I went and graphed Oct-Dec $10k change for CAPE, DSEEX, SP500, low-vol LC ETFs, plus DOD, MMTM, QUAL, SCHD, VIG.... And yeah, everyone has already beat me to the point: DSEEX and CAPE did not do any better, to the contrary, did somewhat worse.
(I too have wanted to use CAPE for Merrill no-cost trading but cannot.)
I was v impressed to see how comparatively well TWEIX, YACKX, and PRBLX did during that significant slump. Yay for active management sometimes.

@Sven, DSENX is not a balanced fund (as thoroughly discussed in past discussions here. msf I believe had some good info on that point) so that comparison you gave ends up being apples to oranges. I suppose it could be called a "hybrid" type fund for whatever that means. For me it's just a large cap fund that has a really good return record and does better than the index, whether that's the LC Value or S&P 500 index. And what is meant by your comment that the 2018 drawdown is sizeable? In 2018 per M* the fund lost -4.3% while the LC value index lost -8.5% (S&P500 was -4.4%). It is a little more volatile if you are basing that on the STD, but does that matter if your holding the fund long term and not trying to get in and out to time the market? Higher STD is a bad thing if you don't hold on to your funds. In any case, there is nothing to say this fund is significantly more risky than your typical large cap fund. Take a look at the upside/downside capture ratio. Again DSENX has more upside than the S&P500 index and less downside. It blows the LCV index out of the water by that measure.
@MikeW, didn't really pay much attention before, but per M*, DSENX lost -15.6% and in comparison the S&P500 lost -13.5% in the 4th qtr. The CAPE ETF also lost about the same as DSENX so apparently it relates to the S&P500 low valuation sectors the CAPE formula was invested in at the time. It is not a low-volatility fund if that's what you are looking for.

By Jim Sloan at SeekingAlpha:
"Summary
•Buffett's 2013 Shareholder Letter stated that he would instruct the trustee of his wife's bequest to invest 90% in an S&P 500 index fund and 10% in short Treasuries.
•An academic back study shows that this unorthodox allocation produces not only high returns but a much lower failure rate than conventional 40/60 and 30/70 portfolios.
•The essence of the Buffett portfolio is to divide the future into the short term in which money is needed and the long term in which stock returns are superior.
•The effect, in bond manager lingo, is a "barbell" portfolio with concentration at very short and very long maturities and an excluded middle - the Berkshire term structure.
•It turns out that the barbell may be the best way of matching maturities to the needs of pension funds, institutions, insurance companies, and individuals - including some retirees."
https://seekingalpha.com/article/4239453-buffetts-barbell-90-percent-equities-10-percent-cash-wife-berkshire-maybe-retirees?ifp=0

David, why would you need a CAPE stand in?
You turned me on to DSENX years ago and it remains one of my top holdings. FDSAX seems a poor substitute for DOD and it hasn't even kept up with the S&P500 let alone DSENX. Some times more is less. Maybe not even sometimes.

CAPE, again, has outperformed DOD the last 6/5/4/3/1y periods. (Slightly.) I shoulda considered it when looking for a CAPE standin, instead of QUAL and MMTM and a few others. DOD sure has a higher UI, though, and by some degree.

FYI: Time to check in on some old friends: the Dogs of the Dow.
The “dogs” are just the 10 stocks with the highest dividend yields in the 122-year-old Dow Jones Industrial Average, which these days include Verizon (ticker: VZ), International Business Machines (IBM) and Pfizer (PFE).
It is an old stock-picking strategy grounded in the idea that you can make more money by buying cheap stocks than you can buying expensive stocks. Sounds simple, but it works.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.barrons.com/articles/buying-the-dow-stocks-with-the-highest-dividends-is-a-winning-strategy-51549620000?mod=hp_DAY_9
Dogs Of The Dow.Com:
http://www.dogsofthedow.com/

FYI: Just like the broader market this week, the rally in high yield credit stalled out a bit. Earlier on Friday, we highlighted the fact that the S&P 500 ran into resistance right at its 200-DMA earlier this week and has been pulling back ever since. In the case of the ETF that tracks the high yield credit market (HYG), we have seen a similar setup. Coming off the lows in December, high yield was a little bit late to the rally, but it quickly made up any lost ground and has since followed the move in the S&P 500 step for step. In fact, this week HYG even managed to briefly trade above its 200-DMA. In this case, though, HYG ran out of momentum pretty much right at the same spot (~$85) where recent bounce attempts also ran out of steam.
The fact that these rallies in both high yield and the broader equity market are stalling out right at key moving averages is no doubt a focus of technicians, but given the magnitude of the moves off the lows, they had to take a break at some point, so why not at a point where everyone was expecting it. The only test now is whether there are enough bids below current levels to support the market, or will sellers eventually overwhelm the balance.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.bespokepremium.com/think-big-blog/high-yield-stalls/

Yes, I remember when Kinder Morgan MLP shareholders received significant income in taxable and non-taxable accounts when the MLPs were converted into Kinder Morgan stock.
Here is a reminder of that incident:
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-advisors/010516/mlp-investors-hit-surprise-tax-bill-ira-income.asp
Here is a link for Cramer on the same issue:
https://www.thestreet.com/story/11544379/1/cramer-on-retirement-can-master-limited-partnerships-hurt-your-ira.html

FYI:
Regards,
Ted
https://www.cnbc.com/video/2019/02/05/cashin-the-p-is-moving-up-and-the-e-is-slipping-down.html?&qsearchterm=Art Cashin

@FD1000, you make a good point looking at the last 3 month spurt. In that case I agree the time to buy was 3 months ago (sounds like a Geico commercial :) ). I was looking at it as what to expect from a long term, next 3-5 years, investment in Munis (or maybe bonds in general) and in that way I wouldn't be comfortable that 1 year or 3 year Muni returns will out-perform CD's or even a money market like they did in past years. But who knows. And maybe that changes if in a taxable account versus tax deferred.
I agree with the point you made though.

My choice for HY munis is ORNAX. 5 stars since forever at M*.

FYI: RiverPark Advisors, LLC today announced the conversion of the RiverPark Floating Rate CMBS Fund (RCRIX, RCRFX) to an open-end mutual fund with daily liquidity from an interval fund. The strategy is managed by Edward L. Shugrue III, as it has been since its inception in 2010. The strategy has not had a down year since its inception and has averaged 6.16% per year over that period. The conversion was effective as of November 12, 2018.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190205005181/en

FYI: -Catalyst Funds, an alternative-focused mutual fund company, today announced the launch of the Catalyst Enhanced Income Strategy Fund (EIXIX). The Fund employs an income-focused strategy that invests in a variety of non-traditional income asset classes.
Regards,
Ted
https://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20190205005219/en

(Unable to read the wsj article.)
I’ve normally gravitated to funds that preached value investing. There are are many different ways to define what a “value stock” represents. But the most important thing IMHO is that the “worst news” has already been discounted by the market so that these stocks aren’t likely to fall much further. Should be just the recipe for a patient long term investor.
Obviously, value hasn’t been the place to be for at least a decade. But it would be sad if managers who preach value investing were to begin acting contrary to the contract they have with their investors and stray from the value approach in search of better return.
Louis Navellier made 10 recommendations in late 2018 for stocks he felt were top value picks. https://investorplace.com/2018/11/10-value-stocks-to-buy-for-december/.
Here’s Navellier’s list:
Wendy’s, Boeing, Intel, Microsoft, Amazon?, Berkshire Hathaway, J.P. Morgan Chase, Proctor & Gamble, United Health Care, Chevron
Of the above, only one, United Health Care, is among OAKBX’s top 25 holdings (my previous post).
:) Just noticed OAKBX holds Phillip Morris. Hard to argue with that one. I think it’s been considered a “value stock” for about as long as I’ve been investing (50 years).

The Hulbert article offers the following list of value stocks for the DIYer who can't find a fund for the job:
• Bank OZK OZK 3.55% (OZK)
• Brighthouse Financial BHF -0.83% (BHF)
• Capital One Financial COF 0.63% (COF)
• Citigroup C 0.61% (C)
• Goldman Sachs GS 0.60% (GS)
• Gulfport Energy GPOR -0.12% (GPOR)
• Mallinckrodt MNK -0.67% PLC (MNK)
• New York Community Bancorp (NYCB)
• PennyMac Mortgage Investment Trust PMT 1.24% (PMT)
Financial services figure prominently. OAKBX has a few, but Citigroup is the only one in common.

I deserted OAKBX late in 2018 after a near 15-year marriage. It got ravaged during the December market rout. It is, of course, supposed to be a value fund. BTW - It’s been hot ever since I left. :)
Interested what folks think of these top 25 holdings. Is that fund still true to its value roots, or has it morphed into something else? Thanks for any observations.
Symbol Name % Weight
GM General Motors Co 4.95%
BAC Bank of America Corporation 4.80%
TEL TE Connectivity Ltd 3.93%
-- United States Treasury Notes 1.25%
MA Mastercard Inc A 3.11%
NSRGY Nestle SA ADR 2.98%
CVS CVS Health Corp 2.58%
UNH UnitedHealth Group Inc 2.36%
DEO Diageo PLC ADR 2.26%
GOOG Alphabet Inc Class C 2.18%
PM Philip Morris International Inc 2.12%
-- United States Treasury Notes 2.12%
C Citigroup Inc 1.82%
CHTR Charter Communications Inc A. 1.78%
-- United States Treasury Notes 1.75%
FL Foot Locker Inc 1.73%
ORCL Oracle Corp 1.69%
ALLY Ally Financial Inc 1.67%
BWA BorgWarner Inc 1.63%
-- United States Treasury Notes 2.38%
-- United States Treasury Notes 1.62%
NOV National Oilwell Varco Inc 1.41%
LEA Lear Corp 1.30%
GLEN Glencore PLC 1.30%
AIG American International Group Inc. 1.23%
Source: https://ycharts.com/mutual_funds/M:OAKBX/holdings

I don't have access to the article. But....the emerging markets fund I mentioned in the recent Emerging Market Funds thread is offered by a firm that represents itself as a classic value fund shop. PZVEX invests only in stocks in the lowest "normalized" P/E ratio quintile at the time of purchase.
https://snl.com/Cache/1001247182.PDF?O=PDF&T=&Y=&D=&FID=1001247182&iid=4162576
M* puts the fund's P/B ratio at 0.90 vs 1.70 for the category average....but that doesn't say what the ratio looked like at the time of initial stock purchase.
Here is how the Pzena folks describe their investment process:
pzena.com/OurApproach/Index?KeyGenPage=306616
This info is not offered as a "rebutal" but rather just as an example of a firm that labels itself as a classic value shop......

Mark Hulbert's column today in the WSJ Investing in Funds section is quite revealing. For those who subscribe:
https://www.wsj.com/articles/want-to-invest-in-a-true-value-fund-good-luck-finding-one-11549249860?mod=searchresults&page=1&pos=1
For those who don't, Hulbert points out, citing a study by a trio of academics, that no ETFs and only a couple of nearly unknown OEFs really invest in pure value stocks, those "that trade for the lowest ratios of price to book value."
Maybe our members have a favorite value investor or fund to offer by way of rebuttal.

(Sorry, didn't see Ted's post from earlier this morning)
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/277751/000119312519026477/d613622d497.htm
497 1 d613622d497.htm 497
Janus Investment Fund
497 1 d613622d497.htm 497
Janus Investment Fund
Janus Henderson Global Unconstrained Bond Fund
Supplement dated February 4, 2019
to Currently Effective Prospectuses
Effective March 1, 2019, William H. Gross, the Portfolio Manager for Janus Henderson Global Unconstrained Bond Fund (the “Fund”) intends to retire. In connection with Mr. Gross’ retirement, effective on or about February 15, 2019, Nick Maroutsos will become the new Portfolio Manager of the Fund, and the Fund will change its name to Janus Henderson Absolute Return Income Opportunities Fund. The Fund’s investment objective and principal investment strategies are not changing, and the name change is intended to align the Fund’s name to other Janus Henderson products managed by Mr. Maroutsos using the absolute return income investment approach.
The Fund is expected to experience increased shareholder redemptions as a result of the above changes, which may cause the Fund to sell portfolio securities at times when it would not otherwise do so. As a result, the Fund may deviate from its stated investment strategies and policies in order to meet redemption requests. Increased shareholder redemptions and efforts to realign the Fund’s portfolio to reflect Mr. Maroutsos’ investment approach may also accelerate the realization of taxable income to shareholders if such sales of investments result in gains, and will also increase transaction costs. In addition, increased shareholder redemptions would result in the Fund’s current expenses being allocated over a smaller asset base, which would lead to an increase in the Fund’s expense ratio, but will not alter the expense caps currently in place for each share class of the Fund.
Based on the above changes, effective on or about February 15, 2019, the Fund’s prospectuses are amended as follows:
1. Under “Management” in the Fund Summary section of the Fund’s prospectuses, the following paragraph replaces the corresponding paragraph in its entirety:
Portfolio Manager: Nick Maroutsos is Executive Vice President and Portfolio Manager of the Fund, which he has managed since February 2019.
2. Under “Investment Personnel — Janus Henderson Global Unconstrained Bond Fund” in the Management of the Funds section of the Fund’s prospectuses, the following information replaces the corresponding information in its entirety:
Nick Maroutsos is Executive Vice President and Portfolio Manager of the Fund, which he has managed since February 2019. Mr. Maroutsos is also Portfolio Manager of other Janus Henderson accounts. He joined Janus Capital in 2015, and is a member of the Janus Global Macro leadership team. Prior to joining Janus Capital, Mr. Maroutsos was a Founder and Managing Director of Kapstream Capital, now a Janus Henderson subsidiary. Prior to forming Kapstream Capital in 2006, Mr. Maroutsos held positions with Pacific Investment Management Company LLC from 1999 to 2005. Mr. Maroutsos holds a Bachelor of Arts in Economics from the University of California at San Diego and an MBA from the UCLA Anderson School of Management.
Effective on or about February 15, 2019, all references to William H. Gross are deleted from the Fund’s prospectuses.
Supplement dated February 4, 2019
to Currently Effective Prospectuses
Effective March 1, 2019, William H. Gross, the Portfolio Manager for Janus Henderson Global Unconstrained Bond Fund (the “Fund”) intends to retire. In connection with Mr. Gross’ retirement, effective on or about February 15, 2019, Nick Maroutsos will become the new Portfolio Manager of the Fund, and the Fund will change its name to Janus Henderson Absolute Return Income Opportunities Fund. The Fund’s investment objective and principal investment strategies are not changing, and the name change is intended to align the Fund’s name to other Janus Henderson products managed by Mr. Maroutsos using the absolute return income investment approach.
The Fund is expected to experience increased shareholder redemptions as a result of the above changes, which may cause the Fund to sell portfolio securities at times when it would not otherwise do so. As a result, the Fund may deviate from its stated investment strategies and policies in order to meet redemption requests. Increased shareholder redemptions and efforts to realign the Fund’s portfolio to reflect Mr. Maroutsos’ investment approach may also accelerate the realization of taxable income to shareholders if such sales of investments result in gains, and will also increase transaction costs. In addition, increased shareholder redemptions would result in the Fund’s current expenses being allocated over a smaller asset base, which would lead to an increase in the Fund’s expense ratio, but will not alter the expense caps currently in place for each share class of the Fund.
Based on the above changes, effective on or about February 15, 2019, the Fund’s prospectuses are amended as follows:
1. Under “Management” in the Fund Summary section of the Fund’s prospectuses, the following paragraph replaces the corresponding paragraph in its entirety:
Portfolio Manager: Nick Maroutsos is Executive Vice President and Portfolio Manager of the Fund, which he has managed since February 2019.
2. Under “Investment Personnel — Janus Henderson Global Unconstrained Bond Fund” in the Management of the Funds section of the Fund’s prospectuses, the following information replaces the corresponding information in its entirety:
Nick Maroutsos is Executive Vice President and Portfolio Manager of the Fund, which he has managed since February 2019. Mr. Maroutsos is also Portfolio Manager of other Janus Henderson accounts. He joined Janus Capital in 2015, and is a member of the Janus Global Macro leadership team. Prior to joining Janus Capital, Mr. Maroutsos was a Founder and Managing Director of Kapstream Capital, now a Janus Henderson subsidiary. Prior to forming Kapstream Capital in 2006, Mr. Maroutsos held positions with Pacific Investment Management Company LLC from 1999 to 2005. Mr. Maroutsos holds a Bachelor of Arts in Economics from the University of California at San Diego and an MBA from the UCLA Anderson School of Management.
Effective on or about February 15, 2019, all references to William H. Gross are deleted from the Fund’s prospectuses....

I’ve always been leary of EM equity funds. Perhaps unjustified - but it relates to approximately 35 years ago when a fee-based advisor moved me (and his other clients) from TEMWX, which at the time was a great fund, into TEGOX*, Templeton’s new EM fund. (At that time it represented 100% of my assets.) His stated reason was that the latter would outperform. But it never did as long as I was with him and Templeton. The first had lower fees and an enviable track record. Much easier to “digest” during falling markets. The second had high fees and poor erratic performance at that time.
I do like to own some EM bonds however. Currently own PREMX. I perceive them less risky than EM equities and still offering potential above average long term return. A big reason they’ve spiked recently is in response to the Fed’s 180-degree change in posture and the subsequent pullback in the dollar vs many foreign currencies. As for EM equities, many globally diversified equity funds commit anywhere from 5-25% of their assets to EM equities. (Read Prospectus / Fund Report.) Gets you the EM equity exposure while leaving the harder part (where, when, how much to commit) to the managers.
* Just noticed this fund has been liquidated.
FWIW