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Derf said:Why don't you all use the private messaging on this site. Easy to use. Good luck, Derf
Why don't you all use the private messaging on this site. Easy to use. Good luck, Derf
Link: TBO private board - respond to this thread to apply for access to the board
★★★ Link: TBO private board - respond to this thread to apply for access to the board ★★★
ohlgroup said:I need access
I need access
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Anyway, Monday (tomorrow) starts a new week....I have been waiting for Monday to get here so I can start making more calls. I honestly don't know where to start. I just know I will do anything in my power to get our money back and help us all to reach that same goal!!!!
Does anyone have hacker friends? Friends at the FBI? Friends in law enforcement? Anyone that can help us or knows what direction to point us? Friends of friends? Let's keep brainstorming.......
How about calling the banks where they cashed the checks and where we sent the wires? Is there no insurance for wire and check fraud? Mine was Wells Fargo and Fifth Third Bank. I have calls into both of them!
Disclosure - I am familiar with several PB sites and have my own too.
FB Groups also good controllability.
BTW, PM systems (here and elsewhere) have limitations in that people can be added or leave at will. I was once involuntarily included in a PM group chain (not at MFO) that I didn't care for. I was so offended that I deleted the PM originator from the group chain. The poor fellow may be still wondering what happened.
Here's the blog page:
1340017489258. The Truist swift number is SNTRUS3AXXX. And we all know the account name he used was HMC Trading LLC. I wonder if Truist knows they were the conduit (or one of them) for this major fraudulent scheme?
ONE MORE TIME- Please use the following link to request access to the private TBO Board: Your request at that link may take some time to be activated. It isn't automatic- an actual human being will need to activate your request, and that may take some time since those volunteers also have a life doing other stuff.
Use the link referenced in Old_Joe's post which is right before your post.
In early August I contacted the SEC and reported my findings. Three days later I was contacted by SEC investigators, and I supplied them with my research and findings. within a few weeks the firm's website came down and the LinkedIn profiles of the firm and the principals were removed as well.
I cannot confirm, but I assume that the SEC is behind the sudden disappearance of TBO Capital. Typically, the SEC will also move quickly to freeze the assets of the fund manager, the fund, the principals, and any related assets to try to recover funds for investors. I do not know, but I assume, that the SEC will eventually make a public announcement about their actions and look to secure the fund's/firm's records to try to determine who may have been caught up in the fraud.
Hi All, below is the research that my husband has done on the APPF (Authorized Push Payment Fraud). In the UK they have laws and basically automatically reimburse victims like us in situations like this. The US is behind. But there is hope. Here is his research:
Making the Case the Fraudster's Banks are Guilty of Negligence and Ought to Reimburse the Fraud Losses
The argument in short is the banks should have prevented the fraudster from opening accounts with the banks to stole our money. Moreover, the banks should have carefully monitored the accounts for suspicious activity, preventing the fraudster from stealing our money. Such suspicious activity includes withdrawing our money immediately or very soon after it was deposited, cashing large checks instead of depositing them, transferring our deposited money into crypto currencies, performing in-person bank activities in quasi-disguise (a cap and a medical mask), etc.
The fraud is called Authorized Push Payment Fraud, or APP fraud:
This fraud "happens when fraudsters deceive consumers or individuals at a business to send them a payment under false pretenses to a bank account controlled by the fraudster. As payments made using real-time payment schemes are irrevocable, the victims cannot reverse a payment once they realize they have been conned." (https://www.fico.com/blogs/what-authorised-push-payment-fraud)
The responsibility of the banks to detect fraudster's opening or holding an account(s) with their bank falls under the principle of Know Your Customer, or KYC:
This "refers to due diligence that banks and other financial institutions must perform on their customers before doing business with them. Know your customer policies are usually required by governments and enforced by bank regulators to prevent corruption, identity theft, financial fraud, money laundering and terrorism financing. Most Know Your Customer frameworks are based on four components: 1) customer identification, 2) customer acceptance, 3) transaction monitoring and 4) ongoing risk management. Requirements vary by country, but the collection of basic identity documents, comparison against certain name lists (‘politically exposed persons’ or PEP lists, for example), and analysis of transaction behaviors are most common." (https://fraud.net/d/kyc-know-your-customer/)
Anti-Money Laundering (AML) regulations are also relevant.
"AML is a set of regulations, laws and procedures that detect and prevent criminals from disguising illegal funds as legitimate income. AML policies help banks and financial institutions combat financial crimes. AML regulations require banks to collect customer information, monitor and screen their transactions and report suspicious activity to financial regulatory authorities. Additionally, the AML holding period requires deposits to remain in an account for a specified amount of time (at least five trading days in the U.S.). Banks can use this holding period to help in anti-money laundering and risk management." (https://www.jumio.com/aml-guidance-banking-finance-2021/)
Financial scams and frauds using banks has greatly increased in recent years. Victims of fraud are unaware of this development, but banks are well aware of it and therefore ought to be even more diligent than ever. In other words, banks are more culpable than ever for insufficient Know Your Customer and Anti-Money Laundering practices in a setting where financial fraud has significantly increased and banks know it.
"Authorized Push Payment (APP) fraud losses have now outstripped fraud losses on bank and credit cards for the first time. Impersonation scams more than doubled (up 123%), investment scams rose by 95% and romance scams were up 62%." (https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/20949/could-poor-bank-kyc-part-the-problem-of-fraud) Given this, banks should be especially diligent to prevent their banks from being involved in APP scams.
above is some info (probably not helpful ultimately) with a useless link to the scammer at the bottom
might be worth getting in touch w NC officials to see if coordination is going on
please feel free to copy and post to private group