MBSF is a new fund launched on 2/27/24; the ER is 49 bps. Its still missing basic data on yield, etc. M* shows portfolio as lower quality (unclear what ratings are used for GSEs or securitized holdings), but it invests in floating rate RMBS from GSEs (Fannie, Freddie). It would be interesting to compare it with Treasury FRN USFR, TFLO, both with ER of 15 bps only. One would have to see if the yield advantage of RMBS floaters over Treasury FRNs is all eaten up by extra 34 bps ER.
https://www.regancapital.com/etf-mbsf/
https://www.morningstar.com/etfs/arcx/mbsf/portfolio

@WABAC, Thanks. Yes, that is a good commentary.
I can not believe it is the $67B (small relative to the size of the market) in covered call ETF strategies that could be the catalyst for any catastrophe (as the headline reads) but the general (robust / excessive?) option activity in the market place and the corresponding institutional counter parties' activities. If the market goes down, DIVO will go down as well (as should be expected) with or without its covered call activity. (Some strategies probably write calls on SPY (naked calls) rather than on individual holdings.) There are a lot of nuances and without each strategy being dissected it is very difficult to know which ones are taking excessive (or untested) risks or if the gun powder is $67B or $67K size. Hopefully, fund managers are providing good commentary of benefits and risks of their funds and owners of funds are reading those commentaries regularly.
Interestingly, JEPI and JEPQ have $50B AUM between them. May be owners of those can share their thoughts.
Re covered call ETFs, OP says, '[A]ssets in such funds has topped $67 billion, up from $7 billion at the end of 2020.] I must be missing something as JEPI and JEPQ are new and JEPI assets in 2020 were not much.

@sma3, that rule of thumb, 5% return for a 1% drop in rates, may be the case for a 5yr T-bond, but not necessarily for a bond "mutual fund" which includes total return, (yield + perceived value), right? I mean, even with no drop in rates to date, a lot of mutual funds already have returned 10% or more over the past year, just in anticipation of rate drops. Bond mutual funds have in general well surpassed CDs or treasuries in 1 year. Hindsight of course. Even the very conservative RPHYX (cash-like) is up over 6%.
Just saying, it is very difficult to predict the future return of bond funds. I believe they have a pretty good near term future and room to advance more, but if rate drop anticipation has already driven them up, it's anyone's guess when that trend will end or what it will look like in the future. Just my 2cents.

If you get any div and reinvest you have more shares at a lower price? So you net zero. You do have more shares going up IF rates go down. Am I correct that if rates fall by 1 per cent and you have a duration of 5 you might see a total return of about 5 %. Just want to make certain I understand.

You have to know" what interest rates will do and then still assume the funds duration will not change.
So in a year you will get the dividend plus the % change in interest rates time duration.
A 1% decline in rates will produce a 5% increase in NAV of fund with Duration of 5. If you are in LT Treasuries you will make 20% or more. But you could also lose 20% if rates go back up

I dread to get into this discussion because derivatives have been and always be a complicated beast. There is listed, Over the counter, and multiple types of instruments. There is the one thing we can see (because its easy) and the 99 things we can't see.
The FT Alphaville had an article:
https://www.ft.com/content/d9b964f0-7cc2-4684-b75d-80f47359d8a5
"JPMorgan blames JPMorgan for suppressed volatility
Once more unto the Vix discourse"
It should be free for those who sign up for FT Alphaville (its a free section of the FT).
Doing a thorough analysis needs something of this sort. One needs to measure (and continuously measure) the evolving greeks from derivatives funds to have any measurable market call.
Maybe its helpful to some...

Thoughtful piece by that title in the WSJ, 3/16-17/2024. One bullish argument for stocks is that there's an ocean of cash "on the sidelines" that might flood the market in the face of a dip.
Telis Demos, writing for the Journal, argues "not so much." Two reasons. First, while money is pouring into money market funds, it seems mostly to be moving from savings or checking accounts with negative real returns (the average yield on sweep accounts is 0.05% he claims, while my credit union is doling out a rich 0.01% on savings) to liquidity fund that are yielding 5% or so.
Second, when the money flows back out of money market funds, it usually flows into income investments rather than equity investments.
(I also suspect that the folks most desperate to buy Nvidia or DJT on a dip are not necessarily folks which huge cash reserves and vice versa, the folks like me who structure a 50% income sleeve into their portfolios are not apt to suddenly become memesters.)
Money markets hold $6.5 trillion currently, up $150 billion in two months. "[A]nalysts at Barclays estimate that ... what appears poised to possibly move into riskier assets is about $400 billion to $600 billion," including both equity and income investments. JP Morgan Chase strategists report that "companies with huge cash piles are still opting to be weighted toward money funds ... S&P 500 nonfinancial companies' cash investment portfolios hit a historical high of57% allocated to cash" at the end of 2023.
See "Market Bulls Won't Get a 'Wall of Cash,'" March 16-17, 2024, p.B12. The article is online but behind a paywall.
Palm Valley Capital Fund continues to putt along with about 80% cash and short bonds which implies that its microcap value stocks have been returning something like 15% a year for the past three years. (I'm assuming a 2% annual returns on the cash portion of the portfolio.) Stocks in the only microcap ETF (First Trust Dow Jones Select MicroCap ETF FDM), which is also value-oriented, 2.92% annually for the same period. Translation: the fully invested microcap ETF returned 2.9% while Palm Valley, with only 20% invested, returned 4.3%.

Covered-call funds, about which Devesh has written a series of essays (two more will appear in our April issue), are artificially and temporarily suppressing volatility, if Charley Grant and the WSJ are to be believed:

The stock market is calmer than it has been in years. Some worry that a popular strategy is contributing to the tranquility.
Measures of market volatility have fallen to levels last seen in 2018 ...
Investors are seeking protection from potential losses by pour money into [covered-call ETFs] ... assets in such funds has topped $67 billion, up from $7 billion at the end of 2020."

Their argument is that this sort of herd trade (in volatility ETFs) "blew up in spectacular fashion six years ago." The options trade now exceed stocks in value, with ever covered-call position necessarily matched over an opposite position in "call overwrites." The concern is that this is a complex, leveraged structure that might be catastrophically vulnerable to an external shock that causes a cascading rush to the exits.
To be clear, Devesh and the Journal are competent to comment on the risks. I'm not. Mostly I wanted to highlight the prospect that your hedges might become your anchors. (See Charley Grant, "Popular bet weighs on volatility," WSJ, 3/26/2024, B1. It's online with a paywall and a slightly different title.)
Curious for them to repeat a story unless their anxiety is growing. (Might call for Zoloft.)

What is the best bond fund total return one can HOPE for in the next twelve months? Assume dividends are irrelevant because they will be reinvested,,, assume low default rate because you have chosen a fund with high quality portfolio. And said fund has a duration of 5.8 years. And let us imagine that in the next twelve months interest rates are cut 1%. More specifically 4 cuts of .25%. So what would be the best possible total return under this scenario? Just wondering.

@BaluBalu. You gave me a good laugh. I'll keep it on the watch list for now.
I'll need some cooperation from Mr. Market before I have more cash to sink into equities for the IRA. And then I'll have to think about whether I want more of the equity sleeve in the larger, and growthier cap boxes. At this point its main competition would be AMAGX if I go larger and growthier or GTSGX if I want to keep the current spread. Or I could just stick with the funds I have already condensed into, as described on the buy, sell, why thread
@yogibearbull, I'm not seeing the turnover history at that link. I see a condensed M* summary of all their share classes.
I have looked at the history of its weight in the M* boxes on the portfolio page.
@raqueteer, AUSF has 245% yearly turnover because of a specific sector rotation type of strategy that makes sense to me for the purpose I bought it for. So I own it for now.
When it comes down to humans saying this stock is something I need to buy, or sell, right this minute, there's Charlie Munger turnover, and then there's Rajiv Jain turnover.
Seems to me that the more often a manager is selling and buying stocks, the more often he has to be right.

Rajiv Jain of GQG uses value conscious growth approach. But unlike the traditional GARP, he combines value portion with momentum portion. Firm only has a handful of funds. Its other funds seems to have reasonable turnovers, but the high turnover for GQEPX may be due to where the US market is now. It may be useful to look at its turnover history.
https://www.morningstar.com/asset-management-companies/gqg-partners-BN00000J55/funds

The $50.00 transfer/extortion fee will be covered by the value of some fractional shares.

You probably know this already, but for anyone else who is not aware: Schwab does reimburse transfer fees. So, this is just a nuisance - no loss.

No, @yugo. I did NOT know that. Good news. How does it appear, then? What should I look for?
*In the BAD news category: my TS ADR holding is "ineligible" for dividend reinvestment. The chat-box agent tried to tell me the reason was with the Exchange. Reinvestment was not available. I cheerfully informed him that ineligibility in this case is a Schwab decision; reinvestment worked fine at TRP.
Is the better HUMAN contact at Schwab, compared to my recent experience at TRP, worth the hassles? The jury is out...

GQG Partners gets a lot of comments here. Them seem favorable. The institutional version of GQEPX frequently turns up in my screens at MFO Premium as a "Great Owl." I have it on a watch list. The expense ratio is reasonable. It's available at Fido; I could add it to my IRA.
So? What's my problem? With GQEPX, that is . . .
The turnover. M* says it's 211%. That's a lot of turnover. So I look at the investment strategy in the prospectus:

the Adviser typically pursues a “growth style” of investing as it seeks to capture market inefficiencies which the Adviser believes are driven by investors’ propensity to be short-sighted and overly focused on quarter-to-quarter price movements rather than on a company’s fundamentals over a longer time horizon (5 years or more). The Adviser believes that this market inefficiency tends to lead investors to underappreciate (sic) the compounding potential of quality, growing companies. To identify this subset of companies, the Adviser generates investment ideas from a variety of sources, ranging from institutional knowledge and industry contacts, to the Adviser’s proprietary screening process that seeks to identify suitable companies based on several quality factors such as rates of return on equity and total capital, margin stability and profitability. Ideas are then subject to rigorous fundamental analysis as the Adviser seeks to identify and invest in companies that it believes reflect higher quality opportunities on a forward-looking basis. Specifically, the Adviser seeks to buy companies that it believes are reasonably priced and have strong fundamental business characteristics and sustainable and durable earnings growth. The Adviser seeks to outperform peers over a full market cycle by seeking to capture market upside while limiting downside risk. For these purposes, a full market cycle can be measured from a point in the market cycle (e.g., a peak or trough) to the corresponding point in the next market cycle

That doesn't read to me like "And the only way we can do all that good stuff is to turn this sucker completely over twice a durn burn year! Yeehaw!"
The strategy reads more like an argument for a sedate rate of turnover to enjoy those "sustainable and durable earnings" over "a full market cycle" with tea and biscuits in an old, well-upholstered leather chair, on a Persian rug, by a crackling fire.
Am I missing something with this? Are we just hoping the team is that good at selling and buying stocks at that pace? And can keep it up over some period of time?

The $50.00 transfer/extortion fee will be covered by the value of some fractional shares.

You probably know this already, but for anyone else who is not aware: Schwab does reimburse transfer fees. So, this is just a nuisance - no loss.

Anyone moving into or adding to LT Treasuries now that the Fed is talking 3 rate decreases this year?

No, still riding my favorites. I want to stay at about 50/50 stocks/bonds. I'll add WCPNX sooner or later. Less risk.

Done.
I had to send a message to TRP to find out just what's what. The reply specified the transfer would be done TONIGHT. The $50.00 transfer/extortion fee will be covered by the value of some fractional shares. Those will not transfer. Any remainder will be sent as cash to Schwab.
Great. There was absolutely nothing about this process which was easy, routine and normal. Jayzuz. Next I'm waiting to hear if a trustee to trustee switch can be made with the Bruce Fund. Don't hold your breath. Looking forward to Purdue vs. Gonzaga on the week-end. "March Madness." Game-watch party here.

One of the things that convinced me to take a flyer on SYLD is their screens only include companies engaged in net share buybacks. Their screens for shareholder yield also include paying down debt.
I tried watching the video, but I find it hard to watch and/or listen to most people that lack any kind of professional experience or training. So I don't know what their complaints with buybacks are.
BTW. I know of two other ETF's, PKW and WTV, playing the buyback theme. Per MFO premium, the debt/equity ratios are .75 for SYLD, 3.06 for WTV, and 3.47 for PKW.

I asked a highly regarded professor of Finance to opine buybacks versus stock based compensation about a year ago. I am quoting him here but not his name. :
Devesh: I came across this article, which is slightly dated:
https://www.pionline.com/article/20170316/ONLINE/170319937/the-s-p-500-s-hidden-828-billion-annual-expenses
If correct, this means a large portion (or most of the buybacks) might just be repurchasing stock issued in comp each year.
Finance Professor:
First, a piece of advice. Don’t believe much that you read (including what I write), especially about buybacks. The mythology on buybacks is staggering, including the claims that they are funded mostly with debt, that they come at the expense of value creating investments and that they are primarily to cover stock-based compensation. The truth is that stock-based compensation is not only a much smaller amount than the buybacks, but the companies that are the biggest buyback players are not the ones where stock compensation is a large percent of expenses. Finally, starting in 2007, stock compensation has shifted away from options (which used to be the primary reason for buying back stock to cover exercise) to restricted stock units (which don’t require these gymnastics). The truth is that the buybacks, for the most part, are cash infusions to investors, and much of that cash gets reinvested back into the market.

You here little about the massive stock buybacks of most companies. The main reason they do it is to avoid dilution from the even more massive option awards that they give their top employees.
SP500 companies spent 2/3s of profits purchasing 2.7% of their market capitalization each year, but only reduced the total share count 0.7% in the last decade.
If you are playing poker for 30 minutes and you can't recognise the patsy, the patsy is you.