Signature also had a cryptocurrency business. While Signature didn't have loans backed by cryptocurrencies or hold cryptocurrencies on its balance sheet, it had a payment platform for processing crypto transactions. But deposits associated with the crypto platform had been dropping, prompting some concern from Wall Street.
Before SVB's failure, there wasn't too much concern. Signature had 10 Buy ratings out of 17 analysts listed on Bloomberg following earnings reported on Jan. 17. The average analyst price target was about $145 a share.
As the crisis at SVB mounted, Signature stock fell about 50%. The company reported deposit balances of about $89 billion and loan balances of about $72 billion on March 8.

https://research2.fidelity.com/cgi-bin/upload.dll/file.pdf?zf68e7d0az434bcf7ae0d446a59d6ca006eda289a2

Days after one of the largest bank failures in U.S. history, the fallout continues. Some of the country's top banking and financial regulators appeared before the Senate Banking Committee on Tuesday to testify about what led to the downfall of Silicon Valley Bank. Policymakers will be debating whether new laws, rules or attitudes are needed to keep other banks from going under.

Five takeaways from Tuesday's hearing:
• Silicon Valley Bank's management messed up
• Regulators issued warnings, but the problems were not fixed
• Modern bank runs can happen really fast
• Other banks will pay for the failure, but maybe not all banks
• Bank executives could pay

• Silicon Valley Bank's management messed up-
Regulators had some tough words about SVB's management at the hearing. Silicon Valley Bank more than tripled in size in the last three years, but its financial controls didn't keep pace.
The government bonds it was buying with depositors' money tumbled in value as interest rates rose, but the bank seemed unconcerned by that. "The [bank's] risk model was not at all aligned with reality," said Michael Barr, the Federal Reserve's vice chair for supervision. "This is a textbook case of bank mismanagement."
• Regulators issued warnings, but the problems were not fixed-
How much blame should be laid at regulators feet? That was a question that cropped up repeatedly during the hearing.
Barr stressed that federal regulators had repeatedly warned the bank's managers about the risks it was facing, at least as far back as October 2021. The bank was served with formal notices documenting "matters requiring attention" and "matters requiring immediate attention." But the risks remained and the Fed stopped short of ordering changes, which frustrated some of the senators in the Senate Banking Committee from both sides of the aisle.
The problems developed during a time when the Fed was generally pursuing a light touch in bank regulation. In 2021, for example, the Fed issued a rule — at the urging of bank lobbyists — noting that guidance from bank supervisors does not carry the force of law. That led some senators to call out colleagues who pushed for lighter rules, only to turn around and blame a lack of regulatory muscle for the bank's failure.
• Modern bank runs can happen really fast-
In their testimony, regulators also stressed the speed at which the banks collapsed. When big depositors got wind of the problems at Silicon Valley Bank, they raced to pull their money out, withdrawing $42 billion in a single day. The bank scrambled to borrow more money overnight, but it couldn't keep up. By the following morning, depositors had signaled plans to withdraw another $100 billion — more than the bank could get its hands on.
• Other banks will pay for the failure, but maybe not all banks-
Also under scrutiny throughout the testimony, was the federal regulators' decision to backstop all deposits at SVB as well as Signature Bank. Silicon Valley bank was taken over by the FDIC on March 10, but fears of a more widespread bank run led regulators to announce days later they would guarantee all the deposits at both SVB and Signature Bank, not just the $250,000 per account that's typically insured.
By law, that money will come from a special assessment on other banks — and that's left many senators unhappy. The FDIC has some discretion in how those insurance costs are divided up among different categories of banks. A recommended formula will be announced in early May.
• Bank executives could pay-
The role of SVB's top executives came under scrutiny as well during the hearing. Lawmakers expressed frustration at reports that executives at Silicon Valley Bank sold stock and received bonuses shortly before the bank's collapse.
Although the government doesn't have explicit authority to claw back compensation, it does have the power to levy fines, order restitution and prohibit those executives from working at other banks, if wrongdoing is found. Sen. Chris Van Hollen, D-Md, said "Almost every American would agree it's simply wrong for the CEO and top executives to profit from their own mismanagement and then leave FDIC holding the bag,"

"...With so little cash it’s not worth my time and effort seeking out the best return..."
That's where I'm always at, myself, too. So, someone shows me a better CD rate, and I seethe. For a moment. Then I remember it's just not how I operate. @hank

@rforno - "I think."
I've tried that, not much good ever ensues.

MainStreet Bank of Fairfax, Virginia, introduced a 15-month, no-penalty CD with a 5% rate on March 14 but the small bank had planned to roll out the product before the Silicon Valley crisis, says CEO Jeff Dick. He says the bank’s deposits have grown, rather than shrunk, in the wake of Silicon Valley's troubles.
He added, however, that MainStreet was planning to offer the CD for just three weeks. With many customers shifting deposits since the crisis, “We’re going to keep it out there now” for another week or two. “I definitely want to have more of a cushion.”