I think I've suggested PRDSX to you before? I'm sticking with it. If I'm not mistaken, its mandate and methodology became explicitly "quant" along the way, and I'm pretty happy with the change. Strong long-term performance: +17.72% compounded over past 10 years. In the current run-up, it's up +18.68, putting it in the middle of the pack.
But consider: "Quantitatively driven T. Rowe Price QM U.S. Small-Cap Growth Equity is an excellent option for investors seeking low-priced exposure to the MSCI U.S. Small Cap Growth Index...." So, if Morningstar's analyst is not "all wet," PRDSX is not MEANT to actually stand out from all the rest.

In addition to John Oliver’s focus on investing in mobile homes, you might also want to invest in mobile home parks. Some reasons (From Mobile Home University):
- “From the New York Times to Bloomberg, mobile home park investing is starting to be recognized as an attractive real estate sector ... Mobile home parks have the highest yields in commercial real estate, with starting cap rates often over 10%, and cash-on-cash returns of 20% standard fare.”
- “If you believe that the U.S. economy will continue to decline in the years ahead, ... then mobile home parks are virtually the only form of real estate that performs better in a recession. ... Over 20% of the U.S. population has a household income of $20,000 per year or less (which is nearly the poverty line). As America gets poorer, mobile home parks are the only form of housing devoted to this demographic ...
- “One reason that mobile home parks have long held their value is the simple fact that virtually no city or town in the U.S. will allow new parks to be built. Why? Nobody wants a mobile home park as a neighbor, and their vocal dislike for mobile home parks eliminates any chance of political approval.”
- “Another interesting barrier is the difficulty tenants have in moving their home out of a mobile home park. It costs around $5,000 to move a mobile home, so virtually no tenants can ever afford to move. As a result, the revenues of mobile home parks are unbelievably stable.”
https://www.mobilehomeuniversity.com/articles/why-invest-in-mobile-home-parks.php

@BenWP @Old_Joe
Ben, OJ was very involved with writing a user guide and sorting out bugs with testing and related during the birth of MFO.
A site search indicates the word, paramecium; had previously never been used at this site in text discussion.
ADD: I've met two politicians in Michigan over the years who were not far evolved from a paramecium.

Agreed! I'd pay up to maybe .90 for that (which I do for PRBLX) but 1.32 is too much.
Also noted this fund has only been around for 5-ish years so it's really thrived as growth funds thrived. Let's see how it handles the ext GFC before getting too excited..

If the fund has little turnover (a good thing), then what do they do that requires a 1.32% ER (not a good thing)?

Here's an ungodly long link from a M* chart, showing that MOAT's cumulative performance over DSENX is about 20% for last 3 years. The 5 year period, not shown here, is similarly favorable for MOAT. I wish I could be as cool as @catch22 with my chart.
http://quotes.morningstar.com/chart/etf/chart.action?t=MOAT&region=usa&&dataParams={"zoomKey":7,"version":"US","showNav":true,"mainSettingId":"main","navSettingId":"nav","benchmarkSettingId":"benchmark","sliderBgSettingId":"sliderBg","volumeSettingId":"volume","id":"F00000O2CJ|F00000QBC0","type":"FE|FO","region":"USA","name":"ARCX:MOAT|XNAS:DSENX","qsType":"USA:MOAT|F00000QBC0","baseCurrency":"USD","defaultBenchmarks":["$FOCA$LB$$|Large Blend|CA]FE","XIUSA04G92|S&P 500 TR USD|XI"],"hideDividendMenu":false,"startDay":"04/09/2016","endDay":"04/08/2019","chartWidth":955}

I've admired this managers skills even way back when he ran FBR Focus. When I moved my retirement money to Schwab back in 2014, I think I remember AKREX had a TF to buy, so decided not to hold it.
Long story short, I noticed no TF at schwab now so I decided to do a 1 for 1 swap. Back in Feb. I bought AKREX to take the place of GTLOX, another really good large cap growth fund. So now I hold the manager I've wanted for the last 10 years.

@MikeM and @davidmoran: I did overstate the performance figures for MOAT vs. DSENX. I relied on the "chart" function on M* which has cumulative performance. 3 years +22.76% for DSENX and +41.98% for MOAT, but the 5-year difference is not huge. MOAT made a very wise modification to its methodology after a bad 2015 when the fund wound up with a slew of energy companies at the wrong time. They doubled the number of stocks and abandoned the quarterly rejiggering of the whole portfolio, producing fine results. All-in-all, it's an endorsement of the M*'s wide-moat strategy with which I'm happy. I have advocated previously for MOAT here, but my voice has been drowned out by waves of postings and complaints about their frequency. For a few years I owned BFOR and MOAT, but the latter has left the former in the dust. The so-called GAARP fund from Barron's has really disappointed.

FYI: Akre Focus Fund (AKREX) takes buy-and-hold investing to heart, often holding the same small group of stocks for years at a time.
The $9.8 billion mutual fund, which was up more than 19% in the first quarter of this year, currently has 22 holdings that the fund managers believe compound shareholder capital at above-average rates of return. Investments are made based on four criteria, says John Neff, one of the fund’s portfolio managers.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.wsj.com/articles/a-funds-long-time-frame-forever-11554688920
M* Snapshot AKREX:
https://www.morningstar.com/funds/xnas/akrex/quote.html

Yeah, the last couple years many value-ish ETFs have outperformed (hardly clocked) DSE_X and CAPE; I have posted about this a couple of times as I have been seeking alternatives to CAPE, although not specifically mentioning MOAT.

@johnN: The link below will take you to a December 2015 post that I made about my asset allocation. It seems, I was at this time just moving to about 20% cash, 30% income, 35% growth and income and 15% growth asset allocation. Prior to that, based upon my recollection, I was at about 15% cash, 25% income, 40% growth & income and 20% growth asset allocation. Most likely, I was at an asset allocation of about 10% cash, 20% income, 40% growth & income and 30% growth during the time span you inquired about (2009-2010).
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/24926/old-skeet-s-new-portfolio-asset-allocations-2016#latest
I'll keep looking and if I come up with something else I'll post it.
And, here is something else that I came up with that dates back to March of 2012 as how I went about adjusting my asset allocation. Perhaps, it will be of some interest.
https://www.mutualfundobserver.com/discuss/discussion/2501/a-system-i-use-to-adjust-my-asset-allocation#latest
As you can see through the years; and, as I have aged, I have reduced my allocation to equities and raised my allocation to income while cash has stayed about the same except when I was positioned for the 2009-2010 stock market rebound. Back then cash was at about 10%. One reason that I hold excess cash is that it provides me the opportunity to open special equity spiff positions form time-to-time should I feel this is warranted. This is something that I have done for a good number of years ... and, I still do form time-to-time. However, I did not put a spiff in play during the last market swoon (4th Quarter of 2018) as I was in the process of rebalancing and reconfiguring my portfolio. Howerver, I did leave myself +5% equity heavy during this last rebalance process to tactically overweighting equities from my newely established asset allocation of 20% Cash, 40% Income, 30% Gr & Inc and 10% Growth. With this, my Growth Area is now +5% heavy while my Cash Area is -5% light from their neutral positions due to this tactical overweight positioning in equities.

...
(With nonretirement-account losses able to 'detax' any gains for years to come, I have been pondering recently, as I raise cashflow from both rollovers and Roths per ORP, whether the taxfree future of my Roths really matters.)

Different ways of viewing it for sure. In pure dollars and cents the linked article probably makes sense. Did 3 conversions. First & biggest in March ‘09. Motivation was primarily to reduce by at least 50% the RMDs that would be coming down the road in a few more years. (And there are years when the only distribution comes from the traditional.)
While they’re invested conservatively (like the traditional IRAs) I vowed never to keep a cash position in any of the Roths. That has probaby made the biggest difference in their outperformance. Also, I avoid holding newer untested funds in the Roths. Deserve a bit extra care.

Doing it for you, with the same conclusion (spread, anyway):
https://www.i-orp.com/bequest/index.html
(With nonretirement-account losses able to 'detax' any gains for years to come, I have been pondering recently, as I raise cashflow from both rollovers and Roths per ORP, whether the taxfree future of my Roths really matters.)

I’m doing it all wrong.
First, I’ve allowed my Roths to outperform my Traditional IRAs over the years. Roths now comprise over 65% of IRA assets. Worse yet, if I need $10,000, I take $5,000 from the Traditional and $5,000 from the Roth. This leaves an immediate tax liability on $5,000 (instead of $10,000).
But always willing to learn something from the links board.

Relative to the funds in the article (and the additional funds mentioned here), RPHYX doesn't look so impressive these days. It has an SEC yield of 2.10%. Clearly it's having difficulty meeting its objective of beating the 1 year Treasury (currently 2.4%, as noted by Lewis) by 200 - 400 bps.
Currently, Treasuries are essentially flat from 1mo to 7 years. With that sort of curve (actually dipping in the middle), it makes little sense to me to try to eek out yield by going longer than ultrashort. Also, buying a one year CD or Treasury could serve as a hedge against rates dropping in the short term.
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/pages/textview.aspx?data=yield
Instead of keeping day-to-day money in a low/no interest checking account, one can keep money in Fidelity's SPRXX (2.25% SEC yield) or FZDXX (2.37% SEC yield) and write checks/pay bills directly from that fund. (Fidelity automatically sells the MMF if you have no cash in your core/transaction account.) Every penny helps.

I belatedly agree with @msf. I searched and couldn’t find where it’s illegal to access these sites through the back door. Nor has anyone alleged that it is. More of a personal comfort level I guess. I’d rather pay for the goods I consume.
Subscriptions to top quality publications are dirt cheap considering the quality of writing and analysis one can receive for $15-25 monthly. For around $40-50 monthly I receive 2 top quality national newspapers 7 days a week (ad free) delivered to my Kindle reader, plus 2 top-notch science magazines monthly, also on the Kindle, plus one free audiobook of my choosing every month (great for falling asleep at night). And my $$ goes to support good journalism. What a deal.
Tend to agree with @Sven on a couple points. Admire LB’s writing. And, I’ve little use anymore for Barrons. Received it for the past year for their $52 special rate and rarely picked it up. I suspect some of that may be a degradation of the content over the past 50 years and some of it a maturation of the reader over the same time span.

My thinking falls somewhere in the cracks here.
I will only read content at a third party site if it is licensed there. For example, T. Rowe Price used to provide select WSJ articles online to Personal Services investors (back when that required "only" $100K invested). Some articles are reprinted on MarketWatch (another Dow Jones company).
I would not hack into a site merely because I had another channel to access the same content. For example, some publications (WSJ, Consumer Reports, etc.) sell paper subscriptions separately from online subscriptions. IMHO having a paper subscription does not justify accessing the content online if one does not subscribe to that medium.
That said, I consider using well publicized back doors (google, anonymous browsing) fair game. These portals to the content sites are provided by the vendor. Barron's, as sister pub to WSJ, could easily shut down anonymous browsing if it did not have a business purpose in making it available.
It's not as though the publishers aren't gaming us at least as much as some may think they're gaming the "system".
https://www.niemanlab.org/2018/02/after-years-of-testing-the-wall-street-journal-has-built-a-paywall-that-bends-to-the-individual-reader/

FYI: There was a time when earning 1% from a short-term bond was acceptable. Five years ago, the average one-year Treasury bill yielded less than 0.2% and many money-market funds paid essentially nothing. Ultrashort-term bond funds, which took on a little more risk, but paid a bit more, were one of the few viable options for conservative investors seeking income from their cash.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.barrons.com/articles/higher-rates-produce-more-short-term-bond-alternatives-51554512253?mod=past_editions

I'm writing about categorization of the allocation within funds, which M* totally overhauled some years ago and wrecked a good system.
By analysis, I meant a general term, in other words, drilling down to give an investor what they need to make decisions. I didn't specifically mean analyst reports or star ratings or M*'s approach to fund credit ratings. Sorry that one stray word sent you off on a wild goose chase.
In addition, I've run across many cases where M* data is stale, and the only way to get up-to-date info in that case is thru the provider. That in some cases could be the provider's fault, but the fact remains.

I'd suggest skipping M* entirely when researching bond fund allocation. It's easy to find almost any fund's allocation, using their info, and that info usually has the distinct advantage of being basically accurate. M* bollixed up their bond analysis several years ago, and it's really not worth the time using them for bond allocation info any longer.

You seem to be conflating "allocation" with "analysis". M* reports funds' allocations exactly as reported by the funds. On the other hand, M* calculates its own weighted average of credit quality. It does this because a simple average isn't meaningful.
To understand this, think about star ratings. M* grades on a bell curve. That makes sense because fewer than 20% of funds perform at 'A' (5*) level, while lots more than 20% perform at a mediocre 'C' (3*) level.
If you don't like this bell curve, you can always look at Lipper ratings, which rate fully 20% of the funds "A' (5). But it's not as helpful. (I think the Lipper ratings are more helpful because they rate different aspects of the fund, like consistency and returns, but in terms of the scale they use, their unweighted scale isn't as helpful.)
Similar idea with credit ratings. According to S&P data (see figure below), virtually no AAA bonds (0.00%) default within a year, almost as few (0.17%) BBB bonds default, while a quarter (26.82%) of CCC bonds default within the span of a year. Now that default doesn't mean they go bust, more likely they just stop paying interest.
Still, think about a portfolio containing one AAA bond and one CCC bond, vs. a portfolio containing two BBB bonds. The latter has less than a 0.34% chance of any bond defaulting. The former has better than a 1/4 chance of defaulting, though the impact is cut in half since the CCC bond represents only half the portfolio.
Both portfolios "average" BBB in credit rating, if we take a simple average. That average doesn't tell us anything; these two portfolios have such disparate risk profiles.
What we can do with the first portfolio is weight the bond ratings by their impact. So while we might rate AAA as "A" (giving it a numeric value of 1), we might rate CCC bonds as 'Z' (giving it a numeric value of 26, corresponding to its 26+% chance of defaulting). Now when we average the two bonds, we get somewhere around 13, which might correspond to "high quality" junk.
That gives us a better sense of what to expect from the portfolio in terms of defaults. If getting a sense of portfolio default risk is what we want from an average credit rating, then this method of averaging is more meaningful.
If what we want from an average credit rating is to compress the bond allocation (how many A's, how many B's, etc.) down to a single number, then a simple average is better. Personally, if I want to know what the allocation of bonds is, I just look at a bar chart or table showing the whole distribution. It's not as though there are that many grades of bonds that the picture is confusing.

I bought back into IOFIX last week with profits I took out of riskier CEfs after the big ytd runup began to slow, and looked at the current asset allocation on the web site before I plunked the $ down. It's still 98% residential MBS, but the legacy share is down to ~ 3/4 of the port. There's 0.4% in what they refer to as ABS, "which may encompass aircraft, shipping, and transportation assets" (so sayeth the fact sheet).
I'd suggest skipping M* entirely when researching bond fund allocation. It's easy to find almost any fund's allocation, using their info, and that info usually has the distinct advantage of being basically accurate. M* bollixed up their bond analysis several years ago, and it's really not worth the time using them for bond allocation info any longer.