What made HOSIX great to this point is its SD. In terms of returns, HOSIX performed in line with HY bonds, hence my reference to BGHIX. What is unknown is how HOSIX will do when the space gets hit, and it inevitably will. What concerns me most is even looking at the structured space, other funds experienced significantly more volatility (the SD for CLOZ was 3.07 compared to 1.25 for HOSIX...and the max DD was 1.35 versus .16). Was this the result of better bond selection at HOSIX or the possibility that HOSIX has hard to price bonds such that volatility is masked when the bonds perform? Again, no one knows. I think I will still with JSVIX for now. Those guys from Semper have seen tough times before and that provides some comfort. Separate from these bond funds, I've been pretty impressed with BUYW in terms of risk v. reward. Good luck all!

What made HOSIX great to this point is its SD.

Nope. Both performance and risk/SD were great. That's 2 knockouts.
RPHIX has better SD than HOSIX but performance is far behind.
This is exactly what I'm looking for. Performance + lower SD. It doesn't mean I get the best performance; I get good risk-adjusted performance funds.
Remember, SD is based on monthly numbers and does not always show the volatility.
I don't invest in typical HY or EM, and if I do, it's only for weeks.
But if I'm looking for riskier funds, EGRIX, and APDPX would be top funds for me.
See 3+ years of EGRIX, APDPX, BGHIX
(

link).
You can also see YTD at (https://schrts.co/egqaVFzj)

The fact is that since the inception of HOSIX its CAGR is 8.97 versus 8.01 for BGHIX. I get the comparison over the past three years of the funds you listed on PV...but if you go back past 3 years you can look at how HOBIX compares to BGHIX (surrogate for the HY space) back to 2016. While I get that HOBIX is not HOSIX, if I recall correctly it was still a fund heavily invested in the securitized space. It's not such a pretty picture for HOBIX as BGHIX performed better overall, and even better compared to EGRIX, which shows how different times can yield very different outcomes.

What made HOSIX great to this point is its SD. In terms of returns, HOSIX performed in line with HY bonds, hence my reference to BGHIX. What is unknown is how HOSIX will do when the space gets hit, and it inevitably will. What concerns me most is even looking at the structured space, other funds experienced significantly more volatility (the SD for CLOZ was 3.07 compared to 1.25 for HOSIX...and the max DD was 1.35 versus .16). Was this the result of better bond selection at HOSIX or the possibility that HOSIX has hard to price bonds such that volatility is masked when the bonds perform? Again, no one knows. I think I will still with JSVIX for now. Those guys from Semper have seen tough times before and that provides some comfort. Separate from these bond funds, I've been pretty impressed with BUYW in terms of risk v. reward. Good luck all!

What made HOSIX great to this point is its SD.

Nope. Both performance and risk/SD were great. That's 2 knockouts.
RPHIX has better SD than HOSIX but performance is far behind.
This is exactly what I'm looking for. Performance + lower SD. It doesn't mean I get the best performance; I get good risk-adjusted performance funds.
Remember, SD is based on monthly numbers and does not always show the volatility.
I don't invest in typical HY or EM, and if I do, it's only for weeks.
But if I'm looking for riskier funds, EGRIX, and APDPX would be top funds for me.
See 3+ years of EGRIX, APDPX, BGHIX
(

link).
You can also see YTD at (https://schrts.co/egqaVFzj)

What made HOSIX great to this point is its SD. In terms of returns, HOSIX performed in line with HY bonds, hence my reference to BGHIX. What is unknown is how HOSIX will do when the space gets hit, and it inevitably will. What concerns me most is even looking at the structured space, other funds experienced significantly more volatility (the SD for CLOZ was 3.07 compared to 1.25 for HOSIX...and the max DD was 1.35 versus .16). Was this the result of better bond selection at HOSIX or the possibility that HOSIX has hard to price bonds such that volatility is masked when the bonds perform? Again, no one knows. I think I will still with JSVIX for now. Those guys from Semper have seen tough times before and that provides some comfort. Separate from these bond funds, I've been pretty impressed with BUYW in terms of risk v. reward. Good luck all!

What made HOSIX great to this point is its SD.

SECURE 2.0 introduced two notable changes to this system:
mandatory Roth treatment for catch-up contributions by high earners for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 2023
optional "super catch-up" contributions for participants ages 60 to 63 for taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 2024

Due to concerns that plan sponsors and recordkeepers would be unable to comply with the mandatory Roth catch-up requirement by the original deadline, Notice 2023-62 provided a transition period that delayed the effective date until Jan. 1, 2026 (although, a later effective date may apply for collectively bargained plans).

No FICA Wages, No Roth Mandate. Participants without FICA wages (e.g., partners who have only self-employment income) are not subject to the Roth requirement.

The loan market has grown substantially over the past 20 years to $1.6 trillion in size, now exceeding the high yield bond market in total par outstanding. Concurrent with the growth of the market has been a gradual shift lower in credit quality, when measured using rating agencies as a proxy. Since 2005, the median issuer net leverage in the loan market has increased more than in the high yield bond market. As a result, while the high yield market has “high-graded” in recent years, the average quality in the loan market has shifted from previously a BB oriented market to a segment that is more single-B focused.

Lots of trader comments which just brings stress to my thinking. I just bought 2 CDs at 4 and 4.2% at my local bank, while they are available. Money Market rates are falling pretty quickly now and don't expect any of them to make 4% much longer. Lots of comments about SD and Sharpe on bond oefs, but the last 3 years can produce misleading expectations going forward.

A simple gloomy model you could have of private equity is:

1. Once upon a time, companies were mispriced. Lots of companies were available cheaply. Their price didn’t reflect the present value of their cash flows, or at least, it didn’t reflect the present value of the cash flows they could reasonably achieve if you added some leverage and improved their management.
2. A few ambitious risk-seeking entrepreneurs noticed this systematic mispricing and set out to fix it. They raised money from friends and family and patient investors who were willing to take risk, they bought companies at low prices, levered them up, fixed their operations and resold them after a few years at higher prices.
3. It helped, in doing this business, that interest rates were declining for decades and valuation multiples were rising. If you bought a company, did nothing to it, waited five years and sold it, you’d have a profit just from valuation tailwinds.
4. The people who started this business — private equity — made great returns for their investors and became billionaires themselves.
5. This attracted many, many more people to the business. Who wouldn’t want to become a billionaire by buying and selling companies? Who wouldn’t want to invest with them?
6. So now private equity is the default career path for smart ambitious people entering the financial industry, and private equity firms are now giant alternative asset managers with hundreds of billions of dollars under management.
7. Why would companies be mispriced?

Like: There was an arbitrage, and correcting it made people rich, and now it is corrected, so correcting it can no longer make you rich. If you want to buy a good company, lever it up, improve its operations and sell it back to the public markets:

• Other private equity firms have already bought most of the good companies;
• The companies that are left have all levered themselves up and hired consultants to improve their operations, like a private equity firm would have done, so there’s no reward to you for doing that;
• Interest rates have gone up, so borrowing money is more expensive now than it was a few years ago; and
• Other private equity firms own tons of companies that they want to sell, so you have to compete with them when you try to sell your company back to the public markets, and you won’t get a premium price.

In the golden age of private equity, private equity ownership was an exception, a way to move companies from a low-value state to a high-value state. In 2025, private equity ownership is almost the norm: Huge chunks of modern business are owned by private equity funds rather than public shareholders. It would be a little weird if those private equity funds could all sustainably get much higher returns than public shareholders.
Anyway Bloomberg’s Allison McNeely, Preeti Singh and Laura Benitez report on gloomy times for private equity:

After a half-century of meteoric growth, buyout firms are facing challenges at every step of their life cycle: Attractive takeover targets are scarcer, financing costs are up and it’s harder to cash out old investments and deliver the robust returns once promised to pension managers, endowments, foundations and wealthy individuals. Even dealmakers are frustrated — waiting to collect their share of profits known as carried interest that comes when investments are successfully wrapped up. …
“Private equity has lost its way and has to go back to what this industry — that employs the brightest and best minds — does best,” Orlando Bravo, managing partner of private equity firm Thoma Bravo, said in an interview. That’s “buying and selling companies and generating great returns for its investors.” …
“Many PE firms are dead already, they just don’t know it,” said Charles Wilson, senior vice president of investment management at industry recruiter Selby Jennings. “Survival will likely hinge on how forgiving managers find their LPs to be when they hit the fundraising trail again in coming years.”
The troubles follow a long, high-flying era. For more than a decade, rock-bottom interest rates and cheap financing helped firms scoop up businesses, re-engineer their finances and then unload them at lofty valuations. But when the Federal Reserve started hiking borrowing costs in 2022, the industry got stuck — unable to exit holdings at the prices and returns they had been touting in marketing pitches and updates to clients. …
Privately, many institutional investors concede that their expectations from private equity investments are muted for the next decade compared with the previous 10 years.

Perfect time to, uh, sell private equity to retail?