Banking is a confidence trick. You put money in the bank today because you are confident you can take it out tomorrow; to you, a dollar that you have deposited in the bank is just as good — just as much money — as a dollar bill in your wallet. If you show up at the ATM at any time of day or night, you expect it to give you your dollars.
But the bank doesn’t just put your dollars in a box and wait for you to take them out; the bank uses its depositors’ money to make loans or buy bonds, and just keeps a little bit around for people who need cash. If everyone asked for their money back tomorrow, the bank wouldn’t have it.
But everyone is confident that, if they ask for their money back tomorrow, the bank will have it. So they mostly don’t ask for it, so when they do, the bank does have it. The widespread belief that banks have the money is what makes it true.
This is obvious stuff. Also obvious, and famous, is that it is an unstable equilibrium. If people stop believing it, it stops being true. If everyone stops believing in a bank, they will all rush to get their money out, and the bank won’t have it, and their lack of belief will be retrospectively justified. Whereas if they had kept believing, their belief would also have been justified.
Isn’t this ridiculous? But there is a deep social purpose to the confidence trick. Banking is a way for people collectively to make long-term, risky bets without noticing them, a way to pool risks so that everyone is safer and better-off.
You and I put our money in the bank because it is “money in the bank,” it is very safe, and we can use it tomorrow to pay rent or buy a sandwich. And then the bank goes around making 30-year fixed-rate mortgage loans: Homeowners could never borrow money from me for 30 years, because I might need the money for a sandwich tomorrow, but they can borrow from us collectively because the bank has diversified that liquidity risk among lots of depositors.
Or the bank makes small-business loans to businesses that might go bankrupt: Those businesses could never borrow from me, because I need the money and don’t want to take the risk of losing it, but they can borrow from us collectively because the bank has diversified that credit risk among lots of depositors and also lots of borrowers.
But the basic problem remains: the confidence trick, where trust in banks makes them trustworthy and distrust in banks makes them fail.
Bankers and bank regulators tend not to talk in these terms... because talking about it ruins the magic. But they know it in their bones; at a deep level they understand that preserving that confidence is their most important job.
More specifically they know that if there is a run on a bank, and that bank goes bust and doesn’t pay depositors, then there will be a run on other banks. And they know that the run can start with a bank that is bad, that is undercapitalized and made poor decisions and in some sense deserves to fail, but that it can spread to other banks that are good.
And they know that “good” and “bad” are not really the things that matter: What makes a bank good is not just its capital ratios and liquidity position but also confidence, and however good the ratios it is hard for a bank to survive a loss of confidence. They know that they are all interconnected, that they are players in an essentially social game, and that the goal of the game is not to win but to keep playing.

Bruce Fund (BRUFX)
Inception date: 3/20/1968
Capital gain in 2022: 58.7%
This fund invests in domestic stocks and bonds, along with zero-coupon government bonds. It currently has about $505 million in assets, and its price declined 20% last year. With a current NAV of $520, an investor with 10 shares worth would have a capital gains bill of about $3,100 to then pay taxes on.

“In particular, common equity instruments are the first ones to absorb losses, and only after their full use would Additional Tier 1 be required to be written down. This approach has been consistently applied in past cases and will continue to guide the actions of the SRB [Single Resolution Board] and ECB [European Central Bank] banking supervision in crisis interventions,” their statement read.

The Bank of England has also distanced itself from FINMA’s decision, stating that the U.K. “has a clear statutory order” detailing which shareholders and creditors were expected to take on losses. AT1 bonds “rank ahead” of equity investments, the statement noted, adding that they had followed this process in the unwinding of SVB UK.

I like to sleep well at night. 10 years in bucket #1 is the best sleeping aid.