2021-23 will go down the history as the WORST period for bonds. Investors and organizations (M*, etc) that have gone exclusively with bond FUNDs only for all times have done poorly. But those who have also used other fixed-income tools have done better - individual Treasuries, CDs, ladders, stable-value (in retirement plans); m-mkt funds too since mid-2022.
The media is NOW saying that these are the best times to get into bonds. But many investors don't trust that.
Here is a chart showing Treasuries, core, core-plus and multisector bond funds (beneficiaries of HY); default is 1-yr, but can change timeframes to 2, 3 or other years.
https://stockcharts.com/h-perf/ui?s=IEF&compare=BND,FBND,PIMIX&id=p36003419830

BTW, the expected yield on the 20-year Treasury bond auction today is 5.156%

I track a number of bond funds on the soon-to-be extinct M* portfolio manager. These are all funds that were highly ranked with good returns in their various categories. Very few of these funds have achieved 5% returns over the past 15 years, and few hit 3% over the past 10 years. The average returns among various short and intermediate bond funds was 1.1% over 5 years, 1.56% over 10 years, and 3.79% over 15 years. Multi-sector bond funds fared slightly better — 1.3% over 5 years, 2.65% over 10 years, and 5.93% over 15 years. The best performing bond funds were high-yield or junk — 2.78% over 5 years, 3.58% over 10 years, and 7.06% over 15 years.
Here is my question: why bother with bond funds when you can currently lock CDs and Treasuries with yields above or approaching 5% over the next 3, 5, 10 and 20 years? I have sold a number of bond funds this year to set up CD and Treasury ladders extending out 5 years. However, I still maintain substantial holdings in several bond funds with good long term returns (but terrible returns over the past 5 years), in hopes that their future returns will rebound when yields finally stabilize or fall. Plus, selling now would just lock in my losses.
I’ll be 70 years old in January. I might not be alive in 10 years, or the time it takes for bond funds to recoup their losses. It’s different with stock funds because it’s not unusual for them to post large gains after bear markets and corrections. But bond funds? Do they ever have big years that make up for the terrible losses they’ve incurred over the past 2-3 years?

What's the connection? Is the cheapest quintile requirement intended to bias the selection toward Vanguard, American Funds, D&C (not one of the three firms totaling 18 funds on the list), and Baird? If so, is it also intended to bias against Fidelity and T. Rowe Price? As Kinnel wrote in his 2019 edition, these families tend to have funds with ERs just outside the lowest quintile.
I do think that requiring an analyst rating is a bit hokey. Especially since this builds in an unnecessary bias toward larger firms (the ones M* covers). And it's prospective which makes it less than objective.
M* is nevertheless rational in covering primarily larger firms: that's where the investor money is. 98% of money invested goes into the 150 largest firms.
Aside from a few analyst rating criteria, the other screens used - like ER, manager longevity (at least five years), and so on - are objective. Are there particular criteria you feel are intentionally biased or have other problems?
For example, comparing a manager's performance with a benchmark sounds good, until one realizes that there are some periods when most funds in a given category beat their benchmark. Wouldn't it make more sense to require a fund to best both its benchmark and its category average performance?
That would knock out one of the few funds on the list from a smaller firm: MERDX. Meade and Schaub had a great record with Triton, but since they took over Meridian Growth in Sept 2013 (almost exactly 10 years ago), the have not set the world on fire. Sure, their 10 year record (as of Sept 30, 2023) of 7.43% annualized beat the M* benchmark of 6.88%, but it underperformed its category (returning 7.78%) and also underperformed the S&P 600 by about 0.05% cumulative over a decade, let alone the S&P 600 growth by about 1%/year on an annualized basis.
Kinnel has fudged the list in the past, e.g. removing PRFDX because the manager (Brian Rogers) was about to retire. So in the future the fund would no longer have a manager meeting the five year requirement.
Certainly he could have fudged his list here to remove MERDX because the fund beat a benchmark but not its category average and not a different category benchmark.
Which funds would you knock off the list of thrilling 30 and why? Or which funds would you add by relaxing which criteria? Independent of advertising dollars.

MOVEit lawsuits are moving very slowly through the MA court.
https://ybbpersonalfinance.proboards.com/post/1213/thread

As a follow up to the MoveIT etc breach, we have been hacked twice more since this summer. Our Utility was hacked with out info and an old employer of mine (2019) was hacked.
Both offered us two years of "IDEX" credit and email address monitoring, but when I called them, they said the only way they can monitor your credit accounts is without a credit freeze. So I am supposed to unfreeze my credit reports ( so I could become an identify theft victim? ) so these turkeys can monitor it and then tell me I was a victim of identity theft?
What a scam

Thrilling 30 has 18 funds from just 3 firms. Wonder how much $$$ Morningstar gets from them in ad dollars?

Link for the Quarterly call: Thursday 2 pm EST. for those who'd like to join.
https://info.crossingbridgefunds.com/fixed-income-market-update-10-23

The prices people actually pay
https://messaging-custom-newsletters.nytimes.com/dynamic/render?campaign_id=116&emc=edit_pk_20231017&first_send=0&instance_id=105431&nl=paul-krugman&paid_regi=1&productCode=PK&regi_id=22268089&segment_id=147573&te=1&user_id=83d45440ead1d14c2a89a1e7221337d1&uri=nyt://newsletter/4e6687ad-ec48-5b2d-9317-d1fb5847a915

+1 @Devo

Good question. I had a nice talk with Carl Kaufman, their CIO and co- CEO today. They're celebrating their 40th year in business and have been thinking a bit about what it will take to have 40 more. Some of the recent moves might be tied to that reflection.
The short version is that Osterweis has internal benchmarks and expectations for their strategies. For Total Return in particular, the expectation was that the strategy would be able to seriously outperform a broad Bar Cap Agg strategy in turbulent markets. 2022 was "eye-opening," since the hope was for much smaller losses than the market and maybe even a gain. As it turns out, the performance was purely mediocre. In addition, investors weren't beating on the doors to get it.
So Osterweis made a painful and principled decision: "I've been reading the book Quit: The Power of Knowing When to Walk Away lately. In 2012, we shut our hedge funds. Like them, this strategy had the promise, not the performance. It was time to react to reality. They're a really great team, but it is what it is and we did what we had to."
He observed that the Zeo case was sort of parallel, which is what led to the same decision there.
It struck me as principled and thoughtful, for what that's worth.

My takeaways from the article were:
1. Marks is forcing a conversation among asset allocators. He’s right.
2. He prefers credit. He’s right there but how do you get asset allocators to act. Questionable. Not easy to get people to move.
3. He says credit yield are high enough to for now ditch equities. Eventually once equities go down he expects equities to then once again be the right play because nominal earnings will be there tool to beat inflation. This makes sense.
4. The big problem with this is that these investments require a sense of sequencing and thus are frowned upon as market timing. Especially among the endowment crowd that he is trying to influence.
5. If you market time out of stocks and into credit how will you know it’s ok to get out. Committees don’t know this stuff. So they do nothing. And take the volatility.
6. Marks knows all this but his hands are tied. If he is helpful he needs to tell you to sequence. He is running against how institutions make decisions for asset allocation.
7. At least he has forced us to have a conversation and understand our weaknesses.

My "roadster" is a 2008 stick-shift Fit. Fun for driving around town. A little too bouncy on the freeway at higher speed.
My favorite driving experience was an ‘86 Ford Escort with “4 on the floor”. Just a 4-banger but fun to drive & maneuverable. Later I owned a 2013 Mustang with automatic / V6. A good looker, but less enjoyable driving. Ford had retarded the timing at lower RPM’s to boost EPA ratings. So the advertised 300+ HP didn’t even kick in until you reached a certain RPM. Really a dog off the line considering engine size.

I have to put in a plug for Honda vans which I have owned continuously since 1999. Way more capacity (i.e., 4x8 sheets of plywood) than an SUV, easy to get into, and no teenager or 20-something kid of mine has ever asked to take my car. As for Mom's Accord, another story. Come to think of it, they don't ask to take my stick-shift roadster, either.

It's the minvan that replaced the station wagon. SUV's never had the cargo capacity. They're just squared off sedans. We're closing in on 300K with our Odyssey. Carried all sorts of stuff in it besides kids and dogs.
My "roadster" is a 2008 stick-shift Fit. Fun for driving around town. A little too bouncy on the freeway at higher speed.

SUV.
Sink Unlimited Volumes of money into it.
My tiny white front-wheel drive Saturn 4-door went cross-country maybe three times. And I took it to British Columbia, too. Cassette Tape player. And A/C. Luxury model with automatic transmission. Almost 300k miles before it was donated to charity.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/811030/000089418923007621/osterweistotalreturn497eli.htm
497 1 osterweistotalreturn497eli.htm 497
OSTERWEIS TOTAL RETURN FUND – OSTRX
Supplement dated October 16, 2023
to the Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”), each dated June 30, 2023
Osterweis Capital Management, LLC, the Adviser to the Osterweis Total Return Fund (the “Fund”), has recommended, and the Board of Trustees of Professionally Managed Portfolios has approved, a plan of liquidation and the termination of the Fund. This decision was made due to the Fund’s inability to obtain a level of assets necessary for it to be viable.
Effective with the close of business on October 16, the Fund will no longer accept purchases of new shares. The Fund will be closed to new purchases, whether from existing or new investors.
The liquidation of the Fund is expected to occur after the close of business on December 15, 2023 (the “Liquidation Date”). Prior to the Liquidation Date, the Fund will engage in business and activities for the purposes of winding down the Fund’s business affairs and reducing the Fund’s portfolio (to the extent practicable) to cash in preparation for the orderly liquidation and subsequent distribution of its assets on the Liquidation Date. During this transition period, the Fund will no longer be pursuing its investment objective or be managed consistent with its investment strategies as stated in the Prospectus. This is likely to impact Fund performance.
Shareholders of the Fund may redeem their investments as described in the Fund’s Prospectus. The proceeds per share to be distributed to each remaining shareholder of record on the Liquidation Date will be the net asset value per share of the Fund less any required tax withholdings, after all expenses and liabilities of the Fund have been paid or otherwise provided for. For U.S. federal income tax purposes, the receipt of liquidation proceeds will generally be treated as a taxable event and may result in a gain or loss. At any time prior to the Liquidation Date, shareholders of the Fund may redeem or, subject to investment minimums and other applicable restrictions on exchanges, exchange their shares of the Fund for shares of another Osterweis fund (if available) pursuant to the procedures set forth under “SHAREHOLDER INFORMATION—Exchange Privilege” in the Prospectus.
Any IRAs still invested in the Fund on the Liquidation Date will be redeemed and distributed using an age-based distribution code and may be subject to tax withholding. If you hold your shares in an IRA account directly with U.S. Bank, N.A., you have 60 days from the date you receive your proceeds to reinvest your proceeds into another IRA account and maintain their tax-deferred status. Direct IRA shareholders wishing to avoid mandatory withholding taxes from being taken from their liquidation because they plan to roll over their proceeds to another IRA should submit a written redemption request to the Fund with enough time to be received prior to liquidation day. Any redemption request will be processed on the day received provided the request is in good order. Shareholders who own the Fund through a financial institution or brokerage should consult their financial advisor.
You may be subject to federal, state, local or foreign taxes on exchanges or redemptions of or liquidating distributions made on Fund shares. You should consult your tax advisor for information regarding all tax consequences applicable to your investment in the Fund.
Please contact the Fund at (866) 236-0050 or your financial advisor if you have questions or need assistance.
Please retain this supplement for your reference.
From Osterweis:
https://www.osterweis.com/files/Osterweis_Prospectus_2023.pdf

I dont remember when PRWCX closed but I could start a new position in ITCSX in an old VOYA retirement account I kept open in 10/2019, so ITCSX was open then.

I opened a small position in my IRA on June 16 of 2014, shortly after the coming closure was announced.

+1
Yes thanks to all here. I like Marks a lot. That said, ISTM he made his name analyzing / investing in distressed debt. So the tilt towards credit doesn’t surprise me. But Yuppers - I’d listen to him ahead of a lot of others. Nice summary @BaluBalu.

I dont remember when PRWCX closed but I could start a new position in ITCSX in an old VOYA retirement account I kept open in 10/2019, so ITCSX was open then.

@msf, good PV analyses.
For me, this started out as a broader mini-project in response to Vanguard's request to bring up several Admiral accounts for VG hybrid funds to min $50K - I posted on that. I have finally DUMPED all those hybrid funds, and some more VG hybrids, and REPLACED them with the ETFs at VG. I also wrote to VG about this that we weren't happy with its orders for our accounts that were within stone throws of Admiral min in the next rally, if/when it came. So, I told VG that it lost assets in VG funds, although that money remains in the VG Brokerage "for now".
Using TCAF + PYLD + USFR is just an example of what I did to approximate PRWCX. I investigated the general idea of creating broad and flexible portfolios with 3 ETFs and did some backtesting with PV too. This can be found in the link below. One may see this as a variation of the Bogleheads concept of using 2-4 funds but I find their use of total markets too constraining.
https://ybbpersonalfinance.proboards.com/thread/512/portfolio-allocation-3-etfs