Tonight on CNBC every Treasury bill, note, and bond listed is either at or above 5%, or right on the doorstep (only the 5y and 10y).

Better Loeys at the following link, which I got to from the article posted above.
https://www.ft.com/content/651cc7a4-27e3-4026-9381-76421a0203bb

BTW, the expected yield on the 20-year Treasury bond auction today is 5.156%

Many investors think that the 20-year is a good buy now. 20 years of 5% interest will work for many folks. But once interest rates start declining you will make a nice CG on the bonds you own. Any kind of market timing is difficult. If one doesn't hit the highest yield, 5% is still great and most likely will be great a few years from now.

All of the Primecap Odyssey funds, which are in multi-year outflow mode, are distributing over 5%. (Looks like the Growth fund is doling out almost 12%, which comes on top of bottom quartile 5-yr. relative performance in its category, so no surprise people are exiting.)

@TheShadow has an annual thread on fund distribution links.
This thread is to note mutual funds/OEFs that have outrageously high yearend distributions. Culprits are high outflows and/or recent manager changes (new managers want to start with fresh portfolios for their tenure).
This problem isn't significant for ETFs, but those too can have notable CG distributions when there are heavy outflows (their advantage of "in-kind trading without tax impact" basically runs out). Vanguard's dual OEF and ETF class structure also bites because both VG OEFs and VG ETFs have identical CG distributions (as % of prices).
M* RK has noted 3, https://www.morningstar.com/funds/3-funds-whose-tax-bills-might-tick-up
AKREX, outflow 9.2% of AUM
VPMAX, outflow 6.8% of AUM
DHSCX, outflows and manager change, 03/2023 (from the link at @TheShadow, est 21.65%!)
Too early for the amounts of CG distributions.
Posters should add more as they learn about large ( > 5%) yearend CG distributions.

from the great John Waggoner
The S&P500 quarterly income tax rate for Q2 2023 was 18.81%, down from the Q1 2023 20.20% rate, down from the Q2 2022 20.05%, significantly lower than the pre-Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017's Q2 2013 29.53% (10 years ago), and 48% lower than the Q2 1998 35.84% rate (25 years ago).
Good thing they're passing those savings on to their customers!

@Yogibearbull - Thanks for clarifying. Guess I’ll have to sell it than! For years I’ve been under the false impression it was a bond fund. Actually, not knowing what I’m doing sometimes works better than when I know what I’m doing.
Yes, M* shows CVSIX to have only a small weighting in bonds. Looks like 15-20% on their pie chart. However, Lipper puts the bond holdings somewhat higher at 46%. Bonds & cash combined come out to 65-70%.
ALLOCATION (CVSIX)
Bonds 45.94%
Stocks 34.79%
Cash 21.56%
Other -2.29%
(Figures from MarketWatch / Lipper)

Hello @Tarwheel - my thoughts are with you as I’ve become increasingly impatient with the bond funds I still own, having sold quite a few to end the money drain, investing in both Mmkt and individual treasuries. As you know, our bond funds have a higher yield (~5%) but that doesn’t come close to matching the NAV drain.
As an example, I’ve been invested in PIMIX, which M* shows a TTM yield of 7.49%. On it’s face, this would seem to be a valued investment. Well, if you’re only in it for the distribution and don’t mind the funds value continuing to decrease, all would be good, yes? If that were the case, I’d have invested in a CEF with higher yields. My bad. I should have believed the name, PIMCO “Income.”
Yes, my bond funds have left me a bit cranky. On a more positive note, I’m loving the Mmkt yield on VMFXX.

Is CVSIX a bond fund? I think so. It’s up 7.1% YTD, 9.44% for 1 year, and has a 5 year annualized return of 3.38%, which compares favorably to cash over that period. Not all “bond funds” are equal.
(Numbers from M*)

I’m not trying to convince anyone to buy CDs and Treasuries, just trying to wrap my head around investing in them. For most of my investing history, cash investments have yielded next to nothing. Treasuries and short term bonds fared little better.
Many financial planners and experts say you can safely withdraw about 4% a year from a portfolio in retirement. I am unlikely to live 20 or more years, based on my family history, although my wife could. So, if I can buy a 20-year Treasury yielding 5.15%, that will pay more than my income needs for longer than my expected life span, what’s not to like? I have no intention in putting all of my portfolio in Treasuries, just a portion that would make up the long portion of a ladder.
I’m trying to decide whether to convert more of my bond funds into Treasuries. My bond funds are currently yielding close to 6% but continue to lose value. I know that at some point they will start increasing in value again, and selling now will lock in my losses, so I don’t plan to totally abandon them. But I no longer view them as low-risk investments to anchor my portfolio. I also plan to continue holding 40-60% of my portfolio in stock funds.
So, if I buy a 20-year Treasury that pays dividends semiannually, is that income compounded, or simply paid out in cash every 6 months? So far, the Treasuries I’ve bought are all zero-coupons that you buy at a discount and mature at full cash value. I haven’t bought any 5-year or longer Treasuries, so I don’t understand if the interest is compounded or simply paid out at regular intervals.

Asset class returns to 2023/Q3. Twitter LINK
Image Link https://pbs.twimg.com/media/F8uTaYrXoAAPtZB?format=jpg&name=large

BTW, the expected yield on the 20-year Treasury bond auction today is 5.156%

I track a number of bond funds on the soon-to-be extinct M* portfolio manager. These are all funds that were highly ranked with good returns in their various categories. Very few of these funds have achieved 5% returns over the past 15 years, and few hit 3% over the past 10 years. The average returns among various short and intermediate bond funds was 1.1% over 5 years, 1.56% over 10 years, and 3.79% over 15 years. Multi-sector bond funds fared slightly better — 1.3% over 5 years, 2.65% over 10 years, and 5.93% over 15 years. The best performing bond funds were high-yield or junk — 2.78% over 5 years, 3.58% over 10 years, and 7.06% over 15 years.
Here is my question: why bother with bond funds when you can currently lock CDs and Treasuries with yields above or approaching 5% over the next 3, 5, 10 and 20 years? I have sold a number of bond funds this year to set up CD and Treasury ladders extending out 5 years. However, I still maintain substantial holdings in several bond funds with good long term returns (but terrible returns over the past 5 years), in hopes that their future returns will rebound when yields finally stabilize or fall. Plus, selling now would just lock in my losses.
I’ll be 70 years old in January. I might not be alive in 10 years, or the time it takes for bond funds to recoup their losses. It’s different with stock funds because it’s not unusual for them to post large gains after bear markets and corrections. But bond funds? Do they ever have big years that make up for the terrible losses they’ve incurred over the past 2-3 years?

What's the connection? Is the cheapest quintile requirement intended to bias the selection toward Vanguard, American Funds, D&C (not one of the three firms totaling 18 funds on the list), and Baird? If so, is it also intended to bias against Fidelity and T. Rowe Price? As Kinnel wrote in his 2019 edition, these families tend to have funds with ERs just outside the lowest quintile.
I do think that requiring an analyst rating is a bit hokey. Especially since this builds in an unnecessary bias toward larger firms (the ones M* covers). And it's prospective which makes it less than objective.
M* is nevertheless rational in covering primarily larger firms: that's where the investor money is. 98% of money invested goes into the 150 largest firms.
Aside from a few analyst rating criteria, the other screens used - like ER, manager longevity (at least five years), and so on - are objective. Are there particular criteria you feel are intentionally biased or have other problems?
For example, comparing a manager's performance with a benchmark sounds good, until one realizes that there are some periods when most funds in a given category beat their benchmark. Wouldn't it make more sense to require a fund to best both its benchmark and its category average performance?
That would knock out one of the few funds on the list from a smaller firm: MERDX. Meade and Schaub had a great record with Triton, but since they took over Meridian Growth in Sept 2013 (almost exactly 10 years ago), the have not set the world on fire. Sure, their 10 year record (as of Sept 30, 2023) of 7.43% annualized beat the M* benchmark of 6.88%, but it underperformed its category (returning 7.78%) and also underperformed the S&P 600 by about 0.05% cumulative over a decade, let alone the S&P 600 growth by about 1%/year on an annualized basis.
Kinnel has fudged the list in the past, e.g. removing PRFDX because the manager (Brian Rogers) was about to retire. So in the future the fund would no longer have a manager meeting the five year requirement.
Certainly he could have fudged his list here to remove MERDX because the fund beat a benchmark but not its category average and not a different category benchmark.
Which funds would you knock off the list of thrilling 30 and why? Or which funds would you add by relaxing which criteria? Independent of advertising dollars.

The prices people actually pay
https://messaging-custom-newsletters.nytimes.com/dynamic/render?campaign_id=116&emc=edit_pk_20231017&first_send=0&instance_id=105431&nl=paul-krugman&paid_regi=1&productCode=PK&regi_id=22268089&segment_id=147573&te=1&user_id=83d45440ead1d14c2a89a1e7221337d1&uri=nyt://newsletter/4e6687ad-ec48-5b2d-9317-d1fb5847a915

My takeaways from the article were:
1. Marks is forcing a conversation among asset allocators. He’s right.
2. He prefers credit. He’s right there but how do you get asset allocators to act. Questionable. Not easy to get people to move.
3. He says credit yield are high enough to for now ditch equities. Eventually once equities go down he expects equities to then once again be the right play because nominal earnings will be there tool to beat inflation. This makes sense.
4. The big problem with this is that these investments require a sense of sequencing and thus are frowned upon as market timing. Especially among the endowment crowd that he is trying to influence.
5. If you market time out of stocks and into credit how will you know it’s ok to get out. Committees don’t know this stuff. So they do nothing. And take the volatility.
6. Marks knows all this but his hands are tied. If he is helpful he needs to tell you to sequence. He is running against how institutions make decisions for asset allocation.
7. At least he has forced us to have a conversation and understand our weaknesses.

Below is the complete response received from Fidelity. There's really little else Fidelity could say.

Thank you for your email that we received on October 6, 2023, regarding SEC rule 2a-7. As your concerns are important to us, your email was forwarded to the Executive Office for review. I appreciate this opportunity to address your concerns.
Fidelity has been working diligently to implement the SEC’s amendments. To ensure our investors are aware, we have incorporated the recent changes to each money market fund’s fact sheet on our website.
I can confirm that Fidelity fully complies with all laws and regulations applicable to our businesses, products, and services, including SEC Rule 2a-7. Before October 2, when Rule 2a-7 permitted fees and gates, Fidelity did not impose a fee upon the sale of shares or temporarily suspend a shareholder’s ability to sell shares in any money market fund we manage.
We appreciate your years of loyalty to Fidelity, and we look forward to assisting with your accounts in the future. If you have additional questions, please call us at 800-544-6666. For your convenience, representatives are available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.
Sincerely,
Nathan Snyder
Executive Office

What's the point of a having prospectus that (still) says that the fund might violate the law (by suspending redemptions)? It could just as easily say that the fund might hold long term securities. That's also prohibited. Hard to trust a document that borders on fiction.
Updates to Fidelity's website do not inform all of Fidelity's investors of changes. Fidelity MMF investors also invest via third parties (e.g. WellsTrade, Merrill). They see the unamended SEC filings.

SUV.
Sink Unlimited Volumes of money into it.
My tiny white front-wheel drive Saturn 4-door went cross-country maybe three times. And I took it to British Columbia, too. Cassette Tape player. And A/C. Luxury model with automatic transmission. Almost 300k miles before it was donated to charity.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/811030/000089418923007621/osterweistotalreturn497eli.htm
497 1 osterweistotalreturn497eli.htm 497
OSTERWEIS TOTAL RETURN FUND – OSTRX
Supplement dated October 16, 2023
to the Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”), each dated June 30, 2023
Osterweis Capital Management, LLC, the Adviser to the Osterweis Total Return Fund (the “Fund”), has recommended, and the Board of Trustees of Professionally Managed Portfolios has approved, a plan of liquidation and the termination of the Fund. This decision was made due to the Fund’s inability to obtain a level of assets necessary for it to be viable.
Effective with the close of business on October 16, the Fund will no longer accept purchases of new shares. The Fund will be closed to new purchases, whether from existing or new investors.
The liquidation of the Fund is expected to occur after the close of business on December 15, 2023 (the “Liquidation Date”). Prior to the Liquidation Date, the Fund will engage in business and activities for the purposes of winding down the Fund’s business affairs and reducing the Fund’s portfolio (to the extent practicable) to cash in preparation for the orderly liquidation and subsequent distribution of its assets on the Liquidation Date. During this transition period, the Fund will no longer be pursuing its investment objective or be managed consistent with its investment strategies as stated in the Prospectus. This is likely to impact Fund performance.
Shareholders of the Fund may redeem their investments as described in the Fund’s Prospectus. The proceeds per share to be distributed to each remaining shareholder of record on the Liquidation Date will be the net asset value per share of the Fund less any required tax withholdings, after all expenses and liabilities of the Fund have been paid or otherwise provided for. For U.S. federal income tax purposes, the receipt of liquidation proceeds will generally be treated as a taxable event and may result in a gain or loss. At any time prior to the Liquidation Date, shareholders of the Fund may redeem or, subject to investment minimums and other applicable restrictions on exchanges, exchange their shares of the Fund for shares of another Osterweis fund (if available) pursuant to the procedures set forth under “SHAREHOLDER INFORMATION—Exchange Privilege” in the Prospectus.
Any IRAs still invested in the Fund on the Liquidation Date will be redeemed and distributed using an age-based distribution code and may be subject to tax withholding. If you hold your shares in an IRA account directly with U.S. Bank, N.A., you have 60 days from the date you receive your proceeds to reinvest your proceeds into another IRA account and maintain their tax-deferred status. Direct IRA shareholders wishing to avoid mandatory withholding taxes from being taken from their liquidation because they plan to roll over their proceeds to another IRA should submit a written redemption request to the Fund with enough time to be received prior to liquidation day. Any redemption request will be processed on the day received provided the request is in good order. Shareholders who own the Fund through a financial institution or brokerage should consult their financial advisor.
You may be subject to federal, state, local or foreign taxes on exchanges or redemptions of or liquidating distributions made on Fund shares. You should consult your tax advisor for information regarding all tax consequences applicable to your investment in the Fund.
Please contact the Fund at (866) 236-0050 or your financial advisor if you have questions or need assistance.
Please retain this supplement for your reference.
From Osterweis:
https://www.osterweis.com/files/Osterweis_Prospectus_2023.pdf

@msf, good PV analyses.
For me, this started out as a broader mini-project in response to Vanguard's request to bring up several Admiral accounts for VG hybrid funds to min $50K - I posted on that. I have finally DUMPED all those hybrid funds, and some more VG hybrids, and REPLACED them with the ETFs at VG. I also wrote to VG about this that we weren't happy with its orders for our accounts that were within stone throws of Admiral min in the next rally, if/when it came. So, I told VG that it lost assets in VG funds, although that money remains in the VG Brokerage "for now".
Using TCAF + PYLD + USFR is just an example of what I did to approximate PRWCX. I investigated the general idea of creating broad and flexible portfolios with 3 ETFs and did some backtesting with PV too. This can be found in the link below. One may see this as a variation of the Bogleheads concept of using 2-4 funds but I find their use of total markets too constraining.
https://ybbpersonalfinance.proboards.com/thread/512/portfolio-allocation-3-etfs