I don’t know why M* coughed-up its premium analyst rating when I pulled up OAKCX this morning. Not a subscriber. But I coped a piece of it (excerpt from a portion of full report):
”Oakmark Bond Fund earns an Average Process Pillar rating. The investment strategy as stated in the fund's prospectus is as follows: The investment seeks to maximize both current income and total return, consistent with prudent investment and principal protection management. The fund invests primarily in a diversified portfolio of bonds and other fixed-income securities. Under normal market conditions, and it invests at least 25% of its assets in investment-grade fixed-income securities and may invest up to 35% of its assets in below investment-grade fixed-income securities (commonly known as "high-yield" or "junk bonds").
“The main contributor to the rating is the firm's five-year retention rate of 82% over the period. Management team experience, which averages 16 years at this fund, also supports the rating. Lastly, the process is limited by the parent firm's five-year risk-adjusted success ratio of 47%. The measure indicates the percentage of a firm's funds that survived and outperformed their respective category's median Morningstar Risk-Adjusted Return for the period. The parent's subpar success ratio suggests that the firm could do better across its fund lineup.
“This strategy has a 3.7% 12-month yield, higher than its average peer's 3.4%. Typically, higher yields come at the cost of higher credit risk. Rated on Jun 23, 2023 Published on Jun 23, 2023”

* AUM rarely bothers me unless below 50 M putting a fund at risk of closure. All else being equal I prefer smaller AUMs.

Oakmark site and M* both show, as of 5/31/23:
YTD: 1.86%
1 year: -1.45%
Since inception: -5.92%
(Mousing over perfomance barchart on Oakmark site)

My smaller cap funds are trailing considerably behind S&P 500. The banking crisis in March did not help either. Additionally, the possibility of recession by year end (inverted yield curve) and more rate hikes had me to rethink the investment for the latter half of this year.
So far, I have sold all commodity futures and alternatives to fund short term bonds, VGSH and allocation funds, FBLAX. Will buy more T bills as older T bills and CDs mature.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1586009/000121390023052922/ea157252_497.htm
497 1 ea157252_497.htm 497
Wildermuth Fund
Supplement dated June 29, 2023, to the Wildermuth Fund Class A Shares and Class C Shares
prospectus and the Class I Shares prospectus, each dated July 29, 2022
and to the Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) of the Class A, Class C and Class I Shares of the
Wildermuth Fund dated July 29, 2022
Effective immediately, the Board of Trustees (the “Board”) of Wildermuth Fund (the “Fund”), based upon the recommendation of Wildermuth Advisory LLC (the “Adviser”), the Fund’s investment adviser, approved a plan of liquidation for the Fund (the “Liquidation Plan”). After considering a variety of factors, the Board concluded that it would be advisable and in the best interest of the Fund and its shareholders that the Fund be closed and liquidated.
As a result of the adoption of the Liquidation Plan, the Fund will no longer actively pursue its stated investment objective, and the Adviser will begin to liquidate the Fund’s portfolio. The Fund’s portfolio manager will likely increase the Fund’s assets held in cash and cash equivalents in order to prepare for an orderly liquidation. As a result, the Fund is expected to deviate from its stated investment objective, policies and strategies.
In connection with the Fund’s liquidation, shareholders will receive one or more payments representing the shareholder’s proportionate interest in the net assets of the Fund, after the Fund has paid or provided for all taxes, expenses and any other liabilities, subject to any required withholdings. While the Fund intends to proceed with the Liquidation Plan, at this time, there is no estimate of when the liquidation will be completed.
Sales of the Fund’s shares were suspended effective June 22, 2023. In addition, effective June 29, 2023, the Fund’s quarterly repurchase offers will be suspended through the final distribution of the Fund’s assets pursuant to the Liquidation Plan.
The Fund’s website (www.wildermuthfund.com) will provide information, when available, about the status of the Fund, including information regarding dates and amounts of distributions, among other information and periodic reports relating to the Fund.
This supplement supersedes any prior supplements related to the above topics.
Please retain this supplement with the Fund’s Prospectus and SAI.

I used to but now that I've finally made up my mind to only index on the equity side (only took 20+ years lol) when it's gone it's gone. Anything sold now goes right into the index.... done.

Smart. This is the direction I'm heading, too, however tentatively. Bond holdings excepted.

Stress tests
If you are a risk manager at a big bank, you might want to run some stress tests examining how your bank will perform under stressful scenarios. If you are creative and good at your job, you will have fun thinking up the scenarios. You will get in a room with some of your subordinates, and ideally with some front-line traders and managers, and brainstorm bad stuff that might happen.
Your brainstorming might include some history: “What if 2008 happens again?” “What if 1929 happens again?” “What if LTCM happens again?” It might include some simple numerical questions: “What if the S&P falls by 20%?” “What if the Fed raises rates to 7%?” “What if the Fed lowers rates to 0%?” You might think about social and geopolitical and technological questions and try to translate them into economic scenarios: “What if nobody goes back to the office and office rents fall 50%?” “What if artificial intelligence causes mass unemployment?” “What if Russia’s war in Ukraine keeps pushing up oil prices?” You might think about scenarios specific to your bank’s operations: “What if our CEO gets run over by a bus?” “What if our CEO steals the corporate treasury?”
Have fun, go nuts, be creative. Think of lots of scenarios. Then model how those scenarios will translate into market prices, how they will affect your funding costs and the cash flows from your assets. Then model how much capital and liquidity you will have in each scenario. Part of the goal here is to make sure that you will have plenty of capital and liquidity in a wide range of stressful scenarios. Part of the goal is to figure out which scenarios will be worse for you, so you can know what to worry about and hedge: If your model tells you that you’ll be fine if the Fed raises rates and bankrupt if it lowers rates, maybe you should do something about that.
If there is some specific event that you are worried about — some new worry that crops up — you might sit down and design a stress test for that event to make sure that you’d survive it. But your overall approach to stress testing will be something like “let’s constantly think of new things to worry about, and test for those.” It will not be “let me think of the one biggest thing to worry about, and test only for that.” Lots of things can go wrong in different directions! If you only worry about one thing, you will miss the other things.
Also separately the Federal Reserve conducts annual stress tests for big US banks, but those are … different. The Fed’s stress tests were created after the 2008 crisis, basically to shore up confidence in the banks so that they could raise capital. The Fed is in the business of supervising big banks, and as part of that business it prods the banks to consider various risks, to prepare for different scenarios, to build a robust culture of stress testing and risk management. But the Fed’s official stress tests are a public exercise designed to make sure — and tell everyone — that the banking system could survive another 2008.
And so each year the Fed sits down and thinks something like “what is the most plausible way for 2008 to happen this year,” and then it writes one stress-test scenario[1] that is basically “there’s a recession and real estate prices collapse,” and the banks run their models to see how much money they would lose in that scenario, and generally the answer is “a certain amount, but not enough to leave us undercapitalized,” and the banks pass the stress tests.
This became slightly awkward in 2020 when the stress-test scenario involved the US unemployment rate peaking at 10%, while the actual stress of Covid-19 caused unemployment to peak at 14.7%. If you ask questions like “can banks survive another 2008,” you will not quite get an answer to the question “can banks survive a global pandemic?” The answer to that question, however, turned out to be yes: For a combination of reasons (supportive government policy and Fed lending, but also profiting on volatility), the big banks did pretty well in Covid.
It also became slightly awkward this year when the Fed released its stress-test scenario in February, and it went like this:

The severely adverse scenario is characterized by a severe global recession accompanied by a period of heightened stress in both commercial and residential real estate markets, as well as in corporate debt markets. The U.S. unemployment rate rises nearly 6½ percentage points from the starting point of the scenario in the fourth quarter of 2022 to its peak of 10 percent in the third quarter of 2024. The sharp decline in economic activity is also accompanied by an increase in market volatility, widening corporate bond spreads, and a collapse in asset prices, including a 38 percent decline in house prices and a 40 percent decline in commercial real estate prices. …
The rising unemployment rate and the rapid decline in aggregate demand for goods and services significantly reduce inflationary pressures. …
Short-term interest rates, as measured by the 3-month Treasury rate, fall significantly to near zero by the third quarter of 2023 and remain there for the remainder of the scenario. Long-term interest rates, as measured by the 10-year Treasury yield, fall by nearly 3¼ percentage points by the second quarter of 2023, and then gradually rise in late 2023 to about 1½ percent by the end of the scenario.

Fine, right, recession, real-estate collapse, corporate credit blows out, rates go to zero, the 2008 of 2023. But then in March a couple of US banks failed, and many others came under a lot of stress, for exactly the opposite reason: Inflation was persistently high, interest rates went up, and those banks had to pay more on deposits even as their holdings of Treasury bonds lost value. Silicon Valley Bank was not subject to the Fed’s stress tests, as a mid-sized bank, but if it had been it would have done great! It did not do great in real life.
Anyway yesterday the 23 big banks subject to the stress tests all passed. Here are the Fed’s press release and the full results. One of the banks that passed is the US arm of Credit Suisse Group AG, which survived the Fed’s hypothetical stress scenario just fine but which vanished due to the stress of real life. From the Fed’s press release:

"Today's results confirm that the banking system remains strong and resilient," Vice Chair for Supervision Michael S. Barr said. "At the same time, this stress test is only one way to measure that strength. We should remain humble about how risks can arise and continue our work to ensure that banks are resilient to a range of economic scenarios, market shocks, and other stresses."

Yes.
Now, this year’s stress test did include another scenario for the eight biggest banks, which (1) is different from the regular stress test and (2) is closer to what actually happened:

In February 2023, for the first time, the Federal Reserve published an additional, exploratory market shock component that applied only to U.S. G-SIBs. The purpose of the stress test is to understand a firm’s resilience to a range of severe but plausible events, and the exploratory component furthers that purpose by posing a different set of risks than is probed by this year’s global market shock component.
In contrast to this year’s global market shock component, which was characterized by a severe recession with fading inflation expectations, the exploratory market shock is characterized by a less severe recession with greater inflationary pressures induced by higher inflation expectations, increases in interest rates, an appreciation of the U.S. dollar, and increases in commodity prices.

This scenario doesn’t count for bank capital requirements — “Consistent with the nature of an exploratory exercise, the exploratory market shock will not contribute to the capital requirements set by this year’s stress test” — but it is intellectually interesting. Broadly speaking the big banks did a little better in this scenario than in the severe-recession scenario.
But also, in real life, the big banks did fine in the scenario that actually happened (except Credit Suisse!): The problems at US regional banks seem to have driven deposits into the biggest banks, as depositors got nervous about small banks and fled to the safety of big banks. (Look how safe they are, they keep passing the stress tests.) The actual world of 2023 was different from the hypothetical world of the stress tests, and in some ways more stressful for the US banking system, but it worked out fine for the biggest banks.
A general feature of the Fed’s stress tests is that, when the Fed serves up a “severely adverse” stress scenario to the banks, the banks go off and model the effect it would have on their business, and if they come back to the Fed and say “actually this would be good for us,” the Fed gets mad at them. You’re not supposed to say that! Goldman Sachs Group notably did this in 2020, arguing that its trading business was countercyclical, and that in a stressful scenario it would simply make a ton of money trading derivatives; the Fed was not amused. But sometimes it is true! Some hypothetical scenarios would be very bad for the big banks, other hypothetical scenarios would be good for the big banks, and it’s perfectly plausible that some scenarios would be bad — for the world, for the economy, for the banking system — while also being good for the big banks. The way to manage this risk is to think about lots of scenarios and make sure the banks would survive all of them.

Fund Allocations (Cumulative), 5/31/23
There were tiny shifts from global stocks & hybrids into m-mkt funds. The changes for OEFs + ETFs were based on a total AUM of about $30.50 trillion in the previous month, so +/- 1% change was about +/- $305.0 billion. Also note that these changes were from both fund inflows/outflows & price changes. #Funds #OEFs #ETFs #ICI
OEFs & ETFs: Stocks 57.57%, Hybrids 5.00%, Bonds 19.63%, M-Mkt 17.80%
https://ybbpersonalfinance.proboards.com/post/1089/thread

Thanks for all the thoughts. Cuts both ways for me. When something I’ve sold (typically a stock) soars another 50% or so in a few months I feel like an idiot. On the other hand, yesterday I picked up something previously owned that had been beaten up the past couple months and so bought it again at a better price. Having tracked it was useful.
One thing I’ve found is that for really speculative plays a small investment is enough. So the perceived “loss” from having sold early, while stunning sometimes, may be relatively small in dollar terms.

@catch22 :
"Our house takes RMD's from T-IRA's in December and we play with how much FED and STATE tax we want removed depending on our estimate of how much we will owe from taxable sources through the tax year. Our goal is to be about even in taxes paid versus taxes owed."
I usually do the same , wait until the last two months of the year & take my RMD.
Over the last three years refund $995 owe $317 refund 1011 from Fed Taxes .
I believe the year I owed Mr. Vanguard had some rather unexpected CG's !

AAII Sentiment Survey, 6/28/23
Bullish remained the top sentiment (41.9%; above average) & bearish remained the bottom sentiment (27.5%; below average); neutral remained the middle sentiment (30.6%; below average); Bull-Bear Spread was +14.4% (above average). Investor concerns: Inflation (moderating but high); economy; the Fed; dollar; crypto regulations; market volatility (VIX, VXN, MOVE); Russia-Ukraine war (70+ weeks, 2/24/22- ); geopolitical. For the Survey week (Th-Wed), stocks were mixed, bonds up, oil down, gold down, dollar up. All 23 big banks passed the Fed Stress Tests. #AAII #Sentiment #Markets
https://ybbpersonalfinance.proboards.com/post/1088/thread

Real wages are still higher than they were in three out of the four years of the previous administration prior to the Covid outbreak, and it's false to say every month. They just started to rise this year:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LES1252881600Q
Meanwhile, the 3.7% unemployment rate is close to an all-time low:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE

It's funny how 2 people look at the same numbers https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LES1252881600Q and come up with different opinions.
The biggest wage increase since 1980 happened during Trump which reached the highest point. Covid brought it down and the current administration is far from the peak.
Here are the numbers based on the stlouisfed chart. During the Trump years: Q4/2016=349....Q2/2020=393 (that is 12.6% real wage increase in just 3.5 years). Trump finished in Q4/2020=377. There is nobody else that came close to a 12.6% real wage increase. Since 1980 the second biggest increase during any other presidency was about 5%.
The last number from Q1/2023=263 is still far from the top. This is after trillions of support and a waste of money for the next generation.

All 23 banks passed the Federal Reserve Stress Tests.
Press Release https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20230628a.htm
Full Report https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2023-dfast-results-20230628.pdf
https://i.ibb.co/kcRWp6M/Screenshot-2023-06-28-20-54-13.png

Real wages are still higher than they were in three out of the four years of the previous administration prior to the Covid outbreak, and it's false to say every month. They just started to rise this year:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/LES1252881600Q
Meanwhile, the 3.7% unemployment rate is close to an all-time low:
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/UNRATE

I "love" Bofa predictions. See what they said on 12/28/2022 (https://www.businessinsider.com/stock-market-volatility-2023-investing-strategy-sp500-bank-america-subramanian-2022-12)
Bofa recomendations were:
1) Subramanian said she sees stocks going through a volatile period in the first half of 2023 as a recession hits the US economy.
2) avoid the S&P 500 index and mega tech
3) Her most-preferred sectors for 2023 are energy, financials, consumer staples, and utilities.
Reality:
1) Volatility wasn't high in the first half. In fact the indexes were nicely up
2) YTD...SPY made 14.8%...QQQ 37.3%
3) Subramanian preferred categories YTD performance...XLF -3.3%...XLE -7.1%...XLP -0.2%...XLU -7.8%
If you follow the above you missed at least 15-20%. Let me know another profession you can keep your job and be so wrong so many times.
=============
A week ago (link)
MMM...maybe it's time to sell, after all subramanian said "The market is more rational than its been in a decade’"
More than a decade? did she look at what the SP500 made in the last 10 years? SPY made 225% in 10 years and QQQ made 460%.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/773757/000119312523176970/d431892d497.htm
[The fund is rated four stars]
497 1 d431892d497.htm COLUMBIA FUNDS SERIES TRUST I
Supplement dated June 28, 2023
to the Prospectus and Summary Prospectus of the following fund:
Fund Prospectus and Summary Prospectus Dated
Columbia Funds Series Trust I
Columbia Small Cap Growth Fund 1/1/2023
The Board of Trustees of Columbia Funds Series Trust I (the Trust) has approved the re-opening of Columbia Small Cap Growth Fund (the Fund), a series of the Trust, on or about July 31, 2023 (the Effective Date). In connection with this action, on the Effective Date, the first paragraph under the Purchase and Sale of Fund Shares section is hereby removed from the Fund's prospectus and summary prospectus.
Shareholders should retain this Supplement for future reference.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1014913/000110465923075579/tm2319682d1_497.htm
497 1 tm2319682d1_497.htm 497
Filed pursuant to Rule 497(e)
Registration No. 333-07305
1940 Act File No. 811-07685
FRONTIER FUNDS, INC.
Supplement to Prospectus Dated October 31, 2022
Frontier MFG Select Infrastructure Fund
Institutional Class Shares (FMSIX)
Service Class Shares (FMSSX)
The Board of Directors (the “Board”) of Frontier Funds, Inc. (the “Company”), based upon the recommendation of Frontegra Asset Management, Inc. (“Frontegra”), has determined to liquidate the Frontier MFG Select Infrastructure Fund (the “Fund”). Frontegra is the Fund’s investment adviser and MFG Asset Management is the Fund’s subadviser. After considering a variety of factors, the Board concluded that it would be advisable and in the best interest of the Fund and its shareholders that the Fund be closed and liquidated as a series of the Company, effective as of the close of business on the liquidation date, August 23, 2023.
The Board approved a Plan of Liquidation that determines the manner in which the Fund will be liquidated. Pursuant to the Plan of Liquidation and in anticipation of the Fund’s liquidation, the Fund will be closed to new purchases, additional investments and incoming exchanges, except for purchases made through an automatic investment program or the reinvestment of any distributions or a purchase exception that is approved by the officers of the Company, effective after market close on June 29, 2023. After the Fund is closed to new investments, shareholders will be permitted to exchange their shares of the Fund for shares of the other available Frontier Funds or to redeem their shares of the Fund, as provided in the Fund’s prospectus, until the liquidation date. No redemption fees will be imposed by the Fund in connection with redemptions or exchanges; however, please note that your financial intermediary may charge fees in connection with redemptions or exchanges.
Prior to the August 23, 2023, liquidation date, the Fund will no longer actively pursue its stated investment objective, and MFG Asset Management will begin to liquidate the Fund’s portfolio. The Fund’s portfolio managers will likely increase the Fund’s assets held in cash and cash equivalents in order to prepare for an orderly liquidation and to meet anticipated redemption requests. As a result, the Fund is expected to deviate from its stated investment objective, policies and strategies.
Pursuant to the Plan of Liquidation, any shareholder who has not exchanged or redeemed their shares of the Fund prior to the liquidation date of August 23, 2023, will have their shares redeemed in cash and will receive one or more payments representing the shareholder’s proportionate interest in the net assets of the Fund as of the liquidation date, after the Fund has paid or provided for all taxes, expenses and any other liabilities, subject to any required withholdings. The automatic redemption of Fund shares on the liquidation date will generally be treated the same as any other redemption of Fund shares for tax purposes, so that shareholders (other than tax-exempt accounts) will recognize gain or loss for income tax purposes on the redemption of their Fund shares in the liquidation. In addition, the Fund and its shareholders will bear transaction costs and tax consequences associated with the disposition of the Fund’s portfolio holdings prior to the liquidation date. The Fund expects to have declared and paid a distribution or distributions, which, together with all previous such distributions, will have the effect of distributing to the Fund’s shareholders all of the Fund’s investment company taxable income and net capital gain (after reductions for any available capital loss carryforward), if any, realized in the taxable periods ending on or prior to the liquidation date. The distribution or distributions will include any additional amounts necessary to avoid federal income or excise tax. Shareholders should consult their tax adviser for further information about federal, state and local tax consequences relative to their specific situation.
Important Information for Retirement Plan Investors
If you are a retirement plan investor, you should consult your tax adviser regarding the consequences of a redemption of Fund shares. If you hold your Fund shares through a tax-deferred retirement account, you should consult with your tax adviser or account custodian to determine how you may reinvest your redemption proceeds on a tax-deferred basis. If the redeemed shares are held in a qualified retirement account such as an individual retirement account (IRA) and you have made no election regarding tax withholding, the redemption proceeds may be subject to a 10% federal income tax withholding and any applicable state required withholding. If you will receive a distribution from an IRA or a Simplified Employee Pension (SEP) IRA that is terminating as a result of the liquidation of the Fund, you must either roll the proceeds into another IRA within 60 days of the date of the distribution in order to avoid having to include the distribution in your taxable income for the year, if applicable, or request that the distribution be made directly to another IRA or eligible retirement plan. Please note you can make only one tax-free rollover of a distribution you receive from an IRA to another (or the same) IRA in any 12-month period, regardless of the number of IRAs you own. If you receive a distribution from a 403(b)(7) custodial account (tax-sheltered account) or a Keogh account, you must roll the distribution into an eligible retirement plan within 60 days in order to avoid disqualification of the plan and inclusion of the distribution in your taxable income for the year. If you are the trustee of a qualified retirement plan or the custodian of a 403(b)(7) custodial account (tax-sheltered account) or a Keogh account, you may reinvest the proceeds in any way permitted by its governing instrument.
This supplement should be retained with your Prospectus for future reference.
The date of this Supplement to the Prospectus is June 28, 2023.

@sma3: I grew up 10 miles from New London. My father’s small company built wooden boats by hand using skilled craftsmen. After the Nautilus was launched around 1955, Electric Boat (now part of General Dynamics, I think) as a defense contractor could offer much higher wages than my father could pay and he lost many employees. Fiberglass boats and the employee drain eventually caused him to shut down the business in the late 60’s. His motor sailers, however, continue to provide great service to old-school yacht owners.
In the same part of the state, a practically non-existent tribe of Pequots opened a huge casino that became the biggest taxpayer to the State. Job creation for sure, but not in a line of business that sits well with my belief system.

According to LCORX's Fact Sheet, its investment objective is: "Capital appreciation and income while maintaining prudence in terms of managing exposure to risk. Investment guidelines are 30%-70% equity exposure and 30%-70% fixed income." What is the value in comparing it to a 100% equity fund like SPY after the longest equity bull market in history just ended? PRWCX is a fairer comparison as is VBIAX, and PRWCX has been a terrific fund.

I compared LSLTX(99+% in stocks) to SP500 and LCORX(60+% stocks) to PRWCX.
Leuthold funds have high ER and small AUM.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1491978/000113743923000850/flexn14497062023.htm
497 1 flexn14497062023.htm
FLEXSHARES® TRUST
To the Shareholders of
FlexShares® International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund (IQDE)
FlexShares® Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund (QDYN)
(each, a “Target Fund” and together, the “Target Funds”)
SUPPLEMENT DATED JUNE 27, 2023 TO THE JOINT PROSPECTUS/INFORMATION STATEMENT DATED JUNE 9, 2023
Upon a recommendation of Northern Trust Investments, Inc. (“NTI”), the Board of Trustees of FlexShares® Trust, on behalf of the FlexShares® International Quality Dividend Defensive Index Fund (“IQDE”) and FlexShares® International Quality Dividend Index Fund (“IQDF”), and NTI have agreed to terminate the Agreement and Plan of Reorganization (“Plan”) for IQDE, which will result in the cancellation of the proposed reorganization of IQDE with and into IQDF. The reason for the cancellation of the proposed reorganization is that, following the reconstitution of the underlying indexes of IQDE and IQDF, there was no longer sufficient overlap in the two portfolios to support a tax-free reorganization.
Termination of the Plan for IQDE and cancellation of IQDE’s reorganization will have no impact on the reorganization of the FlexShares® Quality Dividend Dynamic Index Fund with and into the FlexShares® Quality Dividend Index Fund (the “QDYN Reorganization”). Accordingly, the QDYN Reorganization will proceed as described in the Joint Prospectus/Information Statement.
Please retain this Supplement for future reference.