insight from "The Economist" All,
I managed to parse this from my digital subscription. I value their content and feel compelled to properly cite and gracefully share:
The Economist Business
Mar 26th 2022 edition Surge pricing
Mar 26th 2022
How companies use AI to set prices
The pricing of products is turning from art into science
Few american business tactics are as peculiar in a freewheeling capitalist society as the manufacturer’s suggested retail price. P.H. Hanes, founder of the textile mill that would eventually become HanesBrands, came up with it in the 1920s. That allowed him to use adverts in publications across America to deter distributors from gouging buyers of his knitted under garments. Even today many American shopkeepers hew to manufacturers’ recommended prices, as much as they would love to raise them to offset the inflationary pressures on their other costs. A growing number, though, resort to more sophisticated pricing techniques.
A seminal study from 2010 by McKinsey, a consultancy, estimated that raising prices by 1% without losing sales can boost operating profits by 8.7%, on average. Getting this right can be tricky. Set prices too high and you risk losing customers; set them too low and you leave money on the table. Retailers have historically used rules of thumb, such as adding a fixed margin on top of costs or matching what competitors charge. As energy, labour and other inputs go through the roof, they can no longer afford to treat pricing as an afterthought.
To gain an edge, shopkeepers have been turning to price-optimisation systems. These predict how customers will respond to different pricing scenarios, and recommend those that maximise sales or profits. At their core are mathematical models that use oodles of transaction data to estimate price elasticities—how much demand increases as the price falls and vice versa—for thousands of products. Price-sensitive items can then be discounted and price-insensitive ones marked up. Merchants can fine-tune the algorithms to prevent undesirable outcomes, such as double-digit price surges or larger packages costing more by unit of weight than smaller ones.
These systems are becoming cleverer thanks to advances in artificial intelligence (ai). Whereas older models used historical sales data to estimate price elasticities for individual items, the latest crop of ai-powered ones can spot patterns and relationships between multiple items. Makers of pricing software are incorporating new data sources into their models, from customers’ tweets to online product reviews, says Doug Fuehne of Pricefx, one such firm. The cloud-based platform developed by Eversight, another provider, allows retailers to test how slight increases or decreases in the price of, say, Heinz ketchup at different stores affect sales not just of that specific condiment but across the category. It is used by big manufacturers such as Coca-Cola and Johnson & Johnson, as well as some supermarkets (Raley’s) and clothes- sellers (JCPenney).
All this makes pricing systems “much more three-dimensional”, observes Chad Yoes, a former executive at Walmart who oversaw pricing at the retail behemoth. Retail bosses are keen to promote this sophistication to investors, who value firms’ pricing power at a time of high inflation. In February Starbucks, a chain of coffee shops, boasted about its use of analytics and ai to model pricing “on an ongoing basis”. us Foods, a food distributor, has touted its pricing system’s ability to use “over a dozen different inputs” to boost sales and profits.
Price-optimisation may make prices more volatile. “Retailers are pricing faster today than they ever have before,” says Matt Pavich of Revionics, another pricing-software firm. That is especially true in the fast-moving world of e-commerce. But even Walmart reviews the prices of many items in its stores 2-4 times a year, says Mr Yoes, up from once or twice a few years ago.
What pricing systems do not do is lead inexorably to higher prices. Mr Pavich calls this misconception “one of the biggest myths” about products like his. Sysco, a big food distributor which rolled out new pricing software last year, is a case in point. The firm says the system allows it to lower prices on “key value items”—as price-sensitive bestsellers are known in the trade—and raise them on other products. It can thus increase profits by expanding sales while maintaining margins. That keeps investors content and shoppers sweet. ■
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This article appeared in the Business section of the print edition under the headline "Artificial prices"
Published since September 1843 to take part in “a severe contest between intelligence, which presses forward, and an unworthy, timid ignorance obstructing our progress.”
God bless
the Pudd
Parnassus Core Equity Fund As
@MikeW says, GQEPX is worth consideration. For its first three
years of existence M* classified it as LCG and gave it low marks in its comparison group. Recently, ISTM, Jain has embraced a value discipline, a development M* recognizes in its style box. I wonder if the reported 143% turnover reflects this shift. I don’t have snapshots of the fund’s earlier portfolio holdings that might facilitate a comparison. In the event, PBLRX is 30 times bigger with only 40 positions, so it’s unlikely to be able to pivot as GQEPX seems to have done. It’s also obvious that Jain has no ESG mandate to follow; you get tobacco in his fund. I tend to like funds with smaller asset bases and concentrated holdings, criteria that Jain’s fund meet. By way of disclosure, I still hold AKREX, even though its AUM have mushroomed; it does still have a very concentrated portfolio. I think Jain is a very good LCG EM manager and my reason for not owning his fund is that I don’t see the value in EM stocks that some analysts appear to see.
Parnassus Core Equity Fund It sounds like you're talking about the fee table in Fidelity fund prospectuses. Is it prospectus disclosures you have in mind? I was not aware that Fidelity ever charged 12b-1 fees (outside of its Fidelity Advisor load funds).
For example, here's the
current summary prospectus for FPURX and the
one from ten years ago. They both list just management fees, other fees, and 0% 12b-1 fees as you describe. Fidelity, along with many other families, has always (or at least for many
years) been rather opaque about fees in its prospectuses.
If you're talking about information that's in the SAI (e.g. group fees), at least some of that is still provided. The
current SAI for FPURX reports that the actual 2021 management fee of 0.3745% was comprised of a group fee of 0.2245% and an individual fund fee of 0.15%. Similarly, the current SAI reports that in 2021 Puritan paid $2,315,707 for pricing and bookkeeping services. (One could look up the average AUM to calculate a percentage.)
M* -- Bond Investors Facing Worst Losses in Years Thing to remember is that insurance co workouts take YEARS. The state insurance system doesn't have any pool of funds and does the workout by first seeking merger with a healthy co, and failing that, by running the failed insurer itself. I had experience with this when Mutual Benefit Life (MBL, an old, well-respected and highly-rated co until the run), a guaranteed-rate option within our 403b, failed due to a run. We were offered immediate withdrawals at 40% haircut, or the option to stick with the workout at prevailing m-mkt rates (that were about half of the guaranteed-rate by MBL) and that took several years to sort out. While money wasn't lost, there was opportunity cost due to frozen accounts. So, don't buy an insurance product from a low-rates co thinking that state insurance will you bail out quickly.
The insurance co workout is nothing like the FDIC workout for failed banks - close on Friday, reopen on Monday under a new owner/management. Main difference is that FDIC system is funded (or, very underfunded now). I have had that experience too, but that is for another time.
M* -- Bond Investors Facing Worst Losses in Years 3 Ways to Get Better Yields than Bonds via Barrons…
https://www.marketwatch.com/articles/bonds-yields-51648235275“ Multi-Year Guaranteed Annuities.These are the equivalents of bank certificates of deposits, except that they’re sold by insurers. As of Friday morning, you could get a a 5-year MYGA from an A-rated insurer yielding as much as 3.15%”
I think that annuities can be good investments for some (in limited cases) so don't take this the wrong way, but the assertion that SPDAs, esp. multi-year ones, are equivalent to CDs overstates their safety and misses some tax differences.
In terms of taxes, they are more like IRAs - withdrawals prior to age 59½ are subject to penalties.
In terms of risk, the column states that "Even if the insurer that sold you the MYGA goes broke, which is a rare event, you will get your principal back though you may get reduced interest." Well, sort of.
Executive Life of NY (ELNY) is a good case study of what could go wrong. This insurer was solvent when the state put it into receivership. (Its parent company was bankrupt and investors, not understanding the distinction, began a "run on the bank".) Bad things can happen even without the insurer going broke.
SPDA owners had a choice of:
1. Taking the cash value of their policies, which meant forfeiting possibly several percent of principal in penalties if they were not past the multi-year penalty period, or
2. Getting a new policy (with MetLife, a solid insurer) at a lower rate and with a new seven year penalty period (regardless of the term of the original contract)
https://www.nylb.org/Documents/ELNY_VerifiedPetition_ExB.pdfSure, if you waited another seven
years, you'd get your principal back with interest, but if you took the money and ran, you could wind up with less than the principal you started with. Likely to happen? Definitely not. Possible? Yes.