Feb 20th Episode:

Beyond Diversification: What Every Investor Needs to Know About Asset Allocation:

On October 28th, Sébastien Page and Chris Dillon discussed principles from Sébastien’s recent book, “Beyond Diversification.” Sébastien combines his 20 years of investing experience; analysis from more than 200 academic articles; insights shared from a cast of expert colleagues at T. Rowe Price; and, perhaps most importantly, practical lessons passed down by his father, a renowned finance professor.

beyond-diversification-insights-webinar-replay
Against the Wind (CNBC Interview):

Sebastien Page's Bio and Articles:
Sébastien Page, CFA, Head of Global Multi-Asset

I have also always thought of IHI as the comparable ETF for FSMEX. But I, tonight, found XHE. It’s the SPDR HC Equipmenr ETF. There appears to be significant overlap between the two (link). And doing a cursory check of recent performance, XHE has outperformed IHI over the last year or so. Has anyone looked at, or does anyone hold, XHE?
Also, and many may know this, but the Fido Select Sector funds do not seem to have a redemption fee if held for under 60 days.
I hold FSMEX as the single holding in my wife’s Fido only 403b (which she can no longer add to, and which is only about $5K). Good fund! Sold out of it in my own portfolio for FBIOX among others. Sorry I did that! I also bought a small piece of the Fido Healthcare Disruptor fund to see how it does.
Also, EDOC is the ETF that focuses on telemedicine and related stocks, if anyone is interested.

Hi @carew388
I use eBay for a proxy of what the general public is willing to spend on a given item at the present time. Note: I'm a buyer/seller since May, 1997; so I have a bit of bias with what I see/know at the site.
This list is for Ryan. But, scroll down a tiny bit and find the Koosman, same card, too.
I set this search list to "sold" auctions. The list will continue to populate as sold auctions close.
'Course, not unlike collectible coins..........condition, condition, condition, eh?
Enjoy.

Here is the SEC filing concerning the closure announced on 2/17/21:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1217286/000119312521045281/d119465d497.htm

@hank a 1.34% (no matter the history of lower) - would not get me out of bed. I just can't subscribe to it. It's tough. I now own 1 bond fund FXNAX and it's painful. I divested Intermediate and Long Term bonds last year. I just think... these days - with interest rates so low, it makes no sense for bonds. I know there are many that rely on them for income but I'd rather play the equity side long term. Own bonds for "diversification benefits?" - it hasn't panned out for me in a very long time. Here's CNBC's take ... it's got to be 1.75% but it will take more for me. https://www.cnbc.com/2021/02/19/the-10-year-treasury-still-has-higher-to-go-before-it-threatens-the-stock-market-strategists-say.html

Oh, dear. Good question. SHORT-term debt? Nope. Just, no. I'd rather buy a 10-year "zero" and hold it. Last one I had, I redeemed in 2013, almost doubled my original investment. Can a 5-plus percent rate be found anywhere on a 10-year "zero" today?

5.25% front-load. Nope. This method sounds too complicated for ME. (I had to edit this down just a bit. Straight from the Morningstar report.)
...will close to new investors starting March 12, 2021. The fund will no longer be able to receive subscriptions from new investors from that date; however, existing investors will continue to have the ability to make additional investments or to reinvest distributions. Assets under management have swelled to $15.6 billion as of Jan. 31, 2021, following a rush of inflows in 2020. Soft-closing the fund is a prudent decision aimed at preserving the strategy’s ability to effectively execute options trading, and further reinforces its Morningstar Analyst Rating of Silver for the cheapest share classes.
Attractive fees, a transparent and consistent process, and an experienced manager elevate JPMorgan Hedged Equity ahead of its peers... Morningstar Analyst Rating of Silver.
...aims to provide smoother equity returns by a systematically implemented options strategy. (T)he team purchases puts 5% below the S&P 500’s value. To offset the cost of the puts, the team first sells puts 20% out-of-the-money ...to protect the fund from quarterly losses in the 5%-20% range; if markets fall less than 5%, the fund should fall in line with the market, and if the market falls more than 20%, the fund should incur the same incremental losses beyond negative 5%. The team also sells call options to generate enough option premium income to cover remaining cost of the hedges. The systematic options overlay structure has led to a dependable outcome even in the most volatile markets, such as in the first quarter of 2020, when it contained losses to less than 5%.
Hamilton Reiner is the lead manager and architect of the strategy. Reiner joined JPMorgan in 2009 and has over three decades of equity and options trading experience.
Assets have grown at a staggering rate, but the strategy should be able absorb the influx relatively easily as it uses liquid securities. In the past three years through August 2020, assets have grown from just over $1 billion to nearly $9.7 billion thanks to solid performance and low fees. Institutional and retirement share classes, in particular, are a lot cheaper than the options-based Morningstar Category average. These low fees coupled with JPMorgan’s transparent process make it an interesting option.
This fund uses a well-defined and thoughtful approach to options trading. Its transparent and repeatable process should deliver predictable results over the long term. The strategy earns an Above Average Process rating.
The strategy aims to provide a smoother ride to equity investing by purchasing 5% out-of-the-money put options and selling 20% out-of-the-money put options over a U.S. equity portfolio. This structure, called a put-spread, is designed to protect capital when markets sell off 5%-20% in a given quarter but also has a lower cost compared with outright put protection. However, since the short option position is so far out-of-the-money, management also sells a call option to cover the price of the long put position. The call options are usually sold 3.5%-5.5% out-of-the-money, depending on the amount of income needed to cover the cost of the long put, but periods of heightened volatility can move that target higher. The level at which the call strikes are written will determine the strategy’s upside cap for the quarter.
The team intends to generate a small level of alpha in the equity portfolio by slightly overweighting attractively priced stocks and slightly underweighting expensive stocks based on fundamental analysis. Since the constitution of the equity portfolio closely replicates the S&P 500, the use of the index options is not problematic from a hedging perspective.
The core long equity portfolio should track the S&P 500 closely as it constrains tracking error to 1.5% annually. It aims to outperform that index by tweaking the individual stock exposure within a 1-percentage-point range using a dividend discount model that ranks stocks from most attractive to least attractive based on forecast earnings and company-specific growth catalysts. The team creates a well-diversified portfolio that mitigates risk associated with individual holdings, with the resulting portfolio holding around 200 stocks. Sector weightings resemble the S&P 500 with modest underweightings in real estate and consumer staples and a small overweighting in consumer discretionary.
The team constructs a zero-cost option overlay at the beginning of each calendar quarter and resets it at the end of the quarter. Call premiums received should improve with persistently high market volatility and higher interest rates, thus improving the strategy’s upside in such a market environment. This was the case at the beginning of 2020’s second quarter when the call options had a strike price closer to 7% out-of-the-money following a period of extremely high volatility. However, in periods of serious market stress (such as Black Monday in 1987, where the S&P 500 dropped 23% in a single day), the short out-of-the-money put leg of the spread may expose the fund to additional losses.
An experienced and dedicated manager and access to JPMorgan’s ample resources earn this strategy an Above Average People rating.
The core team tasked with managing this strategy is small, but concerns about its size are assuaged by the options overlay’s systematic implementation and access to a strong support team. Lead portfolio manager and strategy architect Hamilton Reiner joined the firm in 2009 and has extensive experience trading derivatives, with a career dating back more than three decades. Prior to joining JPMorgan, Reiner held senior positions at Barclays Capital, Lehman Brothers, and Deutsche Bank, and he spent the first 10 years of his career at O’Connor and Associates, an options specialist firm. It was announced last year that Reiner would be responsible for leading JPMorgan’s U.S. structured equity team, although this new responsibility should not interfere with his portfolio management duties on the option-based strategies. Raffaele Zingone, the other named portfolio manager, joined the firm in 1991 and is responsible for the equity portfolio implementation. He directs JPMorgan's deep bench of 26 equity analysts, who average 20 years of industry experience.
Reiner has more than $1 million invested alongside investors, signaling a strong alignment of interest between management and shareholders. Zingone has between $500,000 and $1 million invested in the fund.
Parent |
Above Average Jun 2, 2020
J.P. Morgan Asset Management’s strong investment culture, which shows through its long-tenured, well-aligned portfolio managers and deep analytical resources, supports a renewed Above Average Parent rating.
Across asset classes and regions, the firm's diverse lineup features many Morningstar Medalists, such as its highly regarded U.S. equity income strategy that’s available globally. There's been some turnover in the multi-asset team recently, but it remains deeply resourced and experienced. Manager retention and tenure rates, and degree of alignment for U.S. mutual funds compare favorably among the competition. Managers' compensation emphasizes fund ownership over stock ownership, which is distinctive for a public company.
The firm continues to streamline its lineup and integrate its resources further. For instance, in late 2019, the multi-asset solutions division combined with the passive capabilities. The firm hasn’t launched trendy offerings as it’s mostly expanded its passive business lately, but acquisition-related redundancies and more hazardous launches in the past weigh on its success ratio, which measures the percentage of funds that have both survived and outperformed peers. Fees are regularly reviewed downward globally; they're relatively cheaper in the U.S. than abroad. Also, the firm is building its ESG capabilities and supports distinctive initiatives on diversity.
Performance
This strategy has consistently met performance expectations.
Since its December 2013 inception, the strategy has returned 7.8% annualized through August 2020, beating the options-based category average by nearly 4.7 percentage points annualized. It has also outperformed on a risk-adjusted basis. Its Sharpe ratio of 1.0 since January 2014 trounces the category average of 0.3.
The options overlay is designed to protect capital when the S&P 500 drops 5%-20% in a given quarter. This means investors will be exposed to losses if the S&P 500 loses less than 5% in a three-month period. However, this hasn’t stopped the strategy from achieving its goal of lower volatility relative to the S&P 500. Since December 2013, it has had a 6.7% monthly standard deviation compared with the S&P 500's 13.8%. Moreover, the maximum drawdown (based on monthly data) has been limited to negative 7.9% relative to the S&P 500’s negative 19.6%.
Investors should note that the intraquarter experience will vary given that option pricing is dynamic until expiration. Options’ values are marked to market daily, which often results in intraquarter deviations from the quarter-end return. For example, the strategy was down nearly 19% at one point in the first quarter of 2020 but ended the period down 4.9%.
Price
It’s critical to evaluate expenses, as they come directly out of returns. The share class on this report levies a fee that ranks in its Morningstar category’s second-cheapest quintile. Based on our assessment of the fund’s People, Process and Parent pillars in the context of these fees, we think this share class will be able to deliver positive alpha relative to the category benchmark index, explaining its Morningstar Analyst Rating of Bronze.

"To be clear, I am not an investor, I am an engineer. I don't own any publicly-traded stock besides Tesla ... However, when fiat [regular] currency has negative real interest, only a fool wouldn't look elsewhere. Bitcoin is almost as BS as fiat money. The key word is 'almost'." Newsweek
Related - Earlier Story from USA Today Tesla buys $1.5 billion in bitcoin
Also related ... Another bump up for the 10 year treasury yield today. 1.34% at last glance. Seem low? Consider around 0.60% less than a year ago.
Question What rate on short term debt or cash would entice you to unload some of your equity holdings (if any) ?

Hi @Mark
This is a reply to Derf from Jan. 18, which includes some info about Fido select trading. A bit of other not related chat, too.
I don't recall the start date for phone trading of select funds, but did use this feature for a pencil performance chart I kept for each week ending pricing. I still have the darn papers.
___@Derf You try'in to overload an oldtimers brain cells....??? :)
I recall reading a few articles in Barron's or WSJ about the Beardstown Ladies investment club.
About the coworker investment club: the life span was a portion of 1985 through a portion of 1991. As most funds required $2,500 to invest (exception was FCNTX); we had to get to that point for a purchase of a fund. The goal was met in short fashion. The initial monies went into a MM Cash Reserves fund that had a 1988, 7 day yield of 7.2%.
Additionally for the funds of this time period, is that many had a 3% (one time) front load and some had redemption fees up 1.5% within the first 12 months of purchase. This was still better than many of the prominent big houses at the time.....a Merrill Lynch, etc. The E.R. range was from .83 through 2%. The Select funds might also have a $75 trading fee. Select funds at the time could be bought and sold on the hour throughout the business day. Transactions were performed through F.A.S.T. (Fidelity Automated Service Telephone) using a touch-tone phone.
All investments were through a Fidelity account and only used their mutual funds.
I can offer a few trinkets about this period (1985-1991) and investing. As noted previous, Fidelity had already established numerous "select" funds; the front runners of sector funds or what are named thematic today.
To the best of my recall, we used the following funds during this period:
---Cash Reserves, MM
---Select American Gold (later merged in Precious Metals)
---Select Computers
---Select Health Care
---Contra... FCNTX
---Captial & Income, (junk bonds and related) FAGIX
We didn't trade often, mostly due to the fees. We also escaped, without harm, during the Oct., 1987 market melt, as we did not sell anything, and our position in American Gold provided a +40 in 1987 to provide a balance.
My recall for the time frame of the club is 10-12% annualized. As members of the club placed different amounts each month, each member had a percentage of ownership when the club was dissolved; and the total profits were dispatched to each member, along with their tax form for the year.
I'm sure I've missed something I thought about previously, but a fun flashback.
Take care,
Catch

Just noticed today that M* dropped FSPHX from 5 Stars to 4 Stars.

Fasten your seatbelts' — The case for a roaring economic recovery: Morning Brief
https://www.google.com/amp/s/finance.yahoo.com/amphtml/news/fasten-your-seatbelts-case-for-roaring-economic-recovery-morning-brief-110049254.html
***
The U.S. economy is in a reasonably good place right now.
Consumer spending is robust and activity in the service and manufacturing sectors is increasing at a faster rate. The labor market stabilized in January, though as Thursday's report on initial jobless claims showed there is still considerable pressure for workers.***
Maybe more good times ahead...multiple yrs bulls?
Anyone seeing risks double dip ??

I just received the 19a for IOFIX showing the estimated FY-2020 source of distributions to consist of 50% ROC. As others have mentioned however these are not the final figures.
From the 19a notice:
"Not Tax Reporting. The amounts and sources of distributions reported in this notice are only estimates in order to comply with SEC regulations and are not being provided for tax reporting purposes. The actual amounts and sources of the amounts for tax reporting purposes will depend upon each Fund’s investment experience during the remainder of its fiscal year and may be subject to changes based on tax regulations. The Fund will send you a Form 1099-DIV in early 2022 for the 2021 calendar year that will tell you how to report these distributions for federal income tax purposes (e.g., ordinary income, long-term capital gain or return of capital)."

See link for table of affected funds:
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/810893/000119312521047719/d125452d497.htm
Here is the other change as noted by @msf :
...In addition, effective March 1, 2021, the second paragraph of the “Purchases, Redemptions and Exchanges — Eligibility” section of the Prospectus is deleted in its entirety and replaced by the following:
In order to protect the interests of shareholders, PIMCO may find it necessary to limit new purchases of shares of each of the PIMCO National Municipal Opportunistic Value Fund and PIMCO California Municipal Opportunistic Value Fund when PIMCO determines that allowing additional inflows into those Funds could negatively affect a Fund’s ability to meet the applicable Fund’s investment objective. PIMCO may close the PIMCO National Municipal Opportunistic Value Fund and/or the PIMCO California Municipal Opportunistic Value Fund to (i) initial purchases by new investors or (ii) initial purchases by new investors and subsequent purchases by existing shareholders, in PIMCO’s sole discretion. Such a closure will not affect the rights of existing shareholders with respect to shares of the Funds held as of the date of the closure. In addition, during such a closure, the purchase of additional shares of the applicable Fund through dividend reinvestments will continue to be permitted. If the PIMCO California Municipal Opportunistic Value Fund and/or the PIMCO National Municipal Opportunistic Value Fund is closed, PIMCO may re-open the applicable Fund(s) to (i) subsequent purchases by existing shareholders or (ii) initial purchases by new investors and subsequent purchases by existing shareholders, as appropriate in light of market conditions, as determined by PIMCO in its sole discretion. Notice will be provided regarding such closures or re-openings.
In addition, effective March 1, 2021, the final paragraph of the “Purchases, Redemptions and Exchanges” section of the SAI is deleted in its entirety and replaced by the following:
In order to protect the interests of shareholders, PIMCO may find it necessary to limit new purchases of shares of each of the PIMCO National Municipal Opportunistic Value Fund and PIMCO California Municipal Opportunistic Value Fund when PIMCO determines that allowing additional inflows into those Funds could negatively affect a Fund’s ability to meet the applicable Fund’s investment objective. PIMCO may close the
PIMCO National Municipal Opportunistic Value Fund and/or the PIMCO California Municipal Opportunistic Value Fund to (i) initial purchases by new investors or (ii) initial purchases by new investors and subsequent purchases by existing shareholders, in PIMCO’s sole discretion. Such a closure will not affect the rights of existing shareholders with respect to shares of the Funds held as of the date of the closure. In addition, during such a closure, the purchase of additional shares of the applicable Fund through dividend reinvestments will continue to be permitted. If the PIMCO California Municipal Opportunistic Value Fund and/or the PIMCO National Municipal Opportunistic Value Fund is closed, PIMCO may re-open the applicable Fund(s) to (i) subsequent purchases by existing shareholders or (ii) initial purchases by new investors and subsequent purchases by existing shareholders, as appropriate in light of market conditions, as determined by PIMCO in its sole discretion. Notice will be provided regarding such closures or re-openings.

https://www.visualcapitalist.com/the-buffett-indicator-at-all-time-highs-is-this-cause-for-concern/
***However, history has been known to repeat itself. So, while we might not need to fasten our seatbelts just yet, this historically high ratio is certainly worth paying attention to.***
Unclear about trends, many folks/pundits say we are at a new bullmarket past 4 5 months
Wait and see approaches I think

He is old but still Sharp as a knife
We still have large portions of our monies in his portfolio
Brk.b is one of longer funds we hold
We do still hold gld, 20s% down since past 9 months
Gld may Appear attractive again (long term)
https://finance.yahoo.com/m/73046e85-4b3a-3020-930c-6403ab68af5b/warren-buffett-dumped-gold.html

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/923184/000119312521047245/d136720d497.htm
497 1 d136720d497.htm 497
MATTHEWS ASIA FUNDS
Supplement dated February 18, 2021
to Prospectus dated April 29, 2020, as supplemented
This supplement should be read in conjunction with the Prospectus dated April 29, 2020, as supplemented.
For all existing shareholders of the Matthews Emerging Asia Fund—Institutional Class (MIASX) and Investor Class (MEASX):
The Board of Trustees (the “Board”) of Matthews Asia Funds (the “Trust”) has approved the tax-free reorganization (the “Reorganization”) of the Matthews Emerging Asia Fund, a series of the Trust (the “Target Fund”), into the Matthews Asia Small Companies Fund, a series of the Trust (the “Acquiring Fund”), which is expected to be renamed the Matthews Emerging Markets Small Companies Fund on or about April 30, 2021. The Reorganization does not require the approval of the shareholders of the Target Fund or the Acquiring Fund.
The Matthews Emerging Markets Small Companies Fund will, as a result of the name change, also change its investment policies so that it will invest, under normal circumstances, at least 80% of its net assets in the common and preferred stocks of small-capitalization companies located in emerging market countries anywhere in the world. Emerging market countries generally include every country in the world except the United States, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore and most of the countries in Western Europe. These changes to the name and principal investment strategies of the Acquiring Fund are subject to possible further changes related to obtaining effectiveness of an amendment to the registration statement and revised disclosure, which is expected to occur on or about April 30, 2021.
The Reorganization was proposed because Matthews International Capital Management, LLC, the Funds’ investment adviser (“Matthews”), recognized that Asia now represents approximately 75% of the emerging markets small capitalization universe, and therefore that there is an increasing overlap between an investment strategy focused on small companies in emerging market countries and one focused on small companies in Asia. Further, Matthews believes that shareholders of each Fund will benefit more from exposure to a broader investment universe as well as from potential operating efficiencies and economies of scale that may be achieved by combining the Funds’ assets in the Reorganization, than by continuing to operate the Funds separately. Matthews also believes that the Acquiring Fund’s investment objective and strategies make it a compatible fund within the Trust for a reorganization with the Target Fund. The Target Fund and the Acquiring Fund have the same investment objective and similar investment strategies, policies, risks and restrictions.
To effectuate the Reorganization, the Target Fund will transfer all of its assets to the Acquiring Fund, and the Acquiring Fund will assume all of the liabilities of the Target Fund. On the date of the closing of the Reorganization, shareholders of the Target Fund will receive Institutional Class or Investor Class shares, as applicable, of the Acquiring Fund equal in aggregate net asset value to the value of their shares of the Target Fund, in exchange for their shares of the Target Fund. The Reorganization is expected to be effective on or about April 29, 2021.
Effective after the close of business on April 16, 2021, shares of the Target Fund will no longer be offered to new or existing shareholders, and shareholders holding shares of any other series of the Trust will not be able to exchange their shares for shares of the Target Fund.
Effective on or about April 30, 2021, in connection with the name change of the Acquiring Fund, Robert Harvey, CFA, who is currently a Lead Manager of the Target Fund, will become a Co-Manager of the Acquiring Fund. Vivek Tanneeru, who has been Lead Manager of the Acquiring Fund since August 2020, will remain as Lead Manager of the Acquiring Fund. In addition, Jeremy Sutch, CFA, who has been a Senior Research Analyst at Matthews since 2015 and has supported the firm’s India and Pacific Tiger strategies, will become a Co-Manager of the Acquiring Fund.
If you do not want to participate in the Reorganization, you may redeem your shares of the Target Fund in the ordinary course until the last business day before the Reorganization is effective. Redemption requests received after that time will be treated as redemption requests for shares of the Acquiring Fund received in connection with the Reorganization.
Please keep this Supplement with your Prospectus.
From Matthews' website (check the footnotes) on the page:
https://us.matthewsasia.com/resources/docs/fund-documents/

@fundly: Thanks for correcting my post. Right, how did you find that percentage if it wasn't from AlphaCentric? Maybe you had better luck last year than finder did this year getting it from AC?
@finder: I bet you know this, but just in case, ROC on the Fido 1099 shows up under nondiv distributions. I just looked at mine again, and it's on the last page. (Had some from ETNMX and PFNIX.) Yes, sounds like there's a problem if you've got 19a's with ROC info & Fido's not showing it. (The recording on the CSR line there said Monday, I think it was, that it was a 35m wait to get somebody on the phone.)

Hi, guys.
I wanted to follow up with the GP folks before sharing anything. Exchanged notes with their president yesterday, and we've just sent this note to the folks on MFO's mailing list. I wanted to share if with you against the prospect that any of it is interesting to you.
David
- - - - -
On February 12, Grandeur Peak announced their intention to institute a "hard close" for four funds and a soft close on one fund. A hard close is one that stops additional purchases by both new and existing shareholders; a soft close stops new investors from opening accounts. The funds affected are:
Hard closed: Global Opportunities, International Opportunities, International Stalwarts and Global Micro Cap.
Soft closed: Emerging Markets Opportunities.
Each of the affected funds returned between 30-50% in 2020; Global Micro Cap and Emerging Markets have already posted double-digit returns for 2021. The hard closed funds all have four star ratings from Morningstar and are MFO Honor Roll funds; in addition, International Stalwarts is an MFO Great Owl which signals consistently first-tier risk-adjusted returns.
The public explanation was "we carefully review capacity at both the strategy and firm level. We are committed to keeping our investment strategies nimble to fully pursue their investment objectives without being encumbered by their individual asset base or the firm’s collective assets."
I asked president Eric Huefner to talk a bit about the necessity to close a $60 million fund and the oddity of hard-closing one of their least capacity-constrained funds. He noted that Global Micro Cap closed on the day it was launched but has doubled in size in the past 12 months. That's due to modest inflows, "sticky" investors and a 50% return in 2020. Grandeur's goal is "total investment flexibility in the micro-cap arena"
The Stalwarts funds were created, primarily, to serve the needs of investment advisors who had worked with Grandeur for years but found that Grandeur's "core" funds were now closed and, hence, inaccessible to new clients. The suite of Stalwarts funds were designed to give investors access to Grandeur's style through funds that targeted slightly larger (hence, more liquid) stocks. The hope was that those funds would not have to close as quickly as the small- and micro-cap focused core funds. I asked about what had happened to limit capacity. Mr. Huefner noted that total capacity for the Stalwarts strategy - funds + SMAs, US/global/international - was in the $5-7 billion range with International having more assets than the other two combined. "We soft closed the Int’l Stalwarts strategy in June [but] the AUM in the International Stalwarts strategy has still grown more than 40% since then. Given the continuing rapid growth, it felt necessary to close it in order to preserve space for our other Stalwarts strategies."
If you believe that the market will continue on its recent trajectory, dominated by US large tech stops, then there's nothing much you need to do. If you believe that the market might be rotating in response to a new administration, a new environment or simple exhaustion, you might anticipate international outperforming domestic, developing outperforming developed, small outperforming large. These funds are at the vanguard of investing in those style.
Possible responses to their closing:
Check your target asset allocation, whether for the individual fund or the asset class it represents. Consider whether you want to make an additional allocation now, in an admittedly pricey market, to bring your investment in line with your target.
In my case, Global Micro Cap is my third-largest holding and represents 15% of my portfolio. As much as I'm delighted by its performance - 18% annually since launch - it would be hard for me to justify allocating more there now.
Consider alternative GP funds as options. The young Global Contrarian fund has an R-squared of 97 against Global Micro Cap. Both have substantial micro cap exposure (about 40%) with Contrarian's stocks being a bit larger and noticeably lower priced than Micro Caps.
Similarly, Global Stalwarts has a correlation to International Stalwarts of 98 and a nearly identical Sharpe ratio, annual return and maximum drawdown. Global is about 55% international.
Consider Rondure, Wasatch and Seven Canyons funds as options. All four families are driven by Wasatch alumni. While they have very distinctive perspectives and strengths, all have a shared perspective on global small- and micro-cap investing and a respect for their investors as partners. By way of example, Rondure New World (four star, $250 million) has an R-squared of 95 against Emerging Markets Opportunities and Wasatch EM Small Cap (four star, $520 million) has an R-squared of 93. These are all very solid advisors with investor-centered cultures and strong records, though not identical strategies. Between them, 11 of their 24 eligible funds (those with records of three years or more) have earned an MFO Great Owl designation.

Here's a bit of additional information excerpted from a recent article in the WSJ:

The billionaire Warren Buffett added two more big, American brands to Berkshire Hathaway Inc.’s investment portfolio.
Mr. Buffett’s conglomerate has purchased $8.6 billion in stock in Verizon Communications Inc., the largest U.S. mobile carrier, and $4.1 billion in Chevron Corp. according to a snapshot of investments held in the quarter ended Dec. 31.
In 2020, Chevron had its worst year since 2016, and Verizon’s fourth-quarter profit fell after it booked higher costs and gained fewer new customers than usual.
It isn’t clear whether Mr. Buffett made the decision to invest in the two firms or if the decision was made by Berkshire money managers Todd Combs and Ted Weschler. The two are expected to take over all of Berkshire’s investments once Mr. Buffett is no longer in the top job.
Berkshire adjusted some of its drugmaker investments bets. The conglomerate sold off its $136 million investment in the Covid-19 vaccine maker Pfizer Inc., while increasing stakes in the pharmaceutical brands AbbVie Inc., Merck & Co. and Bristol Myers Squibb Co.
It also continued to cut back from financial firms, selling off its remaining $93 million investment in JPMorgan Chase & Co., and whittling away at its stake in Wells Fargo & Co. by $1.4 billion.
Last year Berkshire Hathaway sold stakes in airlines, including United Airlines Holdings Inc., American Airlines Group Inc., Delta Air Lines Inc. and Southwest Airlines Co. Mr. Buffett said he thought consumer behavior regarding travel had changed for the long term.

Additionally, I believe that in the past few days I read an article reporting that Berkshire had significantly cut back it's investments in Apple, but I'm unable to locate that source at this time.