Monthly Archives: September 2015

Why Vanguard Will Take Over the World

By Samuel Lee

Vanguard is eating everything. It is the biggest fund company in the U.S., with over $3 trillion in assets under management as of June-end, and the second biggest asset manager in the world, after BlackRock. Size hasn’t hampered Vanguard’s growth. According to Morningstar, Vanguard took in an estimated $166 billion in U.S. ETF and mutual fund assets in the year-to-date ending in August, over three times the next closest company, BlackRock/iShares. Not only do I think Vanguard will eventually overtake BlackRock, it will eventually extend its lead to become by far the most dominant asset manager in the world.

With index funds, investors mostly care about having their desired exposure at the lowest all-in cost, the most visible component of which is the expense ratio. In other words, index funds are commodities. In a commodity industry with economies of scale, the lowest-cost producer crushes the competition. Vanguard is the lowest-cost producer. Not only that, it enjoys a first-mover advantage and possesses arguably the most trusted brand in asset management. These advantages all feed on each other in virtuous cycles.

It’s commonly known Vanguard is owned by its mutual funds, so everything is run “at cost.” (This is a bit of a fiction; some Vanguard funds subsidize others or outside ventures.) “Profits” flow back to the funds as lower expense ratios. There are no external shareholders to please, no quarterly earnings targets to hit. Many cite this as the main reason why Vanguard has been so successful. However, the mutual ownership structure has not always led to lower all-in costs or dominance in other industries, such as insurance, or even in asset management. Mutual ownership is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for Vanguard’s success.

What separates Vanguard from other mutually owned firms is that it operates in a business that benefits from strong first-mover advantages. By being the first company to offer index funds widely, it achieved a critical mass of assets and name recognition before anyone else. Assets begot lower fees which begot even more assets, a cycle that still operates today.

While Vanguard locked up the index mutual fund market, it almost lost its leadership by being slow to launch exchange-traded funds. By the time Vanguard launched its first in 2001, State Street and Barclays already had big, widely traded ETFs covering most of the major asset classes. While CEO and later chairman of the board, founder Jack Bogle was opposed to launching ETFs. He thought the intraday trading ETFs allowed would be the rope by which investors hung themselves. From a pure growth perspective, this was a major unforced error. The mistake was reversed by his successor, Jack Brennan, after Bogle was effectively forced into retirement in 1999.

In ETFs, the first-movers not only enjoy economies of scale but also liquidity advantages that allows them to remain dominant even when their fees aren’t the lowest. When given the choice between a slightly cheaper ETF with low trading volume and a more expensive ETF with high trading volume, most investors go with the more traded fund. Because ETFs attract a lot of traders, the expense ratio is small in comparison to cost of trading. This makes it very difficult for new ETFs to gain traction when an established fund has ample trading volume. The first U.S. ETF, SPDR S&P 500 ETF SPY, remains the biggest and most widely traded. In general, the biggest ETFs were also the first to come out in their respective categories. The notable exceptions are where Vanguard ETFs managed to muscle their way to the top. Despite this late start, Vanguard has clawed its way up to become the second largest ETF sponsor in the U.S.

This feat deserves closer examination. If Vanguard’s success in this area was due to one-off factors such as the tactical cleverness of its managers or missteps by competitors, then we can’t be confident that Vanguard will overtake entrenched players in other parts of the money business. But if it was due to widely applicable advantages, then we can be more confident that Vanguard can make headway against entrenched businesses.

A one-off factor that allowed Vanguard to take on its competitors was its patented hub and spoke ETF structure, where the ETF is simply a share class of a mutual fund. By allowing fund investors to convert mutual fund shares into lower-cost ETF shares (but not the other way around), Vanguard created its own critical mass of assets and trading volume.

But even without the patent, Vanguard still would have clawed its way to the top, because Vanguard has one of the most powerful brands in investing. Whenever someone extols the virtues of index funds, they are also extoling Vanguard’s. The tight link was established by Vanguard’s early dominance of the industry and a culture that places the wellbeing of the investor at the apex. Sometimes this devotion to the investor manifests as a stifling paternalism, where hot funds are closed off and “needless” trading is discouraged by a system of fees and restrictions. But, overall, Vanguard’s culture of stewardship has created intense feelings of goodwill and loyalty to the brand. No other fund company has as many devotees, some of whom have gone as far as to create an Internet subculture named after Bogle.

Over time, Vanguard’s brand will grow even stronger. Among novice investors, Vanguard is slowly becoming the default option. Go to any random forum where investing novices ask how they should invest their savings.  Chances are good at least someone will say invest in passive funds, specifically ones from Vanguard.

Vanguard is putting its powerful brand to good use by establishing new lines of business in recent years. Among the most promising in the U.S. is Vanguard Personal Advisor Services, a hybrid robo-advisor that combines largely automated online advice with some human contact and intervention. VPAS is a bigger deal than Vanguard’s understated advertising would have you believe. VPAS effectively acts like an “index” for the financial advice business. Why go with some random Edward Jones or Raymond James schmuck who charges 1% or more when you can go with Vanguard and get advice that will almost guarantee a superior result over the long run?

VPAS’s growth has been explosive. After two years in beta, VPAS had over $10 billion by the end of 2014. By June-end it had around $22 billion, with about $10 billion of that  growth from the transfer of assets from Vanguard’s traditional financial advisory unit. This already makes Vanguard one of the biggest and fastest growing registered investment advisors in the nation. It dwarfs start-up robo-advisors Betterment and Wealthfront, which have around $2.5 billion and $2.6 billion in assets, respectively.

Abroad, Vanguard’s growth opportunities look even better. Passive management’s market share is still in the single digits in many markets and the margins from asset management are even fatter. Vanguard has established subsidiaries in Australia, Canada, Europe and Hong Kong. They are among the fastest-growing asset managers in their markets.

The arithmetic of active management means over time Vanguard’s passive funds will outperform active investors as a whole. Vanguard’s cost advantages are so big in some markets its funds are among the top performers.

Critics like James Grant, editor of Grant’s Interest Rate Observer, think passive investing is too popular. Grant argues investing theories operate in cycles, where a good idea transforms into a fad that inevitably collapses under its own weight. But passive investing is special. Its capacity is practically unlimited. The theoretical limit is the point at which markets become so inefficient that price discovery is impaired and it becomes feasible for a large subset of skilled retail investors to outperform (the less skilled investors would lose even more money more quickly in such an environment—the arithmetic of active management demands it). However, passive investing can make markets more efficient if investors opting for index funds are largely novices rather than highly trained professionals. A poker game with fewer patsies means the pros have to compete with each other.

There are some problems with passive investing. Regularities in assets flows due to index-based buying and selling has created profit opportunities for clever traders. Stocks added to and deleted from the S&P 500 and Russell 2000 indexes experience huge volumes of price-insensitive trading driven by dumb, blind index funds. But these problems can be solved by smart fund management, better index construction (for example, total market indexes) or greater diversity in commonly followed indexes.

Why Vanguard May Not Take Over the World

I’m not imaginative or smart enough to think of all the reasons why Vanguard will fail in its global conquest, but a few risks pop out.

First is Vanguard’s relative weakness in institutional money management (I may be wrong on this point). BlackRock is still top dog thanks to its fantastic institutional business. Vanguard hasn’t ground BlackRock into dust because expense ratios for institutional passively managed portfolios approach zero. Successful asset gatherers offer ancillary services and are better at communicating with and servicing the key decision makers. BlackRock pays more and presumably has better salespeople. Vanguard is tight with money and so may not be willing or able to hire the best salespeople.

Second, Vanguard may make a series of strategic blunders under a bad CEO enabled by an incompetent and servile board. I have the greatest respect for Bill McNabb and Vanguard’s current board, but it’s possible his successors and future boards could be terrible.

Third, Vanguard may be corrupted by insiders. There is a long and sad history of well-meaning organizations that are transformed into personal piggybanks for the chief executive officer and his cronies. Signs of corruption include massive payouts to insiders and directors, a reversal of Vanguard’s long-standing pattern of lowering fees, expensive acquisitions or projects that fuel growth but do little to lower fees for current investors (for example, a huge ramp up in marketing expenditures), and actions that boost growth in the short-run at the expense of Vanguard’s brand.

Fourth, Vanguard may experience a severe operational failure, such as a cybersecurity hack, that damages its reputation or financial capacity.

Individually and in total, these risks seem manageable and remote to me. But I could be wrong.

Summary

  • Vanguard’s rapid growth will continue for years as it benefits from three mutually reinforcing advantages: mutual ownership structure where profits flow back to fund investors in the form of lower expenses, first-mover advantage in index funds, and a powerful brand cultivated by a culture that places the investor first.
  • Future growth markets are huge: Vanguard has subsidiaries in Australia, Canada, Hong Kong and Europe. These markets are much less competitive than the U.S., have higher fees and lower penetration of passive investing. Arithmetic of active investing virtually guarantees Vanguard funds will have a superior performance record over time.
  • Vanguard Personal Advisor Services VPAS stands a good chance of becoming the “index” for financial advice. Due to fee advantages and brand, VPAS may be able to replicate the runaway growth Vanguard is experiencing in ETFs.
  • Limits to passive investing are overblown; Vanguard still has lots of runway.
  • Vanguard may wreck its campaign of global domination through several ways, including lagging in institutional money management, incompetence, corruption, or operational failure.

September 1, 2015

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

They’re baaaaaack!

My students came rushing back to campus and, so far as I can tell, triggered some sort of stock market rout upon arrival. I’m not sure how they did it, but I’ve learned not to underestimate their energy and manic good spirits.

They’re a bright bunch, diverse in my ways. While private colleges are often seen as bastion of privilege, Augustana was founded to help the children of immigrants make their way in a new land. Really that mission hasn’t much changed in the past 150 years: lots of first-generation college students, lots of students of color, lots of kids who shared the same high school experience. They weren’t the class presidents so much as the ones who quietly worked to make sure that things got done.

It’s a challenge to teach them, not because they don’t want to learn but because the gulf between us is so wide. By the time they were born, I was already a senior administrator and a full-blown fuddy duddy. But we’re working, as always we do, to learn from each other. Humility is essential, both a sense of humor and cookies help.

augie a

Your first and best stop-loss order

The week’s events have convinced us that you all need to learn how to execute a stop-loss order to protect yourself in times like these. A stop-loss order is an automatic, pre-established command which kicks in when markets gyrate and which works to minimize your losses. Generally they’re placed through your broker (“if shares of X fall below $12/share, sell half my holdings. If it falls below $10, liquidate the position”) but an Observer Stop Loss doesn’t require one. Here’s how it works:

  • On any day in which the market falls by enough to make you go “sweet Jee Zus!”
  • Step Away from the Media
  • Put Down your Phone
  • Unhand that Mouse
  • And Do Nothing for seven days.

Well, more precisely, “do nothing with your portfolio.” You’re more than welcome to, you know, have breakfast, go to the bathroom, wonder what it’s going to take for anyone to catch the Cardinals, figure out what you’re going to do with that ridiculous pile of tomatoes and all that.

My Irish grandfather told me that the worst time to fix a leaky roof is in a storm. “You’ll be miserable, you might break your neck and you’ll surely make a hames of it.” (I knew what Gramps meant and didn’t get around to looking up the “hames” bit until decades later when I was listening to the thunder and staring at a growing damp spot in the ceiling.)

roof in the rain

The financial media loves financial cataclysm to the same extent, and for the same reason, that The Weather Channel loves superstorms. It’s a great marketing tool for them. It strokes their egos (we are important!). And it drives ratings.

Really, did you think this vogue for naming winter storms came from the National Weather Service? No, no, no.  “Winter Storm Juno” was straight from the marketing folks at TWC.

If CNBC’s ratings get any worse, I’m guessing that we’ll be subjected to Market Downturn Alan soon enough.

By and large, coverage of the market’s recent events has been relentlessly horrible. Let’s start with the obvious: if you invested $10,000 into a balanced portfolio on August 18, on Friday, August 28 you had $9,660.

That’s it. You dropped 3.4%.

(Don’t you feel silly now?)

The most frequently-invoked word in headlines? “Bloodbath.”

MarketWatch: What’s next after market’s biggest bloodbath of the year ? (Apparently they’re annual events.)

ZeroHedge: US Market Bouncing Back After Monday’s Bloodbath (hmm, maybe they’re weekly events?)

Business Insider: Six horrific stats about today’s market bloodbath. (“Oil hit its lowest level since March 2009.” The horror, the horror!)

ZeroHedge: Bloodbath: Emerging Market Assets Collapse. (Ummm … a $10,000 investment in an emerging markets balanced fund, FTEMX in this case, would have “collapsed” to $9872 over those two weeks.)

RussiaToday: It’s a Bloodbath. (Odd that this is the only context in which Russia Today is willing to apply that term.)

By Google’s count, rather more than 64,000 market bloodbaths in the media.

Those claims were complemented by a number of “yeah, it could get a lot worse” stories:

NewsMax: Yale’s Shiller, “Even bigger” plunge may follow.

Brett Arends: Dow 5,000? Yes, it could happen. (As might a civilization-ending asteroid strike or a Cubs’ World Series win.)

Those were bookended with celebratory but unsubstantiated claims (WSJ: U.S. stock swings don’t shake investors; Barry Ritholz: Mom and pop outsmart Wall Street pros) that “mom ‘n’ pop” stood firm.

Bottom line: nothing you read in the media over the past couple weeks improved either your short- or long-term prospects. To the contrary, it might well have encouraged you (or your clients) to do something emotionally satisfying and financially idiotic. The markers of panic and idiocy abound: Vanguard had to do the “all hands on deck” drill in which portfolio managers and others are pulled in to manage the phone banks, Morningstar’s site repeatedly froze, the TD Ameritrade and Scottrade sites couldn’t execute customer orders, and prices of thousands of ETFs became unmoored from the prices of the securities they held. We were particularly struck by trading volume for Vanguard’s Total Stock Market ETF (VTI).

VTI volume graph

That’s a 600% rise from its average volume.

Two points:

  1. Winter is coming. Work on your roof now!

    Some argue that a secular bear market started last week. (Some always say that.) Some serious people argue that a sharp jolt this year might well be prelude to a far larger disruption later next year. Optimists believe that we are on a steadily ascending path, although the road will be far more pitted than in recent memory.

    Use the time you have now to plan for those developments. If you looked at your portfolio and thought “I didn’t know it could be this bad this fast,” it’s time to rethink.

    Questions worth considering:

    • Are you ready to give up Magical Thinking yet? Here’s the essence of Magical Thinking: “Eureka! I’ve found it! The fund that makes over 10% in the long-term and sidesteps turbulence in the short-term! And it’s mine. Mine! My Preciousssss!” Such a fund does not exist in the lands of Middle-Earth. Stop expecting your funds to act as if they do.
    • Do you have more funds in your portfolio than you can explain? Did you look at your portfolio Monday and think, honestly puzzled, “what is that fund again?”
    • Do you know whether traditional hybrid funds, liquid alt funds or a slug of low-volatility assets is working better as your risk damper? Folks with either a mordant sense of humor or stunted perspective declared last week that liquid alts funds “passed their first test with flying colors.” Often that translated to: “held up for one day while charging 2.75% for one year.”
    • Have you allocated more to risky assets than you can comfortably handle? We’re written before about the tradeoffs embedded in a stock-light strategy where 70% of the upside for 50% of the downside begins to sound less like cowardice and more like an awfully sweet deal.
    • Are you willing to believe that the structure of the fixed income market will allow your bond funds to deliver predictable total returns (current income plus appreciation) over the next five to seven years? If critics are right, a combination of structural changes in the fixed-income markets brought on by financial reforms and rising interest rates might make traditional investment-grade bond funds a surprisingly volatile option.

    If your answer is something like “I dunno,” then your answer is also something like “I’m setting myself up to fail.” We’ll try to help, but you really do need to set aside some time to plan (goals –> resources –> strategies –>tactics) with another grown-up. Bring black coffee if you’re Lutheran, Scotch if you aren’t.

  2. If you place your ear tightly against the side of any ETF, you’re likely to hear ticking.

    My prejudices are clear and I’ll repeat them here. I think ETFs are the worst financial innovation since the Ponzi scheme. They are trading vehicles, not investment vehicles. The Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF has no advantage over the Vanguard Total Stock Market Index fund (the tiny expense gap is consumed in trading costs) except that it can be easily and frequently traded. The little empirical research available documents the inevitable: when given a trading vehicle, investors trade. And (the vast majority of) traders lose.

    Beyond that, ETFs cause markets to move in lockstep: all securities in an ETF – the rock solid and the failing, the undervalued and the overpriced – are rewarded equally when investors purchase the fund. If people like small cap Japanese stocks, they bid up the price of good stocks and bad, cheap and dear, which distorts the ability of vigilantes to enforce some sort of discipline.

    And, as Monday demonstrates, ETFs can fail spectacularly in a crisis because the need for instant pricing is inconsistent with the demands of rational pricing. Many ETFs, CEFs and some stocks opened Monday with 20-30% losses, couldn’t coordinate buyers and sellers fast enough and that caused a computer-spawned downward price spiral. Josh Brown makes the argument passionately in his essay “Computers are the new dumb money” and followed it up with the perhaps jubilant report that some of the “quants I know told me the link was hitting their inboxes all day from friends and colleagues around the industry. A few desk traders I talk to had some anecdotes backing my assumptions up. One guy, a ‘data scientist’, was furiously angry, meaning he probably blew himself up this week.”

    As Chris Dietrich concludes in his August 29 Barron’s article, “Market Plunge Provides Harsh Lessons for ETF Investors”

    For long-term investors unsure of their trading chops, or if uncertainty reigns, mutual funds might be better options. Mutual fund investors hand over their money and let the fund company do the trading. The difference is that you get the end-of-day price; the price of an ETF depends on when you sold or bought it during the trading day. “There are benefits of ETFs, including transparency and tax efficiency, but those come at a cost, which is that is you must be willing to trade,” says Dave Nadig, director of ETFs at FactSet Research Systems. “If you don’t want to be trading, you should not be using ETFs.”

The week’s best

Jack Bogle, Buddhist. Jack Bogle: “I’ve seen turbulence in the market. This is not real turbulence. Don’t do something. Just stand there.” (Thanks for johnN for the link.) Vanguard subsequently announced, “The Inaction Plan.”

All sound and fury, signifying nothing. Jason Zweig: “The louder and more forcefully a market pundit voices his certainty about what is going to happen next, the more likely it is that he will turn out to be wrong.”

Profiting from others’ insanity

Anyone looking at the Monday, 8/24, opening price for, say, General Electric – down 30% within the first few seconds – had to think (a) that’s insanity and (b) hmmm, wonder if there’s a way to profit from it? It turns out that the price of a number of vehicles – stocks, a thousand ETFs and many closed-end funds – became temporarily unmoored from reality. The owners of many ETFs, for example, were willing to sell $10 worth of stock for $7, just to get rid of it.

The folks at RiverNorth are experts at arbitraging such insanity. They track the historical discounts of closed-end funds; if a fund becomes temporarily unmoored, they’ll consider buying shares of it. Why? Because when the panic subsides, that 30% discount might contract by two-thirds. RiverNorth’s shareholders have the opportunity to gain from that arbitrage, whether or not the general direction of the stock market is up or down.

I spoke with Steve O’Neill, one of RiverNorth’s portfolio managers, about the extent of the market panic. Contrary to the popular stories about cool-headed investors, Steve described them as “vomiting up assets” at a level he hadn’t seen since the depth of the financial meltdown when the stability of the entire banking sector was in question.

In 2014, RiverNorth reopened their flagship RiverNorth Core Opportunity (RNCOX) fund after a three-year closure. We’ll renew our profile of this one-of-a-kind product in our October issue. In the meanwhile, interested parties really should …

rivernorth post card

RiverNorth is hosting a live webcast with Q&A on September 17, 2015 at 3:15pm CT / 4:15pm ET. Their hosts will be Patrick Galley, CIO, Portfolio Manager, and Allen Webb, Portfolio Specialist. Visit www.rivernorth.com/events to register.

Update: Finding a family’s first fund 

Families First FundIn August, we published a short guide to finding a family first fund. We started with the premise that lots of younger (and many not-so-younger) folks were torn between the knowledge that they should do something and the fear that they were going to screw it up. To help them out, we talked about what to look for in a first fund and proposed three funds that met our criteria: solid long term prospects, a risk-conscious approach, a low minimum initial investment and reasonable expenses.

How did the trio do in August? Not bad.

James Balanced: Golden Rainbow GLRBX

-1.9%

A bit better than its conservative peers; so far in 2015, it beats 83% of its peers.

TIAA-CREF Lifestyle Conservative TSCLX

– 2.3%

A bit worse than its conservative peers; so far in 2015, it beats 98% of its peers.

Vanguard STAR VGSTX

– 3.1%

A bit better than its moderate peers; so far in 2015, it beats about 75% of its peers.

 Several readers wrote to commend Manning & Napier Pro-Blend Conservative (EXDAX) as a great “first fund” candidate as well.  We entirely agree. Unlike TIAA-CREF and Vanguard, it invests in individual securities rather than other funds. Like them, however, it has a team-managed approach that reduces the risk of a fund going awry if a single person leaves. It has a splendid 20 year record. We’ve added it to our original guide and have written a profile of the fund, which you can get to below in our Fund Profiles section.

edward, ex cathedraWe Are Where We Are, Or, If The Dog Didn’t Stop To Crap, He Would Have Caught The Rabbit

“I prefer the company of peasants because they have not been educated sufficiently to reason incorrectly.”

               Michel de Montaigne

At this point in time, rather than focus on the “if only” questions that tend to freeze people in their tracks in these periods of market volatility, I think we should consider what is important. For most of us, indeed, the vast majority of us, the world did not end in August and it is unlikely to end in September.  Indeed, for most Americans and therefore by definition most of us, the vagaries of the stock market are not that important.

What then is important? A Chicago Tribune columnist, Mary Schmich, recently interviewed Edward Stuart, an economics professor at Northeastern Illinois University as a follow-up to his appearance on a panel on Chicago Public Television’s “Chicago Tonight” show. Stuart had pointed out that the ownership of stock (and by implication, mutual funds) in the United States is quite unequal. He noted that while the stock market has done very well in recent years, the standard of living of the average American citizen has not done as well. Stuart thinks that the real median income for a household size of four is about $40,000 …. and that number has not changed since the late 70’s. My spin on this is rather simple – the move up the economic ladder that we used to see for various demographic groups – has stopped.

If you think about it, the evidence is before us. How many of us have friends whose children went to college, got their degrees, and returned home to live with their parents while they hunted for a job in their chosen field, which they often could not find? When one drives around city and suburban streets, how many vacancies do we see in commercial properties?  How many middle class families that used to bootstrap themselves up by investing in and owning apartment buildings or strip malls don’t now? What is needed is a growing economy that offers real job prospects that pay real wages. Stuart also pointed out that student debt is one of the few kinds of debt that one cannot expunge with bankruptcy.

As I read that piece of Ms. Schmick’s and reflected on it, I was reminded of another column I had read a few months back that talked about where we had gone off the rails collectively. The piece was entitled “Battle for the Boardroom” by Joe Nocera and was in the NY Times on May 9, 2015. Nocera was discussing the concept of “activist investors” and “shareholder value” specifically as it pertained to Nelson Peltz, Trian Investments, and a proxy fight with the management and board of DuPont.  And Nocera pointed out that Trian, by all accounts, had a good record and was often a constructive force once it got a board seat or two.

Nocera’s concern, which he raised in a fashion that went straight for the jugular, was simple. Have we really reached the point where the activist investor gets to call the tune, no matter how well run the company? What is shareholder value, especially in a company like DuPont? Trian’s argument was that DuPont was not getting a return on its spending on research and development? Yet R&D spending is what made DuPont, given the years it takes to often produce from scientific research a commercial product. Take away the R&D spending argued Nocera, and you have not just a poorer DuPont, but also a poorer United States. He closed by talking with and quoting Martin Lipton, a corporate attorney who has made a career out of disparaging corporate activists. Lipton said, “Activism has caused companies to cut R&D, capital investment, and, most significantly, employment,” he said. “It forces companies to lay off employees to meet quarterly earnings.”

“It is,” he concluded, “a disaster for the country.”

This brings me to my final set of ruminations. Some years ago, my wife and I were guests at a small dinner party at the home of a former ambassador (and patriot) living in Santa Fe.  There were a total of six of us at that dinner. One of the other guests raised the question as to whether any of us ever thought about what things would have been like for the country if Al Gore, rather than George W. Bush, had won the presidential election. My immediate response was that I didn’t think about such things as it was just far too painful to contemplate.

In like vein, having recently read Ron Suskind’s book Confidence Men, I have been forced to contemplate what it would have meant for the country if President-elect Barack Obama had actually followed through with the recommendations of his transition advisors and appointed his “A” Economic Team. Think about it – Paul Volcker as Secretary of the Treasury, the resurrection of Glass-Steagall, the break-up of the big investment banks – it too is just too painful to contemplate.  Or as the line from T.H. White’s Once and Future King goes, “I dream things that never were, and ask why not?”

Now, a few thoughts about the carnage and how to deal with it.  Have a plan and stick to it. Do not panic, for inevitably all panic does is lead to self-inflicted wounds. Think about fees, but from the perspective of correlated investments. That is, if five large (over $10B in assets) balanced funds are all positively correlated in terms of their portfolios, does it really make sense not to own the one with the lowest expense ratio (and depending on where it is held, taxes may come into play)? Think about doing things where other people’s panic does not impact you, e.g., is there a place for closed end funds in a long-term investment portfolio? And avoid investments where the bugs have not been worked out, as the glitches in pricing and execution of trades for ETF’s have shown us over the last few weeks.

There is a wonderful Dilbert cartoon where the CEO says “Asok, you can beat market averages by doing your own stock research. Asok then says, “So … You believe every investor can beat the average by reading the same information? “Yes” says the CEO. Asok then says, “Makes you wonder why more people don’t do it.” The CEO closes saying, “Just lazy, I guess.”

Edward A. Studzinski

charles balconyChecking in on MFO’s 20-year Great Owls

MFO first introduced its rating system in the June 2013 commentary. That’s also when the first “Great Owl” funds were designated. These funds have consistently delivered top quintile risk adjusted returns (based on Martin Ratio) in their categories for evaluation periods 3 years and longer. The most senior are 20-year Great Owls. These select funds have received Return Group ranking of 5 for evaluation periods of 3, 5, 10, and 20 years. Only about 50 funds of the 1500 mutual funds aged 20 years or older, or about 3%, achieve the GO designation. An impressive accomplishment.

Below are the current 20-year GOs (excluding muni funds for compactness, but find complete list here, also reference MFO Ratings Definitions.)

GO_1GO_2GO_3GO_4

Of the original 20-year GO list of 47 funds still in existence today, only 19 remain GOs. These include notables: Fidelity GNMA (FGMNX), PIMCO Foreign Bond – USD-Hedged I (PFORX), James Balanced: Golden Rainbow R (GLRBX), T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation (PRWCX), Vanguard Wellington Inv (VWELX), Meridian Growth Legacy (MERDX), and Hennessy Gas Utility Investor (GASFX).

The current 20-year GOs also include 25 Honor Roll funds, based on legacy Fund Alarm ranking system. Honor Roll funds have delivered top quintile absolute returns in its category for evaluation periods of 1, 3, and 5 years. These include: AMG Managers Interm Dur Govt (MGIDX), PIMCO Foreign Bond – USD-Hedged I (PFORX), James Balanced: Golden Rainbow R (GLRBX), T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation (PRWCX), and T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Growth (RPMGX).

A closer look at performance of the original list of 20-year GOs, since they were introduced a little more than two years ago, shows very satisfactory performance overall, even with funds not maintaining GO designation. Below is a summary of Return Group rankings and current three-year performance.
OGO_1OGO_2OGO_3OGO_4
Of the 31 funds in tables above, only 7 have underperformed on a risk adjusted basis during the past three years, while 22 have outperformed.

Some notable outperformers include: Vanguard Wellesley Income Inv (VWINX), Oakmark International I (OAKIX), Sequoia (SEQUX), Brown Capital Mgmt Small Co Inv (BCSIX), and T. Rowe Price New Horizons (PRNHX).

And the underperformers? Waddell & Reed Continental Inc A (UNCIX), AMG Yacktman (YACKX), Gabelli Equity Income AAA (GABEX), and Voya Corporate Leaders Trust (LEXCX).

A look at absolute returns shows that 10 of the 31 underperformed their peers by an average of 1.6% annualized return, while the remaining 21 beat their peers by an average of 4.8%.

Gentle reminder: MFO ratings are strictly quantitative and backward looking. No accounting for manager or adviser changes, survivorship bias, category drift, etc.

Will take a closer look at the three-year mark and make habit of posting how they have fared over time.

New Voices at the Observer: The Tale of Two Leeighs

We’re honored this month to be joined by two new contributors: Sam Lee and Leigh Walzer.

Sam LeeSam is the founder of Severian Asset Management, Chicago. He is also former editor of Morningstar analyst and editor of their ETF Investor newsletter. Sam has been celebrated as one of the country’s best financial writers (Morgan Housel: “Really smart takes on ETFs, with an occasional killer piece about general investment wisdom”) and as Morningstar’s best analyst and one of their best writers (John Coumarianos: “Lee has written two excellent pieces [in the span of a month], and his showing himself to be Morningstar’s finest analyst”). Sam claims to have chosen “Severian” for its Latinate gravitas.

We’ll set aside, for now, any competing observations. For example, we’ll make no mention of the Severian Asset Management’s acronym. And certainly no reflections upon the fact that Severian was the name of the Journeyman torturer who serves as narrator in a series of Gene Wolfe’s speculative fiction. Nor that another Severian was a popular preacher and bishop. Hmmm … had I mentioned that one of Sam’s most popular pieces is “Losing My Religion”?

You get a better sense of what Sam brings to the table from his discussion of his approach to things as an investment manager:

Investing well is hard. We approach the challenge with a great deal of humility, and try to learn from the best thinkers we can identify. One of our biggest influences is Warren Buffett, who stresses that predictions about the future should be based on an understanding of economic fundamentals and human nature, not on historical returns, correlations and volatilities. He stresses that we should be skeptical of the false precision and unwarranted sense of control that come with the use of quantitative tools, such as Monte Carlo simulations and Markowitz optimizations. We take these warnings seriously.

Our approach is based on economic principles that we believe are both true and important:

  • First and foremost, we believe an asset’s true worth is determined by the cash you can pull out of it discounted by the appropriate interest rate. Over the long run, prices tend to converge to intrinsic value … Where we differ with Buffett and other value investors is that we do not believe investment decisions should be made solely on the basis of intrinsic value. It is perfectly legitimate to invest in a grossly overpriced asset if one knows a sucker will shortly come along to buy it … The trick is anticipating what the suckers will do.
  • Second, we believe most investors should diversify. As Buffett says, “diversification is protection against ignorance.” This should not be interpreted as a condemnation of the practice. Most investors are ignorant as to what the future holds. Because most of us are ignorant and blind, we want to maximize the protection diversification affords.
  • Third, we believe risk and reward are usually, but not always, positively related … Despite equities’ attractive long-term returns, investors have managed to destroy enormous amounts of wealth while investing in them by buying high and selling low. To avoid this unfortunate outcome, we scale your equity exposure to your behavioral makeup, as well as your time horizon and goals.
  • Fourth, the market makes errors, but exploiting them is hard.

We prefer to place actively managed funds (and other high-tax-burden assets) in tax-deferred accounts. In taxable accounts, we prefer tax-efficient, low-cost equities, either held directly or through mutual funds. Many exchange-traded funds are particularly tax-advantaged because they can aggressively rid themselves of low cost-basis shares without passing on capital gains to their investors.

In my experience, Sam’s writing is bracingly direct, thoughtful and evidence-driven. I think you’ll like his work and I’m delighted by his presence. Sam’s debut offering is a thoughtful and data rich profile of AQR Style Premia Alternative (QSPIX). You’ll find a summary and link to his profile under Observer Fund Profiles.

Leigh WalzerLeigh Walzer is now a principal of Trapezoid LLC and a former member of Michael Price’s merry band at the Mutual Series funds. In his long career, Leigh has brought his sharp insights and passion for data to mutual funds, hedge funds, private equity funds and even the occasional consulting firm.

We had a chance to meet during June’s Morningstar conference, where he began to work through the logic of his analysis of funds with me. Two things were quickly clear to me. First, he was doing something distinctive and interesting. As base, Leigh tried to identify the distinct factors that might qualify as types of managerial skill (two examples would be stock selection and knowing when to reduce risk exposure) and then find the data that might allow him to take apart a fund’s performance, analyze its component parts and predict whether success might persist. Second, I was in over my head. I asked Leigh if he’d be willing to share sort of bite-sized bits of his research so that folks could begin to understand his system and test the validity of its results. He agreed.

Here’s Leigh’s introduction to you all. His first analytic piece debuts next month.

Mutual Fund Observer performs a great service for the investment community. I have found information in these pages which is hard to obtain anywhere else. It is a privilege to be able to contribute.

I founded Trapezoid a few years ago after a long career in the mutual fund and hedge fund industry as an analyst and portfolio manager. Although I majored in statistics at Princeton many moons ago and have successfully modelled professional sports in the past, most of my investing was in credit and generally not quantitative in nature. As David Snowball mentioned earlier, I spent 7 years working for Mutual Shares, led by Michael Price. So the development of the Orthogonal Attribution Engine marks a return to my first passion.

I have always been interested in whether funds deliver value for investors and how accurately allocators and investors understand their managers.  My freshman economics course was taught by Burton Malkiel, author of a Random Walk Down Wall Street, who preached that the capital markets were pretty efficient. My experience in Wall Street and my work at Orthogonal have taught me this is not always true.  Sometimes a manager or a strategy can significantly outperform the market for a sustained period.  Of course, competitors react and capital flows until an equilibrium is achieved, but not nearly as quickly as Malkiel assumes.

There has been much discussion over the years about the active–passive debate.  John Bogle was generous in his time reviewing my work.  I generally agree with Jack and he is a giant in the industry to whom we all owe a great deal.  For those who are ready to throw in the towel of active investing, Bogle makes two (related) assumptions which need to be critically reviewed:

  1. Even if an active manager outperforms the average, he is likely to revert to the mean.
  2. Active managers with true skill (in excess of their fee structure) are hard to identify, so investors are better off with an index fund

I try to measure skill in a way which is more accurate (and multi-faceted) than Bogle’s definition and I look at skill as a statistical process best measured over an extended period of time. I try to understand how the manager is positioned at every point in time, using both holdings and regression data, and I try to understand the implications of his or her decisions.

My work indicates that the active-passive debate is less black and white than you might discern from the popular press or the marketing claims of mutual fund managers. The good news for investors is there are in fact many managers who have demonstrated skill over an extended period of time. Using statistical techniques, it is possible to identify managers likely to outperform in the future. There are some funds whose expected return over the next 12 months justifies what they charge. There are many other managers who show investment skill, but not enough to justify their expense structure.

Feel free to check out the website at www.fundattribution.com which is currently in beta test. Over 30,000 funds are modelled; users who register for demo access can see certain metrics measuring historic manager skill and likelihood of future success on a subset of the fund universe.

I look forward to sharing with you insights on specific funds in the coming months and provide MFO readers a way to track my results. Equally important, I hope to give you new insights to help you think about the role of actively managed funds in your portfolio and how to select funds. My research is still a work in process. I invite the readership of MFO to join me in my journey and invite feedback, suggestions, and collaboration.  You may contact me at [email protected].

We’re very much looking forward to October and Leigh’s first essay. Thanks to both. I think you’ll enjoy their good spirits and insight.

Top developments in fund industry litigation

fundfoxFundfox, launched in 2012, is the mutual fund industry’s only litigation intelligence service, delivering exclusive litigation information and real-time case documents neatly organized, searchable, and filtered as never before. For the complete list of developments last month, and for information and court documents in any case, log in at www.fundfox.com and navigate to Fundfox Insider.

Court Decisions & Orders

  • In the shareholder litigation regarding gambling-related securities held by the American Century Ultra Fund, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of American Century, agreeing that the shareholder could not bring suit against the fund adviser because the fund had declined to do so in a valid exercise of business judgment. Defendants included independent directors. (Seidl v. Am. Century Cos.)
  • Setting the stage for a rare section 36(b) trial (assuming no settlement), a court denied parties’ summary judgment motions in fee litigation regarding multiple AXA Equitable funds. The court cited only “reasons set forth on the record.” (Sanford v. AXA Equitable Funds Mgmt. Group, LLC; Sivolella v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co.)
  • A court gave its final approval to (1) a $24 million partial settlement of the state-law class action regarding Northern Trust‘s securities lending program, and (2) a $36 million settlement of interrelated ERISA claims. The state-law class action is still proceeding with respect to plaintiffs who invested directly in the program. (Diebold v. N. Trust Invs., N.A.; La. Firefighters’ Ret. Sys. v. N. Trust Invs., N.A.)
  • In the long-running fee litigation regarding Oakmark funds that had made it all the way to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit affirmed a lower court’s grant of summary judgment for defendant Harris Associates. The appeals court cited the lower court’s findings that (1) “Harris’s fees were in line with those charged by advisers for other comparable funds” and (2) “the fees could not be called disproportionate in relation to the value of Harris’s work, as the funds’ returns (net of fees) exceeded the norm for comparable investment vehicles.” Plaintiffs have filed a petition for rehearing en banc. (Jones v. Harris Assocs.)
  • Extending the fund industry’s dismal record on motions to dismiss section 36(b) litigation, a court denied PIMCO‘s motion to dismiss an excessive-fee lawsuit regarding the Total Return Fund. Court: “Throughout their Motion, Defendants grossly exaggerate ‘the specifics’ needed to survive a 12(b)(6) motion, essentially calling for Plaintiff to prove his case now, before discovery.” (Kenny v. Pac. Inv. Mgmt. Co.)
  • A court granted the motion to dismiss a state-law and RICO class action alleging mismanagement by a UBS investment adviser, but without prejudice to refile the state-law claims as federal securities fraud claims. (Knopick v. UBS Fin. Servs., Inc.)

The Alt Perspective: Commentary and news from DailyAlts.

dailyaltsAs we all now know, August was anything but calm. Despite starting that way, the month delivered some tough love in the last two weeks, just when we were all supposed to be relaxing with family and friends. Select Morningstar mutual fund categories finished the month with the following returns:

  • Large Blend (US Equity): -6.07%
  • Intermediate-Term Bond: -0.45%
  • Long/Short Equity: -3.57%
  • Nontraditional Bonds: -0.91%
  • Managed Futures: -2.52%

The one surprise of the five categories above is Managed Futures. This is a category that typically does well when markets are in turmoil and trending down. August proved to be an inflection point, and turned out to be challenging in what was otherwise a solid year for the strategies.

However, let’s take a look at balanced portfolio configurations. Using the above category returns, at traditional long-only 60/40 blend portfolio (60% stocks / 40% bonds) would have returned -3.82% in August, while an alternative balanced portfolio of 50% long/short equity, 30% nontraditional bonds and 20% managed futures would have returned -2.56%. Compare these to the two categories below:

  • Moderate Allocation: -4.17%
  • Multialternative: -2.22%

Moderate Allocation funds, which are relatively lower risk balance portfolios, turned in the lowest of the balanced portfolio configurations. The Multialternative category of funds, which are balanced portfolios made up of mostly alternative strategies, performed the best, beating the traditional 60/40 portfolio, the 50/30/20 alternative portfolio and the Moderate Allocation category. Overall, it looks like alternatives did their job in August.

August Highlights

Believe it or not, Vanguard launched its second alternative mutual fund in August. The new Vanguard Alternative Strategies Fund will invest across several alternative investment strategies, including long/short equity and event driven, and will also allocate some assets to currencies and commodities. Surprisingly, Vanguard will be managing the fund in-house, but does that the ability to outsource some or all of the management of the fund. Sticking with its low cost focus, Vanguard will charge a management fee of 0.18% – a level practically unheard of in the liquid alternatives space.

In a not quite so surprising move, Catalyst Funds converted its fourth hedge fund into a mutual fund in August with the launch of the Catalyts/Auctos Multi Strategy Fund. In this instance, the firm did go one step beyond prior conversions and actually acquired the underlying manager, Auctos Capital Management. One key benefit of the hedge fund conversion is the fact that the fund can retain its performance track record, which dates back to 2008.

Finally, American Century (yes, that conservative, mid-western asset management firm) launched a new brand called AC Alternatives under which it will manage a series of alternative mutual funds. The firm currently has three funds under the new brand, with two more in the works. Similar to Vanguard, the firm launched a market neutral fund back in 2005, and a value tilted version in 2011. The third fund, an alternative income fund, is new this year.

Let’s Get Together

Two notable acquisitions occurred in August. The first is the acquisition of Arden Asset Management, a long-time institutional fund-of-hedge funds manager, by Aberdeen. The latter has been on the acquisition trail over the past several years, with a keen eye on alternative investment firms. Through the transaction, Arden will get global distribution, while Aberdeen will pick up very specific hedge fund due diligence, manager research and portfolio construction capabilities. Looks like a win-win.

The second transaction was the acquisition of 51% of the Australian-based unconstrained fixed income shop Kapstream Capital by Janus for a cool $85 million. Janus also has the right to purchase the remainder of the firm, which has roughly $6 billion under management. Good for Kapstream as the valuation appears to be on the high end, but perhaps Bill Gross needed some assistance managed his unconstrained portfolios.

The Fall

A lot happens in the Fall. Back to school. Football. Interest rate hike. Changing leaves. Halloween. Thanksgiving. Federal debt ceiling. Maybe there is enough for us all to take our minds off the markets for just a bit and let things settle down. Time will tell, but until next month, enjoy the Labor Day weekend and the beginning of a new season.

Observer Fund Profiles:

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve. 

AQR Style Premia Alternative (QSPIX). AQR’s new long-short multi-strategy fund takes factor investing to its logical extreme: It applies four distinct strategies–value, momentum, carry, and defensive–across stock, bond, commodity, and currency markets. The standard version of the fund targets a 10% volatility and a 0.7 Sharpe ratio while maintaining low to no correlation with conventional portfolios. In its short life, the fund has delivered in spades. Please note, this profile was written by our colleague, Sam Lee.

Manning & Napier Pro-Blend Conservative (EXDAX): this fund has been navigating market turbulences for two decades now. Over the course of the 21st century, it’s managed to outperform the Total Stock Market Index with only one-third of the stocks and one-third of the volatility. And you can start with just $25!  

TCW/Gargoyle Hedged Value (TFHVX/TFHIX):  if you understand what you’re getting – a first-rate value fund with one important extra – you’re apt to be very happy. If you see “hedged” and think “tame,” you’ve got another thing coming.

Launch Alert: Falcon Focused SCV (FALCX)

falcon capital managementThe fact that newly-launched Falcon Focused SCV has negligible assets (it’s one of the few funds in the world where I could write a check and become the fund’s largest shareholder) doesn’t mean that it has negligible appeal.

The fund is run by Kevin Silverman whose 30 year career has been split about equally between stints on the sell side and on the buy side.  He’s a graduate of the University of Wisconsin’s well-respect Applied Securities Analysis Program . Early in his career he served as an analyst at Oakmark and around the turn of the century was one of the managers of ABN AMRO Large Cap Growth Fund. He cofounded Falcon Capital Management in April 2015 and is currently one of the folks responsible for a $100 million small cap value strategy at Dearborn Partners in Chicago. They’ve got an audited 14 year record.

I’m endlessly attracted to the potential of small cap value investing. The research, famously French and Fama’s, and common sense concur: this should be the area with the greatest potential for profits. It’s huge. It’s systemically mispriced because there’s so little analyst coverage and because investors undervalue value stocks. Growth stocks are all cool and sexy and you want to own them and brag to all your friends about them. Value stocks are generally goofed up companies in distressed industries. They’re boring and a bit embarrassing to own; on whole, they’re sort of the midden heap of the investing world.

The average investor’s unwillingness or inability to consider them raises the prospect that a really determined investor might find exceptional returns. Kevin and his folks try to build 5 to 10 year models for all of their holdings, then look seriously at years four and five. The notion is that if they can factor emotion out of the process (they invoke the pilot’s mantra, “trust your instruments”) and extend their vision beyond the current obsession with this quarter and next quarter, they’ll find opportunities that will pay off handsomely a few years from now. Their target is to use their models to construct a portfolio that has the prospect for returns “in the mid-20s over the next three years.” Mathematically, that works out to a doubling in just over three years.

I’m not sure that the guys can pull it off but they’re disciplined, experienced and focused. That puts them ahead of a lot of their peers.

The initial expense ratio, after waivers, is 1.25%. The no-load Institutional shares carry a $10,000 minimum, which is reduced to $5000 for tax-advantaged accounts and those set up with an automatic investing plan. The fund’s website is still pretty sparse (okay, just under “pretty sparse”), but you can find a bit more detail and one pretty panorama at the adviser’s website.

Launch Alert: Grandeur Peak Global Stalwarts Fund (GGSOX/GGSYX)

grandeur peakGrandeur Peak launched two “alumni” funds on September 1, 2015. Grandeur Peak’s specialty is global micro- and small-cap stocks, generally at the growth end of the spectrum. If they do a good job, their microcap stocks soon become small caps, their small caps become midcaps, and both are at risk of being ejected from the capitalization-limited Grandeur Peak funds.

Grandeur Peak was approached by a large investor who recognized the fact that many of those now-larger stocks were still fundamentally attractive, and asked about the prospect of a couple “alumni” funds to hold them. Such funds are attractive to advisors since you’re able to accommodate a much larger asset base when you’re investing in $10 billion stocks than in $200 million ones.

One investor reaction might be to label Grandeur Peak as sell-outs. They’ve loudly touted two virtues: a laser-like focus and a firm-wide capacity cap at $3 billion, total. With the launch of the Stalwarts funds, they’re suddenly in the mid-cap business and are imagining firmwide AUM of about $10 billion.

Grandeur Peak, however, provided a remarkable wide-ranging, thoughtful defense of their decision. In a letter to investors, dated July 15, they discuss the rationale for and strategies embodied by three new funds:

Grandeur Peak Global Micro Cap Fund (GPMCX): A micro-cap strategy primarily targeting companies in the $50M-350M market cap range across the globe; very limited capacity.

Grandeur Peak Global Stalwarts Fund (GGSOX/GGSYX): A small/mid-cap (SMID) strategy focused on companies above $1.5B market cap across the globe.

Grandeur Peak International Stalwarts Fund (GISOX/GISYX): A small/mid-cap strategy focused on companies above $1.5B market cap outside of the U.S.

They argue that they’d always imagined Stalwarts funds, but didn’t imagine launching them until the firm’s second decade of operation. Their success in identifying outstanding stocks and drawing assets brought high returns, a lot of attention and a lot of money. While they hoped to be able to soft-close their funds, controlling inflows forced a series of hard closes instead which left some of their long-time clients adrift. By adding the Stalwarts funds as dedicated vehicles for larger cap names (the firm already owns over 100 stocks in the over $1.5 billion category), they’re able to provide continuing access to their investors without compromising the hard limits on the micro- and nano-cap products. Here’s their detail:

As you know, capacity is a very important topic to us. We believe managing capacity appropriately is another critical competitive advantage for Grandeur Peak. We plan to initially close the Global Micro Cap Fund at around $25 million. We intend to keep it very small in order to allow the Fund full access to micro and nanocap companies …

Looking carefully at the market cap and liquidity of our holdings above $1.5 billion in market cap, the math suggests that we could manage up to roughly $7 billion across the Stalwarts family without sacrificing our investment strategy or desired position sizes in these names. This $7 billion is in addition to the roughly $3 billion that we believe we can comfortably manage below $1.5 billion in market cap.

Our existing strategies will remain hard closed as we are committed to protecting these strategies and their ability to invest in micro-cap and small-cap companies. We are very aware that many good small cap firms lose their edge by taking in too many assets and being forced to adjust their investment style. We will not do this! We are taking a more unique approach by partitioning the lower capacity, less liquid names and allowing additional assets in the higher capacity, liquid stocks where the impact will not be felt by the smaller-cap funds.

The minimum initial investment is $2000 for the Investor share class, which will be waived if you establish the account with an automatic investment plan. Unlike Global Micro Cap, there is no waiver of the institutional minimum available for the Stalwarts. Each fund will charge 1.35%, retail, after waivers. You might want to visit the Global Stalwarts or International Stalwarts homepages for details.

Funds in Registration

There are 17 new funds in registration this month. Funds in registration with the SEC are not available for sale to the public and the advisors are not permitted to talk about them, but a careful reading of the filed prospectuses gives you a good idea of what interesting (and occasionally appalling) options are in the pipeline. Funds currently in registration will generally be available for purchase in November.

Two of the funds will not be available for direct purchase: T. Rowe Price is launching Mid Cap and Small Cap index funds to use with 529 plans, funds-of-funds and so on. Of the others, there are new offerings from two solid boutiques: Driehaus Turnaround Opportunities will target “distressed” investing and Brown Advisory Equity Long/Short Fund will do about what you expect except that the filings bracket the phrase Equity Long/Short. That suggests that the fund’s final name might be different. Harbor is launching a clone of Vanguard Global Equity. A little firm named Gripman is launched a conservative allocation fund (I wish them well) and just one of the funds made my eyes roll. You’ll figure it out.

Manager Changes

We tracked down 60 or 70 manager changes this month; the exact number is imprecise because one dude was leaving a couple dozen Voya funds which we reduced to just a single entry. We were struck by the fact that about a dozen funds lost women from the management teams, but it appears only two funds added a female manager.

Sympathies to Michael Lippert, who is taking a leave from managing Baron Opportunity (BIOPX) while he recovers from injuries sustained in a serious bicycle accident. We wish him a speedy recovery.

Updates

A slightly-goofed SEC filing led us to erroneously report last month that Osterweis Strategic Investment (OSTVX) might invest up to 100% in international fixed-income. A “prospectus sticker” now clarifies the fact that “at the fund level OSTVX is limited to 50% foreign.” Thanks to the folks at Osterweis for sharing the update with us. Regrets for any confusion.

Morningstar giveth: In mid-August, Morningstar initiated coverage of two teams we’ve written about. Vanguard Global Minimum Volatility (VMVFX) received a Bronze rating, mostly because it’s a Vanguard fund. Morningstar praises the low expenses, Vanguard culture and the “highly regarded–and generally successful–quantitative equity group.” The fund’s not quite two years old but has a solid record and has attracted $1.1 billion in assets.

Vulcan Value Partners (VVPLX) was the other Bronze honoree. Sadly, Morningstar waited until after the fund had closed before recognizing it. The equally excellent Vulcan Value Partners Small Cap (VVPSX) fund is also closed, though Morningstar has declined to recognize it as a medalist fund.

Morningstar taketh away: Fidelity Capital Appreciation (FDCAX) is no longer a Fanny Fifty Fund: it has been doing too well. There’s an incentive fee built into the fund’s price structure; if performance sucks, the e.r. drops. If performance soars, the e.r. rises.

Rewarding good performance sounds to the novice like a good idea. Nonetheless, good performance has had the effect of disqualifying FDCAX as a “Fantastic” fund. Laura Lutton explains why, in “These Formerly ‘Fantastic’ Funds Now Miss the Mark.

In 2013, the fund outpaced that index by 2.47 percentage points, upping the expense ratio by 4 basis points to 0.81%. This increase moved the fund’s expenses beyond the category’s cheapest quintile…

Uhhh … yup. 247 basis points of excess return in exchange for 4 basis points of expense is clearly not what we expect of Fantastic funds. Out!

From Ira’s “What the hell is that?” file: A rare T Rowe flub

Ira Artman, a long-time friend of the Observer and consistently perceptive observer himself, shared the following WTF performance chart from T. Rowe Price:

latin america fund

Good news: T. Rowe Price Latin America (PRLAX) is magic! It’s volatility-free emerging market fund.

Bad news: the chart is rigged. The vertical axis is compressed so eliminate virtually all visible volatility. There’s a sparky discussion of the chart on our discussion board that provides both uncompressed versions of the chart and the note that the other T. Rowe funds did not receive similarly scaled axes. Consensus on the board: someone deserves a spanking for this one.

Thanks to Ira for catching and sharing.

Briefly Noted . . .

CRM Global Opportunity Fund (CRMWX) is becoming CRM Slightly-Less-Global Opportunity Fund, in composition if not in name. Effective October 28, the fund is changing its principal investment strategy from investing “a majority” of its assets outside the US to investing “at least 40%” internationally, less if markets get ugly. Given that the fund’s portfolio is just 39% global now (per Morningstar), I’m a little fuzzy on why the change will make a difference.

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

Seafarer’s share class model is becoming more common, which is a good thing. Seafarer, like other independent funds, needs to be available on brokerage platforms like Schwab and Scottrade; those platforms allow for lower cost institutional shares so long as the minimum exceeds $100,000 and higher cost retail shares with baked-in 12(b)1 fees to help pay Schwab’s platform fees. Seafarer complied but allows a loophole: they’ll waive the minimum on the institutional shares if you (a) buy it directly from them and (b) set up an automatic investing plan so that you’re moving toward the $100,000 minimum. Whether or not you reach it isn’t the consideration. Seafarer’s preference is to think of their low-cost institutional class as their “universal share class.”

Grandeur Peak is following suit. They intend to launch their new Global Micro Cap Fund by year’s end, then to close it as soon as assets hit $25 million. That raises the real prospect of the fund being available for a day or two. During that time, though, they’ll offer institutional shares to retail investors who invest directly with them. They write:

We want the Global Micro Cap Fund to be available to both our retail and institutional clients, but without the 0.25% 12b-1 fee that comes with the Investor share class. Our intention is to make the Institutional class available to all investors, and waive the minimum to $2000 for regular accounts and $100 for UTMA accounts.

Invesco International Small Company Fund will reopen to all investors on September 11, 2015. Morningstar has a lot of confidence in it (the fund is “Silver”) and it has a slender asset base right now, $330 million, down from its peak of $700 million before the financial crisis. The fund has been badly out of step with the market in recent years, which is reflected in the fact that it has one of its peer group’s best ten-year record and worst five-year records. Since neither the team nor the strategy has changed, Morningstar remains sanguine.

Matthews Pacific Tiger Fund (MAPTX) has reopened to new investors.

Effective July 1, 2015 the shareholder servicing fee for the Investor Class Shares of each of the Meridian Funds was reduced from 0.25% to 0.05%. Somehow I missed it. Sorry for the late notice. The Investor shares continue to sport their bizarre $99,999 minimum initial investment.

Wells Fargo Advantage Index Fund (WFILX) reopens to new investors on October 1. It’s an over-priced S&P 500 Index fund. Assuming you can dodge the front load, the 0.56% expense ratio is a bit more than triple Vanguard’s (0.17% for Investor shares of Vanguard 500, VFINX). That difference adds up: over 10 years, a $10,000 investment in WFILX would have grown to $19,800 while the same money in VFINX grew to $20,700.

CLOSINGS (and related inconveniences)

Acadian Emerging Markets (AEMGX) is slated to close to new investors on October 1. The adviser is afraid that the fund’s ability to execute its strategy will be impaired “if the size of the Fund is not limited.” The fund has lost an average of 3.7% annually for the current market cycle, through July 2015. You’d almost think that losing money, trailing the benchmark and having higher-than-normal volatility would serve as automatic brakes limiting the size of the portfolio.” Apparently not so much.

M.D. Sass 1-3 Year Duration U.S. Agency Bond Fund (MDSHX) is closing the fund’s retail share class and converting them to institutional shares. It’s an okay fund in a low return category, which means expenses matter. Over the past three years, the retail shares trail 60% of their peer group while the institutional shares lead 60% of the group. The conversion will give existing retail shareholders a bit of a boost and likely cut the adviser’s expenses by a bit.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

Effective August 27, 2015 361 Global Managed Futures Strategy Fund (AGFQX) became the 361 Global Counter-Trend Fund. I wish them well, but the new prospectus language is redolent of magic wands and sparkly dust: “counter-trend strategy follows an investment model designed to perform in volatile markets, regardless of direction, by taking advantage of fluctuations.  Using a combination of market inputs, the model systematically identifies when to purchase and sell specific investments for the Fund.” What does that mean? What fund isn’t looking to identify when to buy or sell specific investments?

American Independence Laffer Dividend Growth Fund (LDGAX) has … laughed its last laff? Hmmm. Two year old fund run by Laffer Investments, brainchild of Arthur B. Laffer, the genius behind supply-side economics. Not, as it turns out, a very good two year old fund.  At the end of July, American Independence merged with FolioMetrix LLC to form RiskX Investments. Somewhere in the process, the fund was declared to be surplus.

Effective September 1, 2015, the name of the Anchor Alternative Income Fund (AAIFX) will be changed to Armor Alternative Income Fund.

Effective August 7, 2015, Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Small-Cap Value Fund became Eaton Vance Tax-Managed Global Small-Cap Fund (ESVAX).

The Hartford Emerging Markets Research Fund is now Hartford Emerging Markets Equity Fund (HERAX) while The Hartford Small/Mid Cap Equity Fund has become Hartford Small Cap Core Fund (HSMAX).  HERAX is sub-advised by Wellington. Back in May they switched out managers, with the new guy bringing a more-driven approach so they’ve also added “quantitative investing” as a risk factor in the prospectus.  For HSMAX, midcaps are now out.

In mid-November, three Stratton funds add “Sterling Capital” to their names: Stratton Mid Cap Value (STRGX) becomes Sterling Capital Stratton Mid Cap Value. Stratton Real Estate (STMDX) and Stratton Small Cap Value (STSCX) get the same additions.

Effective September 17, 2015, ROBO-STOXTM Global Robotics and Automation Index ETF (ROBO) will be renamed ROBO GlobalTM Robotics and Automation Index ETF. If this announcement affects your portfolio, consider getting therapy and a Lab puppy.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

American Beacon is pretty much cleaning out the closet. They’ve announced liquidation of their S&P 500 Index Fund, Small Cap Index Fund, International Equity Index Fund, Emerging Markets Fund, High Yield Bond Fund, Intermediate Bond Fund, Short-Term Bond Fund and Zebra Global Equity Fund (AZLAX). With regard to everything except Zebra, the announcement speaks of “large redemptions which are expected to occur by the end of 2015” that would shrink the funds by so much that they’re not economically viable. American Beacon started as the retirement plan for American Airlines, was sold to one private equity firm in 2008 and then sold again in 2015. It appears that they lost the contract for running a major retirement plan and are dumping most of their vanilla funds in favor of their recent ventures into trendier fare. The Zebra Global Equity Fund was a perfectly respectable global equity fund that drew just $5 million in assets.

In case you’re wondering whatever happened to the Ave Maria Opportunity Fund, it was eaten by the Ave Maria Catholic Values Fund (AVEMX) at the end of July.

Eaton Vance announced liquidation of its U.S. Government Money Market Fund, around about Halloween, 2015. As new SEC money market regs kick in, we’ve seen a lot of MMFs liquidate.  

hexavestEaton Vance Hexavest U.S. Equity Fund (EHUAX) is promoted to the rank of Former Fund on or about September 18, 2015, immediately after they pass their third anniversary.  What is a “hexavest,” you ask? Perhaps a protective garment donned before entering the magical realms of investing? Hmmm … haven’t visited WoW lately, so maybe. Quite beyond that it’s an institutional equity investment firm based in Montreal that subadvises four (oops, three) funds for Eaton Vance.  Likely the name derived from the fact that the firm had six founders (Greek, “hex”) who wore vests.

Rather more quickly, Eaton Vance also liquidated Parametric Balanced Risk Fund (EAPBX). The Board announced the liquidation on August 11; it was carried out August 28. And you could still say they might have been a little slow on the trigger:

eapbx

The Eudora Fund (EUDFX) has closed and will liquidate on September 10, 2015.

Hundredfold Select Equity Fund (SFEOX) has closed and will discontinue its operations effective October 30, 2015. It’s the sort of closure about which I think too much. On the one hand, the manager (described on the firm’s Linked-In page as “an industry visionary”) is a good steward: almost all of the money in the fund is his own (over $1 million of $1.8 million), he doesn’t get paid to manage it, his Simply Distribute Foundation helps fund children’s hospitals and build orphanages. On the other hand, it’s a market-timing fund of funds will an 1100% turnover which has led the fund to consistently capture much more of the downside, and much less of the upside, than its peers. And, in a slightly disingenuous move, the Hundredfold Select website has already been edited to hide the fact that the Select Equity fund even exists.

Ticker symbols are sometimes useful time capsules, helping you unpack a fund’s evolution. Matthews Asian Growth and Income is “MACSX” because it once was their Asian Convertible Securities fund. Hundredfold Select is “SFEOX” because it once was the Direxion Spectrum Funds: Equity Opportunity fund.

KKM Armor Fund (RMRAX) was not, it appears, bullet-proof. Despite a 30% gain in August 2015, the 18 month old, $8 million fund has closed and will liquidate on September 24, 2015. RMRAX was one of only two mutual funds in the “volatility” peer group. The other is Navigator Sentry Managed Volatility (NVXAX). I bet you’re wondering, “why on earth would Morningstar create a bizarre little peer group with only two funds?” The answer is that there are a slug of ETFs that allow you to bet changes in the level of market volatility; they comprise the remainder of the group. That also illustrates why I prefer funds to ETFs: encouraging folks to speculate on volatility changes is a fool’s errand.

The Modern Technology Fund (BELAX) has closed and will liquidate on September 25, 2015.

There’s going to be one less BRIC in the wall: Goldman Sachs has announced plans to merge Goldman Sachs BRIC Fund (GBRAX) into their Emerging Markets Equity Fund (GEMAX) sometime in October.  The Trustees unearthed a new euphemism for “burying this dog.” They want “to optimize the Goldman Sachs Funds.” The optimized line-up removes a fund that, over the past five years, turned $10,000 into $8,500 by moving its assets into a fund that turned $10,000 into $10,000.

In an interesting choice of words, the Board of Directors authorized the “winding down” Keeley Alternative Value Fund (KALVX) and the Keeley International Small Cap Value Fund (KISVX). By the time you read this, the funds will already have been quite unwound. The advisor gave Alternative Value about four years to prove its … uhh, alternative value (it couldn’t). It gave International Small Cap all of eight months. Founder John Keeley passed away in June at age 75. The firm had completed their transition planning just a month before his passing.

PIMCO Tax Managed Real Return Fund (PXMDX) will be liquidated on or about October 30, 2015.  In addition, three PIMCO ETFs are getting deposited in the circular file: 3-7 Year U.S. Treasury Index (FIVZ), 7-15 Year U.S. Treasury Index (TENZ) and Foreign Currency Strategy Active (FORX) ETFs all disappear on September 30, 2015. “This date may be changed without notice at the discretion of the Trust’s officers.” Their average daily trading volume was just a thousand or two shares.

Ramius Hedged Alpha Fund (RDRAX) will undergo “termination, liquidation and dissolution,” all on September 4, 2015.

rdrax

A reminder to all muddled Lutherans: your former Aid Association for Lutherans (AAL) Funds and/or your former Lutheran Brother Funds, which merged to become your Thrivent Funds, aren’t exactly thriving. The latest evidence is the decision to merge Small Value and Small Growth into Thrivent Small Cap, Mid Cap Value and Mid Cap Growth into Thrivent Mid Cap Stock and Natural Resources and Technology into Thrivent Large Cap Growth

Toroso Newfound Tactical Allocation Fund (TNTAX) has closed and will liquidate at the end of September, 2015.  The promise of riches driven by “a proprietary, volatility-adjusted and momentum driven model” never quite panned out for this tiny fund-of-ETFs.

In Closing . . .

Warren Buffett turned 85 on Sunday. I can only hope that we all have his wits and vigor when we reach a similar point in our lives. To avoid copyright infringement and the risk of making folks ears bleed, I didn’t sing “happy birthday” but I celebrate his life and legacy.

As you read this, I’m boring at bunch of nice folks in Cincinnati to tears. I was asked to chat with the folks at the Ultimus Fund Services conference about growth in uncertain times. It’s a valid concern and I’ll try to share in October the gist of the argument. In late August, a bright former student of mine, Jonathon Woo, had me visit with some of his colleagues in the mutual fund research group at Edward Jones. I won’t tell you what I said to them (it was all Q&A and I rambled) but what I should have said about how to learn (in this case about the prospect of an individual mutual fund) from talking with others. And, if the market doesn’t scramble things up again, we’ll finally run the stuff that’s been in the pipeline for two months.

We’re grateful to the folks who continue to support the Observer, both financially and with an ongoing stream of suggestions. Thanks to Tyler for his recent advice, and to Rick, Kirk, William, Beatrice, Courtney, Thaddeus, Kevin, Virginia, Sunil, and Ira (a donor advised fund – that’s so cool) for their financial support. You guys rock! A number of planning firms have also reaching out with support, kind words and suggestions. So thanks to Wealth Care, LLC, Evergreen Asset Management, and Integrity Financial Planning.  I especially need to track down our friends at Evergreen Asset Management for some beta testing questions. Too, we can’t forget the folks whose support comes from the use of our Amazon Affiliate link. Way to go on finding those back-to-school supplies!

I don’t mean to frighten anyone before Halloween, but historically September and October are the year’s most volatile months. Take a deep breath, try to do a little constructive planning on quiet days, pray for the Cubs (as I write, they’re in third place but with a record that would have them leading four of the six MLB divisions), cheer for the Pirates, laugh at the dinner table and remember that we’re thinking of you.

As ever,

David

AQR Style Premia Alternative I (QSPIX), AQR Style Premia Alternative LV I (QSLIX), September 2015

By Samuel Lee

Objective and strategy

AQR’s Style Premia Alternative, or SPA, strategy offers leveraged, market-neutral exposure to the four major investing “styles” AQR has identified:

Value, the tendency for fundamentally cheap assets to beat expensive assets.

Momentum, the tendency for relative performance in assets to persist over the short run (about one to twelve months).

Carry, the tendency for high-yield assets to beat low-yield assets.

Defensive, the tendency for low-volatility assets to offer higher volatility-adjusted returns than high-volatility assets.

To make the cut as a bona fide style, a strategy has to be persistent, pervasive, dynamic, liquid, transparent and systematic.

SPA offers pure exposure to these styles across virtually all major markets, including stocks, bonds, currencies, and commodities. It removes big, intentional directional bets by going long and short and hedging residual market exposure. As with all alternative investments, the goal is to create returns uncorrelated with conventional portfolio returns.

SPA sizes its positions by volatility, not nominal dollars. In quant-speak, risk is often used as short-hand for volatility, a convention I will adopt. Of course, volatility is not risk (though they are awfully correlated in many situations).

SPA’s strategic risk allocations to each style are as follows: 34% each to value and momentum, 18% to defensive, and 14% to carry. Its strategic risk allocations to each asset class are as follows: 30% to global stock selection, 20% each to equity markets and fixed income, and 15% each to currencies and commodities. There is a bias to the value and momentum styles, perhaps reflecting AQR’s greater confidence in and longer history with them.

Risk allocations drift based on momentum and “style agreement,” where high-conviction positions are leveraged up relative to low-conviction positions. The strategy’s overall risk target falls in steps in the event of a drawdown and rises as losses are recouped. These overlays embody some of the hard-knock knowledge speculators have acquired over the decades: bet on your best ideas, cut losers and ride winners, and cut capital at risk when one is trading poorly.

SPA targets a Sharpe ratio of 0.7 over a market cycle. AQR offers two flavors to the public: the 10% volatility-targeted QSPIX and the 5%-vol QSLIX.

Adviser

AQR Capital Management, LLC, was founded in 1998 by a team of ex-Goldman Sachs quant investors led by Clifford S. Asness, David G. Kabiller, Robert J. Krail, and John M. Liew. AQR stands for Applied Quantitative Research. The firm’s bread and butter has long been trading value and momentum together, an idea Asness studied in his PhD dissertation at the University of Chicago. (Asness’s PhD advisor was none other than Eugene Fama, father of modern finance and one of the co-formulators of the efficient market hypothesis.)

When the firm started up, it was hot. It had one of the biggest launches of any hedge-fund up to that point. Then the dot-com bubble inflated. The widening gap in valuations between value and growth stocks almost sunk AQR. According to Asness, the firm was six months away from going out of business. When the bubble burst, the firm’s returns soared and so did its assets. The good times rolled until the financial crisis shredded its returns. Firm-wide assets from peak-to-trough went from $39.1 billion to $17.2 billion. The good times are back: As of June-end, AQR has $136.2 billion under management.

The two near-death experiences have instilled in AQR a fear of concentrated business risks. In 2009, AQR began to diversify away from its flighty institutional clientele by launching mutual funds to entice stickier retail investors. The firm has also launched new strategies at a steady clip, including managed futures, risk parity, and global macro.

AQR has a strong academic bent. Its leadership is sprinkled with economics and finance PhDs from top universities, particularly the University of Chicago. The firm has poached academics with strong publishing records, including Andrea Frazzini, Lasse Pedersen, and Tobias Moskowitz. Its researchers and leaders are still active in publishing papers.

The firm’s principals are critical of hedge funds that charge high fees on strategies that are largely replicable. AQR’s business model is to offer up simplified quant versions of these strategies and charge relatively low fees.

Managers

Andrea Frazzini, Jacques A. Friedman, Ronen Israel, and Michael Katz. Frazzini was a finance professor at University of Chicago and rising star before he joined AQR. He is now a principal on AQR’s Global Stock Selection team. Friedman is head of the Global Stock Selection team and worked at Goldman Sachs with the original founders prior to joining AQR. Israel is head of Global Alternative Premia and prior to AQR was a senior analyst at Quantitative Financial Strategies Inc. Katz leads AQR’s macro and fixed-income team.

Frazzini is the most recognizable, as he has the fortune of having a last name that’s first in alphabetical order and publishing several influential studies in top finance journals, including “Betting Against Beta” with his colleague Lasse Pedersen.

Unlisted is the intellectual godfather of SPA, Antti Ilmanen, a University of Chicago finance PhD who authored Expected Returns, an imposing but plainly-written tome that synthesizes the academic literature as it relates to money management. Though written years before SPA was conceived, Expected Returns can be read as an extended argument for an SPA-like strategy.

Strategy capacity and closure

AQR has a history of closing funds and ensuring its assets don’t overwhelm the capacity of its strategies. When the firm launched in 1998, it could have started with $2 billion but chose to manage only half that, according to founding partner David Kabiller.

Of its mutual funds, AQR has already closed its Multi-Strategy Alternative, Diversified Arbitrage and Risk Parity mutual funds. However, AQR will meet additional demand by launching additional funds that are tweaked to have more capacity. As of the end of 2014, AQR reported a little over $3 billion in its SPA composite return record. Given the strategy’s strong recent returns, assets have almost certainly grown through capital appreciation and inflows.

Because AQR uses many of the same models or signals in different formats and even in different strategies, the effective amount of capital dedicated to at least some components of SPA’s strategy is higher than the amount reported by AQR.

Management’s stake in the fund

As of Dec. 31, 2014, the strategy’s managers had no assets in the low-volatility SPA fund and little in the standard-volatility SPA fund. One trustee had less than $50,000 in QSPIX. Collectively, the managers had $170,004 to $700,000 in the SPA mutual funds.

Although these are piddling amounts compared to the millions the managers make every year, the SPA strategy is tax-inefficient. If the managers wanted significant exposure to the strategies, they would probably do so through the partnerships AQR offers to high-net-worth investors. But would they do that? AQR, like most quant shops, attempts to scarf down as much as possible the “free lunch” of diversification. The managers are well aware that their human capital is tied to AQR’s success and so they would probably not want to concentrate too heavily in its potent leveraged strategies.

Opening date

QSPIX opened on October 30, 2013. QSLIX opened on September 17, 2014. The live performance composite began on September 1, 2012.

Minimum investment

The minimum investment varies depending share class, broker-dealer and channel. For individual investors, a Fidelity IRA offers the lowest hurdle: a mere $2,500 for the I share class of the normal and low-volatility flavors of SPA. Or you can get access through an advisor. Otherwise, the hurdles are steep: $5 million for the I class, $1 million for the N class, and $50 million for the R6 class.

Expense ratio

The I shares cost 1.66%, the N shares cost 1.91%, and the R6 shares cost 1.56%, as of June 2023.

AUM is $825 million, as of June 2023.  

The per-unit price of exposure to SPA is lower the higher the volatility of the strategy. QSPIX targets 10% vol and costs 1.5%. QSLIX targets 5% vol and costs 0.85%. Anyone can replicate a position in QSLIX by simply halving the amount invested in QSPIX and putting the rest in cash. The effective expense ratio of a half QSPIX, half cash clone strategy is 0.75%.

Comments

QSLIX has been liquidated (June 2023). 

Among right-thinking passive investors who count fees by the basis point, AQR’s SPA strategy elicits revulsion. It’s expensive, leveraged, complicated, hard to understand, and did I mention expensive?

To make the strategy easier to swallow, some passive-investing advocates argue SPA is “passive” because it’s a transparent, systematic, and involves no discretionary stock-selection or market forecasting. This definition is not universally accepted by academics, or even by AQR. The purer, technical definition of passive investing is a strategy that replicates market weightings, and indeed this definition is used by the venerable William Sharpe in his famous essay, “The Arithmetic of Active Management.”

I do not think SPA is passive in any widely understood sense of the word. In fact, I think it’s about as active as you can get within a mutual fund. And I also happen to think SPA is a great fund. Regardless of my warm feelings for the strategy, I consider SPA suitable only for a rare kind of nerd, not the investing public.

Though SPA is aggressively active, its intellectual roots dig deep into the foundations of financial theory that underpin what are commonly thought to be “passive” strategies, particularly value- and size-tilted stock portfolios (DFA has made a big business selling them).

The nerds among you will have quickly caught on that what AQR calls a style is nothing more than a factor, a decades-old idea that sprung from academic finance.

For the non-nerds: A factor, loosely speaking, is a fundamental building block that explains asset returns. Most stocks move together, as if their crescendos and diminuendos were orchestrated by the hand of some invisible conductor. This co-movement is attributed to the equity market factor. According to factor theory, a factor generates a positive excess return called a premium as reward for the distinct risk it represents.

It is now widely agreed that two factors pervade virtually all markets: value and momentum (size has long been criticized as weak). AQR’s researchers—including some of the leading lights in finance—argue there are two more: carry and defensive. They’ve marshalled data and theoretical arguments that share an uncanny family resemblance with the data and arguments marshalled to justify the size and value factors.

The SPA strategy is a potent distillation of the factor-theoretical approach to investing. If you believe the methods that produced the research demonstrating the value and size effects are sound, then you have to admit that those same tools applied to different data sets may yield more factors that can be harvested.

OK, I’ve blasted you with theory. On to more practical matters.

Who should invest in this fund?

Investors who believe active management can produce market-beating results and are willing to run some unusual but controllable risks.

How much capital should one dedicate to it?

Depends on how much you trust the strategy, the managers, and so on. I personally would invest up to 30% of my personal money in the fund (and may do so soon!), but that’s only because I have a high taste for unconventionality, decades of earnings ahead of me, high conviction in the strategy and people, and a pessimistic view of competing options (other alternatives as well as conventional stocks and bonds). Swedroe, on the other hand, says he has 3% of his portfolio in it.

How should it be assessed?

At a minimum, an alternative has to produce positive excess returns that are uncorrelated to the returns of conventional portfolios to be worthwhile.

However, AQR is making a rather bold claim: It has identified four distinct strategies that produce decent returns on a standalone basis and are both largely uncorrelated with each other and conventional portfolios. When combined and leveraged, the resulting portfolio is expected to produce a much steadier stream of positive returns, also uncorrelated with conventional portfolios.

So far, the strategy is working as advertised. Returns have been good and uncorrelated. In back-tests, the strategy only really suffered during the dot-com bubble and the financial crisis. Even then, returns weren’t horrendous.

Is AQR’s 0.7 Sharpe ratio target reasonable?

I think so, but I would be ecstatic with 0.5.

What are its major risks?

Aside from leverage, counterparty, operational, credit, etc., I worry about a repeat of the quant meltdown of August 2007. It’s thought that a long-short hedge fund suddenly liquidated its positions then. Because many hedge funds dynamically adjust their positions based on recent volatility and returns, the sudden price movements induced by the liquidation set off a self-reinforcing cycle where more and more hedge funds cut the same positions. The stampede to the exits resulted in huge and sudden losses. However, the terror was short-lived. The funds that sold out lost a lot of money; the funds that held onto their positions looked fine by month-end.

AQR is cognizant of this risk and so keeps its holdings liquid and doesn’t go overboard with the leverage. However, it is hard for outsiders to assess whether AQR is doing enough to mitigate this risk. I think they are, because I trust AQR’s people, but I’m well aware that I could be wrong.

Bottom line

One of the best alternative funds available to mutual-fund investors.

Fund website

AQR Style Premia Alternative Fund 

aqrfunds.com

aqr.com

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2015. All rights reserved. The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication. For reprint/e-rights contact us.

TCW/Gargoyle Hedged Value (TFHVX/TFHIX), September 2015

By David Snowball

This fund has been liquidated.

Objective and strategy

TCW/Gargoyle Hedged Value seeks long-term capital appreciation while exposing investors to less risk than broad stock market indices. The strategy is to hold a diversified portfolio mid- to large-cap value stocks, mostly domestic, and to hedge part of the stock market risk by selling a blend of index call options. In theory, the mix will allow investors to enjoy most of the market’s upside while being buffered for a fair chunk of its downside.

Adviser

TCW. TCW, based in Los Angeles, was founded in 1971 as Trust Company of the West. About $140 billion of that are in fixed income assets. The Carlyle Group owns about 60% of the adviser while TCW’s employees own the remainder. They advise 22 TCW funds, as well as nine Metropolitan West funds with a new series of TCW Alternative funds in registration. As of June 30, 2015, the firm had about $180 billion in AUM; of that, $18 billion resides in TCW funds and $76 billion in the mostly fixed-income MetWest funds.

Manager

Joshua B. Parker and Alan Salzbank. Messrs. Parker and Salzbank are the Managing Partners of Gargoyle Investment Advisor, LLC. They were the architects of the combined strategy and managed the hedge fund which became RiverPark/Gargoyle, and now TCW/Gargoyle, and also oversee about a half billion in separate accounts. Mr. Parker, a securities lawyer by training is also an internationally competitive bridge player (Gates, Buffett, Parker…) and there’s some reason to believe that the habits of mind that make for successful bridge play also makes for successful options trading. They both have over three decades of experience and all of the investment folks who support them at Gargoyle have at least 20 years of experience in the industry.

Strategy capacity and closure

The managers estimate that they could manage about $2 billion in the stock portion of the portfolio and a vastly greater sum in the large, liquid options market. TCW appears not to have any clear standards controlling fund closures.

Active share

“Active share” measures the degree to which a fund’s portfolio differs from the holdings of its benchmark portfolio. High active share indicates management which is providing a portfolio that is substantially different from, and independent of, the index. An active share of zero indicates perfect overlap with the index, 100 indicates perfect independence. Gargoyle has calculated the active share of the equity portion of the portfolio but is legally constrained from making that information public. Given the portfolio’s distinctive construction, it’s apt to be reasonably high.

Management’s stake in the fund

As of January 2014, the managers had $5 million invested in the strategy (including $500,000 in this fund). Gargoyle Partners and employees have over $10 million invested in the strategy.

Opening date

The strategy was originally embodied in a hedge fund which launched December 31, 1999. The hedge fund converted to a mutual fund on April 30, 2012. TCW adopted the RiverPark fund on June 26, 2015.

Minimum investment

$5000, reduced to $1000 for retirement accounts. There’s also an institutional share class (TFHIX) with a $1 million minimum and 1.25% expense ratio.

Expense ratio

1.50%, after waivers, on assets of $74.5 million, as of July, 2015.

Comments

Shakespeare was right. Juliet, the world’s most famously confused 13-year-old, decries the harm that a name can do:

‘Tis but thy name that is my enemy;
Thou art thyself, though not a Montague.
What’s Montague? it is nor hand, nor foot,
Nor arm, nor face, nor any other part
Belonging to a man. O, be some other name!
What’s in a name? that which we call a rose
By any other name would smell as sweet;
So Romeo would, were he not Romeo call’d,
Retain that dear perfection which he owes
Without that title.

Her point is clear: people react to the name, no matter how little sense that makes. In many ways, they make the same mistake with this fund. The word “hedged” as the first significant term of the name leads many people to think “low volatility,” “mild-mannered,” “market neutral” or something comparable. Those who understand the fund’s strategy recognize that it isn’t any of those things.

The Gargoyle fund has two components. The fund combines an unleveraged long portfolio and a 50% short portfolio, for a steady market exposure of 50%. The portfolio rebalances between those strategies monthly, but monitors and trades its options portfolio “in real time” throughout the month.

The long portfolio is 80-120 stocks, and stock selection is algorithmic. They screen the 1000 largest US stocks on four valuation criteria (price to book, earnings, cash flow and sales) and then assign a “J score” to each stock based on how its current valuation compares with (1) its historic valuation and (2) its industry peers’ valuation. They then buy the hundred most undervalued stocks, but maintain sector weightings that are close to the S&P 500’s.

The options portfolio is index call options. At base, they’re selling insurance policies to nervous investors. Those policies pay an average premium of 2% per month and rise in value as the market falls. That 2% is a long-term average, during the market panic in the fall of 2008, their options were generating 8% per month in premiums.

Why index calls? Two reasons: (1) they are systematically mispriced, and so they generate more profit (or suffer less of a loss) than they theoretically should. Apparently anxious investors are not as price-sensitive as they should be. In particular, these options are overpriced by about 35 basis points per month 88% of the time. For sellers such as Gargoyle, that means something like a 35 bps free lunch. Moreover, (2) selling calls on their individual stocks – that is, betting that the stocks in their long portfolio will fall – would reduce returns. They believe that their long portfolio is a collection of stocks superior to any index and so they don’t want to hedge away any of their stock-specific upside. By managing their options overlay, the team can react to changes in the extent to which their investors are exposed to the stock markets movements. At base, as they sell more index options, they reduce the degree to which the fund is exposed to the market. Their plan is to keep net market exposure somewhere in the range of 35-65%, with a 50% average and a healthy amount of income.

On whole, the strategy works.

The entire strategy has outperformed the S&P. Since inception, its returns have roughly doubled those of the S&P 500. It’s done so with modestly less volatility.

Throughout, it has sort of clubbed its actively-managed long-short peers. More significantly, it has substantially outperformed the gargantuan Gateway Fund (GATEX). At $7.8 billion, Gateway is – for many institutions and advisors – the automatic go-to fund for an options-hedged portfolio. It’s not clear to me that it should be. Here’s the long-term performance of Gateway (green) versus Gargoyle (blue):

GATEX

Two things stand out: an initial investment in Gargoyle fifteen years ago would have returned more than twice as much as the same investment at the same time in Gateway (or the S&P 500). That outperformance is neither a fluke nor a one-time occurrence: Gargoyle leads Gateway over the past one, three, five, seven and ten-year periods as well.

The second thing that stands out is Gargoyle’s weak performance in the 2008 crash. The fund’s maximum drawdown was 48%, between 10/07 and 03/09. The managers attribute that loss to the nature of the fund’s long portfolio: it buys stocks in badly dented companies when the price of the stock is even lower than the company’s dents would warrant. Unfortunately in the meltdown, those were the stocks people least wanted to own so they got killed. The fund’s discipline kept them from wavering: they stayed 100% invested and rebalanced monthly to buy more of the stocks that were cratering. The payback come in 2009 when they posted a 42% return against the S&P’s 26% and again in 2010 when they made 18% to the index’s 15%.

The managers believe that ’08 was exceptional, and note that the strategy actually made money from 2000-02 when the market suffered from the bursting of the dot-com bubble. Morty Schaja, president of River Park Funds, notes that “We are going to have meltdowns in the future, but it is unlikely that they will play out the same way as it did 2008 . . . a market decline that is substantial but lasts a long time, would play better for Gargoyle that sells 1-2% option premium and therefore has that as a cushion every month as compared to a sudden drop in one quarter where they are more exposed. Similarly, a market decline that experiences movement from growth stocks to value stocks would benefit a Gargoyle, as compared to a 2008.” I concur. Just as the French obsession with avoiding a repeat of WW1 led to the disastrous decision to build the Maginot Line in the 1930s, so an investor’s obsession with avoiding “another ‘08” will lead him badly astray.

What about the ETF option? Josh and Alan anticipate clubbing the emerging bevy of buy-write ETFs. The guys identify two structural advantages they have over an ETF: (1) they buy stocks superior to those in broad indexes, and (2) they manage their options portfolio moment by moment, while the ETF just sits and takes hits for 29 out of 30 days each month.

There’s evidence that they’re right. The ETFs are largely based on the CBOE S&P Buy-Write Index (BXM). Between 2000 and 2012, the S&P 500 returned 24% and the BXM returned 52%; the options portion of the Gargoyle portfolio returned 110% while the long portfolio crushed the S&P.

Nonetheless, investors need to know that returns are lumpy; it’s quite capable of beating the S&P 500 for three or four years in a row, and then trailing it for the next three or four. The fund’s returns are not highly correlated with the returns of the S&P 500; the fund may lose money when the index makes money, and vice versa. That’s true in the short term – it beat the S&P 500 during August’s turbulence but substantially trailed during the quieter July – as well as the long-term. All of that is driven by the fact that this is a fairly aggressive value portfolio. In years when value investing is out of favor and momentum rules the day, the fund will lag.

Bottom line

On average and over time, a value-oriented portfolio works. It outperforms growth-oriented portfolios and generally does so with lower volatility. On average and over time, an options overlay works and an actively-managed one works better. It generates substantial income and effectively buffers market volatility with modest loss of upside potential. There will always be periods, such as the rapidly rising market of the past several years, where their performance is merely solid rather than spectacular. That said, Messrs. Parker and Salzbank have been doing this and doing this well for decades. What’s the role of the fund in a portfolio? For the guys, it’s virtually 100% of their US equity exposure. In talking with investors, they discuss it as a substitute for a large-cap value investment; so if your asset allocation plan is 20% LCV, then you could profitably invest up to 20% of your portfolio in Gargoyle. Indeed, the record suggests “very profitably.”

Fund website

TCW/Gargoyle Hedged Value homepage. If you’re a fan of web video, there’s even a sort of infomercial for Gargoyle on Vimeo but relatively little additional information on the Gargoyle Group website.

Fact Sheet

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2015. All rights reserved. The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication. For reprint/e-rights contact us.

Manning & Napier Pro-Blend Conservative (EXDAX), September 2015

By David Snowball

Objective and strategy

The fund’s first objective is to provide preservation of capital. Its secondary concerns are to provide income and long-term growth of capital. The fund invests primarily in fixed-income securities. It tilts toward shorter-term, investment grade issues while having the ability to go elsewhere when the opportunities are compelling. It also invests in foreign and domestic stocks, with a preference for dividend-paying equities. Finally, it may invest a bit in a managed futures strategy as a hedge. In general, though, bonds are 55-85% of the portfolio. In the past five years, stocks have accounted for 25-35% of the portfolio though they might be about 10% higher or lower if conditions warrant.

Adviser

Manning & Napier. Manning & Napier was founded in 1970 by Bill Manning and Bill Napier. They’re headquartered near Rochester, NY, with offices in Columbus, OH, Chicago and St. Petersburg. They serve a diversified client base of high-net-worth individuals and institutions, including 401(k) plans, pension plans, Taft-Hartley plans, endowments and foundations. It’s a publicly-traded company (symbol: MN) with $43 billion in assets under management. Of that, about $18 billion are in their team-managed mutual funds and the remainder in a series of separately-managed accounts.

Manager

The fund is managed by a seven-person team, headed by Jeffrey Herrmann and Marc Tommasi. Both of them have been with the fund since its launch. The same team manages all of Manning & Napier’s Pro-Blend and Target Date funds.

Management’s stake in the fund

We generally look for funds where the managers have placed a lot of their own money to work beside yours.  The managers work as a team on about 10 funds. While few of them have any investment in this particular fund, virtually all have large investments between the various Pro-Blend and Lifestyle funds.

Opening date

November 1, 1995.

Minimum investment

$2,000. That is reduced to $25 if you sign up for an automatic monthly investing plan.

Expense ratio

0.88% on $384.1 million in assets, as of July 2023.

Comments

Pro-Blend Conservative offers many of the same attractions as Vanguard STAR (VGSTX) but does so with a more conservative asset allocation. Here are three arguments on its behalf.

First, the fund invests in a way that is broadly diversified and pretty conservative. The portfolio holds something like 200 stocks and 500 bonds, plus a few dozen other holdings. Collectively those represent perhaps 25 different asset classes. No stock position occupies as much as 1% of the portfolio and it currently has much less direct foreign investment than its peers.

Second, Manning & Napier is very good. The firm does lots of things right, and they’ve been doing it right for a long while. Their funds are all team-managed, which tends to produce more consistent, risk-conscious decisions. Their staff’s bonuses are tied to the firm’s goal of absolute returns, so if investors lose money, the analysts suffer, too. The management teams are long-tenured – as with this fund, 20 year stints are not uncommon – and most managers have substantial investments alongside yours.

Third, Pro-Blend Conservative works. Their strategy is to make money by not losing money. That helps explain a paradoxical finding: they might make only half as much as the stock market in a good year but they managed to outperform the stock market over the past 15. Why? Because they haven’t had to dig themselves out of deep holes first. The longer a bull market goes on, the less obvious that advantage is. But once the market turns choppy, it reasserts itself.

At the same time, the fund has the ability to become more aggressive when conditions warrant.  It just does so carefully. Chris Petrosino, one of the Managing Directors at Manning, explained it this way:

We have the ability to be more aggressive. For us, that’s based on current market conditions, fundamentals, pricing and valuations. It may appear contrarian, but valuations dictate our actions. We use those valuations that we see in various asset classes (not only in equities), as our road map. We use our flexibility to invest where we see opportunities, which means that our portfolio often looks very different than the benchmark.

Bottom Line

Pro-Blend Conservative has been a fine performer since launch. It has returned over 6% since launch and 5.4% annually over the past 15 years. That’s about 1% per year better than either the Total Stock Market or its conservative peers. In general, the fund has managed to make between 4-5% each year; more importantly, it has made money for its investors in 19 of the past 20 years. It is an outstanding first choice for cautious investors.

Fund website

Manning & Napier Pro-Blend Conservative homepage. 

Fact Sheet

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2015. All rights reserved. The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication. For reprint/e-rights contact us.

September 2015, Funds in Registration

By David Snowball

American Beacon Bridgeway Large Cap Growth Fund

American Beacon Bridgeway Large Cap Growth Fund will seek long-term total return on capital, primarily through capital appreciation.  Bridgeway is selling their LCG fund to American Beacon, pending shareholder approval. The fund will still be managed by John Montgomery and the Bridgeway team. The initial expense ratio will be 1.20%, rather above the current Bridgeway charge. The minimum initial investment is $2500. 

Aristotle Small Cap Equity Fund

Aristotle Small Cap Equity Fund will seek long-term capital appreciation by investing in high quality, small cap businesses that are undervalued. The fund will be managed by David Adams and Jack McPherson. The initial expense ratio will be 1.15%. The minimum initial investment is $2,500.

Aristotle Value Equity Fund

Aristotle Value Equity Fund will seek long-term capital appreciation by investing mostly in undervalued mid- and large-cap stocks. The fund will be managed by Howard Gleicher, Aristotle’s CIO. The initial expense ratio will be 0.68%. The minimum initial investment is $2,500.

Aston/River Road Focused Absolute Value Fund

Aston/River Road Focused Absolute Value Fund will seek long-term capital appreciation. The plan is to deploy that “proprietary Absolute Value® approach,” in hopes of providing “attractive, sustainable, low volatility returns over the long term.”  The fund will be managed by Andrew Beck, River Road’s CEO, and Thomas Forsha, their co-CIO. The initial expense ratio will be 1.26%. The minimum initial investment is $2,500, reduced to $500 for various sorts of tax-advantaged accounts..

Brown Advisory Equity Long/Short Fund

Brown Advisory Equity Long/Short Fund will seek to provide long-term capital appreciation by combining both “long” and “short” equity strategies. The plan is pretty straight forward: go long on securities with “few or no undesirable traits” and short the ugly ones. They have the option of using a wide variety of instruments (direct purchase, ETFs, futures and so on) to achieve that exposure. The fund will be managed by Paul Chew, Brown Advisory’s CIO and former manager of the Growth Equity fund. The initial expense ratio will be 2.24% for Investor shares and 2.49% for Advisor shares. The minimum initial investment is $5,000 for Investor shares and $2000 for Advisor shares, which are designed to be purchased through places like Scottrade. .

Dana Small Cap Equity Fund

Dana Small Cap Equity Fund will seek long-term growth. The plan is to create a risk-managed portfolio by using a sector-neutral, relative-value, equal-weight discipline. The large cap version of the strategy has been around for five years and has been perfectly respectable if not particularly distinguished for good or ill. The fund will be managed by a team from Dana Investment Advisers. The initial expense ratio will be 1.20%. The minimum initial investment is $1,000.

Driehaus Turnaround Opportunities Fund

Driehaus Turnaround Opportunities Fund will seek to maximize capital appreciation, while minimizing the risk of permanent capital impairment, over full-economic cycles.. The plan is to invest in the equity and debt securities of “distressed, stressed and leveraged companies,” on the popular premise that they’re widely misunderstood and their securities are often incorrectly priced. The fund will be managed by Elizabeth Cassidy and Thomas McCauley of Driehaus. The initial expense ratio has not been released. The minimum initial investment is $10,000 for retail accounts, reduced to $2000 for retirement accounts.

Ensemble Fund

Ensemble Fund will seek long term capital appreciation. The plan is to identify 15-25 high quality companies with undervalued stock, then buy some. The fund will be managed by Sean Stannard-Stockton, Ensemble’s president and CIO. The initial expense ratio will be 2.0%. The minimum initial investment is $5,000, reduced to $1000 for IRAs and accounts established with an automatic investment plan.

FFI Diversified US Equity Fund

FFI Diversified US Equity Fund will seek long-term capital growth. The plan is to invest in 40-50 U.S. stocks, with a target portfolio market cap of $20 billion. The fund will be managed by a team from FormulaFolio Investments, led by CIO James Wenk. The initial expense ratio will be a stout 2.25%. The prospectus doesn’t offer any immediate evidence that the guys will overcome a high expense ratio in such a competitive slice of the market. The minimum initial investment is $2,000, reduced to $1,000 for retirement accounts and those established with an automatic investing plan.

Gripman Absolute Value Balanced Fund

Gripman Absolute Value Balanced Fund will seek long-term total return and income. The plan is to pursue a conservative asset allocation on the order of 30% equity/70% intermediate-term fixed income. A sliver might be in junk bonds. The fund will be managed by Timothy W. Bond. The initial expense ratio hasn’t been announced. The minimum initial investment is $2,000.

Harbor Diversified International All Cap Fund

Harbor Diversified International All Cap Fund  will seek long-term growth of capital. The plan is to invest mostly in cyclical companies, which you typically buy when they look absolutely ghastly and sell as soon as they start looking decent. The fund will be managed by a very large team led by William J. Arah from Marathon Asset Management, a London-based adviser. Mr. Arah founded Marathon, which also serves as sub-advisor to Vanguard Global Equity. The initial expense ratio will be 1.22%. The minimum initial investment is $2,500.

Iron Equity Premium Income Fund

Iron Equity Premium Income Fund will seek to provide superior risk-adjusted total returns relative to the CBOE S&P 500 BuyWrite Index (BXM). The plan is to buy ETFs which track the S&P 500 while writing call options to generate income. The fund will be managed by a team from IRON Financial. The initial expense ratio will be 1.45%. The minimum initial investment is $10,000.

Preserver Alternative Opportunities Fund

Preserver Alternative Opportunities Fund will seek high total returns with low volatility. The plan is to hire sub-advisers to do pretty typical liquid alts stuff in the portfolio. The subs have not yet been named, though. The initial expense ratio will be 2.43%. The minimum initial investment is $2,000.

Quantified Self-Adjusting Trend Following Fund

Quantified Self-Adjusting Trend Following Fund (really? It feels like they consulted with Willy Wonka to select their name.)  will seek “high appreciation on an annual basis consistent with a high tolerance for risk.” Do you suppose it’s really seeking a high tolerance for risk, or merely requires that prospective investors have a high tolerance?  The plan is to determine the market’s trend, then invest in ETFs, leveraged ETFs or inverse ETFs. If there’s no discernible trend, they’ll invest in bonds. The fund will be managed by Jerry Wagner, President of the Flexible Plan Investments, and Dr. Z. George Yang, their director of research. The initial expense ratio will be 1.75%. The minimum initial investment is $10,000.

T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Index Fund

T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Index Fund will seek to match the performance of the Russell Select Midcap Completion Index, with a correlation of at least 0.95. The fund will be managed by Ken D. Uematsu. The initial expense ratio will be 0.32%.

T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Index Fund

T. Rowe Price Small-Cap Index Fund will seek to match the performance of the Russell 2000®Index with a correlation of at least 0.95. The fund will be managed by Ken D. Uematsu. The initial expense ratio will be 0.34%.

Manager changes, August 2015

By Chip

Because bond fund managers, traditionally, had made relatively modest impacts of their funds’ absolute returns, Manager Changes typically highlights changes in equity and hybrid funds.

Ticker Fund Out with the old In with the new Dt
AISCX Acuitas International Small Cap Fund Mike Jolin is no longer listed as a portfolio manager to the fund. Preston Brown has joined Dennis Jensen, Christopher Tessin, Jonathan Brodsky, Drew Edwards, Marco Priani, Bram Zeigler, and Regina Chi on the management team. 8/15
AFXAX American Beacon Flexible Bond Fund GAM International Management is no longer listed as a subadvisor to the fund, therefore Timothy Haywood and Daniel Sheard will no longer serve as portfolio managers. Payden & Rygel are new subadvisors to the fund, bringing Brian Matthews, Scott Weiner, and Brad Boyd to the management team. 8/15
AAIFX Anchor Alternative Income Fund Anchor Capital Management Group, Inc. will no longer manage any portion of the assets of the fund; Garrett Waters and Eric Leake will be removed as portfolio managers. Joel Price will be the sole portfolio manager 8/15
BIOPX Baron Opportunity Fund No one, but Michael Lippert will be recovering from a bicycle accident. While Mssr. Lippert recovers, Alex Umansky, Neal Rosenberg, and Ashim Mehra, will temporarily co-manage the fund. 8/15
BAMIX BMO Multi-Asset Income Fund Jeff Weniger is no longer listed as a portfolio manager to the fund. Lowell Yura and Jon Adams join Brent Schutte in managing the fund 8/15
CALSX Calamos Long/Short Fund Daniel Fu is no longer listed as a portfolio manager to the fund. Gary Black, John Calamos, and Matthew Wolfson remain on the fund 8/15
CSMIX Columbia Small Cap Value Fund John Barrett is no longer listed as a portfolio manager to the fund. Jeremy Javidi remains as the sole manager of the fund 8/15
BTAEX Deutsche EAFE Equity Index Fund Joseph LaPorta is no longer listed as a portfolio manager Patrick Dwyer joins Thomas O’Brien in managing the fund 8/15
DTMAX Dreyfus Total Emerging Markets Fund No one, but . . . Sean Fitzgibbon and Alexander Kozhemiakin are joined by Federico Garcia Zamora, Jay Malikowski and Josephine Shea. 8/15
ECCGX Eaton Vance Greater China Growth Fund Lily Jap is no longer listed as a portfolio manager to the fund. Stephen Ma and June Lui remain on the fund 8/15
FAGOX Fidelity Advisor Growth Opportunities Fund Gopal Reddy is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Long time manager Steven Wymer returns, joined by Kyle Weaver. 8/15
FAOFX Fidelity Advisor Series Growth Opportunities Gopal Reddy is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Kyle Weaver and Steven Wymer have taken over the fund. 8/15
VEEEX Global Strategic Income Fund Matthew Benkendorf is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Gary Friedle, Stuart Shikiar, and Albert Sipzener have taken over. 8/15
GMSAX Goldman Sachs Managed Futures Strategy Fund Alex Wang will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. James Park and William Fallon will continue on 8/15
GCMAX Goldman Sachs Mid Cap Value Portfolio Dolores Bamford announced that she will be retiring from Goldman Sachs, effective September 1st. Sung Cho joins Timothy Ryan and Sean Gallagher in managing the fund 8/15
HERAX Hartford Emerging Markets Equity Fund Cheryl Duckworth is no longer listed as a portfolio manager David Elliot has taken over as portfolio manager 8/15
HRLAX Hartford Global Real Asset Fund Lindsay Politi will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Jay Bhutani, Scott Elliott, Brian Garvey, and David Chang will continue managing the fund 8/15
HIPAX Hartford Inflation Plus Fund Lindsay Politi will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Joseph Marvan will take over as sole manager to the fund 8/15
HDVAX Hartford International Capital Appreciation Fund Jean-Marc Berteaux, James Shakin, and Tara Connolly Stilwell will no longer serve as a portfolio managers for the fund. Kent Stahl and Gregg Thomas remain. 8/15
HNCAX Hartford International Growth Fund. Jean-Marc Berteaux will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Tara Connolly Stilwell has joined John Boselli in managing the fund. 8/15
HAFAX Hartford Multi-Asset Income Fund No one, but . . . David Elliot, Campe Goodman, and Richard Meagher have been joined by Lutz-Peter Wilke 8/15
HTNAX Hartford Municipal Real Return Fund Lindsay Politi will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Timothy Haney and Brad Libby will be joined by Joseph Marvan 8/15
HRTVX Heartland Value Fund Bradford Evans has stepped down as a portfolio manager Adam Peck joins William Nasgovitz to manage the fund 8/15
IMIFX Innovator McKinley Income Fund Steven Carhart is no longer listed as a manager to the fund Robert A. Gillam, Robert B. Gillam, Sheldon Lien, Brandon Rinner, and Gregory Samorajski will now run the fund 8/15
JEVAX John Hancock Funds Emerging Markets Fund Henry Gray and Karen Umland are no longer listed as a portfolio managers on the fund. Joseph Chi, Jed Fogdall, and Allen Pu will continue on. 8/15
GIDEX John Hancock International Core Fund Thomas R. Hancock, Ph.D. will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. David Cowan, Ben Inker, and Sam Wilderman will continue as portfolio managers of the fund. They will be joined by Neil Constable and Chris Fortson. 8/15
JISAX John Hancock International Small Company Fund No one, but . . . Arun Keswani and Bhanu Singh have joined Joseph Chi, Jed Fogdall, Henry Gray, and Karen Umland as portfolio managers of the fund 8/15
JASOX John Hancock New Opportunities Fund Bhanu Singh will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Joel Schnieder has joined Joseph Chi, Jed Fogdall and Henry Gray as a portfolio manager of the fund 8/15
JHUAX John Hancock U.S. Equity Fund Thomas Hancock, Ph.D. will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. David Cowan, Ben Inker, and Sam Wilderman will continue as managers of the fund 8/15
JHUAX John Hancock U.S. Equity Fund Thomas R. Hancock, Ph.D. will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. David Cowan, Ben Inker, and Sam Wilderman will continue as portfolio managers of the fund. 8/15
IJEAX JPMorgan Emerging Markets Equity Fund Richard Titherington is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Austin Forey, Leon Eidelman, and Amit Mehta will continue on. 8/15
JEMEX JPMorgan Emerging Markets Equity Income Fund Richard Titherington is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Omar Negyal is now the sole portfolio manager on the fund 8/15
MNILX Litman Gregory Masters International Fund Wellington Management Company LLP will be removed as a sub-advisor and Jean-Marc Berteaux will be removed as the portfolio manager. That’s a rare rebuke for Wellington. The other four sets of sub-advisers remain. 8/15
NWUAX Nationwide U.S. Small Cap Value Fund Bhanu Singh will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Joel Schnieder has joined Joseph Chi, Jed Fogdall and Henry Gray as a portfolio manager of the fund 8/15
NSIAX Nuveen Symphony International Equity Fund Joel Drescher is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Marc Snyder joins Ross Sakamoto and Gunther Stein in managing the fund 8/15
NCGAX Nuveen Symphony Large-Cap Growth Fund Joel Drescher is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Marc Snyder joins Ross Sakamoto and Gunther Stein in managing the fund 8/15
NCCAX Nuveen Symphony Mid-Cap Core Fund Joel Drescher is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Marc Snyder joins Ross Sakamoto and Gunther Stein in managing the fund 8/15
OOSAX Oppenheimer Senior Floating Rate Fund Effective October 28, 2015, Margaret Hui will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. On that date, David Lukkes will join existing manager Joseph Welsh 8/15
PRDAX Principal Diversified Real Asset James Fennessey is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Benjamin Rotenberg, Marcus Dummer, Jessica Bush, Jake Anonson, and Kelly Grossman will continue to manage the fund. 8/15
PMSAX Principal Global Multi-Strategy James Fennessey is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Benjamin Rotenberg, Marcus Dummer, Jessica Bush, Jake Anonson, and Kelly Grossman will continue to manage the fund. 8/15
RAMVX Roumell Opportunistic Value Fund Edward Crawford is no longer a portfolio manager to the fund JamesRoumell, lead portfolio manager, will continue to provide services to the fund. 8/15
SSCPX Saratoga Small Capitalization Fund Patrick O’Brien is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Mitch Zacks is the new portfolio manager 8/15
SMENX Schroder Emerging Markets Multi-Cap Equity Fund Daniel Winterbottom will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Ayse Serinturk, James Larkman, Stephen Langford, and Justin Abercrombie will remain with the fund. 8/15
SRLN SPDR Blackstone / GSO Senior Loan ETF Lee Shaiman will retire by the end of September. Daniel McMullen will assume the portfolio manager role. 8/15
FUSIX Strategic Advisers® International II Fund H.B. King is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Wilfred Chilangwa and Cesar Hernandez will continue to manage the fund 8/15
TVRAX Transparent Value Directional Allocation Fund Julian Koski will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Hammond, Armen Arus and Gennadiy Khayutin will remain as the portfolio managers of the fund. 8/15
TVEAX Transparent Value Dividend Fund Julian Koski will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Hammond, Armen Arus and Gennadiy Khayutin will remain as the portfolio managers of the fund. 8/15
TVAAX Transparent Value Large-Cap Aggressive Fund Julian Koski will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Hammond, Armen Arus and Gennadiy Khayutin will remain as the portfolio managers of the fund. 8/15
TVBAX Transparent Value Large-Cap Core Fund Julian Koski will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Hammond, Armen Arus and Gennadiy Khayutin will remain as the portfolio managers of the fund. 8/15
TVDAX Transparent Value Large-Cap Defensive Fund Julian Koski will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Hammond, Armen Arus and Gennadiy Khayutin will remain as the portfolio managers of the fund. 8/15
TVGAX Transparent Value Large-Cap Growth Fund Julian Koski will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Hammond, Armen Arus and Gennadiy Khayutin will remain as the portfolio managers of the fund. 8/15
TVMAX Transparent Value Large-Cap Market Fund Julian Koski will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Hammond, Armen Arus and Gennadiy Khayutin will remain as the portfolio managers of the fund. 8/15
TVVAX Transparent Value Large-Cap Value Fund Julian Koski will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Hammond, Armen Arus and Gennadiy Khayutin will remain as the portfolio managers of the fund. 8/15
TVSAX Transparent Value Small-Cap Fund Julian Koski will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Hammond, Armen Arus and Gennadiy Khayutin will remain as the portfolio managers of the fund. 8/15
TVKAX Transparent Value SMID-Cap Directional Allocation Fund Julian Koski will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. Scott Hammond, Armen Arus and Gennadiy Khayutin will remain as the portfolio managers of the fund. 8/15
USIFX USAA International Fund No one, but . . . The fund’s Board of Trustees recently approved Lazard Asset Management and Wellington Management LLP as two additional subadvisers to the fund 8/15
VAIAX Virtus Alternative Income Solution Fund Joe Lu will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. The rest of the extensive team remains. 8/15
VATAX Virtus Alternative Total Solution Fund Joe Lu will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for the fund. The rest of the extensive team remains. 8/15
Various Voya Solution, Retirement Solution and Index Solution funds Frank van Etten will no longer serve as a portfolio manager for about 20 funds. The other managers remain. 8/15
WHGMX Westwood Smidcap Fund Ragen Stienk is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Susan Schmidt joins Prashant Inamdar, Thomas Lieu, and Grant Taber in running the fund. 8/15
WHGPX Westwood Smidcap Plus Fund Ragen Stienk is no longer listed as a portfolio manager on the fund. Susan Schmidt joins Prashant Inamdar, Thomas Lieu, and Grant Taber in running the fund. 8/15

 

Checking in on MFO’s 20-year Great Owls

By Charles Boccadoro

Originally published in September 1, 2015 Commentary

MFO first introduced its rating system in the June 2013 commentary. That’s also when the first “Great Owl” funds were designated. These funds have consistently delivered top quintile risk adjusted returns (based on Martin Ratio) in their categories for evaluation periods 3 years and longer. The most senior are 20-year Great Owls. These select funds have received Return Group ranking of 5 for evaluation periods of 3, 5, 10, and 20 years. Only about 50 funds of the 1500 mutual funds aged 20 years or older, or about 3%, achieve the GO designation. An impressive accomplishment.

Below are the current 20-year GOs (excluding muni funds for compactness, but find complete list here, also reference MFO Ratings Definitions.)

GO_1GO_2GO_3GO_4

Of the original 20-year GO list of 47 funds still in existence today, only 19 remain GOs. These include notables: Fidelity GNMA (FGMNX), PIMCO Foreign Bond – USD-Hedged I (PFORX), James Balanced: Golden Rainbow R (GLRBX), T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation (PRWCX), Vanguard Wellington Inv (VWELX), Meridian Growth Legacy (MERDX), and Hennessy Gas Utility Investor (GASFX).

The current 20-year GOs also include 25 Honor Roll funds, based on legacy Fund Alarm ranking system. Honor Roll funds have delivered top quintile absolute returns in its category for evaluation periods of 1, 3, and 5 years. These include: AMG Managers Interm Dur Govt (MGIDX), PIMCO Foreign Bond – USD-Hedged I (PFORX), James Balanced: Golden Rainbow R (GLRBX), T. Rowe Price Capital Appreciation (PRWCX), and T. Rowe Price Mid-Cap Growth (RPMGX).

A closer look at performance of the original list of 20-year GOs, since they were introduced a little more than two years ago, shows very satisfactory performance overall, even with funds not maintaining GO designation. Below is a summary of Return Group rankings and current three-year performance.
OGO_1OGO_2OGO_3OGO_4
Of the 31 funds in tables above, only 7 have underperformed on a risk adjusted basis during the past three years, while 22 have outperformed.

Some notable outperformers include: Vanguard Wellesley Income Inv (VWINX), Oakmark International I (OAKIX), Sequoia (SEQUX), Brown Capital Mgmt Small Co Inv (BCSIX), and T. Rowe Price New Horizons (PRNHX).

And the underperformers? Waddell & Reed Continental Inc A (UNCIX), AMG Yacktman (YACKX), Gabelli Equity Income AAA (GABEX), and Voya Corporate Leaders Trust (LEXCX).

A look at absolute returns show that 10 of the 31 underperformed their peers by an average of 1.6% annualized return, while the remaining 21 beat their peers by an average of 4.8%.

Gentle reminder: MFO ratings are strictly quantitative and backward looking. No accounting for manager or adviser changes, survivorship bias, category drift, etc.

Will take a closer look at the three-year mark and make habit of posting how they fared over time.

We Are Where We Are, Or, If The Dog Didn’t Stop To Crap, He Would Have Caught The Rabbit

By Edward A. Studzinski

“I prefer the company of peasants because they have not been educated sufficiently to reason incorrectly.”

               Michel de Montaigne

At this point in time, rather than focus on the “if only” questions that tend to freeze people in their tracks in these periods of market volatility, I think we should consider what is important. For most of us, indeed, the vast majority of us, the world did not end in August and it is unlikely to end in September.  Indeed, for most Americans and therefore by definition most of us, the vagaries of the stock market are not that important.

What then is important? A Chicago Tribune columnist, Mary Schmich, recently interviewed Edward Stuart, an economics professor at Northeastern Illinois University as a follow-up to his appearance on a panel on Chicago Public Television’s “Chicago Tonight” show. Stuart had pointed out that the ownership of stock (and by implication, mutual funds) in the United States is quite unequal. He noted that while the stock market has done very well in recent years, the standard of living of the average American citizen has not done as well. Stuart thinks that the real median income for a household size of four is about $40,000 …. and that number has not changed since the late 70’s. My spin on this is rather simple – the move up the economic ladder that we used to see for various demographic groups – has stopped.

If you think about it, the evidence is before us. How many of us have friends whose children went to college, got their degrees, and returned home to live with their parents while they hunted for a job in their chosen field, which they often could not find? When one drives around city and suburban streets, how many vacancies do we see in commercial properties?  How many middle class families that used to bootstrap themselves up by investing in and owning apartment buildings or strip malls don’t now?  What is needed is a growing economy that offers real job prospects that pay real wages. Stuart also pointed out that student debt is one of the few kinds of debt that one cannot expunge with bankruptcy.

As I read that piece of Ms. Schmick’s and reflected on it, I was reminded of another column I had read a few months back that talked about where we had gone off the rails collectively. The piece was entitled “Battle for the Boardroom” by Joe Nocera and was in the NY Times on May 9, 2015. Nocera was discussing the concept of “activist investors” and “shareholder value” specifically as it pertained to Nelson Peltz, Trian Investments, and a proxy fight with the management and board of DuPont.  And Nocera pointed out that Trian, by all accounts, had a good record and was often a constructive force once it got a board seat or two.

Nocera’s concern, which he raised in a fashion that went straight for the jugular, was simple. Have we really reached the point where the activist investor gets to call the tune, no matter how well run the company? What is shareholder value, especially in a company like DuPont? Trian’s argument was that DuPont was not getting a return on its spending on research and development? Yet R&D spending is what made DuPont, given the years it takes to often produce from scientific research a commercial product. Take away the R&D spending argued Nocera, and you have not just a poorer DuPont, but also a poorer United States. He closed by talking with and quoting Martin Lipton, a corporate attorney who has made a career out of disparaging corporate activists. Lipton said, “Activism has caused companies to cut R&D, capital investment, and, most significantly, employment,” he said. “It forces companies to lay off employees to meet quarterly earnings.”

“It is,” he concluded, “a disaster for the country.”

This brings me to my final set of ruminations. Some years ago, my wife and I were guests at a small dinner party at the home of a former ambassador (and patriot) living in Santa Fe.  There were a total of six of us at that dinner. One of the other guests raised the question as to whether any of us ever thought about what things would have been like for the country if Al Gore, rather than George W. Bush, had won the presidential election. My immediate response was that I didn’t think about such things as it was just far too painful to contemplate.

In like vein, having recently read Ron Suskind’s book Confidence Men, I have been forced to contemplate what it would have meant for the country if President-elect Barack Obama had actually followed through with the recommendations of his transition advisors and appointed his “A” Economic Team. Think about it – Paul Volcker as Secretary of the Treasury, the resurrection of Glass-Steagall, the break-up of the big investment banks – it too is just too painful to contemplate.  Or as the line from T.H. White’s Once and Future King goes, “I dream things that never were, and ask why not?”

Now, a few thoughts about the carnage and how to deal with it.  Have a plan and stick to it. Do not panic, for inevitably all panic does is lead to self-inflicted wounds. Think about fees, but from the perspective of correlated investments. That is, if five large (over $10B in assets) balanced funds are all positively correlated in terms of their portfolios, does it really make sense not to own the one with the lowest expense ratio (and depending on where it is held, taxes may come into play)? Think about doing things where other people’s panic does not impact you, e.g., is there a place for closed end funds in a long-term investment portfolio? And avoid investments where the bugs have not been worked out, as the glitches in pricing and execution of trades for ETF’s have shown us over the last few weeks.

There is a wonderful Dilbert cartoon where the CEO says “Asok, you can beat market averages by doing your own stock research. Asok then says, “So … You believe every investor can beat the average by reading the same information? “Yes” says the CEO. Asok then says, “Makes you wonder why more people don’t do it.” The CEO closes saying, “Just lazy, I guess.”

Edward A. Studzinski