of my other bond funds pay their distribution annualized within 1-2 basis points of the announced 30 day SEC yield? So do I expect 4.10 % distribution from the fund on an annualized basis or the 30 day SEC yield if there is absolutely no change in rates or fund fees for the next 364 days?

Maybe someone can explain why the 30 day sec yield is supposed to be able for investors to use in comparing bond fund yields but there is a discrepancy of 14 basis points for example in the latest distribution. Why does USFR hold back these 14 basis points and therefore the 30 day SEC yield is meaningless as a comparison tool in this case. Latest distribution was 4.10 %. 30 day SEC yield is 4.24% as both are notated on the USFR page at Wisdom Tree.

Small investors may have access to Collective Investment Trusts (CITs) via their 401(k) plans.
https://www.morningstar.com/personal-finance/dont-know-about-cits-you-probably-should

msf: "ETFs can't be closed."
What is the law or rule that says an ETF is not allowed to close inflows?

There's no rule of law that gives ETFs an advantage over OEFs when it comes to taxes. In fact, the law that says a fund can make embedded gains vanish by offloading them onto investors was written many years before ETFs ever existed.
It's not a rule of law, but a rule of reality - pragmatism - that prevents OEFs from doing this. In order to dump cap gains onto an investor redeeming shares, a fund must redeem those shares in kind. A few OEFs are even known to do this, e.g. Sequoia. But generally only for larger redemptions.
Similarly, it's not that ETFs are prohibited by law from closing, but as others have explained above, pragmatically the chaos it would cause is an effective bar.
Sequoia fund gives departing shareholders stock instead of cash (Investment News 2016)

A provision in the 1940 Investment Company Act allows funds to pay redemptions in securities, rather than cash, but it's a provision that's rarely used, in part because in-kind redemptions could damage a fund's reputation. ... Under the law, the fund doesn't have to distribute in-kind redemptions in proportion to the fund's holdings.

Sequoia prospectus, May 1, 2024

• Unless otherwise prohibited by law, the Fund may pay the redemption price to you in cash or in portfolio securities, or partly in cash and partly in portfolio securities.
• The Fund has adopted a policy under which the Fund may limit cash payments in connection with redemption requests to $250,000 during any ninety (90) day period. As a result, the Fund may pay you in securities or partly in securities if the amount of Fund shares that you redeem is more than $250,000.
• It is highly likely that the Fund will pay you in securities or partly in securities if you make a redemption (or series of redemptions) in an amount greater than $250,000

Schwab platform fees for most OEFs:
NTF funds
- OneSource (retail): typically 0.40%, can be as high as 0.45%
- Retirement plans (e.g. 401k): usually 0.10% to 0.50%, can be as high as 1.10%
TF funds: typically 0.10%, can be as high as 0.25%

An increased transaction fee [currently $74.95] applies to purchases made by self-directed retail clients of funds from certain fund families that do not pay Schwab for recordkeeping, shareholder, and other administrative services on fund shares held by self-directed retail clients

Those families are Vanguard, D&C, and Fidelity.
Schwab's automatic investment plan, begun in 2023, allows one to buy additional shares of most mutual funds except those for which Schwab charges "an increased transaction fee". So you can't cheaply buy additional shares of Vanguard, D&C, or Fidelity funds at Schwab.

Sven: At Fidelity's transaction-fee platform, Vanguard and Dodge & Cox funds will cost $100 to buy, whereas the typical fee is $49.95. Not sure with Schwab's purchase policy.
Both Fido and Schwab charge mutual fund firms platform fees (25-50 bps), whether NTF or TF.
Standard TF fees apply to mutual funds that pay. But higher TF fees apply to those mutual funds that don't pay.
Then, there are some mutual funds that aren't even supported at these platforms.
So, Fido and Schwab aren't providing their mutual fund platforms as public service. This is one lucrative area that remains for them that is untouched by the drive to zero commissions. Options are another area.