Several people have commented in other posts about cumulative performance figures being distorted by a recent year's hot performance ("what have you done for me lately"), including Prof. Snowball, me, and others.
In Prof. Snowball's piece (linked to above, and here), he praises BRUFX by looking at "three metrics across more meaningful stretches: multiple decades, full market cycles and the last two market crashes." BRSVX hasn't been around nearly as long as BRUFX; it started in Oct 2003. With this limitation in mind, here are the data for AVALX, PVFIX, BRSVX. I included IJS (S&P 600 value ETF) as a benchmark in the Portfolio Visualizer link for each period but did not transcribe its figures below.

Period		CAGR				Std Dev			    Sharpe Ratio
AVALX	PVFIX	BRSVX		AVALX	PVFIX	BRSVX		AVALX	PVFIX	BRSVX
15 yr	11.02%	5.54%	9.51%		28.77%	10.78%	22.81%		0.75	0.69	0.72
Full Cycle 2007-2020
6.81%	4.59%	5.24%		28.18%	10.20%	21.97%		0.35	0.41	0.30
Down Cycle 2007-2009
-5.09%	2.65%	-9.59%		36.83%	11.35%	28.03%		-0.01	0.11	-0.37

Looking at these broader picture numbers, it seems not so much that BRSVX benefited from one hot year, but rather that it doesn't do quite so well in down years. Comparing the BRSVX with AVALX not by a calendar year (i.e. 2020), but trough to peak (roughly 3/19/20 - 6/4/21), one sees similar performance though following different paths.
http://stockcharts.com/h-perf/ui?s=BRSVX&compare=AVALX&id=p85687049134
It's in the latter half of 2021, when the market turned and AVALX's greater volatility worked to its detriment that the funds diverged radically.
https://stockcharts.com/h-perf/ui?s=BRSVX&compare=AVALX,IJS&id=p37670197904
PVFIX is certainly a steady performer. But at a cost of way underperforming in good years. From its chart (see the 15 year performance link above), it almost looks like a SCV cousin of RPHYX - ridiculously steady relative to peers. Something I value in a "near cash" fund. But in an equity fund, my personal risk tolerance is a bit higher than that.
If you like AVALX, did you look into DFFVX? A clone of it is available in variable annuities, e.g. TIAA. So unlike the Fidelity fund that is used only internally by Fidelity, some investors could access this fund (sort of).

October 7th Episode:

With the impressive performance of GMO’s Climate Change Fund, which beats its benchmark and boasts 12% annualized returns, investors gain exposure to companies combatting climate change and adapting to its effects. White shares insights on the fund’s unique approach and discusses his journey in launching it.

Complete link:
the-unique-approach-of-lucas-whites-high-performing-gmo-climate-change-fund/

Barron’s Funds Quarterly (2023/Q3–October 9, 2023)
https://www.barrons.com/topics/mutual-funds-quarterly
(Performance data quoted in this Supplement are for 2023/Q3 and YTD to 9/30/23)
Pg L2: SMALL-CAPs (SCs) have attractive relative valuations and their time may finally come; SC-value is especially attractive (some energy, financials, regional banks). But recession poses a high danger for SCs; they may be fine with SOFT LANDING. Mentioned are:
SC-Value AVUV, QRSVX, RYSEX
SC-Blend DFAS,FDSCX, FOSCX, RPMAX
SC-Growth FTXNX, NEAGX
SC-Indexed IWM, IWO, IWN (poor Russell indexes; not selective); SPSM (better S&P index))
SC-Foreign DRIOX, FISMX, MOWNX
All-Cap FLPSX (heavy in SC, MC, foreign)
(By @LewisBraham at MFO)
Pg L6: BEST MONEY MARKET Funds (MMFs). M-Mkt funds have attracted huge inflows. They offer high rates, safety and liquidity. MMF ERs matter the most. (The 2014/16 reforms introduced gates/redemption fees and 3 types of MMFs – Government, Prime-Retail, Prime-Institutional). The new 2023 reforms have removed the gates (i.e. the problematic redemption suspensions) but will allow redemption/liquidity fees when there are heavy daily outflows (5%+ of AUM). So, basically, the distinction between the Government and Prime-Retail MMFs will become less significant for large MMFs. (I don’t recall Barron’s doing the Best MMFs before)
Government MMFs AEAXX, AMAXX, FOBXX, INAXX, PCEXX
Prime-Retail FMEXX, GMGXX, IPPXX, TSCXX, VMRXX
Treasury MMFs BITXX, FZFXX, GABXX, PRTXX, UATXX
Muni MMFs FMOXX, GMHXX, MOTXX, SWTXX, VMSXX
Fund news from elsewhere in Barron’s (Parts 1 & 2).
STREETWISE. Hurt by rising rates, REITs are now attractive. Their yields and FFOs are good; they trade at discounts from book values. REITs are better capitalized than private property owners and should benefit from the CRE weakness/consolidation; some bigger REITs may buy smaller REITs. There are growth/”hare” REITs – hotels (HST, RHP), industrial (CDP, FR), drug research facilities, apartments (ARE, CPT, UDR), senior housing (LTC, SBRA); and income/”tortoise” REITs – casinos (GLPI, VICI), nursing centers, ground leases. What about office REITs? Forget them! Headwinds include higher rates, tighter credit conditions, recession. (Real-estate has been a GICS sector since 2016; mREITs have remained with the financials.)
INCOME. Attractive PREFERREDs include the ETFs EPEI, PFF; the CEFs FFC, JPC; and individual preferreds from C, GS, WFC, etc (both $25 & $1,000). Also look at JUNIOR CORPORATE bonds from ENB and APOS/APO.
Pg L29: In 2023/Q3 (SP500 -3.27%): Among general equity funds, the best was SC-value -1.79%, and the worst was SC-growth -6.32%; ALL general equity categories were NEGATIVE. Among other equity funds, the best was natural resources +11.99%, and the worst were precious metals -9.32%, utilities -8.83% (strange mix). Among fixed-income funds, domestic long-term FI -0.98%, world income -1.86%; ALL FI categories were NEGATIVE (FI isn’t very refined in Lipper mutual fund categories listed in Barron’s).
LINK

How does MFO Premium screen for intangibles?
It appears we live in a time where a company’s valuations is increasingly impacted on criteria that can be difficult to measure.
Here’s an article on the subject of recognizing the value of a business’ “intangibles”.
intangibles-now-represent-a-greater-share-of-value-at-companies

Red flags for BRSVX in gross data include Morningstar 5*, Bronze; high SD. Of course, the chart tells all - all the fun was in 2021.
StockCharts, 3 Yrs https://stockcharts.com/h-perf/ui?s=BRSVX&compare=IJR,SPSM&id=p45673872103

In the spirit of looking differently:
Style boxes, and fund names, are becoming less than useful reference points. Anything based on the S&P 400 midcap range shows up in the small cap box. Funds that tread in less popular names from the 500, like SPGP, are more than half midcap. Vanguard value funds, like VSIAX and VMVAX, are half blend, or more. Lipper says RWJ is core, M* says value. FMIMX is a midcap blend, or a smallcap core, despite the 13.68 PE forward.
If I am looking for small caps, I now include the whole range of mid and small caps in my MFO premium search. Then I look for a Martin ratio => 1, plus alpha greater than zero, expense ratio <= 1, and since COVID for the first pass.
Adjust the expense ratio if you are on the lookout for expensive boutiques.
Once the results are in, I add the columns that I associate with "value." These days I am especially interested in their debt rating. There may be more naked swimmers out there yet to be revealed.
I have this search saved, and I am looking forward to seeing the results after the September data is loaded.

I'm still learning to navigate in a world in which the Morningstar fund screener is ... well, worthless. A once-useful tool has been reduced to being able to answer a single question: "what does Morningstar think about this fund?" Star rating, analyst rating, ESG rating: yes, yes, yes. Comparisons of absolute and risk-adjusted returns over meaningful periods? Go 'way, kid, ya bother me!
Today's adventure sought to answer the question: what are the most consistently solid small cap value funds around? I used MFO Premium to look at domestic and global funds, checked Sharpe and APR for the past 3-, 5-, 7-, 9- and 11-year periods. I found two disappointments: two Great Owl funds were consistently in or around the top five, but one was only available to Fidelity fund managers (Fido Series Intrinsic Opps) and the other (Kinetic Small Cap Opps) had a 41% stake in a single stock, Texas Land & Power.
Pinnacle Value and Aegis Value were frequently, but not always, top five funds. They're both rock solid, distinctive, tiny one-man operations.
The surprise was Bridgeway Small Cap Value, the fund that was in the top five more often that any other. Small- to micro-cap. 130 names. Quant. Five star.
All of which I was going to share until I scanned its Morningstar profile and noticed that its success was entirely driven by one year: 2021. The fund made north of 67% and left everyone in the dust. That number then elevated all of the trailing comparisons. It otherwise trailed more than two-thirds of its peers in five of the past 11 years. It's trailed its index six times but I have no idea of what to make of it since it's a custom Morningstar index which apparently cannot be entered into their charting tool to generate a detailed comparison ... though I can get the index denominated in Euros, pounds, Canadian dollars...). Overall, 2020-2022 was a solid stretch for the fund. 2013-19 and 2023, not so much.
All of which I share as a cautionary tale: look carefully, then look again, differently.

I am using USFR (floating-rate Treasury Note ETF). These FRNs pay 3m yield (reset weekly, so little duration) PLUS a spread MINUS the ETF ER (15 bps). The FRNs have been attractive since mid-2022 when the Fed started raising rates. Think of FRNs as 3m on weekly roll.

Yahoo historical prices show TYX yield hitting 5.05 earlier, back down in the 4.90s since. The 20y is solidly > 5%, 5.13 as I type.

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1593547/000139834423018996/fp0085383-1_497.htm
497 1 fp0085383-1_497.htm
THE ADVISORS’ INNER CIRCLE FUND III
(the “Trust”)
Advocate Rising Rate Hedge ETF
(the “Fund”)
Supplement dated October 5, 2023 to the Fund’s Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and
Statement of Additional Information (“SAI”),
each dated January 28, 2023, as supplemented
This supplement provides new and additional information beyond that contained in the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI, and should be read in conjunction with the Summary Prospectus, Prospectus and SAI.
The Board of Trustees of the Trust, at the recommendation of Advocate Capital Management, LLC (the “Adviser”), the investment adviser of the Fund, has approved a plan of liquidation providing for the liquidation of the Fund’s assets and the distribution of the net proceeds pro rata to the Fund’s shareholders. The Fund will create and redeem creation units through October 24, 2023 (the “Closing Date”), which will also be the last day that the Fund’s shares trade on NYSE Arca, Inc. (the “Exchange”), the Fund’s principal listing exchange. The Fund is expected to cease operations and liquidate on or about October 31, 2023 (the “Liquidation Date”).
In anticipation of the liquidation of the Fund, the Adviser may manage the Fund in a manner intended to facilitate the Fund’s orderly liquidation, such as by holding cash or making investments in other highly liquid assets. As a result, during this time, all or a portion of the Fund may not be invested in a manner consistent with its stated investment strategies, which may prevent the Fund from achieving its investment objective.
Shareholders of the Fund may sell their Fund shares on the Exchange on or before the Closing Date. Customary brokerage charges may apply to such transactions. After the Closing Date, there can be no guarantee that there will be a market for the Fund’s shares. For those Fund shareholders that do not sell their shares on or before the Closing Date, the Fund will distribute to each such shareholder, on or promptly after the Liquidation Date, a liquidating cash distribution equal in value to the shareholder’s interest in the net assets of the Fund as of the Liquidation Date.
The liquidation distribution amount will include any accrued income and capital gains, will be treated as a payment in exchange for shares and will generally be a taxable event for shareholders investing through taxable accounts. You should consult your personal tax advisor concerning your particular tax situation. Shareholders remaining in the Fund on the Liquidation Date will not be charged any transaction fees by the Fund. However, the net asset value of the Fund on the Liquidation Date will reflect costs of liquidating the Fund. Shareholders will receive liquidation proceeds as soon as practicable after the Liquidation Date.
PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE.
ADV-SK-001-0100

Excellent interview, and I agree with a lot of what he says -- especially with his investing style and comments about utilities. The last question is precisely why I like being along for the ride in PRWCX (and potentially TCAP) because it suggests he still has his priorities right.
"People who know me, just know I’m not wired to rest on my laurels or take it easy. I’m just not wired that way. I think we talked about last time when I was on the podcast, I had won couple of Morningstar Manager of the Year awards, trophies. I gave one away to my APM, Steven Krichbaum, and one is in a bag somewhere down in the basement that I don’t know where it is, honestly. And then, I’ve won 18 or 19 awards from Lipper. I’ve never asked for a plaque. I’ve never received a plaque. I don’t want a plaque. I don’t want reminders of past performance making me soft. That’s really important for me. I want to look forward, not backward. That’s really, really important."
< - >
"The last thing I would say is—and it puts a little pressure on me, honestly—is there are so many people that are counting on me: clients, friends, family, my mother, my colleagues, my colleagues’ families, people I grew up with, advisors, and they’ve kind of become accustomed, they’ve come used to generating incredible returns over time. You do it for 15 to 16 years in a row, they expect you to do it next 15 to 16 years. And I have this horrible fear of letting them down. And I’m going to do everything in my power every day that I’m doing this job to make sure that I never let them down. I think if I underperform, my mom is going to be pissed. So, I got to make sure I keep delivering for my clients and my family. And we’re going to continue to work as hard as we possibly can as a team to continue to do that."

Added a bit this morning to a beaten down precious metals / natural resources CEF. Funds came from an international bond fund and a consumers staples stock that have held up relatively well adimst the recent carnage.
Re: metals / Gold is flirting with $1800 level. I doubt it will stay below $1800 for long. But could be wrong.

GMO released a research note today, arguing in favor of (a) Japan equities and (b) value investing therein. Here's their bottom line:

• Investors have been chronically underweight Japan for the past three decades, and rightly so given Japan’s weaker relative fundamentals and underwhelming commitment to corporate reform through much of the 1990s and 2000s.
• But conditions on the ground have changed meaningfully. Improving fundamentals and governance reforms are increasingly evident to investors speaking directly with companies and policymakers in Japan, as our Usonian Japan Equity team does. EPS growth has been relatively strong in Japan for years, distributions of excess capital have increased, and policymakers continue to push for more competitive and capital-efficient companies.
• Nonetheless, most international equity strategies remain materially underweight Japanese equities. Of 225 actively managed strategies in the eVestment database that list the MSCI EAFE index as their preferred benchmark, 84% are underweight Japan by an average of 7.5%. (GMO, "Japan Equities Are Compelling…" 10/4/2023)

GMO runs a couple Japan-value strategies.
Japan is rockin' this year. The New York Times agrees that changes in corporate governance are driving the strong returns ("

Investors Are Putting Big Money Into Japan Again. Here’s Why," 6/14/2023). The counterargument, at least according to my newsfeed, to GMO is that the gains are all driven by currency fluctuations. (Not my argument, and I haven't looked at the evidence behind it. I'm just reporting a headline I read yesterday). That said, the top three Japan-oriented funds over the past 10 are all ETFs, all hedged and all doing fine this year. Per MFO Premium:

1. WisdomTree Japan Hedged SmallCap: 14.4% APR for 10 years, 26% YTD, five star, Bronze analyst rating, highest Sharpe ratio, smallest drawdown,
2. WisdomTree Japan Hedged: 11.1% APR, 33% YTD, Great Owl, five star, Bronze analyst rating, tied for #2 in Sharpe
3. Xtrackers MSCI Japan Hedged Equity ETF: 10.3% APR, Great Owl, four star, Silver analyst rating, tied for #2 in Sharpe

Hennessy Japan Small Cap is the first actively managed fund on the 10-year list, at #4.
For what interest it holds, David

https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1032423/000103242323000063/prospectusstickersmall-mid.htm
497 1 prospectusstickersmall-mid.htm 497
DIAMOND HILL FUNDS
Diamond Hill Small-Mid Cap Fund
(All Share Classes)
Supplement Dated October 5, 2023
to the Prospectus dated February 28, 2023
Effective October 5, 2023, the Diamond Hill Small-Mid Cap Fund will re-open to new investors.
Accordingly, effective October 5, 2023, references to the closure of the Diamond Hill Small-Mid Cap Fund on pages 4, 6 and 44 of the Prospectus are removed.
PLEASE RETAIN THIS SUPPLEMENT FOR FUTURE REFERENCE

@junkster, as imperfect as it may be, I use BKLN ETF as proxy for BL/FR funds. It peaked on Sept 15th and has been trending downward ever since. Are there better alternatives? I hold majority of BL/FR in PRWCX. The fund holds about 10-15 % BL and the rest of bonds are in treasury.

@Sven, not a bad proxy as I use it intraday along with two other bank loan ETFs. But I also use it with the previous day’s NAV to get an idea on how the open end will be priced end of day. I also use the end of the day Morningstar LSTA US Leveraged Loan 100 Index. That index peaked on September 20. It is only down around 0.65% from the top but a far cry from the trend of up, up, and up since the end of May. I could reload on bank loans if they approach the highs but in no hurry. There are some problems out there like banks and the junk corporate bond market. If the latter finally gets hit that could usher in all sorts of credit issues.

Have a heart, Your Honor!
Perhaps the judge did and may have offered parole in say just under 10,000 years :-)
Several countries have introduced CBDCs. The Fed is still evaluating digital-dollar.
Cryptocurrencies and central bank digital currencies may share much of the same technology, but they are substantially different entities with different characteristics and objectives.
From the IMF:

Central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) are digital versions of cash that are issued and regulated by central banks. As such, they are more secure and inherently not volatile, unlike crypto assets. ...
In 1993, the Bank of Finland launched the Avant smart card, an electronic form of cash. ... it can be considered the world’s first CBDC.

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2022/09/Picture-this-The-ascent-of-CBDCs
The main objectives I've seen put forth for CBDCs are: (1) to serve the unbanked and under-banked, and (2) to facilitate secure, speedy transactions.
(Here's the full White House list of objectives.)
Those are fine objectives. Though I don't see what CBDC could offer that banks could not if they offered a form of "universal service" (with outreach programs) and perhaps made some technological upgrades. For example some transit systems now accept bank cards in addition to their own payment cards. Does it really matter whether the form of payment is a digital bank card or a government issued digital currency card?
Most of the benefits arise from "digital" not from "central bank". Much as securities transactions have become easier and faster with (digital) book entry instead of physical paper stock certificates.
Cryptocurrency is different and was promulgated on the objective of decentralization (no controlling authority). While the cryptocurrencies are not controlled by governments (clearly differentiating them from CBDCs), they have still tended toward centralized control.

[Decentralization] was the premise of the initial Bitcoin white paper, which offered a cryptographic solution intended to allow payments to be sent without involving any financial institution or other trusted intermediary. However, Bitcoin became centralized very quickly and now depends on a small group of software developers and mining pools to function. As internet pioneer and publisher Tim O’Reilly observed, “Blockchain turned out to be the most rapid recentralization of a decentralized technology that I’ve seen in my lifetime.”

https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fandd/issues/2022/09/Point-of-View-the-superficial-allure-of-crypto-Hilary-Allen
So, there is something there that may not be obvious to all.
Sizzle?
Or as Clara Peller put it, where's the beef?

Not exactly.
The bank then has two options:
1. Sell the property at a significant discount (let's say $200M)
2. Add value to the property themselves then sell it
Assuming the lender perfected its security interest (i.e. did a UCC 9 filing to put the world on notice that it had a type of lien on the property), then in #1, the buyer would get the property subject to a $300M lien.
how many buyers do you think are out there for distressed $200M office buildings
None, and even fewer (if that were possible) who would buy a $200M office building with a $300M lien against it. Even for $1. That $200M sale ain't a-gonna happen.
As far as walking away from the loan (neither option 1 nor option 2) goes, it is premised on at best a somewhat incomplete understanding of non-recourse loans. Most loans aren't.

WHERE ARE NON-RECOURSE LOANS USED?
These loans are often used to finance commercial real estate projects and other projects that include an extended completion period. In the case of real estate, the land acts as collateral for the loan. A non-recourse loan is also used in financial industries, with securities placed as collateral.
HOW DO I QUALIFY FOR NON-RECOURSE LOANS?
Clearly, the majority of the risk and exposure with non-recourse loans rests with the lender. Therefore, a non-recourse loan may be more difficult to qualify for than a recourse loan. Commercial lenders will often only extend non-recourse loans to finance certain types of properties and only to worthy borrowers. Stable finances and an excellent credit score are two of the most important factors that a lender will look at. Generally, the loan requires the property to be a larger city, be in good condition, and have good historical financials, too.

https://fidelityca.com/non-recourse-loan-financing/
If a large player walks away from a debt, especially one that it could pay, its reputation will be mud for a long time. Most players won't risk their reputation. Though there are exceptions, and they might get lucky - they might find "a reckless institution willing to do business with clients nobody else would touch."
Historically, non-recourse mortgages arose out of the Great Depression. They made the news in the 1990s when several regional real estate markets collapsed and so many homeowners who were underwater simply walked away.

Non-recourse loans are a unique characteristic of the US mortgage market and first emerged in state legislation in the 1930s. A decrease in demand for real estate and the ensuing precipitous drop in prices during the Great Depression led to the realization of mortgages at minimal prices, significantly below their outstanding balances. As a result, not only did borrowers lose the roofs over their heads to lenders but also faced lawsuits by the same lenders for the significant remainder of their debt. This harsh reality caused many states to adopt borrower-friendly legislation. ... In effect it gave the borrower a put option

https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/jleg/vol42/iss2/2/
There are roughly a dozen non-recourse states, the largest of course being California. But it's not so simple there. A bank may execute a non-judicial foreclosure, bypassing the courts and getting a relatively quick sale. If it follows this path, it has no recourse for any deficiency (shortfall). This is the norm for small potato mortgages (I suppose that means $3M homes in California).
However, a bank is not likely to let a creditor with deep pockets like Brookfield simply walk away with a $100M deficiency. It will go through the courts. In California, judicial foreclosures are not non-recourse (pardon the double negative).
Commercial Mortgage Foreclosure (CA), Practice Note, Alston and Bird LLP (14 pages)
Yes, companies like Brookfield will default on a loan (with no recourse), hand back the keys, then buy the same asset back for a huge discount.
Pretty crazy if you ask me
Yes, the idea that they will, or even can, do this is pretty crazy.

Games people play with defaults/bankruptcy, Twitter LINK
"When a large player like Brookfield defaults on a $300M office loan they just hand the keys to the bank...
The bank then has two options:
1. Sell the property at a significant discount (let's say $200M)
2. Add value to the property themselves then sell it
Most banks choose option 1
But how many buyers do you think are out there for distressed $200M office buildings?
Not many. Enter Brookfield again...
Yes, companies like Brookfield will default on a loan (with no recourse), hand back the keys, then buy the same asset back for a huge discount.
Pretty crazy if you ask me."

AAII Sentiment Survey, 10/4/23
BEARISH remained the top sentiment (41.6%; high) & neutral became the bottom sentiment (28.3%; below average); bullish became the middle sentiment (30.1%; below average); Bull-Bear Spread was -11.5% (low). Investor concerns: Budget; inflation; economy; the Fed; dollar; crypto regulations; market volatility (VIX, VXN, MOVE); Russia-Ukraine war (84+ weeks, 2/24/22-now); geopolitical. For the Survey week (Th-Wed), stocks were mixed (cyclicals down, growth up), bonds down, oil down sharply, gold down, dollar up. Long-term rates rose dramatically with 10-yr & 30-yr yields approaching 5%. More DC drama. #AAII #Sentiment #Markets
https://ybbpersonalfinance.proboards.com/post/1202/thread

@junkster, as imperfect as it may be, I use BKLN ETF as proxy for BL/FR funds. It peaked on Sept 15th and has been trending downward ever since. Are there better alternatives? I hold majority of BL/FR in PRWCX. The fund holds about 10-15 % BL and the rest of bonds are in treasury.