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Here's a statement of the obvious: The opinions expressed here are those of the participants, not those of the Mutual Fund Observer. We cannot vouch for the accuracy or appropriateness of any of it, though we do encourage civility and good humor.
  • Follow Up: Vanguard-Watcher Says Tax Suit 'Could Change Industry Landscape'
    FYI: Vanguard spokesman John Woerth in a statement says the company denies wrongdoing, affirms the legality of its practices and says it will defend against the suit vigorously.
    Regards,
    Ted
    Read more at http://www.philly.com/philly/blogs/inq-phillydeals/Has-Vanguard-Group-underpaid-its-income-taxes.html#ogqZ3XlQifG3jzFh.99
  • How Expensive Are Stocks ? (Not Terribly)
    @Charles: thanks for your take on this with individual stocks.
    For someone not purchasing individual stocks, but taking an approach with stock index funds or exchange traded funds, how would you let the Shiller CAPE ratio influence your investing decisions?
    One approach some take is to let the Shiller P/E influence their asset allocation, backing off on equities when the Shiller P/E is elevated. Based on this (Shiller P/E way above long term historic levels of 16.5), some only have 50% or so of their normal allocation to equities right now. Another possible approach is choosing funds that have lower P/E ratios, such as GVAL, the DoubleLine DSENX, the exchange traded note CAPE, investing in the 4 U.S. stock sectors with the lowest Shiller P/Es, and choosing a traditional value fund (based on low P/E and low price/book ratios)
  • How Expensive Are Stocks ? (Not Terribly)
    @rjb112.
    Yes sir. Meb fan I am.
    How then do you think investors should use the Shiller P/E in their investing decisions?
    Every now and then, I fear Mr. Faber does sound a little like a Cape Crusader. But I think I most align with his preference to find the intersection of value and momentum.
    Aloca AA comes to mind this past year. BAC last couple years.
    If I jump-in on low valuation only, even if I really like the company, I'll have it on a short leash. There is just so much unknown. Always.
    But once the stock gets some altitude, thanks to momentum (be it due to earnings or group think), I'll try to use 200 day or 10 mo SMA. If it dips below that, I'll look to exit.
    If momentum turns a 1 bagger to a 2 bagger to a...10 bagger. I will try to stay with it regardless of valuation and use only momentum to determine whether to remain or exit.
    So, I guess the short answer is: I seem to be most comfortable entering a position when it has both value and momentum, but once established, momentum is the driver.
    That's what seems to be working for me these days. FWIW.
    Hope all is well.
    c
  • How Expensive Are Stocks ? (Not Terribly)

    Yes, the current P/E ratio and/or the CAPE ratio are currently a tad (that’s a scientific measure) on the high side relative to long term averages. But these signals, which according to a Vanguard study do provide a 20-30% explanation of market price movements, are not sufficiently above the norm to likely generate negative equity returns for the upcoming decade.
    They are not in the worrisome zone yet, but warrant some watching.
    Based on current values and historical average data, I expect stock dividends to yield 2% annually, productivity gains to yield a 2% gain, demographics to enhance returns by 1% annually........
    Adding these factors together projects an expected 10-year positive 7% annual equity reward.
    1. What is your thinking regarding expecting "demographics to enhance returns by 1% annually....."? One of the biggest demographic issues in the U.S. is "The Graying of America", the aging of America. Substantial numbers of baby boomers retire every day, reducing the overall GDP and productivity, which in and of itself as a factor decreases the profits of corporations. What are the demographic trends you think will add to stock returns going forward?
    2. Re: "according to a Vanguard study do provide a 20-30% explanation of market price movements.
    Do you have a reference to this study, or link/URL? I'm not doubting what you are saying, but would like to read it
    3. Re: 'the current P/E ratio and/or CAPE ratio a tad on the high side relative to long term averages....not in the worrisome zone yet'
    James Montier is a key member on Jeremy Grantham's GMO team, who write their monthly stock market 7-year forecast. The Shiller CAPE is a significant factor they consider.
    James Montier does not agree that the Shiller P/E is a tad high. He says it is exceedingly high.
    In this interview from May 15, 2014: http://money.cnn.com/2014/05/01/pf/stocks-overpriced.moneymag/index.html?iid=SF_M_River
    he is asked:
    Interviewer: "Are stocks overpriced?"
    James Montier: "There is no doubt that the U.S. stock market is exceedingly overvalued."
    Interviewer: "What makes you so sure?"
    James Montier: "The simplest sensible benchmark is the Shiller P/E. Right now we're looking at a broad index like the Standard & Poor's 500 trading at something like 26, 27 times the Shiller P/E. Fair value would be 16 or 17 times historical earnings."
  • How Expensive Are Stocks ? (Not Terribly)
    Hi Guys,
    I’m in davidrmoran’s and Charles’ corner on this issue.
    Yes, the current P/E ratio and/or the CAPE ratio are currently a tad (that’s a scientific measure) on the high side relative to long term averages. But these signals, which according to a Vanguard study do provide a 20-30% explanation of market price movements, are not sufficiently above the norm to likely generate negative equity returns for the upcoming decade.
    They are not in the worrisome zone yet, but warrant some watching.
    Here’s why. I’ll be using the methodology formulated in Chapter 2, On the Nature of Returns, of John Bogle’s classic “Common Sense on Mutual Funds” book.
    Based on current values and historical average data, I expect stock dividends to yield 2% annually, productivity gains to yield a 2% gain, demographics to enhance returns by 1% annually, inflation to contribute about 3%, and since the P/E ratio is nearing a tipping point, I expect a modest regression-to-the-mean to subtract maybe 1% annually.
    Adding these factors together projects an expected 10-year positive 7% annual equity reward. That’s roughly 3% below the long-term returns because of a little muted GDP growth rate (which impacts productivity profits) and a likely slight regression-to-the-mean of the present P/E status.
    Well, that’s my guesstimate. It directly reflects the Bogle long-term returns model, historical data sets, and current parameter valuations. Given the depressed character of current bond performance, stocks still don’t appear to be a bad deal, but also don’t expect the historical average of equity returns. Too bad, but not really too bad.
    Well, that’s my hat in the forecasting ring. Forecasting the next 10-year return is actually easier and more reliably made than projecting next year’s return. I hope this helps.
    Best Regards.
  • How Expensive Are Stocks ? (Not Terribly)
    @Charles, I know you are a big Meb Faber fan, who in his book Global Value places a great deal of importance on the Shiller CAPE. Meb Faber obviously thinks the Shiller CAPE should play a big role in our investing decisions. The referenced chart shows the Shiller P/E to have averaged 25.1 for the past 25 years. How then do you think investors should use the Shiller P/E in their investing decisions?
  • How Expensive Are Stocks ? (Not Terribly)
    This is extremely interesting to me since Shiller CAPE has become such a meme:
    >> If you avoided equities while they were above their historical CAPE measurement, you just missed 24 years of equity gains.
    Hear, hear.
  • How Expensive Are Stocks ? (Not Terribly)
    This is extremely interesting to me since Shiller CAPE has become such a meme:
    >> If you avoided equities while they were above their historical CAPE measurement, you just missed 24 years of equity gains.
  • Time to Buy Biotech
    FYI: Copy & Paste 7/4/14: Amy Feldnan: Barron's:
    I will ask some same question that I have several times in the past, do you own a health care fund ? If you don't you should.
    Regards,
    Ted
    It has been 11 years since the human genome was first mapped, at a cost of $2.7 billion. Since then, the cost of DNA sequencing has dropped to about $1,000, and our understanding of the nature of disease has expanded exponentially. This has created a land rush for biotechnology companies, which use living organisms to develop medical treatments. For the past three years, biotech stocks have risen spectacularly, though this year things have been bumpier.
    Eddie Yoon, manager of the $6.3 billion Fidelity Select Health Care Portfolio (ticker: FSPHX) and leader of Fidelity's 12-person health team, compares the innovations in biotech -- and the new companies being created -- to the explosion in technology and digital businesses that happened after Netscape's 1995 initial public offering. "The price point of sequencing the human genome has fallen so fast, and the early-stage pipeline for biotech is exploding right now," Yoon says. "That's what is driving innovation.
    There are many ways to invest in that innovation, and the pros take very different views in terms of assessing value and risk. New drugs are altering the way we live, and areas like immuno-oncology hold enormous promise, but getting drugs to market is expensive, time-consuming, and far from a sure thing. With risks high, and valuations no longer cheap, minefields abound.
    The best of the health-care funds (and funds with large stakes in health care) all have investments in biotech, but their strategies differ. At one end of the spectrum, Vanguard Health Care (VGHCX), the granddaddy of health funds with $37.7 billion in assets, takes a more conservative approach: It has just 12% in biotech -- a smidge less than the MSCI ACWI health-care index -- while its No. 1 holding is Merck (MRK), the global drug company with a strong pipeline. The fund rarely leads during market rallies, though it suffers less on the downside.
    By contrast, the $2 billion Janus Global Life Sciences (JFNAX) has 32% in biotech, including three of its top five holdings: Gilead Sciences (GILD), a leader in HIV drugs, which has recently launched the hepatitis C blockbuster Sovaldi; Celgene (CELG), whose flagship product, Revlimid, fights blood cancers; and Biogen Idec (BIIB), which specializes in drugs for neurological disorders, autoimmune disorders, and hemophilia. Says Janus Global Life Sciences' manager Andy Acker: "We've seen an acceleration of innovation. More drugs are getting approved more rapidly at lower cost." In fact, he adds, since 1999, biotech-drug sales have soared from $5 billion to more than $100 billion, and the number of blockbuster biotech drugs has risen tenfold, from three to more than 30, a level of innovation that he expects will continue.
    Matt Kamm, lead health analyst at Artisan and co-manager of the $1.1 billion Artisan Global Opportunities (ARTRX), which has 19% of its assets in health care, sees similar opportunities. He points to Regeneron Pharmaceuticals (REGN), whose drug Eylea treats macular degeneration, and which is the fund's No. 3 holding. As the lines blur between biotech and big pharma, Regeneron has set up a partnership with Sanofi (SAN.France), the Paris-based drug giant, also a holding. "It has allowed Regeneron to act like it has a giant balance sheet and build a pipeline, and it gives Sanofi growth and products for the future," Kamm says. In addition to Eylea, Regeneron (which trades at 26 times next year's earnings) has three drugs in Phase 2 and 3 trials, for cholesterol, rheumatoid arthritis, and atopic dermatitis, and another 11 in development. That diversified drug pipeline appeals to Kamm: "This is a risky business, even for the best companies, so it's important that companies make good, risk-adjusted decisions about research-and-development spending and have multiple shots on goal."
    For similar reasons, Kamm likes Biogen Idec, which trades at 23 times next year's earnings. It has a new oral medication for multiple sclerosis, Tecfidera; a new product launching for hemophilia; and other treatments in the pipeline for MS, spinal muscular atrophy, and Alzheimer's -- all squarely part of the firm's focus on neurological disorders. "They're all high-risk as stand-alone opportunities," Kamm says. "But we think it's a broad enough pipeline."
    WHAT OF THE WAVE of biotech IPOs earlier this year? Those are riskier. Janus' Acker, who invests in small-company biotech, keeps the holdings to small pieces of the portfolio. "Some of these are pretty early stage," he says. "We saw some frothiness in the market." Artisan's Kamm is steering clear completely. "They're coin tosses or lottery tickets," he says.
    The Best Defense Is a Good Offense
    With health-care funds returning 37% in the past year, the sector's no longer a defensive strategy. Below are five good options.
    Assets Total Return*
    Fund/Ticker Manager (bil) 1-Year 5-Year Top 3 Holdings**
    Fidelity Select Health Care Portfolio/FSPHX Eddie Yoon $6.3 50.3% 27.6% Actavis, Biogen Idec, McKesson
    Janus Global Life Sciences/JFNAX Andy Acker 2.0 45.0 25.7 Gilead Sciences, Aetna, Celgene
    Prudential Jennison Health Sciences/PHLAX David Chan 2.5 36.6 28.4 Alexion, Biomarin, Vertex
    T. Rowe Price Health Sciences/PRHSX Taymour Tamaddon 9.1 39.8 29.1 Aetna, Agilent Tech, Alexion
    Vanguard Health Care/VGHCX Jean Hynes 37.7 37.9 22.4 Merck, UnitedHealth, Forest Labs
    *Returns are annualized as of 07/02
    **As of 05/31 Sources: Morningstar; fund companies
    Fidelity's Yoon trimmed his fund's exposure to small biotech stocks early this year when he saw stretched valuations and decreasing quality. His fund now tilts its biotech holdings toward larger companies with stable free cash flows and encouraging pipelines. Plus, he has been diversifying holdings to areas such as medical devices, specialty pharmaceuticals, and life sciences. Where Gilead was once Fidelity Select Health Care's top holding, for instance, now it's Actavis (ACT), a global drug company with a huge business in generics. It may not be a sexy business, but Yoon argues that its global footprint in more than 100 countries, and its ability to leverage its sales force across multiple categories, gives it advantages. The shares, recently at $222, trade at 13 times next year's earnings estimates. "They are an innovator; they are a consolidator; and they are accessing the global market," Yoon says.
    Regardless of the broader economy, Yoon argues, the rising demands of an aging population and an emerging middle class worldwide will continue to drive health care. "Just because the health-care space is up a lot," he says, "doesn't mean there aren't a lot of good opportunities in this business."
  • DSENX and RGHVX, seriously
    I just bought this fund and have high hopes for it. One source of good information on the Doubleline Funds is to listen to the online replays and webcasts they produce. There is a replay on this Shiller Enhanced Cape fund that you can download dated May 20th. There is another one coming up on October 21st. The commentator is Jeffrey Sherman on both.
    I usually listen to Doubleline replays and find them very informative.
    Jeffrey Gundlach and Jeffrey Sherman are co-managers.
    http://www.doublelinefunds.com/funds/shiller/overview.html (Barron's webcast)
    http://www.doublelinefunds.com/pdf/DSEEX_Fact_Sheet.pdf
    http://www.doublelinefunds.com/webcasts.html
  • Paul Merriman: The One Asset Class Every Investor Needs
    @MJG: appreciate your post. Yes, I try to look at the P/E given and make sure I know if it is a trailing twelve months P/E, a forward P/E [using the projected/estimated earnings going forward], what company came up with the earnings estimates, and all the details. Often those details are not given sufficiently. As I just replied to someone else, I find it unfortunate that M* just seems to report the forward P/E on the portfolios of individual mutual funds, as well as exchange traded funds and even index funds. I wish it would become standard to report both TTM P/E and forward P/E, and give relevant details such as you bring up.
    I'm sure forward P/E ratios given in 2007 turned out to be way, way off base, since earnings must have collapsed during the great recession. Then the actual P/E goes thru the roof, since the denominator shrinks.....then the P shrinks and after a while we are in a bear market! So I agree with you wrt distrusting earnings forecasts, or any other forecast for that matter.
    I think Buffett said something to the effect of, 'market forecasters make fortune tellers look good.'
    You mentioned "Nobel laureate Robert Shiller recently introduced the 10-year average of real (inflation-adjusted) earnings as the Earnings denominator". I tried to look up when he introduced that, but so far haven't found it. I thought it was quite some time ago, at least people talk about it as if was a long time ago. Certainly has become a very hot topic. I think the current Shiller P/E is 26. Shiller's very good buddy Jeremy Siegel has a number of criticisms about using the Shiller P/E, or CAPE 10, to judge valuation. Especially now, since Siegel doesn't like that it includes the great recession.
    I happen to like Robert Shiller a lot. He had a nice interview with Consuelo Mack on WealthTrack this year.
    You can google it. It's on You Tube. I just posted it, but, "surprise", the URL from You Tube ended up posting the video graphic itself embedded [like when Ted posts a video with an arrow to view it!], and all I wanted to do is post the URL. The WealthTrack show was 2/21/2014
    Cheers
  • Paul Merriman: The One Asset Class Every Investor Needs
    Hi rjb112,
    Definitions matter every bit as much as costs matter when making investment decisions.
    I appreciate that you are a careful researcher, so this observation is likely to be totally unnecessary. However, when consulting any financial article, be sure to understand the precise definition of whatever statistic is being quoted.
    The Price to Earnings ratio is one such statistic that has plenty of special definitions that could be misleading or misinterpreted if not properly recognized. Is the Price component based on current closing price or the monthly average? Is the Earnings component based on current level or is it a trailing 12 month average? Most importantly, are those Earnings the historical values or are they future projections?
    I say most importantly because an estimate of future earnings is simply a forecast prone to error. My position on forecasts has been consistent: I am basically skeptical of most financial forecasts and generally distrust them. As you correctly inferred in your post, the likely explanation for the disparity in P/Es reported is that they were generated from the various sources that you cited.
    When using the P/E ratio as part of the investment decision, it is hazardous to use future estimates. These estimates are often based on optimistic guesstimates, false assumptions, and/or behavioral biases. I believe it is a far safer approach to use the historical P/E ratio.
    Nobel laureate Robert Shiller recently introduced the 10-year average of real (inflation-adjusted) earnings as the Earnings denominator. That’s his Cyclically Adjusted Price to Earnings Ratio (CAPE) formulation. That smoothing operation helps to tame the wild oscillations caused by point data anomalies. That too is a good concept.
    Again historically, the current levels, like those exhibited by the S&P 500 Index, are a bit on the high side of the long-term trendline, but the trendline itself has been slowly increasing over time. Nothing is constant; the constituent makeup of the S&P 500 units slowly morphs.
    As always, you alone get to interpret these data in your investment decision making.
    I would caution you not to get too upset about rather small disparities in reported financial statistics. Given the dynamic nature of the marketplace, these are all subject to rapid changes anyway. As other MFOers have offered, don’t be frozen into paralysis by hyper analyses.
    Good luck and Best Wishes.
  • Paul Merriman: The One Asset Class Every Investor Needs
    FWIW, here the newest GMO 7 year forecast has U.S. Quality @ 2.3%, U.S. large cap @ -1.5%, and U.S. Small Cap @ -4.5% annual after inflation.
    I'm also dubious of M*'s Vanguard figures because they only update by the quarter. IJS, which is updated daily lists a P/E of 18.75 vs. ITOT which has a P/E of 17.33.
    Take with whatever grains of salt you like.
    @mrdarcy or anyone else who knows: Can we get a clear, unambiguous definition of what GMO means by "U.S. Quality"? What mutual funds and exchange traded funds are there that focus on what GMO calls "U.S. Quality"? Note from above that U.S. Quality is not the same as U.S. large cap.
    Also, I think GMO may be using the Shiller CAPE 10 price to earnings ratio to determine these expected 7-year returns. There are exchange traded funds and one mutual fund that specifically choose low Shiller CAPE 10 ratios. For example, Barclays ETN+ Shiller CAPE ETN CAPE ; also the exchange traded fund GVAL specifically chooses only countries that have low Shiller P/E ratios, and currently the portfolio has a P/E of 11.5 per Morningstar. Also DoubleLine Shiller Enhanced CAPE N DSENX
  • Paul Merriman: The One Asset Class Every Investor Needs
    Hi rjb112,
    What works on Wall Street is not constant. That’s why the super quants who currently run the most successful Hedge funds are so secretive about their methods and must use the highest speed computers to find and to exploit the market inefficiencies.
    Folks have been learning this investment lesson forever. Jesse Livermore never revealed his secrets and continuously revised them based on present conditions.
    In 1996, James O’Shaughnessy wrote a book titled “What Works on Wall Street” after much research. It was celebrated as the most influential investment book over decades. When O’Shaughnessy initiated a mutual fund to put his findings into practice, it failed miserably. He sold the fund, and the methods he discovered generated excess returns for a period thereafter. Investment strategies come and go and often return. These things are highly transient.
    Risk and reward are tied at the hip, but with a bungee cord so that departures in time and space are variable and unpredictable. But the cord does exist. It is captured in the Wall Street rule of a regression-to-the-mean.
    Each investor gets to choose his own risk level. As Ben Franklin said: “He that would catch fish, must venture his bait”. More recently, Nassim Taleb observed: “Risk taking is necessary for large success – but it is also necessary for failure”. You get to pick where on the risk spectrum your portfolio is positioned.
    There are no free lunches. The marketplace is not a perfect measuring machine and is never in equilibrium. Markets move in that ideal direction, but never quite get there. Some exogenous event disrupts the process. Physically, it’s like an agitated coiled spring that is slowing down to an equilibrium, but gets an unexpected push. Opportunities present themselves but are extremely transient. Hard work is the price to identifying opportunities.
    Two themes that run throughout Scott Patterson’s excellent book “The Quants” are the secret, competitive nature of its participants, and the need for hypersonic speed. The market pricing dislocations don’t persist. For these wiz-kids, The Truth is an elusive target. Emotions are high and disaster is always near, especially when excessive leverage is deployed to magnify small percentage profits into outsized wealth.
    Many long-term players say investing is conceptually easy, but difficult to execute. When David Swensen was writing “Unconventional Success”, he changed the entire format of his book to advocate an Index approach when he realized that the average investor had neither the time, knowledge, or resources needed to execute the strategies deployed by successful professionals.
    In the business world size does matter.
    A reasonable analogy is the human lifecycle. A vibrant adult (a mature business) is better equipped to endure and survive “the slings and arrows of outrageous (mis)fortune” than a baby (an upstart business).
    Again, historically investment asset classes do have a pecking order in terms of expected returns with anticipated risk factors. Typically, but not always since the marketplace can be wild and illogical for excruciatingly long periods, Small Cap rewards are expected to outdistance Large Cap returns. The historical data generally supports this proposition.
    Although Small Caps are often expected to deliver about 2 % incremental returns over their Large Cap brethren, current investor perceptions that are both factually and emotionally driven do distort these projections. Why?
    Small size often makes the company more vulnerable to unexpected perturbations. Typically their product line is more focused and not as diverse as a Large firm. Another risk factor is that growing businesses are often not geography dispersed. Their marketing is regional, not international, so localized disturbances more directly impact their sales.
    The accessible funding line for these smaller outfits is more fragile with lower reserves and less access to loans and at higher interest rates when they can be secured. Large companies have survived their growing phase and are more stable; smaller firms are more subject to business model failures and exogenous disruptions (a new competitor or invention) with bankruptcy a higher probability.
    The bottom-line is that the old investment saw of “Diversification, diversification, diversification” is operative with respect to business sizes. Smart large businesses have the resources to do it, small businesses do not.
    The equity marketplace recognizes these small organization frailties in the risk-reward tradeoffs. Standard deviation is one incomplete measure of risk that is easily available for all stocks.
    An example of the market’s pricing sensitivities is to compare the Vanguard S&P 500 Index (VFINX) with the Vanguard Small Cap Value Index (VISVX) funds. My comparison dates to 1998 which is the first year of operation for the Small Cap Value fund. Here is a Link to that data set:
    http://quotes.morningstar.com/fund/visvx/f?rbtnTicker=Ticker&t=VISVX&x=0&y=0&SC=Q&pageno=0&TLC=
    Since VISVX inception, it has cumulatively outperformed the S&P 500 Index. From the Morningstar’s chart, VISVX has turned an initial $10K investment into $39.6K while the large cap S&P 500 produced $23.6K.
    Given the wild rides of the marketplace, this ordering of outcome will not persist for all specific timeframes. One thing is certain; change will happen.
    Once again historically, the marketplace belonged to Mom and Pop investors. Now, professional players dominate the landscape. Indexing was nearly nonexistent early-on. Now it is 30% of the investment funds (about half professional and half Mom and Pop). Vanguard now controls more money than does Fidelity. Sea changes are not uncommon in the investment world, so an individual investor must always be alert.
    Investment opportunities quickly fade. The speed needed to take advantage of these opportunities almost always takes the individual investor out of the ballgame. Even Hedge funds suffer this fate. But some general principles remain like diversification and reversion-to-the-mean.
    I hope this helps. Enough pontificating. Thanks for giving me the chance to do so.
    Best Wishes.
  • Paul Merriman: The One Asset Class Every Investor Needs
    Not to flame another Cman/MJG war, but there is definitely another side to this story. Fama-French factors have come into some pretty compelling criticism lately, and it is no longer clear there is a SCV premium or historical outperformance.
    First, a graphic example. (edit: Sigh, looks like M* won't allow you to link to the period I had originally input. To look at that chart, use 6/25/1979 as the start date. The values I listed are correct.)
    Those are the returns of a $10,000.00 investment in each of VFINX ($474,278.66), NAESX ($434,025.38), SCV ($524,319.28), and LCV ($411,828.31) over the past 35 years, approximately the time horizon of a retirement portfolio.
    Second, the CAPM model assumes the most efficient portfolio is one that contains all the securities in a market, and that any excess return comes from increased risk. Fama-French expands that by explaining where you find that risk (beta). You aren't increasing your diversification by adding SCV to a portfolio of domestic stocks (if you doubt this, check a correlation table between VFINX and VISVX). You are adding risk in hope of greater returns.
    So two questions:
    1) Where are the excess returns for the small cap and value premia; and
    2) if this investor didn't get greater returns, why did he/she accept greater risk?
    As a lot of us probably know this, I'll just link these articles and let people ruminate on their own.
    Sam Lee from M* explains Fama-French factors well here and here. He also explains his problems with Efficient Market Theory here. You can find the original paper describing the small-cap premium by Rolf Banz here.
    Turns out, however, that there has been no return premium for small cap stocks since the data was gathered by Banz in 1979. How can that be? Explanations for problems with the Fama-French assumptions, start with their own recent paper explaining how the three factors are actually five. Ask yourself after, "where does this stop?"
    From there you can read:
    Sam lee on the Five-Factor model. ("I think this should be a come-to-Jesus moment for those who've taken the F-F model as the gospel truth. Fama and French admit that their original three-factor model was not motivated by theory. They chose value and size because they worked better than other characteristics in back-tests. Grounded in the efficient-market hypothesis, they came up with risk-based stories for these patterns. Small-cap stocks provided excess returns because they're more vulnerable to the business cycle. Value stocks did so because they were distressed.
    However, since then, the size factor is no longer considered a significant source of excess returns by many academics and practitioners. Rolf Banz's original 1981 study showing a huge size premium was marred by survivorship bias. After it was corrected in the mid-1990s, back-tests showed a much smaller premium. Moreover, whatever excess returns small-cap stocks provided were driven by the smallest, least liquid securities.")
    John Rekenthaler on problems with supposed historical premia. ("To the extent that smaller companies do outperform, those gains likely owe to a liquidity premium. Smaller-company shares have lower trading volume, which increases the chance of moving the stock price by putting in a trade order, and which hampers the investor’s ability to rapidly enter or exit a position. Low liquidity is a real cost that deserves to be compensated with a real return. This is fine--but properly speaking, it’s not a small-company effect.")
    Finally these are articles from Advisor Perspectives, a commentary/newsletter service for FAs: 'The Small Cap Falsehood' ("The supposed outperformance of small cap stocks is a foundational precept on which many respected asset managers have staked their expertise over the years – foremost among them, Dimensional Fund Advisors (DFA), the famed fund company that has gained a near-religious following since they popularized small cap indexing three decades ago. A growing body of research, however, shows no such advantage for the last 30 years and, now, a new study seems to have proven that the supposed small-cap advantage may have never existed in the first place.");
    and 'A Test for Small Cap and Value Stocks' ("In a recent talk, Stanford professor and Nobel economist Bill Sharpe challenged advocates of smart-beta strategies, including overweighting small-cap and value stocks, to respond to two questions. Can the strategy be adopted by all market participants, or does it have a practical limit in terms of assets that can be invested? If it has a practical limit, then one should expect the premium to decrease over time.
    For small-cap stocks, for example, it is obvious that the answer is "no" – eventually the dollars pursuing those stocks would make them mid- or large-cap stocks. The same is true for value stocks; the money pursuing them will eventually drive prices up and erase their risk premium.
    In an email exchange, [Larry] Swedroe essentially agreed.")
    It should be pointed out that Merriman has an agenda here: he sells DFA funds that are uniquely based on the Fama-French factors. To be fair, those funds have done very well since inception. It is worth asking, however, if the small cap premium is based in liquidity and not size, whether an index is the best method of including this asset class in a portfolio.
    It should also be said that the one factor that is predictive of future performance is valuation as measured by Shiller CAPE. And right now, US small caps have historically high valuations.
    So should someone include SCV? That depends on what their horizon and goals are. But if they do weight to SCV, they should be aware they are accepting increased risk with no guarantee of increased returns.
  • A Gundlach Equities Guru Will Grow Elsewhere
    The Shiller Enhanced CAPE fund (DSENX) seems more in the Db'line wheelhouse, vs. a straight actively-managed equity fund. It's a formulaic sector-rotation stock strategy represented by derivatives, backed by a Gundlach bond strategy ... broadly similar to the Pimco PLUS funds.
    P.S. Anyone who's ever had athlete's foot won't have any trouble remembering the ticker ...
  • No Exit From Bond Funds ?
    FYI: Copy & Paste 6/21/14:
    Regards,
    Ted
    A well-thought-out exit strategy is vital to the success of a mission, as the recent events in Iraq demonstrate quite dramatically.
    Given that unfortunate example, it might be well that the Federal Reserve appears to be thinking about the consequences of the end -- and eventual reversal -- of its massive experiment in monetary stimulation. Last week, the Financial Times reported that the central bank is mulling exit fees on bond mutual funds to prevent a potential run when interest rates rise, which, given the ineluctable mathematics of bond investing, means prices fall. Quoting "people familiar with the matter," the FT said that senior-level discussions had taken place, but no formal policy had been developed.
    Those senior folks apparently didn't include Fed Chair Janet Yellen. Asked about it at her news conference on Wednesday, she professed to be unaware of any discussion of bond-fund exit fees, adding that it was her understanding that the matter "is under the purview" of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
    That nondenial denial leaves open the possibility that some entity in the U.S. financial regulatory apparatus is indeed mulling bond-fund exit fees. The Financial Stability Oversight Council established by the Dodd-Frank legislation oversees so-called systemically important financial institutions, or SIFIs, which include nonbank entities. And, indeed, the FSOC has considered designating asset managers as SIFIs, as Barron's has noted previously ("Why Fund Firms Aren't Too Big to Fail," June 2).
    To Dan Fuss, the longtime chief investment officer at Loomis Sayles, the exit-fee story seemed like a "trial balloon." But, he added, "from a practical point of view, I don't think it has a snowball's chance in hell, given the resistance from the retail distributors of mutual funds."
    Still, he continued, "it won't make me very popular -- but I think it's a good idea." That's from someone whom I would call the Buffett of bonds. Like his fellow octogenarian in Omaha, Fuss has lived through more than a few market paroxysms and has been able to take advantage by putting money to work opportunistically during panics. Unlike the head of Berkshire Hathaway, Fuss also has had to contend with outflows from his flagship Loomis Sayles Bond fund and the firm's other corporate-bond funds, as happened during the 2008 financial crisis. For staying the course during those dark days, Fuss was named Morningstar's Fixed-Income Manager of the Year in 2009.
    The latter vantage point no doubt informs his endorsement of the concept of exit fees for bond funds. As the FT quoted former Fed Governor Jeremy Stein, bond funds give investors "a liquid claim on illiquid assets." That is most acute for open-end, high-yield bond funds, Fuss says, and extends to exchange-traded funds "in less liquid areas," which would apply to junk-bond and bank-loan ETFs.
    It is a fact of financial life that most bonds are relatively illiquid, in part owing to their bespoke nature; every bond has its own unique coupon rate and maturity, plus possible features such as call options, seniority, and security, even among the same issuer. In contrast, every common share of most companies is identical (with exceptions for stocks with multiple share classes). Multiple buyers and sellers of the same item is economists' definition of a perfect market, as with a commodity such as wheat. Big, listed stocks come close; bonds, given their granular nature, don't.
    The problem of liquid claims on illiquid assets is etched into American culture in the Christmas-time classic film, It's a Wonderful Life. Faced with a run on his savings-and-loan, Jimmy Stewart pleads with his depositors that there's little cash in the till because the money is invested in the townfolks' mortgages and businesses. The practical solutions to this conundrum: deposit insurance and having central banks act as lenders of last resort.
    Those facilities don't apply to bond funds now, and didn't to money-market funds in 2008. Following the Lehman bankruptcy, the Reserve Fund "broke the buck," with its net asset value falling below $1 a share. The resulting run on that money fund and others exacerbated the crisis as this source of funds to the money market dried up.
    Officials fear that bond funds could represent "shadow banks," the FT writes, intermediaries subject to runs but without resort to the backstops available to banks. Yet, the irony is that the rush into bond funds is a result of the Fed's own policies of pinning interest rates to the floor, which spurred investors to seek income wherever they could find it. As a result, bond funds have ballooned to $3.5 trillion -- with a T -- according to the most recent data from the Investment Company Institute. That's close to the Fed's securities holdings, which total $4.1 trillion.
    Statistical evidence of that reach for yield comes from a research paper from Bank of Canada economists Sermin Gungor and Jesus Sierra (which was passed along by Torsten Slok, chief international economist at Deutsche Bank Securities).
    Not surprisingly, low rates spurred bond funds to increase the credit risk in their portfolios to boost returns. Canadians, it's safe to assume, are no less desirous of maintaining investment income than are their neighbors to the south.
    But with investors having stampeded into bond funds, would exit fees be effective at keeping them from stampeding for the exits at the first sign of higher yields and lower prices? Research suggests otherwise. And, ironically, it comes from within the Fed itself.
    According to a New York Fed staff paper by Marco Cipriani, Antoine Martin, Patrick McCabe, and Bruno M. Parigi (and surfaced by Zerohedge.com), impediments to redemptions could actually spur bond-fund investors to sell first and ask questions later. In other words, exit fees or "gates" to discourage redemptions could backfire.
    In Sartre's No Exit, hell is famously defined as "other people." The crisis that might ultimately await bond-fund investors is the prospect of being stuck with their fellow shareholders as yields rise and prices fall, rather than paying a ransom to escape. The existential choice facing bond-fund investors is whether to stay and face that prospect, or exit while they can -- if they are not prepared for a long-term commitment.
    THE SUMMER SOLSTICE just arrived in the Northern Hemisphere, putting the sun highest in the sky. And, appropriately, the major stock-market averages closed the week at records, notably the Standard & Poor's 500 and the Dow Jones Industrial Average, which approached another round-number milestone: 17,000.
    The latest liftoff came after Fed Chair Janet Yellen made clear that neither rising inflation nor soaring asset prices would deter the central bank from monetary tightening. She called the uptick in the consumer-price index, which is running above the Fed's 2% inflation target (admittedly using a different gauge, the personal consumption deflator), "noisy." But it's hurting Americans' budgets more than their ears.
    In essence, Yellen endorsed the view espoused by hedge fund mogul David Tepper a couple of years ago, that the course of monetary policy "depends" on the economy. If growth is sluggish, policy will remain accommodative, which is bullish for risk assets. Interest-rate hikes won't come until there is strong growth, which also is bullish. And as long as the monetary authorities have their back, investors have little reason to worry. So, volatility premiums collapsed in the options market; if the Fed is offering free insurance, why pay for it with hedges?
    This benign environment is spurring investors to vote with their portfolios. Michael Hartnett, chief investment strategist at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, notes a big, $13 billion inflow into equity mutual funds in the latest week and the first outflows from bond funds, totaling $2.3 billion, in 15 weeks.
    Have fund investors finally been infused with animal spirits? Hard to say, given that the equities data showed a record influx into utilities, some $1.2 billion, which Hartnett suggests indicates some chasing of that group's torrid past performance, up some 16% in 2014. Utility stocks are viewed as first cousins to bonds; income is their primary allure, but with the prospect of dividend growth, that should trump fixed coupons.
    Still, public participation in the stock market has yet to evince irrational exuberance, notes David Rosenberg of Gluskin-Sheff. In other words, the market has yet to violate rule No. 5 of Bob Farrell, the legendary market analyst at Merrill Lynch -- that the public buys most at the peak and least at the lows.
    Tops, Rosenberg explains, typically show a melt-up of a heady 11% over 30 days, which represents a first peak. A pullback lures neophytes and momentum chasers "hook, line, and sinker," to form twin peaks. That pattern was apparent in November 1980; August-October 1987; June-July 1990; April-September 2000; and July-October 2007, he points out.
    To quote every parent of young kids, we're not there yet. But, Rosenberg relates, there also is Farrell's rule No. 7: Markets are strongest when they are broad and weakest when they narrow to a handful of blue chips.
    Another veteran market maven, John Mendelson of International Strategy & Investment Group, last week pointed to the declining number of New York Stock Exchange stocks trading below their 200-day moving averages, a sign of waning momentum in the broad market that he says represents a "negative divergence." That is especially so with the major averages notching records.
    So, easy money continues to float Wall Street's yachts. Belatedly, the gold market also has noticed, with the metal surging 3% on the week, and mining stocks leading the advance. Gold may be sending the true signal, above the supposed noise from the inflation indexes.
  • 33 ETF With P/Es Below 10
    Yes, I'm also keeping my eye on GVAL. Especially after reading Mebane Faber's book Global Value. Also keeping my eye on CAPE and DSENX
  • Doubleline Shiller Enhanced Cape DSENX
    There is a related exchange traded note, symbol CAPE.
    Not a Doubleline product, but deserves comparison to the DSENX.
    Both deserve study, as the Shiller CAPE ratio is being talked about more and more each day.