M* site has all sorts of problems with data, interface, and more. Not surprising to see more complaints. Frankly the premium side has gone downhill over the past 18 months or so in many ways ... and their IT dept is slower than mollasses in addressing even the 'big' problems. :(

@msf- thanks again for your help on this stuff. I did miss the "little balloon", but in going back to take another look they both seem to have the same balloon note, so all things being equal, something still doesn't add up.

PGBOX has (unless waived) a front-end load of up to 3.75%.
So $100 invested Jan 1 would have left you with $100 x (1 - 3.75%) x (1 + 3.09%) = $99.22, a loss of 0.78%.
But WOBDX shares have no load, so $100 would have gotten you $100 x 1 x 3.16% = $103.16.

The last few nights, I've noticed the performance numbers bear the previous day's date. Many people depend on those numbers, even if they are only making use of the offered free membership. Some of us are premium members. Day-old numbers, at 11:49 p.m. of the FOLLOWING day, just doesn't cut the mustard.

@msf: Schwab says YTD (as of 5/31) return for WOBDX is 3.16% vs -0.78% for PGBOX yet the only difference between the two seems to be an ER of 0.59% for WOBDX vs 0.76% for PGBOX.
Can that be right? The historic ratings summary for WOBDX is also significantly better than that of PGBOX. How to account for such a difference between two funds with essentially the same makeup?

It's just one fund - simply two different share classes (like Vanguard Investor and Admiral shares). I found the retail class by looking at the M* "purchase" page for WOBDX and picking another share class. So even before looking at the Schwab site, the answer must be "no, that cannot be right" assuming both figures are from 5/31, and the figures reported are purely fund performance.
But they're not. If you look at the Schwab performance page for the A shares, you'll see a little "balloon" to the right of "YTD Return". Mouse over that. It reads:

YTD Return is adjusted for possible sales charges, and assumes reinvestment of dividends and capital gains

This points to something I think Schwab (and other brokers) do wrong. They incorporate the impact of loads into funds that they sell load-waived. It makes the funds look worse than they are. You're seeing this in performance figures that are lower than what you'd get with the load waived.
This problem also shows up in the M* star ratings on their pages. Schwab reports PGBOX's 3 year and 5 year ratings as two-star. But the 3 and 5 year ratings of PGBOX.lw are three-star.

re. JPM Core Bond and @Ace concern:

Swanson’s announcement in September that he was taking a leave was the first public sign of tension in the Columbus operations. It followed the departure of three members of his team for outside opportunities or other areas within the bank. [...] Then, two months ago, senior money managers, Henry Song and Mark Jackson, quit. Chris Nauseda, who was part of the Core Bond fund and was with the firm for 35 years, plans to retire by July 1

http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-03/jpmorgan-exits-mount-from-a-star-bond-team-said-to-feel-slighted
@BobC With due respect to our newest BD member, can you really say what you have with WOBDX/PGBOX anymore? Frankly, if Doug Swanson and top team managers were to walk on me, my money would leave the fund on the following day. I certainly wouldn't be putting money into it. Just as if Dan Fuss announced his retirement (effective immediately), and Elaine Stokes went on leave the month following ("to spend more time with her family"), and Matt Egan resigned (for a professional opportunity at another firm), leaving money in LSBDX would seem to be uninformed by history.

@msf: Schwab says YTD (as of 5/31) return for WOBDX is 3.16% vs -0.78% for PGBOX yet the only difference between the two seems to be an ER of 0.59% for WOBDX vs 0.76% for PGBOX.
Can that be right? The historic ratings summary for WOBDX is also significantly better than that of PGBOX. How to account for such a difference between two funds with essentially the same makeup?

You'll find that PGBOX is open through Schwab OneSource™.
Unless you were planning on investing $2M, it doesn't really matter whether Schwab offers the select class shares (WOBDX) to new investors. All the brokers seem to require that, even in IRAs, unless you invest through an adviser.
IMHO what's more valuable with BobC's posts is the "why", not the "what". He wrote that he was looking for an investment grade bond fund with less emphasis on credit and more on agency.
WOBDX is about 27% MBS agency (and another 2.6% US agency), along with a tad under 18% corporate (credit). Another good bond fund, available to retail investors with a similar profile is PRCIX. Also about 27% MBS agency (though just 1/2% US agency), with a bit more corporate - around 26%. It's got a std dev at or below category average, though not as low as WOBDX's, and volatility was another concern given.
The two funds seem to track pretty closely, and PRCIX's ER of 0.58% is just one basis point above WOBDX's, and well below that of PBGOX.

FYI:
Regards,
Ted
http://video.cnbc.com/gallery/?video=3000524361&play=1

@ron: I recently added GIBIX (GIBLX is the retail version) as 1/2 of my muni bonds got called and wanted to find a suitable fund with similar income stream. I also like MWTRX, it is generally all higher quality, and I found GIBIX a bit more diversified as 60% are BBB and above, and there are some high yielders. I did also add a bit of DBLTX, but its almost all mortgage bonds, so I put more into the Guggenheim fund for diversity sake. I still have 2 muni bonds that will mature in 4 and 8 years, glad they did not get called, they yield 4% + since they were issued in mid 2000s :)

I really cannot put my finger on this. We have always though of the fund as more of a large value fund, even though John and his team use a multi-cap approach. Why M* labels it mid-blend is beyond me. It is definitely not mid-blend. The fund was hurt by its Valeant position, but unlike Sequoia, OSTFX dumped its shares quickly. Nevertheless 3rd qtr 2015 really hurt them. And its large cash position this year as the market recovered has been problematic. I don't question the cash holding, since the fund has always been a cautious one. We will see how they fare going forward compared to the large value class.
On the other hand OSTIX is doing fine, pretty much as we would expect. Comparing it to other high-yield funds is wrong, in our opinion. Its duration is quite low and it has really short average maturity. A 5.7% yield with very low risk is darned attractive to us. Carl does a great job, and we have a lot of confidence in his team.

One of our big concerns has been the size of the fund, and the total amount of assets that Hasenstab manages, which at one time got close to $100B. We confirmed that he is compensated on the amount of assets he manages, so there has been no incentive to close the fund to new investors to keep the fund from becoming unmanageable. With the parent company being publicly traded it is also in their best interest to keep the fund open.

Comparing TGBAX to Barclays Agg makes no sense to me. We use the Citi World Govt Bond Index as a benchmark, and it stacks up well. Under-performs for 1 and 3 year (mostly because of last 12 months), beats 5 years and wallops 10 years.

Yup, that's the benchmark used by the fund in the prospectus.
The current (Jan 1, 2016) prospectus shows the benchmark comparisons through the end of 2014 (not 2015), confirming that all of the underperformance came since then:
(as of 12/31/2014) 1 year/5 year/10 year annualized:
TGBAX: 1.84% / 6.01% / 7.64%
Index: -0.48% / 1.67% / 3.08%

FYI: You might have clients who want to get in to the stock market, but don't want to take much risk, particularly as the Standard and Poor's 500 stock index flirts with new highs.
Your first job, of course, is to explain that this is like wanting to go swimming but not get terribly wet. Risk and reward are tied at the hip.
Regards,
Ted
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20160608/FREE/160609918?template=printart

I agree the Barclays Agg makes no sense as a 'benchmark.'
I've held TGBAX for ... something like 8, 9 years. Love the insanely-tiny duration of its holdings.
TGBAX has gone nowhere for 1 and 3 years, and 5 years returned 1.57% according to M*. It's 10-15 year returns are nice, but am *very* close to culling it down to a foothold in my portfolio based on that performance, its recent 30%-ish distribution cut, my expectations on its future performance, and because it's still sitting on nearly 50% cash ... which is nice for when opportunity arises, but still. (I think MH and SD are okay managers though.)
As someone said on the M* article, at times TGBAX looks more like a currency hedge fund than a global bond fund.

Comparing TGBAX to Barclays Agg makes no sense to me. We use the Citi World Govt Bond Index as a benchmark, and it stacks up well. Under-performs for 1 and 3 year (mostly because of last 12 months), beats 5 years and wallops 10 years. We have captured gains that have accumulated for the last 10 years in client accounts, but continue to hold the fund. We are not blind to its very recent stumbles, however, and are watching and staying in touch with our Templeton connection. Honestly we like smaller funds better, and there was a tone of hot money that came in since 2010. Some of that has left (moving on to the now-hot sector), which is fine by us.

If not a Frontier fund, she can still join their EM fund, right?
It is a bit underwhelming fund so far based on its performance, and probably needs a good hand, though I am not sure how much she can help.

Sure that would work and if her path is to GP it would make more sense because they haven't registered any new funds that you might think would happen if she was going to run a Frontier fund.
I'm not sure I'd agree with "underwhelming" for GPEOX so far. The history is short so I don't think it means much in the bigger picture, but it's beating its primary and secondary benchmarks since inception and with the exception of YTD 2016 it has also beaten both of the benchmarks each year by a pretty wide margin.
I think the confusion comes because M* lumps all diversified emerging markets funds together but the reality of the last few years has been that larger cap funds have done far better than smaller cap funds. If you look just at the emerging markets funds M* says are true small cap funds, of which there are very few, GPEOX is winning each year pretty easily. Even if you include mid-cap funds, of which there are more to compare, GPEOX is winning each year against most of those too. There's no question they've been in a tough place to play for a while now but in my mind they're doing really well against those they're competing with directly.
They have 2.5 years under their belt so far and it'll be more interesting to talk about their performance after at least 5 years but if the goal is to be exposed to true small cap emerging markets, which mine certainly was, then I think this has been a good choice so far even with the high expense ratio.

FYI: Michael Hasenstab’s $50 billion Templeton Global Bond Fund (TPINX) has had a rough go.
The fund has been wrong-footed on emerging-markets for a while, and a reversal in currencies has hurt bets against the euro and yen. Over the past year, Hasenstab’s flagship has lost 5.9%, one of the worst international bond funds tracked by Morningstar. It trailed the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index in 2014, 2015 and again this year. What now? Well, if you want to take risk, then perhaps it’s time to buy.
Regards,
Ted
http://blogs.barrons.com/focusonfunds/2016/06/08/michael-hasenstabs-bond-fund-buy-or-sell/tab/print/
M* Snapshot TPINX:
http://www.morningstar.com/funds/XNAS/TPINX/quote.html
Lipper Snapshot TPINX:
http://www.marketwatch.com/investing/fund/tpinx
TPINX Is Ranked #22 In The (WB) Fund Category By U.S. Nesw & World Report:
http://money.usnews.com/funds/mutual-funds/world-bond/templeton-global-bond-fund/tpinx

http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/915802/000091580216000164/stickerstonebridgeliquidatio.htm
497 1 stickerstonebridgeliquidatio.htm
FINANCIAL INVESTORS TRUST
STONEBRIDGE SMALL-CAP GROWTH FUND
Supplement dated June 8, 2016
to the
Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information, each dated August 31, 2015,
for the Stonebridge Small-Cap Growth Fund,
a series of Financial Investors Trust (the “Trust”)
The Board of Trustees (the “Board”) of the Trust, based upon the resignation of Stonebridge Capital Management, Inc. (the “Adviser”), the investment adviser to the Stonebridge Small-Cap Growth Fund (the “Fund”), a series of the Trust, has determined to close and liquidate the Fund. The Board concluded that it would be in the best interests of the Fund and its shareholders that the Fund be closed and liquidated as series of the Trust effective as of the close of business on June 27, 2016.
The Board approved a Plan of Termination, Dissolution and Liquidation (the “Plan”) that determines the manner in which the Fund will be liquidated. Pursuant to the Plan and in anticipation of the Fund’s liquidation, the Fund will be closed to new purchases effective as of the close of business on June 8, 2016. However, any distributions declared to shareholders of the Fund after June 8, 2016, and until the close of trading on the New York Stock Exchange on June 27, 2016 will be automatically reinvested in additional shares of the Fund unless a shareholder specifically requests that such distributions be paid in cash. Although the Fund will be closed to new purchases as of June 8, 2016, you may continue to redeem your shares of the Fund after June 8, 2016, as provided in the Prospectus. Please note, however, that the Fund will be liquidating its assets as of the close of business on June 27, 2016.
Pursuant to the Plan, if the Fund has not received your redemption request or other instruction prior to the close of business on June 27, 2016, the effective time of the liquidation, your shares will be redeemed, and you will receive proceeds representing your proportionate interest in the net assets of the Fund as of June 27, 2016, subject to any required withholdings. As is the case with any redemption of fund shares, these liquidation proceeds will generally be subject to federal and, as applicable, state and local income taxes if the redeemed shares are held in a taxable account and the liquidation proceeds exceed your adjusted basis in the shares redeemed. If the redeemed shares are held in a qualified retirement account such as an IRA, the liquidation proceeds may not be subject to current income taxation under certain conditions. You should consult with your tax adviser for further information regarding the federal, state and/or local income tax consequences of this liquidation that are relevant to your specific situation.
All expenses incurred in connection with the liquidation contemplated by the Plan will be paid by the Fund, and are estimated to be approximately $13,000.
Please retain this supplement with your Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information.

FYI: MSCI will answer this question with its June 14 announcement regarding changes to its indexes
Regards,
Ted
http://news.morningstar.com/articlenet/article.aspx?id=756187

Posted yesterday 7 June, please find all MFO ratings and fund metrics updated on MFO Premium site through month ending May.
I continue to marvel at results of Fund Family Scorecard. How do poor performing fund management companies persist? Could be that absolute return is not a concern, that it's all about risk adjusted return. Could be that some of the funds did well initially, then went south but investors are too stuck to change. Could be that these firms just have strong marketing and, my friend Ed offers, "write good newsletters." Could be that they are just having a run of bad luck and stuck in an uncooperative and "irrational" market ... but given enough time and a return to sanity, the Great Pumpkin will appear.
There are 30 fund families that have failed to beat their peers with every fund they manage ... 135 funds (oldest share class only) that underperform against their category averages on an absolute return basis since inception, measured from first full month of offering through May 2016.
Three of these families each manage assets of $1B or more ... Dunham, Hussman, and Domini.

Dunham & Associates Investment Counsel, Inc. is a San Diego based firm with a line-up of of 16 funds that "...operate on performance-based advisory fees, also commonly known as Fulcrum Fees, and feature objectives ranging from capital preservation to aggressive growth." Average age 9 years. Average annual expense ratio 1.90% (all share classes). These 16 funds have nearly $1B in assets under management (AUM). None of the 16 have beaten their category averages. How can that be ... ? One clue: 1.9% across 9 years represents a drag of 18%.

Another is Hussman Strategic Advisors Inc. Four funds. $1.1B AUM. I suspect in this case, Dr. Hussman would argue it's about risk adjusted return: "Investing for long-term returns while managing risk". Certainly that appears to be the case with its Strategic Total Return Fund (HSTRX), but what about the other three funds? Like, its flagship Strategic Growth Fund (HSGFX) ... it has been underwater for 92 months now and counting.
Here are some risk profile metrics for HSGFX since inception and across various time frames, including the last two business cycles ... something appears to have gone terribly wrong this cycle.


Finally, at $1.7B AUM ... "Invest in a greener, more peaceful future with Domini Social Investments." Three funds. Average age nearly 17 years.

Its front-loaded, 9-year-old International Social Equity A (DOMAX) has done pretty well the past three and five years, so Amy Domini is quick to post its five star status on her web site ...

Here's a closer look ...


As always, if you see anything amiss with this month's update or have recommendations for improvements, please do not hesitate to email us.