One of my go-to sites, MaxFunds, scores TMSRX somewhat favorably, giving it the lowest possible risk assessment of 1. Yet, curiously, it grades the fund as one of the worst (5) on its “Hot Money Index.” Pray tell me why a lame low volatility fund like this would be seeing huge investor flows in and out?
Overall assessment = “Good” (73/100)

Placed orders for FAAAX and GMAMX ,two funds that have minimum investment below $2500 at Fidelity .

@carew388 - Happy sailing! :)
(Might be some rough water tomorrow)

Placed orders for FAAAX and GMAMX ,two funds that have minimum investment below $2500 at Fidelity .

I could just repeat what I said in a nearby thread on BAMBX (LINK).

Tips on linking:
One can link to a specific post by copying the link from the date on that post; your post is:
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/comment/143272/#Comment_143272
When quoting material, a link to the source can provide additional context. The M* definition may have come from Morningstar, Morningstar Category for Funds Definitions (May 6, 2021), p. 34.
As to what it means to be an alternative strategy fund, M* changed this about a half year ago. At that time, it removed long-short funds from the alternative strategy group, because these funds are largely influenced by the equity market. But M* kept market neutral funds (a special case of long-short, where long = short) as alternative funds. The reasoning being that these funds have diversified away the equity nature of their risk.
https://www.morningstar.com/articles/1036165/introducing-the-new-alternative-morningstar-categories
That seems to be M*'s current take on alternative funds. That regardless of what they hold they diversify away the intrinsic nature of their holdings. So, if a fund uses multiple alternative strategies, it is now called a multistrategy fund. But if a fund uses multiple strategies that are not alternative strategies, it is not. Well, it's still a multistrategy fund, but it's not a multistrategy category fund.
Are we confused yet? I certainly am, and following the maxim to never invest in something one doesn't understand, I tend to avoid alternative strategy funds, whether singular or multiple. YMMV.
Fidelity has a slew of target retirement funds with lower volatility, higher Sharpe ratios, and better YTD, 1, and 3 year returns, including FFFAX (actively managed), FIKFX (index funds), FHBZX (both actively and passively managed funds), FIRMX, and FIRNX. Along somewhat the same lines is Vanguard's VASIX.
These funds correlate somewhat more closely than TMSRX to the stock and bond markets, but if you're primarily looking for bond alternatives (better than cash and not too volatile) they seem to be good, less complicated candidates.
Portfolio Visualizer correlation matrix
A cursory look at the quarterly performance breakdown suggests that TMSRX may do better in periods of high market volatility, but that doesn't seem to help improve its long term volatility or its longer term performance.
http://performance.morningstar.com/fund/performance-return.action?t=TMSRX

I could just repeat what I said in a nearby thread on BAMBX (LINK).
These multi-strategy funds (ALL alternatives; a formal M* Category under Alternatives) should NOT to be confused with multi-asset funds discussed elsewhere (SOME alternatives; not a formal M* Category).
M* Multistrategy Definition
Multistrategy portfolios offer investors exposure to two or more alternative investment strategies, as
defined by Morningstar’s alternative category classifications, through either a single-manager or multimanager approach. Funds in this category typically have a majority of their assets exposed to alternative
strategies, but at a minimum, alternatives must comprise greater than 30% of the strategy’s gross
exposure. The category includes funds with static allocations to alternative strategies as well as those
that tactically adjust their exposure to different alternative strategies and asset classes. Multistrategy
funds typically aim to have low to modest sensitivity to traditional market indexes, although that may not
be the case for strategies with lower alternatives allocations.

That’s a personal decision. For some it would be the right one.
A cold night in hell before I sell. Noticed early on that the fund often remains flat or rises on days when equities falter. So for me it balances out the load in an increasingly defensive age-appropriate portfolio. In less than 4 years of existence it’s achieved 4+% annual. That’s better than a lot of short and intermediate term bond funds and hands-down better than cash. But all of us, I think, had hoped for more.
If it’s more of a “dog” recently I hadn’t noticed. But that would likely be due to exposure to gold and other non-dollar assets along with domestic bonds. All of these have suffered of late. With gold it’s probably temporary. With bonds I fear it’s terminal.
My bias … I’ve owned TRP funds for around 30 years and believe them very good at making wise allocation decisions and strong macro-reads. However, those macro-calls are often early. I suspect a saying going around in their inner circle might be: “Investors can remain irrational longer than defensive funds can remain in existence.” Since they’ve added a slug of it to a number of their allocation and target date funds, TMSRX’s existence is probably not threatened. Many here may own it without realizing it.
FWIW - I recently unloaded 25% of PRPFX after remaining hands-off for a decade. Had grown to too large a position in the portfolio. Plus - sounds from a recent Barron’s piece (posted here) that Cuggino is beginning to toy around with the allocation more than usual - adding more equities. That will make the fund riskier than in the past. And might help answer a question @bee raised several months ago - “What’s driving PRPFX?”. Harry Browne must be tossing in his slumber.
Like I said at the onset - For less risk averse investors TMSRX is probably one to sell. But recognize you’re sacrificing some downside protection.

Good point about OppenheimerFunds (thankfully merged away now into Invesco/IVZ) that was NOT following the script and had put lot of junk/HY in its core bond and allocation/balanced funds. Its Oppenheimer-Rochester funds were the junkiest of the junk but those investors knew the risks while core bond and allocation/balanced fund investors had no reasons to expect/suspect the bad stuff in their funds.
It was also the manager of IL 529 and I complained to everyone (state regulators, M* (a 529 plan rater), in my own posts) but those early warnings/complaints were ignored. Eventually, OppenheimerFunds made token restorations in IL 529, was eventually replaced as its manager, and IL 529 is now a highly rated plan again (Gold by M*). Invesco/IVZ acquired OppenheimerFunds in 2019.
But note that my reference above was to core-plus bond funds that can have up to 35% HY, while core bond funds have only 5% of less (unless they cheat).

“These days, a typical core-plus bond fund can have up to 35% in below investment-grade bonds.”
I think it’s the trend towards assuming more risk rather than any particular asset class or investor that’s brought to the forefront by the WSJ article. If this is part of a broader national trend across different types of investors - both institutional and individual - than we may be setting up for significant liquidity issues and outsized losses next time around.
Oppenheimer, while an exception, wrote the book on how not to run a Core Bond Fund. In 2008 theirs lost 41%, while their “Champion Bond Fund” did substantially worse.
Brings to mind that old adage about “What’s in a name … ?”

Thank you for your reply @gk3105gklm .
Derf

this is pretty SOMETHING. Even though it will be adjusted and re-worked and adjusted and twisted and manipulated countless times...
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/11/24/jobless-claims-unemployment-benefits-drop-523293

These days, a typical core-plus bond fund can have up to 35% in below investment-grade bonds.
So, insurance companies having 35% in below investment-grade (and illiquid alternatives) doesn't sound so alarming. Leaving aside companies such as BRK that have heavy equity portfolios, most insurance companies portfolios are still heavy in fixed-income but lot of it of the type that you and I cannot tap as retail investors.

Maybe better off 85% tbills and 15% Bitcoin?
Article is frightening to say the least
Where are the adults at the Fed, White House and Treasury?
Play stupid games win stupid prizes?
Baseball Fan

“U.S. life insurers are backing Americans’ policies with bigger slugs of riskier, higher-yielding investments. Holdings of real estate, below-investment-grade bonds, mortgage loans, private equity, hedge funds, limited partnerships and privately placed debt increased 39% from 2015 to 2020, outpacing the 26% increase in total cash and invested assets, according to a new report by Moody’s Investors Service. As a result, these so-called illiquid assets represented about 35% of insurers’ $4.04 trillion in investments as of Dec. 31, 2020, up from 32% out of $3.2 trillion in 2015.”
(Move to riskier assets may impact market liquidity - more evident during times of stress.)
Excerpt from WSJ (11/24/2921) - https://www.wsj.com/articles/life-insurers-use-riskier-assets-to-back-consumers-policies-11637663580 - Subscription Required

I have an update on PDI in the M* link above.
"PDI is starting to look interesting. It is under pressure from the upcoming merger and tax-loss selling. I am watching $24-25 area in trading ahead of Friday, December 10 merger date (PKO and PCI will fold into PDI). This is the end of convergence theme on them that has been in play since 2016.
My usual caution on the understated leverage for CEFs applies. So, the stated leverage for PDI is 41.23% that is debt/total assets. But the PDI holders experience 70.15% that is debt/net assets, or 1.7015x that is the ratio of total assets/net assets.
PDI at Stockcharts https://stockcharts.com/h-sc/ui?s=PDI&p=D&yr=1&mn=0&dy=0&id=p07707774075
PDI at CEFConnect https://www.cefconnect.com/fund/PDI "

@gk3105gklm : It seems you only listed 7. Do you equal weight your small caps ?
Gobble gobble, Derf

BAMBX has SD of 4.6% (high). Turnover of 500% is high, so is ER. About 11% in stocks, rest in bonds & others (probably convertible). Don't treat is as cash or CD proxy.

I owned MSSMX WAMCX until the end of the last cycle. I consider them the ex-champ. In small cap space, I own 8 including CSMVX AFDVX FCPGX FSCRX, favorite 3 are CSMVX AFDVX FSCRX. Here are stat from Marketwatch:
1 week 13 week YTD 1 year 3 year
CSMVX (3.43) 12.69 41.30 56.26 31.75
MSCFX (2.08) 4.96 25.58 33.62 14.40
WAMCX (6.04) (0.85) 8.90 20.32 34.38
MSSMX (9.21) (13.09) 5.57 32.28 51.53
FCPGX (5.32) 2.12 14.51 25.55 25.70
AFDVX (0.79) 14.42 45.17 54.29 24.72
FSCRX (0.47) 6.01 35.29 40.96 19.55
Good luck everyone.

It seems if you go short PDI and long on PCI for the same notional amount, you are guaranteed to make 1.5% (not annualized) in three weeks.

There are discussions on the merger of PKO and PCI into PDI at other sites. This has been a long convergence theme with the merger finally effective on December 10, 2021 (about 3 weeks). https://community.morningstar.com/s/feed/0D53o00005UznTdCAJ

Sorry... I didn't complete my sentence. Was interrupted. Ignore my comment on reversion. Cursory glance at life perf. of some of the SC was interesting but not meaningful given variable time periods of life.
CSMVX +13.09
FCPGX +13.71
BRUSX +13.74
MSSMX +13.83
MSCFX: +15.38 and the lowest ER of the list.