"It's Almost Time to Buy Small-Caps" So declares Spencer Jakab, a WSJ writer, in the October 11 WSJ.
His argument is that small caps are historically undervalued relative to large caps: "the ratio of the Russell 2000 to the Russell 100 index, which has moved between a low of 58% ... to a high of around 115% ... is back down to 74%, indicating a fairly stressed level." At the same time he admits headwinds: small caps are far more exposed to interest rate changes than are large caps. Their debt is more likely floating than fixed and the average maturity on their debt is 4.4 years versus twice that for large caps.
Why consider them? Small caps have outperformed large caps, by an average of 16.51%, coming out of every one of the past 11 recessions. (SJ's wording is odd here: "in the 12 months after a recession was declared every time." The Lords of Finance generally officially declare a recession about eight months after it ends.)
In particular, small value is a good place to be. Focusing on small-value "could have the added benefit of supercharging returns during a recovery. For example, the years 2001-2004 saw $100 investing in the S&P 500 turn into about $98 which an investment in the Russell 2000 Value grew to $180."
The "almost" is the "they do well after a recession but suffer during one" part, I would guess.
My own exposure to the small cap sub-class is divided between the ultra-cautious Palm Valley Capital (micro-cap value, $250M AUM, 13% invested in stocks, up 5.3% YTD) and the ultra-charged Grandeur Peak Global Micro (micro-cap growth, soft-closed with $41M AUM, fully invested, down 2% YTD, but top 1% over five years).
MFO's October issue is live and lively! I suspect the best way to crash crossover SUV sales would be disclose their shameful secret: they're actually station wagons.

Bloomberg, by the way, declared "Station wagons are back to cure SUV fatigue." (In 20
17)
Several Aperture Funds closing to new and existing investors https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1593547/000139834423019108/fp0085596-1_497.htm497
1 fp0085596-
1_497.htm
THE ADVISORS’ INNER CIRCLE FUND III
Aperture New World Opportunities Fund
Aperture Endeavour Equity Fund
Aperture Discover Equity Fund
Aperture International Equity Fund
(the “Funds”)
Supplement dated October
10, 2023 to the Funds’ Prospectus (the “Prospectus”), Summary Prospectuses (the “Summary Prospectuses”) and Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”), each dated May
1, 2023, as supplemented
This supplement provides new and additional information beyond that contained in the Summary Prospectuses, Prospectus and SAI, and should be read in conjunction with the Summary Prospectuses, Prospectus and SAI.
Effective immediately, the Funds are closed to new investments by new and existing shareholders, including new investments made by existing shareholders via systematic purchases. However, automatic reinvestments of distributions will continue to be processed.
PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE
API-SK-002-0200
RiverPark Short Term High Yield Fund re-opening to new investors https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1494928/000139834423019124/fp0085616-2_497.htm497
1 fp00856
16-2_497.htm
RiverPark Funds Trust
RiverPark Short Term High Yield Fund
Institutional Class (RPHIX)
Retail Class (RPHYX)
Supplement dated October
10, 2023 to the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and Statement of Additional Information ("SAI") dated January 26, 2023.
This supplement provides new and additional information beyond that contained in the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI and should be read in conjunction with the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI.
IMPORTANT NOTICE ON PURCHASE OF FUND SHARES
Effective as of 9 a.m. on October
11, 2023 (the "Opening Date"), Retail and Institutional Class Shares of the RiverPark Short Term High Yield Fund (the "Fund") are open to purchase by all investors without restriction.
The Fund reserves the right, in its sole discretion, to reject any purchase order. Sales of Retail Class Shares and Institutional Class Shares of the Fund may be restricted or reopened in the future.
PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE.
Investors Should Fight the Temptation of Cash (Opinion Piece from the FT) Considering that 2023 is turning out to be an unprecedented 3rd BAD year for general bonds (there are always some exceptions), the lesson is that cash is an important part of fixed-income (FI) allocation. Indeed, cash was trash until mid-2022 when the Fed got going in a rush. Timing is difficult even for FI - all cash vs all bond funds.
Cash defined broadly includes T-Bills, m-mkt funds/accounts, ST CDs, ultra-ST bond funds, stable-value funds (SVs; in 401k/403b), and off course that under the mattress or in a can in the backyard (-:).
Investors Should Fight the Temptation of Cash (Opinion Piece from the FT) M*:
Cash Is No Longer Trash, but the Opportunity Cost Might Be Greater Than You Thinkhttps://www.morningstar.com/personal-finance/cash-is-no-longer-trash-opportunity-cost-might-be-greater-than-you-thinkThis M* piece is oriented toward the long term investor:
Cash is yielding more than it has in a decade—so are equities even worth the trouble? We won’t bury the lede. The answer is still yes. But it’s a fair question. Using three-month Treasuries as a cash proxy, investors can earn more than 5% on cash. This is the highest yield since 1995. ...
[It goes on to show how much a pile of cash falls behind stocks over time, and the odds of cash doing better than stocks.]
The lesson is clear: The opportunity cost of sitting in cash is huge and grows over time. ...
There are no perfect allocations or times to invest in risk assets. ...The best thing investors can do is figure out an allocation that works for them and avoid guessing what will happen based on one’s feelings.
Investors Should Fight the Temptation of Cash (Opinion Piece from the FT)
Investors Should Fight the Temptation of Cash (Opinion Piece from the FT) I let the guys running my balanced fund worry about duration, and all that stuff.
Neither have I sold anything to raise cash. Looking forward to the two CD's coming off the books to do a little shopping.
An investor who bought a 10-year US Treasury bond at a yield of 4.5 per cent would see a total return of roughly 13 per cent if that yield fell 1 percentage point over 12 months. If the recession ended up being relatively nasty and the yield fell 2 percentage points, their return would exceed 20 per cent.
How will that feel for the folks that held bonds during the preceding vaporization? Will all be forgiven?