All of them are callable except some of the shorter term ones. Non-callable CDs tend to have much lower yields.

I have bought about 15 CDs this past year from Schwab, that were non-callable, but I did not buy anything longer than 2 years. I just went on Schwab, and looked at their 3, 4, and 5 year CDs and it appears to be primarily non-callable CDs on their menu of offerings. I have no interest in callable CDs, have no intention of buying a callable CD in the future, so apparently I am not facing the same dilemma you are describing. Good luck!

Thanks @Yogi. Looks like you pre-set the start date for 9/22/22. If I’m reading the chart correctly, as of today all 3 major indexes are up about 10% from that low. Umm … feels like more. Extremely left brained. Charts & maps drive me up a wall. Raw data expressed in numbers / words work better. Have had good luck reading the Google charts. Will give it a try there as well.
Edit: Google shows the 2022 low for the S&P (3590) occurring around mid-October. (Looks like I had an incorrect date when I posted.) Currently, BB has the S&P @ 4104. By subtracting (3590) the low from today’s number and then dividing the difference by the October low, I come up with a 14% increase in the S&P since the low. (Assuming some dividends were paid, it would be a bit more.)
Now, are today’s numbers temporarily depressed over fears of a debt default ? Or, are they still considerably elevated by historical standards - which everybody (including the shoeshine boy) seems to agree on? Of course it’s a market of stocks - not a stock market. Indexes aside, there will be individual winners and losers.

All major indexes are similar since 9/22/22, except R2000. In the chart link below, enter date 2022-09-22. However, there were other dips in Oct, Nov, Dec 2022.
https://stockcharts.com/h-perf/ui?s=$INDU&compare=$COMPQ,$SPX,$TRAN,IWM&id=p53718167248

Hi @hank A decent method below. Not too bad to use after a few test runs.
Google Finance for SPY.
From Sept. 22, 2022 to noon May 12, indicates SPY at +9.922%.
Click the one year link, which is set for SPY. Enter at the top of the page, search box, whatever ticker you choose. Hover on the graph at Sept. 22, 2022 to obtain the price for that date. You'll have to do the math with a calculator to discover the performance between this date and 'current'.

@mark
Congratulations! I hope my wife and I will be that lucky.
I am 71 so my kids need to get moving!
My son is getting married May 27, so at least things are going in the right direction!

The FDIC needs to recover it costs after the recent banking turmoil.
Under their proposal, banks with more that $50 billion would shoulder 95% of the cost.
This "special assessment" fee would apply to approximately 113 banks.
A very small number of individual depositors are at risk due to FDIC insurance limits ($250K of deposits per depositor, per FDIC-insured bank, and per ownership category).
These depositors should be offered an option to purchase additional FDIC insurance beyond the $250K limit.
If additional insurance is not purchased, depositors will be subject to complete losses beyond the limits.
There is no need to saddle everyone with this added expense.

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This is almost a soft expansion of the FDIC insurance, although not stated explicitly.
First, the FDIC covers ALL deposits at 3 failed banks (SVB, Signature, First Republic). Second, to recover its costs, it imposes this 12.5 bps fee for 8 quarters on uninsured deposits over $5 billion. During this time, depositors and banks may realize that this is a reasonable cost to just make the insurance "ahead", instead of "after" in an ad-hoc way. If the fee would be for the long-term, it would be reduced too.
The FDIC also has some proposals for deposit insurance modifications on the table. The Treasury and the Fed are evaluating those.

At least early in the history of callable CDs, banks were pretty quick to pull the trigger as rates fell:

When banks and brokerages began hawking callable CDs in the mid-1990s, interest rates were generally headed down, which meant that many issuing banks did indeed call their CDs after the first year.

https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-2001-01-09-0101090053-story.html
That article also states that callable CDs are not limited to brokered CDs. Banks can directly issue callable CDs.
To get an idea of when calls on IOUs are exercised by debtors (such as banks issuing CDs), one can look at callable bonds and at mortgages (where the debtor has the option of prepaying/refinancing, continuously).
One expects bonds to get called if they are trading at a premium, i.e. if they are paying above market rates. Bonds purchased at a premium don't always get called, though, for a couple of reasons.
One is that by the time the call can be exercised, market rates have risen to meet or exceed the bond coupon rate. You seem satisfied with the 5+% you're getting, so in the "worst" case, that's what you'll be stuck with if rates rise rather than fall.
Another reason that premium bonds don't get called is that the issuing institution runs into problems. The institution may have difficulty raising cash to pay off the bond (i.e. it can't refinance at a lower rate).
If a bank gets into trouble, it too may have difficulty raising cash, even when offering above market-rate FDIC-insured CDs. So there are some unusual circumstances when a bank might be slow in calling a CD paying above market rates. (But if it is taken over by the FDIC, the higher CD rate is likely to be terminated anyway.)
Next, mortgages. Anyone who has held a mortgage during a period of declining rates has likely looked into refinancing at the lower rate. Since there's overhead involved (documentation fees, possible points, etc.) one doesn't refinance every time rates drop a few basis points.
And if rates are dropping quickly, one may hold off a bit rather than refinance and then refinance again. By waiting a little longer (and paying the old, higher rate in the interim) one saves costs by refinancing fewer times.
So speed of rate decline is a consideration, and one that I suspect banks look at as well in deciding when to call a CD.
When all is said and done, I expect the late 1990s experience described in the Chicago Tribune to be representative. Many banks will call CDs as soon as they're able, so long as the CDs are paying above market rates for their remaining terms.

@Mark
+1

JPMorgan Chase & Co. (JPM)’s Jamie Dimon took a jab at Donald Trump for encouraging Republican lawmakers to dig in over raising the debt limit even if it means default — an outcome his bank is prepping for by convening a weekly war room. “It’s one more thing he doesn’t know very much about,” Dimon said in an interview with Bloomberg Television Thursday, when asked about the former president’s comments. “Anyone who’s anyone knows that is potentially catastrophic,” he said. 
Excerpt from Bloomberg Media 5/11/23

"The FDIC is proposing to collect the special assessment at an annual rate of approximately 12.5 basis points over eight quarterly assessment periods; however, the special assessment rate is subject to change prior to any final rule depending on any adjustments to the loss estimate, mergers or failures, or amendments to reported estimates of uninsured deposits."
https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2023/pr23037.html

Bloomberg’s in “worry mode” today. It varies day to day along with the weather.
Hitting little white balls would be infinitely more productive and interesting than watching red / green squiggles on a stock chart. But so would be fishing, mowing the grass or carrying out the trash.
That said … While most everything equity related is down (mid-day) miners / metals are being taken to the woodshed. Silver is leading the way down, off more than 4% today - but to be expected after a phenomenal run this year. It’s a bit unnerving how far the yield on the 10-year has fallen in just a month or two. Certainly suggests growing fears of recession. (3.38% today).
@Derf - hope you get a “hole-in-one” today!

https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/financial-stability-report-20230508.pdf
"...the framework focuses primarily on assessing vulnerabilities, with an emphasis on four broad categories and how those categories might interact to amplify stress in the financial system.
1. Valuation pressures arise when asset prices are high relative to economic fundamentals or historical norms. These developments are often driven by an increased willingness of investors to take on risk. As such, elevated valuation pressures may increase the possibility of outsized drops in asset prices (see Section 1, Asset Valuations).
2. Excessive borrowing by businesses and households exposes the borrowers to distress if their incomes decline or the assets they own fall in value. In these cases, businesses and households with high debt burdens may need to cut back spending, affecting economic activity and causing losses for investors (see Section 2, Borrowing by Businesses and Households).
3. Excessive leverage within the financial sector increases the risk that financial institutions will not have the ability to absorb losses without disruptions to their normal business operations when hit by adverse shocks. In those situations, institutions will be forced to cut back lending, sell their assets, or even shut down. Such responses can impair credit access for households and businesses, further weakening economic activity (see Section 3, Leverage in the Financial Sector).
4. Funding risks expose the financial system to the possibility that investors will rapidly withdraw their funds from a particular institution or sector, creating strains across markets or institutions. Many financial institutions raise funds from the public with a commitment to return their investors’ money on short notice, but those institutions then invest much of those funds in assets that are hard to sell quickly or have a long maturity. This liquidity and maturity transformation can create an incentive for investors to withdraw funds quickly in adverse situations. Facing such withdrawals, financial institutions may need to sell assets quickly at “fire sale” prices, thereby incurring losses and potentially becoming insolvent, as well as causing additional price declines that can create stress across markets and at other institutions (see Section 4, Funding Risks)."

AAII Sentiment Survey, 5/10/23
For the week ending on 5/10/23, bearish remained the top sentiment (41.2%; high) & bullish remained the bottom sentiment (29.4% (tie); below average); neutral remained the middle sentiment (29.4% (tie); below average); Bull-Bear Spread was -11.8% (low). Investor concerns: Inflation (moderating but high); economy; the Fed; dollar; crypto regulations; market volatility (VIX, VXN, MOVE); Russia-Ukraine war (63+ weeks, 2/24/22- ); geopolitical. For the Survey week (Th-Wed), stocks were up, bonds down, oil up sharply, gold flat, dollar up a bit. The debt-ceiling issue must be resolved by 6/1/23. The regional banking crisis continues as the underlying problems remain (underwater portfolios & fast runs). #AAII #Sentiment #Markets
https://ybbpersonalfinance.proboards.com/post/1036/thread

I think we can all agree that this problem was created by Congress legislating an amount of spending that exceeded the amount of revenue legislated (taxes, etc.) plus the amount of borrowing legislated.
It used to be that Congress, via its power to borrow, legislated explicitly what was borrowed - how many bonds would be issued, at what rate of interest, for what period of time, and so on. This sort of micromanging is absurd; Congress does not have the expertise nor should it be spending time on setting I bond fixed rates. That is best done by the Treasury.
And so Congress delegated this part of the borrowing process to the Treasury. Within limits, the Treasury could even borrow in excess of budgetary needs. For example, the Treasury might borrow more now because rates were better.
But Congress did not delegate full authority to borrow willy nilly without limit. One could argue that were Congress to delegate full control of debt management to the Treasury it would be delegating a portion of its legislative power (vs. administrative authority). Delegating legislative power is unconstitutional. Full stop.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/nondelegation_doctrine (very short, simple)
https://constitution.findlaw.com/article1/annotation03.html (more depth, including quote below)

the Court would sustain delegations whenever Congress provided an intelligible principle [like a borrowing limit?] to which the President or an agency must conform.

Regarding the breadth of Section 4 of the 14th Amendment, it is worth reading the entire two sentences:

The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.

https://constitution.congress.gov/browse/amendment-14/section-4/
As the NYTimes observed:

That section, historians say, was added because of fears that if former Confederate states were to regain political power in Congress, lawmakers might repudiate federal debts and guarantee Confederate debt.

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/02/us/politics/debt-limit-14th-amendment.html
The best Supreme Court that money can buy might choose to read the 14th Amendment in a vacuum, but context matters.
People instinctively feel that Congress can't require borrowing and simultaneously prohibit actions necessary to service that debt. And they (we) are right. Arguably (and the SC has argued this), the 14th Amendment doesn't add anything on this point. It merely confirms what we all know, and what was true before the 14th Amendment.

We regard [the Fourteenth Amendment, in its fourth section] as confirmatory of a fundamental principle, which applies as well to the government bonds in question, and to others duly authorized by the Congress, as to those issued before the Amendment was adopted. Nor can we perceive any reason for not considering the expression "the validity of the public debt" as embracing whatever concerns the integrity of the public obligations.

Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935)

I haven't been able to find a clear article on what exactly happened, but one thing is clear: the House wouldn't have been the problem. If there was a legislative block, it was in the Senate. Dems couldn't have passed it on their own; it takes 60 votes to limit debate and bring a bill to an actual vote.
They might have used reconciliation to pass it with just D votes, but it would have taken 100% approval from the 50 D and independent/D-voting senators. Manchin and Sinema, especially Manchin, may have kiboshed it if a discussion went that far. His vote was difficult for Dems to corral all through the last Congress.

Yeah, Andy's right here. That BS 60-vote threshold * needs to go, b/c it essentially paralyzes the Senate. Heck, right now they probably can't even get 60 votes to name a post office!!!
* the fillibuster 'rule' is alleged to 'protect the minority' when in actuality it gives the minority full control. Which goes right along with how the winner of the national popular vote is seldom named President, b/c of the BS 'electoral college' nonsense.

Especially, in early November, after the Democrats lost their comfortable majority of the House, they should have made this issue a top priority in the remaining two months of the legislative session. After all, it was well known what the Republican strategy would be. What am I missing?
Fred

I haven't been able to find a clear article on what exactly happened, but one thing is clear: the House wouldn't have been the problem. If there was a legislative block, it was in the Senate. Dems couldn't have passed it on their own; it takes 60 votes to limit debate and bring a bill to an actual vote.
They might have used reconciliation to pass it with just D votes, but it would have taken 100% approval from the 50 D and independent/D-voting senators. Manchin and Sinema, especially Manchin, may have kiboshed it if a discussion went that far. His vote was difficult for Dems to corral all through the last Congress.

Delays [on First Republic brokered CDs] may be because only the broker has customer details & Cede may be involved as an intermediary.
That doesn't seem to differ from any other brokered CDs: "CDs ... are evidenced by a Master Certificate of Deposit representing individual CDs in $1,000 denominations and held at The Depository Trust Company (“DTC”) or directly by the broker."
https://www.sewkis.com/publications/fdic-requirements-for-pass-through-deposit-insurance-in-brokered-deposit-programs/
Under normal circumstances it is the bank not the FDIC making payments, but otherwise the cash flows look the same:

The financial institution [bank] makes principal and interest payments to the Depository Trust Company (DTC). DTC is responsible for passing the principal and interest to the broker-dealers. The broker-dealer is responsible for passing the correct amount of principal and interest to the owners of the Certificates.

https://capitalmarkets.fidelity.com/brokered-certificate-of-deposit-underwriting
Cede & co is the agent of DTC so its involvement should not materially affect speed of payment. In any case, it is primarily a distraction from the main point. Since its role is to serve as legal owner (DTC nominee) of securities, and CDs are not usually securities (see Sewkis link above), this is really getting into the weeds. (Not to mention that none of this is specific to FDIC payments.) But I'll go along for the ride if you think there's something significant here.
----
The basic relationship between brokered CD depositors, issuer banks, and brokers is not dissimilar to the way fund supermarkets work. Brokers do all the customer bookkeeping, aggregate their customers' investments in a given fund, and invest the aggregated moneys in that fund through an omnibus (unified single) account. Dividends and redemption payments are passed from the fund to the broker who distributes them to the owners appropriately.
Delays may be because only the broker has customer details. Funds were slow to participate in fund supermarkets precisely because these details were being kept from them - they lost direct access to their customers.

One problem is that legislative Acts that are passed are applicable for years/decades and many are touted to be budget-neutral when passed. But that is based on wild guesstimates of future economy, taxes, consumer and business behaviors. Many Acts are front-loaded for benefits/effects and back-loaded for revenue generation. So, it is hard to quantify their effects on annual budget deficits.
Of course, there is an obvious budget deficit when the the FY budgets are passed, often with long delays, but that is the time to simultaneously adjust the debt-ceiling. If the FY budget is balanced, then there won't be any need to adjust the debt-ceiling.
Keep in mind that the context of the 14th Amendment was the Civil War debt but it is written in a very broad way.