Hi Mike- At this moment I don't see the 5.08, or anything greater than 4.95 callable.
In non-callable, the best is 4.85. Don't forget to check the actual purchase price- if it's anything over 100% the actual return will be lower than shown.
For example, there's a Toyota Finl Savings 4.9% CD 12/02/2024, but the actual price asked is 101.13600. That lowers the actual return to 4.295%.

Just bought 18 mth CD @ 4.85 at Schwab. That's about the best that I could find there.

That's odd @Old_Joe, At this minute I see 18mo at Schwab at 5.08%, 1yr @ 4.95%, both from JP Morgan Chase. They were there this morning too as 'new issues'.

IWM based on R2000 is not a good SC index. Almost 1/3 rd of its companies have no earnings. Russell also has a bad annual rebalancing policy for all of its indexes - the date is preannounced and all is done on a single day, so there is lot of front-running ahead of Russell rebalancing. So, why do mutual funds benchmark to R2000? It is an easier bogey to beat; some also say that is the total SC market and it is what it is..
Better SC ETFs are IJR, SCHA, SLY, VIOO, etc.

I agree with yogibearbull on the Russell 2000.
The S&P 600 is a better small-cap index.

I know I’ve searched this before, and had a tough-ish time finding something actionable; does anyone know index mutual funds based upon the S&P 600?

I am happy with RWJ, which revenue weights the S&P SC 600. I have had it in my IRA since March 2021. It will replace a cap-weighted 600 in my taxable account in the next six months or so.
For some reason not apparent to me, the revenue weighting pushes it into the value box.

From "https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPRACTICE-108/html/GPO-HPRACTICE-108-35.htm" (referenced above, by Yogi)

Article I, section 2 of the Constitution directs that the House
choose its Speaker and other officers. The Speaker is the only House
officer who traditionally has been chosen from the sitting membership
of the House. Manual Sec. 26. The Constitution does not limit his
selection from among that class, but the practice has been followed
invariably.

This would seem to suggest that it's at least theoretically possible under the Constitution for a non-member to be elected as speaker. It sheds no light at all on Mark's fascinating questions.

Well done! No luck at Fidelity. Will pick up more T bills after FOMC meeting on Dec 14-15th. Yields will be higher than the current ones with another rate hike (50 bps most likely).
Saw few CDs yielding over 5% over the weekend at Vanguard, but they were for OH and AL residence only. MFO has the most updated CD rates.

House Speaker is a member of the House by tradition but he/she doesn't have to be. Speaker has a tie-breaking vote.
On the other hand, Speaker Pro Tempore must be a member.
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-HPRACTICE-108/html/GPO-HPRACTICE-108-35.htm
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Speaker_of_the_United_States_House_of_Representatives

Added more TMF past few wks
Med long term hold 6 18 months
Great job sir OJ
Anyone thoughts credit suises CD
think prince in Saudi maybe buying huge portion of bank /rescue

Just bought 18 mth CD @ 4.85 at Schwab. That's about the best that I could find there.

IWM based on R2000 is not a good SC index. Almost 1/3 rd of its companies have no earnings. Russell also has a bad annual rebalancing policy for all of its indexes - the date is preannounced and all is done on a single day, so there is lot of front-running ahead of Russell rebalancing. So, why do mutual funds benchmark to R2000? It is an easier bogey to beat; some also say that is the total SC market and it is what it is..
Better SC ETFs are IJR, SCHA, SLY, VIOO, etc.

I agree with yogibearbull on the Russell 2000.
The S&P 600 is a better small-cap index.

The 6.6% data was from the past; need to go back to the original time periods.
With the inverted yield curve as of Nov 2022, the short end of T bills don’t appreciate much. So you are looking at the yields. 6-12 months is the sweet spot yielding 4.7% yesterday. CDs are a tad higher at 4.8% non-callable at Fidelity. Next year they may yield higher, but highly unlikely to yield 6.6%.
I have to think twice before getting back to bond funds next years.

I don’t think I would touch this fund. Gross expense ratio is over 3%. The return numbers seem very suspect to me after reading over the funds holdings. Schwab has CEDIX up over 19% YTD? Really? Looking at the funds holding, while I can’t find a breakdown of the credit rating of the bonds it owns, looking at the interest rate of the bonds it is holding it seems a large portion are junk. They also hold about 10% in stocks. In these markets I find it hard to believe it’s assets are accurately priced unless of course if they made way more money on the warrants, currency trades and other derivatives I see the fund holds than I would think possible. I would avoid this fund like the plague.

@Lewis
Forecasting, having and using cash reserves + line of credit to prevent a run on the bank is a common practice amongst seasoned managers.
Managers who have spent a decade or more to build a reputation will "generally" not resort to ethically questionable practices at the risk of the fund blowing up. You've described a few BDC's taking a 50% haircut but this is anecdotal stuff as opposed to the hard 4 bips and $1.2B loss numbers estimated (as an overall market aggregate) in the article link you provided.
Any financial investment outside of FDIC guaranteed CD's and US Govt guaranteed bonds can blow up. During the last crisis some MM funds broke the buck which was deemed unthinkable.
The ghost of Bernie can emerge anytime and anywhere and a dozen or more things can go wrong outside of CD/USG bonds.
Should all of that result in one investing only in the guaranteed stuff? Personal to everyone of course and clearly you and I have different views on this.
Investing beyond the guaranteed stuff entails risk of partial or full loss even if the auditors are one of the Big 4. It comes down to investing based on an individual assessment of the risk/return tradeoffs.

One point I touched on in December was that a dramatic market fall might well be occasioned by the group that the St. Louis Post-Dispatch decried as "the toddlers running Congress." In a 2011 tantrum, the House refused to raise the US debt ceiling which cost the stock market a trillion dollars in one day.
CNN's update:

House Republicans are plotting tactics for their new majority and weighing how to use their leverage to enact a laundry list of demands, with many zeroing in on an issue with enormous economic implications: Raising the nation’s borrowing limit.
It’s an issue confronting House GOP Leader Kevin McCarthy ... more than two dozen House GOP lawmakers laid out their demands to avoid the nation’s first-ever debt default, ranging from new immigration policies to imposing deep domestic spending cuts. And several Republicans flatly said they would oppose raising the borrowing limit even if all their demands were met.

There are two interesting arguments that I've encountered lately. (1) A real "red wave" or a real "blue wave" either would have been better because a razor-thin majority leaves the leadership hostage to their most adamant members - Joe Manchin ruled the Senate and the Freedom Caucus might rule the House. And (2) the House Democrats could blow the entire calculus out of the water by convincing just five Republicans to vote with them in favor of a retired Republican member of the House as speaker. The speaker doesn't have to be a current member and an adult conservative - Paul Ryan, John Kasich, Bob Goodlatte - might disable both ends. Which couldn't happen because, you know, 2024, "the base" fund-raising efforts dependent on demonization ...

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1444822/000119312522299058/d312974d497.htm
497 1 d312974d497.htm AQR FUNDS
AQR FUNDS
Supplement dated December 6, 2022 (“Supplement”)
to the Class I Shares, Class N Shares and Class R6 Shares
Summary Prospectus, Prospectus
and Statement of Additional Information, each dated January 29, 2022, as
amended, of the AQR International Equity Fund (the “Fund”)
This Supplement updates certain information contained in the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information. Please review this important information carefully. You may obtain copies of the Fund’s Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information free of charge, upon request, by calling (866) 290-2688, or by writing to AQR Funds, P.O. Box 2248, Denver, CO 80201-2248.
At a meeting held on December 6, 2022, the Board of Trustees (the “Board”) of AQR Funds (the “Trust”) approved a proposal to liquidate the Fund. Among other things, the Fund was not viable on an ongoing basis. Accordingly, effective 4:00 P.M. (Eastern time) on January 4, 2023, the Fund will no longer accept orders from new investors or existing shareholders to purchase Fund shares.
On or about January 4, 2023, AQR Capital Management, LLC, the Fund’s investment adviser, intends to begin liquidating the Fund’s assets in an orderly manner in advance of the Liquidation Date (as defined below). Proceeds from the liquidation of the Fund’s assets will be held in cash and similar instruments pending distribution to shareholders. As a result, the Fund may deviate from its investment strategies and policies and cease to pursue its investment objective. The Fund may incur transaction costs from liquidating portfolio holdings and performance may be adversely affected from holding cash and similar instruments.
The Fund has declared a dividend to all holders of record on January 20, 2023 (the “Record Date”) consisting of any undistributed income and capital gains (net of available capital loss carryovers). On or about January 27, 2023 (the “Liquidation Date”), the Fund will make a liquidating distribution of its remaining assets proportionately to any shareholders holding shares on the Liquidation Date. Shareholders may redeem their Fund shares or exchange their shares into shares of another series of AQR Funds, subject to any restrictions in the Fund’s Prospectus, at any time prior to the Liquidation Date.
The liquidation of the Fund is expected to have tax consequences for a taxable shareholder. Any final capital gain dividend will be treated as long-term capital gain, and any final income dividend will be taxable as ordinary income, or as qualified dividend income to the extent of the Fund’s income that so qualifies (which is taxed at the same preferential tax rate as long- term capital gain). The Fund’s final liquidating distribution will result in capital gain or loss to the receiving shareholder. Shareholders should consult their tax advisors concerning their tax situation and the impact of the liquidation and/or exchanging to a different fund has on their tax situation.
We appreciate your investment in the AQR Funds. For more information, please contact the Trust at (866) 290-2688.
PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR YOUR FUTURE REFERENCE

Always eager to read what @rforno is buying or selling. :)
Personally ….
- I’ve sold off 2 of my 3 largest equity holdings in recent weeks. Took a nice profit on the global reinsurer I’d held most of the year. Break-even, or a slight loss, on a major bank. Kept the large international food conglomerate, but sold off a little. It’s about break-even since buying early in the year but has been making up lost ground as the dollar has begun to weaken.
- Unloaded 100% of a significant hold in ABRZX. I was very wrong in my previous positive appraisal of that fund - especially its ability to hold up during down markets. Moved the same sum into an old favorite TRRIX. For that matter, both of the afore mentioned funds have stunk up the joint pretty good this year. But the latter’s .49% ER takes away some of the stench. (ABRZX charges 1.37%).
- Added CVSIX to my “Alternative” sleeve with $$ from the stock sales. The thinking here is that with now higher prevailing interest rates, it’s a decent place to hide. Also, some positive commentary on convertible bonds in a recent Barron’s.
- I added 2 small spec positions yesterday. Each represents only 1% of my total invested assets: BCAT & GUG. They caught my attention when reading Randall Forsyth’s always fine Barron’s column over the weekend. Frankly, I’ve had no prior experience with closed-end funds. So am viewing this small venture as mostly a learning experience. (And folks may know that I enjoy dumpster diving.)
-
Here’s the passage referenced from this week’s Barron’s (Randall Forsyth).
“Another bargain is a relatively new type of closed-end fund, which was supposed to avoid sinking to a big discount by going public at net asset value, rather than at a premium, as is usual. Nevertheless, some of these funds have succumbed, including ones from marquee-name portfolio managers such as BlackRock and Guggenheim …. One is BlackRock Capital Allocation Trust (BCAT), which yields 8.52% and trades at a wide 15.93% discount to NAV. The other is the Guggenheim Active Allocation fund (GUG). It yields 10.16% and is quoted at a 12.16% discount. It's no disgrace to delve into offbeat corners to pick up bargains.”

These vehicles are no where near 6.6% yet, but who knows in 2023. You could throw in CD's with these options too. 1 year CD at Schwab is inching it's way to 5% (4.95).

Bought 1000s FLNG with a JAN 2024 30/40 collar spread put on at a nice credit, which is how I like to do them. Reason? Adding to income-generating positions, but also protecting some positions that might be more volatile than expected going forward.
Also stalking CHS preferreds at/below par, TDS-V, CMS-C, and adding to EPD, IEP, and DMLP for income-generating positions.

@StayCalm You are right. I was referring to another interval fund— CCFLX—run by the same manager Cliffwater. But the issue regarding pricing for private securities for both funds is the same. The question comes down to whether securities are mark-to-market or does the manager use some “fair value” estimation: https://investopedia.com/terms/m/marktomarket.asp
I can say the disparity in valuation between what the market thinks the value of illiquid low credit quality securities is versus the managers’ private assessment of that value has been far greater than 0.04% during periods of stress. I’ve witnessed this phenomenon firsthand with the disparity between the public market value of BDCs that invest in illiquid private floating rate loans and the BDCs estimate of that valuation. I’ve seen discounts as high as 50% in bad periods.
The distinction matters because if a loan has a face value of $100 million and the manager has a 2% management fee, they collect $2 million in fees on that loan. But if they marked it down to $50 million during a period of public market distress, they only collect a $1 million fee. So, there is an inherent conflict of interest favoring a more optimistic outlook than the market regarding portfolio value to collect more fees.
What I’ve seen happen in cases where the market is proven right— that the underlying portfolio of credits is impaired and should be marked down—is the manager does this very slowly. Each quarter there is a gradual reduction in NAV that is sadly predictable. This way the manager can keep collecting fees on an inflated portfolio value. This is the “auto correlation” the Advisor Perspectives article was talking about. Because of the “returns smoothing” the first mover who gets out as soon as there is a markdown gets a better return than they deserve as the portfolio should have been marked down earlier. Meanwhile, the person who holds on gets a worse return than they deserve.
In the open end mutual fund space some of these overly optimistic pricings of illiquid securities have proven disastrous where the manager doesn’t mark down the portfolio but suddenly when facing redemptions has to sell those illiquid securities and accept what the market really thinks the portfolio is worth. Then you see these huge markdowns in one or two days. Interval funds don’t have that forced selling issue nearly as much. Yet I still think they should mark their portfolios appropriately during volatile periods. That completely smooth upward sloping line for returns no matter what public market conditions are does not reflect reality.

IWM based on R2000 is not a good SC index. Almost 1/3 rd of its companies have no earnings. Russell also has a bad annual rebalancing policy for all of its indexes - the date is preannounced and all is done on a single day, so there is lot of front-running ahead of Russell rebalancing. So, why do mutual funds benchmark to R2000? It is an easier bogey to beat; some also say that is the total SC market and it is what it is..
Better SC ETFs are IJR, SCHA, SLY, VIOO, etc.