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Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • Wellesley . Government and Agency Obligations 12.3 % Note rate & maturity
    All the bonds will gradually converge on their face value at maturity. So the 0.625% bonds, with a current price below face value, will continue to gain value as you said.
    The 4.25% bonds are currently priced slightly above par. So their market price will gradually decline toward par. But the coupon payments until maturity will more than make up for the slight decline in price.
    The "face value" or "principal" is what a bond pays at maturity. If these were physical paper bonds, this amount would be printed on their face. Hence the term face value.
    I believe that what you are looking at is the fund's latest semi-annual report, Form N-CSRS.
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/105544/000110465923065152/tm239404d2_ncsrs.htm
    N-PORT forms are much less readable. Here's the fund's latest one.
    Neither reports the purchase price - just current and maturity values.
    Fidelity shows a current asking price of $94.280, i.e. 94.28% of face value. The semi-annual (March 31) report valued the bonds at 473,758/501,000 or 94.56% of face value. This decline is due to market interest rates rising. Offsetting that decline, but only partially, was the bond's gradual appreciation, heading toward face value at maturity.
    If you have a login at Fidelity, you can see the quote here.
  • Wellesley . Government and Agency Obligations 12.3 % Note rate & maturity
    @msf If I understand what you said, then the .625 % & 1 % bonds will continue to gain value as they get closer to maturity. I take that "face amount" is total purchase of that particular bond or note ,etc. ?
    Thanks for your time, Derf
  • Making the switch to Fidelity this week
    Fido was my best brokerage experience, and I remain with them. Vanguard became really terrible.
    Also, I would not leave a dime in any Wells Fargo accounts. That bank has a poor history, and I'm not convinced that the culture there has changed. If a bank is opening accounts that customers didn't approve, you don't deal with that bank.
    Never had that experience with Wells Fargo. At one time they sold us on an account to segregate funds from fraud online. Said account came with no charges on trades on mutual funds through their brokerage. At some point we said "What's this account all about?" And then we got rid of it. I still got the breaks for a few years after that. But I wish we had kept that account
    We did have two positive mortgage experiences with them. One was a refinance of Fort Knox on the Marin-Sonoma border. The other was our house in Arizona that we decided to pay off.
    These days, the ETF trades are free, and they charge less for non-NTF funds than Fido. But they don't have near the selection universe.
    The funny thing--to us--is that when we attended college in Minnesota. we both had bank accounts at the bank that bought Wells Fargo
    When we got to San Francisco in October 1979, our first bank account was with Crocker. They were bought by somebody, who was eventually bought by Wells Fargo. Old Joe might remember.
  • Barrons article on How to Sneak into Closed Funds
    Vanguard Health Care had an annualized 16.4% return during Ed Owens'
    long tenure (05/23/1984 - 12/31/2012) compared to the the S&P 500 index's 10.7% return. This fund has not performed as well since Jean Hynes became the sole named manager in 2013. Note: Today it was announced that longtime analyst Rebecca Sykes
    was promoted to comanager on Vanguard Health Care.
    Jean Hynes performance hasn't beaten the Morningstar US Health index since she took over. I am pleasantly surprised that they named a comanager. Jean Hynes is also the CEO of Wellington, so not exactly an easy person to remove from a fund against her will.
  • Barrons article on How to Sneak into Closed Funds
    That ability of a fund to request information is a direct result of the market trading scandal:
    The market timing and late trading issues of the mid 2000’s were caused, in certain cases, by the lack of transparency regarding beneficial mutual fund owners invested through omnibus accounts. Rule 22c-2 under the 1940 Act, which the SEC adopted in response to those scandals, requires a fund to enter into written agreements with financial intermediaries, including those maintaining omnibus account positions with the fund, in which the intermediary agrees to provide the fund with certain shareholder information upon request and to implement any fund-imposed trading restrictions on investors identified by the fund as having violated the fund’s frequent trading policy
    https://www.perkinscoie.com/images/content/1/1/v2/115211/IL-0712-Williamson.pdf
    Still, as you said, this only goes so far:
    Although these policies are designed to deter frequent trading, none of these measures alone, nor all of them taken together, eliminate the possibility that frequent trading will occur in these funds, particularly with respect to trades placed by shareholders who invest in these funds through omnibus accounts maintained by brokers, retirement plan accounts, and other financial intermediaries. The Funds’ access to information about individual shareholder transactions made through such omnibus arrangements is often unavailable or severely limited. As a result, the Funds cannot ensure that their policies will be enforced with regard to those fund shares held through such omnibus arrangements (which may represent a majority of fund shares), so frequent trading could adversely affect these funds and their long-term shareholders as discussed above.
    Guggenheim Funds frequent trading policy
    Sometimes (though probably not with this), enforcement is effected through intimidation, being told something like: "we can get you if you break our rules", even if that's not true.
  • Barrons article on How to Sneak into Closed Funds
    @rforno: you are quite right about the number of new ETFs that should never have seen the light of day and which merit no recommendation. I have browsed a couple of the ETF-dedicated sites and quickly realized that what passes for news is no more than a regurgitated press release from the sponsor of the latest 3X (fill in the asset here) vehicle. It's also true that there many MFs whose deletion from the ranks would not cause a ripple.
    The big fund companies seem to have no trouble issuing ETFs and gathering big assets. I suspect they, like American Funds, have massive retirement AUMs and they can direct their managers to buy the new issues. Harbor Funds, on the other hand and despite some highly rated OEFs do not seem to be able to generate trading volume in what I consider to be attractive ETFs. Unfortunately, Harbor has lost AUM every year since 2014, so getting into ETFs might be seen as a effort to stem the ebb tide. Their ETF assets are rising, but don't offset OEF losses. FWIIW, I own HIISX and just recently purchased WINN, Harbor Long Term Growers ETF. This fund is managed by the same people at Jennison Associates who run their growth strategies, including Harbor Capital Appreciation. The late Sig Segalis was the guru of that strategy. PGIM, Jennison Focused Growth ETF, competes for the same assets, albeit at a higher ER than the Harbor fund. Proliferation for sure resulting in a trivia-laden post such as this one.
  • Wellesley . Government and Agency Obligations 12.3 % Note rate & maturity
    Even with no change in market rates, bond prices change. This is most obvious with zero coupon bonds. They are sold at a discount and one gets yield from price appreciation.
    As bonds get closer to maturity, their prices gradually converge to par. If the coupon is below current market rate based a bond's remaining maturity, a bond will be priced below par. If the coupon is above current market rate a bond will be priced above par. This is true regardless of when a bond was sold or why it was sold with a particular coupon rate.
    The 0.625% bond is a discount bond. That coupon is so low, it's almost like a zero, that trades below par for its entire lifetime. You need to know Wellesley's acquisition price before you can say whether the fund has a mark-to-market loss or gain. All one can tell from the current price and coupon is the YTM.
    The march toward par is not linear. A disproportionate amount of price gain of a discount bond comes early. If a 10 year bond is sold at a discount, then five years later the bond price will have gone up more than half (assuming no change in market rates). That's because it is now a 5 year bond and 5 year bonds yield less than 10 year bonds (usually).
    So one can pick up some yield by continually selling bonds and buying longer term bonds rather than holding bonds to maturity. This strategy is often called "rolling down the yield curve".
    https://corporatefinanceinstitute.com/resources/fixed-income/rolling-down-the-yield-curve/
    The 0.625% bond
  • I forgot
    Was I supposed to sell on the 1st day of May or the last? This investing stuff is so confusing sometimes.
    Chill Out Mark - Like Melania ”I really don’t care …”

  • I forgot
    Was I supposed to sell on the 1st day of May or the last? This investing stuff is so confusing sometimes.
  • Barrons article on How to Sneak into Closed Funds
    "Although usually forbidden if you're buying directly from a fund company, an existing shareholder of a closed fund at an outside broker can transfer a share to you without the fund company knowing about it. Once in, you can add to your position."
    Maybe, maybe not. You can get a share of ARTKX that way, but if
    you receive shares of the closed Fund as a gift from an existing shareholder of the Fund (additional investments generally are not permitted unless you are otherwise eligible to open an account under one of the other criteria listed);
    Prospectus.
  • Making the switch to Fidelity this week
    Both Schwab and Fidelity have local offices close to me, which is a big draw for me. I know others have said the local office isn't important to them because computer and phone service is adequate, but I will always prefer the 1:1 sit down with a real person or a phone chat with a person I know. I'm not presently a Fidelity customer so I can't compare the two.
    To bee's point, I have had a TD Ameritrade Roth IRA account for close to 20 years. I, contrary to bee, am looking forward to the TDA conversion to Schwab. I find the CS trading tools and web site as a whole more to my liking. I guess I've never felt like a product "of" CS. Contrarily, with the switch there are many more financial products open to me.
    Prior to the switch, I was tempted to transfer that TDA account to Fidelity just to have a comparative experience between CS and Fidelity. I still might. Just been lazy.
  • What would you do and how do you see it if debt limit kerfuffle turns into a nothing burger?
    Part of @BaseballFan ‘s question seems to relate to the prognosis for the U.S. economy. None of us have a crystal ball. The person who might know the most on that would be Chairman Powell. I don’t think he’s really shown his hand yet. At what point would the Fed be willing to stimulate should we enter recession? Obviously if we plunge into something like the 1930s or even the 2007-09 mess, all bets are off. Risk assets would tank. Most of us would be poorer.
  • Virtus FORT Trend Fund to be liquidated
    https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1005020/000093041323001656/c106434_497.htm
    497 1 c106434_497.htm
    Virtus FORT Trend Fund,
    a series of Virtus Opportunities Trust
    Supplement dated May 25, 2023, to the Summary and Statutory Prospectuses and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”) of the fund named above, each dated January 27, 2023, as supplemented
    Important Notice to Investors
    On May 23, 2023, the Board of Trustees of Virtus Opportunities Trust voted to approve a Plan of Liquidation of the Virtus FORT Trend Fund (the “Fund”), pursuant to which the Fund will be liquidated (the “Liquidation”) on or about July 12, 2023 (“Liquidation Date”).
    Effective June 9, 2023, the Fund will be closed to new investors and additional investor deposits, except that purchases will continue to be accepted for defined contribution and defined benefit retirement plans, and the Fund will continue to accept payroll contributions and other types of purchase transactions from both existing and new participants in such plans. Investors should note that the Fund’s investments will be sold in anticipation of the Liquidation and may be sold in advance of June 9, 2023.
    At any time prior to the Liquidation Date, shareholders may redeem or exchange their shares of the Fund for shares of the same class of any other Virtus Mutual Fund. There will be no fee or sales charges associated with exchange or redemption requests.
    Prior to the Liquidation Date, the Fund will begin engaging in business and activities for the purposes of winding down the Fund’s business affairs and transitioning some or all of the Fund’s portfolios to cash and cash equivalents in preparation for the orderly liquidation and subsequent distribution of its assets on the Liquidation Date. During this transition period, the Fund will no longer pursue its investment objective or be managed in a manner consistent with its investment strategies, as stated in the Prospectuses. This is likely to impact the Fund’s performance. The impending Liquidation of the Fund may result in large redemptions, which could adversely affect the Fund’s expense ratios. Those shareholders who remain invested in the Fund during part or all of this transition period may bear increased brokerage and other transaction expenses relating to the sale of portfolio investments prior to the Liquidation Date.
    On the Liquidation Date, any outstanding shares of the Fund will be automatically redeemed as of the close of business, except shares held in BNY Mellon IS Trust Company custodial accounts, which will be exchanged for shares of the Virtus Seix U.S. Government Securities Ultra-Short Bond Fund. For BNY Mellon IS Trust Company custodial accounts, Class A shares, Class I shares and Class R6 shares of the Fund will be exchanged for Class A shares, Class I shares and Class R6 shares of the Virtus Seix U.S. Government Securities Ultra-Short Bond Fund, respectively. Class C shares of the Fund will be exchanged into Class A shares of the Virtus Seix U.S. Government Securities Ultra-Short Bond Fund, and any contingent deferred sales charges will be waived.
    Shareholders with BNY Mellon IS Trust Company custodial accounts should consult the prospectus for the Virtus Seix U.S. Government Securities Ultra-Short Bond Fund for information about that fund. The proceeds of any redemption will be equal to the net asset value of such shares after the Fund has paid or provided for all charges, taxes, expenses and liabilities. The distribution to shareholders of these liquidation proceeds will occur as soon as practicable, and will be made to all Fund shareholders of record at the time of the Liquidation. Additionally, the Fund must declare and distribute to shareholders any realized capital gains and all net investment income no later than the final liquidation distribution. The Fund intends to distribute substantially all of its net investment income prior to the Liquidation.
    Although shareholders are expected to receive proceeds of the Liquidation in cash, proceeds distributed to shareholders may be paid in cash, cash equivalents, or portfolio investments equal to the shareholder’s proportionate interest in the net assets of the Fund (the latter payment method, “in kind”). Shareholders who receive proceeds in kind should expect (i) that the in-kind distribution will be subject to market and other risks, such as liquidity risk, before sale, and (ii) to incur transaction costs, including brokerage costs, when converting the investments to cash.
    Because the exchange or redemption of your shares could be a taxable event, we suggest you consult with your tax advisor prior to the Fund’s liquidation.
    Investors should retain this supplement with the Prospectuses and SAI for future reference.
    VOT 8567 FORT Trend Fund Supplement (5/2023)
  • Wellesley . Government and Agency Obligations 12.3 % Note rate & maturity
    Those are older Treasuries nearing maturities. Coupon shown is that at the time of issue.
    For example, 10-yr T-Note issued almost 10 years ago would be nearing maturity now, but will show coupon from 10 years ago. Current price would reflect a change in rates.
  • Wellesley . Government and Agency Obligations 12.3 % Note rate & maturity
    The fund files its complete schedule of portfolio holdings with the Securities and Exchange
    Commission (SEC) for the first and third quarters of each fiscal year as an exhibit to its reports on
    Form N-PORT. The fund’s Form N-PORT reports are available on the SEC’s website at
    www.sec.gov.
    Coupon
    Maturity
    Date
    Face
    Amount
    ($000)
    Market
    Value •
    ($000)
    U.S. Government and Agency Obligations (12.1%)
    U.S. Government Securities (11.7%)
    United States Treasury Note/Bond 0.625% 10/15/24 501,000 473,758
    United States Treasury Note/Bond 4.500% 11/30/24 175,000 175,656
    United States Treasury Note/Bond 1.000% 12/15/24 68,000 64,430
    United States Treasury Note/Bond 4.250% 12/31/24 392,264 392,57
    Why the difference in rates as the maturities are close ? DCA Purchased at different time, probably.
    Face amount & Market value shown.
    So the banks weren't the only ones getting whacked. Wonder if Wellington was holding any T's & notes, ETC..