Monthly Archives: December 2012

Bridgeway Managed Volatility (BRBPX), January 2013

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

To provide high current return with less short-term risk than the stock market, the Fund buys and sells a combination of stocks, options, futures, and fixed-income securities. Up to 75% of the portfolio may be in stocks and options.  They may short up to 35% via index futures.  At least 25% must be in stocks and no more than 15% in foreign stocks.  At least 25% will be in bonds, but those are short-term Treasuries with an average duration of five months (the manager refers to them as “the anchor rather than the sail” of the fund).  They will, on average, hold 150-200 securities.

Adviser

Bridgeway Capital Management.  The first Bridgeway fund – Ultra Small Company – opened in August of 1994.  The firm has 11 funds and 60 or so separate accounts, with about $2 billion under management.  Bridgeway’s corporate culture is famously healthy and its management ranks are very stable.

Managers

Richard Cancelmo is the lead portfolio manager and leads the trading team for Bridgeway. He joined Bridgeway in 2000 and has over 25 years of investment industry experience, including five years with Cancelmo Capital Management and The West University Fund. He has been the fund’s manager since inception.

Management’s stake

Mr. Cancelmo has been $100,000 and $500,000 invested in the fund.  John Montgomery, Bridgeway’s president, has an investment in that same range.  Every member of Bridgeway’s board of trustees also has a substantial investment in the fund.

Opening date

June 29, 2001.

Minimum investment

$2000 for both regular and tax-sheltered accounts.

Expense ratio

0.95% on assets of $29.8 million, as of June 2023. 

Comments

They were one of the finest debate teams I encountered in 20 years.  Two young men from Northwestern University.  Quiet, in an activity that was boisterous.  Clean-cut, in an era that was ragged.  They pursued very few argumentative strategies, but those few were solid, and executed perfectly. Very smart, very disciplined, but frequently discounted by their opponents.  Because they were unassuming and their arguments were relatively uncomplicated, folks made the (fatal) assumption that they’d be easy to beat.   Toward the end of one debate, one of the Northwesterners announced with a smile: “Our strategy has worked perfectly.  We have lulled them into mistakes.  In dullness there is strength!”

Bridgeway Balanced is likewise.  This fund has very few strategies but they are solid and executed perfectly.  The portfolio is 25 – 75% mid- to large-cap domestic stocks, the remainder of the portfolio is (mostly Treasury) bonds.  Within the stock portfolio, about 60% is indexed to the S&P 500 and 40% is actively managed using Bridgeway’s computer models.  Within the actively managed part, half of the picks lean toward value and half toward growth.  (Yawn.)  But also – here’s the exciting dull part – particularly within the active portion of the portfolio, Mr. Cancelmo has the ability to substitute covered calls and secured puts for direct ownership of the stocks!  (If you’re tingling now, it’s probably because your legs have fallen asleep.)

These are financial derivatives, called options.  I’ve tried six different ways of writing a layperson’s explanation for options and they were all miserably unclear.  Suffice it to say that the options are a tool to generate modest cash flows for the fund while seriously limiting the downside risk and somewhat limiting the upside potential.  At base, the fund sacrifices some Alpha in order to seriously limit Beta.  The strategy requires excellent execution or you’ll end up losing more on the upside than you gain on the downside.

But Bridgeway seems to be executing exceedingly well.  From inception through late December, 2012, BRBPX turned $10,000 into $15,000.  That handily beats its long/short funds peer group ($12,500) and the 700-pound gorilla of option strategy funds, Gateway (GATEX, $14,200).  Those returns are also better than those for the moderate allocation group, which exposes you to 60% of the stock market’s volatility against Bridgeway’s 40%. They’ve accomplished those gains with little volatility: for the past decade, their standard deviation is 7 (the S&P 500 is 15) and their beta is 0.41. 

This occurs within the context of Bridgeway’s highly principled corporate structure: small operation, very high ethical standards, unwavering commitment to honest communication with their shareholders (if you need to talk to founder John Montgomery or Mr. Cancelmo, just call and ask – the phone reps are in the same office suite with them and are authorized to ring straight through),  modest salaries (they actually report them – Mr. Cancelmo earned $423,839 in 2004 and the company made a $12,250 contribution to his IRA), a commitment to contribute 50% of their profits to charity, and a rule requiring folks to keep their investable wealth in the Bridgeway funds.

Very few people have chosen to invest in the fund – net assets are around $24 million, down from a peak of $130 million. Not just down, but steadily and consistently down even as performance has been consistently solid.  I’ve speculated elsewhere about the cause of the decline: a mismatch with the rest of the Bridgeway line-up, a complex strategy that’s hard for outsiders to grasp and to have confidence in, and poor marketing among them.  Given Bridgeway’s commitment to capping fees, the decline is sad and puzzling but has limited significance for the fund’s shareholders.

Bottom line

“In dullness, there is strength!”  For folks who want some equity exposure but can’t afford the risk of massive losses, or for any investor looking to dampen the volatility of an aggressive portfolio, Bridgeway Managed Volatility – like Bridgeway, in general – deserves serious consideration.

Company website

Bridgeway Managed Volatility

Fact Sheet

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2013. All rights reserved. The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication. For reprint/e-rights contact us.

January 2013, Funds in Registration

By David Snowball

AdvisorShares Recon Capital Alternative Income ETF

AdvisorShares Recon Capital Alternative Income ETF (PUTS) will seek consistent, low volatility returns across all market cycles. The managers will do that by selling put options on equities in each of the ten sectors of the S&P 500 Index, using a proprietary selection process.  Kevin Kelly and Garrett Paolella of Recon Capital Partners have managed the fund “since 2011” (an intriguing claim for a fund launched in 2013).  Expenses not yet set.

Avatar Capital Preservation Fund

Avatar Capital Preservation Fund seeks to preserve capital while providing current income and limited capital appreciation.  The fund will invest primarily in ETFs and ETNs.  Their investment universe includes short-, intermediate-, and long-term investment grade, taxable U.S. government, U.S. Agency, and corporate bonds, common and preferred stocks of large capitalization U.S. companies and, to a lesser extent, international companies.  In addition, the Fund may use leverage to hedge portfolio positions and manage volatility, and/or to increase exposure to long positions.  The managers use a Global Tactical Asset Allocation model to select investments.  Much of the “investment strategies” strikes me as regrettable mumbling (“The adviser’s investment decision-making process is grounded in the use of comprehensive tactical asset allocation methodology”).  Ron Fernandes and Larry Seibert, co-CIOs of Momentum Investment Partners are co-managers of the fund.  The minimum initial investment $1,000 for regular accounts and (here’s an odd and, I think, unprecedented move) $2500 for tax-qualified accounts such as IRAs and 401(k) plans.  Expenses are not yet set.

Avatar Tactical Multi-Asset Income Fund

Avatar Tactical Multi-Asset Income Fund seeks current income. The fund will invest primarily in ETFs and ETNs.  Their investment universe includes short-, intermediate-, and long-term investment grade, taxable U.S. government, U.S. Agency, and corporate bonds, common and preferred stocks of large capitalization U.S. companies and, to a lesser extent, international companies.  In addition, the Fund may use leverage to hedge portfolio positions and manage volatility, and/or to increase exposure to long positions.  The managers use a Global Tactical Asset Allocation model to select investments.  Much of the “investment strategies” strikes me as regrettable mumbling (“The adviser’s investment decision-making process is grounded in the use of comprehensive tactical asset allocation methodology”).  Ron Fernandes and Larry Seibert, co-CIOs of Momentum Investment Partners are co-managers of the fund.  The minimum initial investment $1,000 for regular accounts and (here’s an odd and, I think, unprecedented move) $2500 for tax-qualified accounts such as IRAs and 401(k) plans.  Expenses are not yet set.

Avatar Absolute Return Fund

Avatar Absolute Return Fund seeks a positive total return in all market environments.  The fund will invest primarily in ETFs and ETNs.  Their investment universe includes short-, intermediate-, and long-term investment grade, taxable U.S. government, U.S. Agency, and corporate bonds, common and preferred stocks of large capitalization U.S. companies and, to a lesser extent, international companies.  In addition, the Fund may use leverage to hedge portfolio positions and manage volatility, and/or to increase exposure to long positions. The percentage of the Fund’s portfolio invested in each asset class will change over time and may range from 0%-100%, and the Fund may experience moderate volatility.  The managers use a Global Tactical Asset Allocation model to select investments.  Much of the “investment strategies” strikes me as regrettable mumbling (“The adviser’s investment decision-making process is grounded in the use of comprehensive tactical asset allocation methodology”).  Ron Fernandes and Larry Seibert, co-CIOs of Momentum Investment Partners are co-managers of the fund.  The minimum initial investment $1,000 for regular accounts and (here’s an odd and, I think, unprecedented move) $2500 for tax-qualified accounts such as IRAs and 401(k) plans.  Expenses are not yet set.

Avatar Global Opportunities Fund

Avatar Global Opportunities Fund will seek maximum capital appreciation through exposure to global markets. The fund will invest primarily in ETFs and ETNs.  Their investment universe includes short-, intermediate-, and long-term investment grade, taxable U.S. government, U.S. Agency, and corporate bonds, common and preferred stocks of large capitalization U.S. companies and, to a lesser extent, international companies.  In addition, the Fund may use leverage to hedge portfolio positions and manage volatility, and/or to increase exposure to long positions.  The managers use a Global Tactical Asset Allocation model to select investments.  Much of the “investment strategies” strikes me as regrettable mumbling (“The adviser’s investment decision-making process is grounded in the use of comprehensive tactical asset allocation methodology”).  Ron Fernandes and Larry Seibert, co-CIOs of Momentum Investment Partners are co-managers of the fund.  The minimum initial investment $1,000 for regular accounts and (here’s an odd and, I think, unprecedented move) $2500 for tax-qualified accounts such as IRAs and 401(k) plans.  Expenses are not yet set.

Investors Variable NAV Money Market Fund

Investors Variable NAV Money Market Fund will seek to maximize current income to the extent consistent with the preservation of capital and maintenance of liquidity by investing exclusively in high-quality money market instruments.  The fund is managed by Northern Trust Investments, though no individuals are named. The expense ratio is 0.35% and minimum initial investment is $2500, $500 for an IRA and $250 for accounts established with an automatic investment plan. They are simultaneously launching three other variable-NAV money market funds: Investors Variable NAV AMT-Free Municipal Money Market, Variable NAV U.S. Government Money Market and Variable NAV Treasury Money Market Fund.

LSV Small Cap Value Fund

LSV Small Cap Value Fund will seek long-term growth by investing in stocks with a market cap under $2.5 billion (or the highest market cap in the Russell 2000 Value Index, whichever is greater).  Their goal is to find stocks which are out-of-favor but show signs of recent improvement.  They use a quant investment model to match fundamentals with indicators of short-term appreciation potential.   The fund will be managed by Josef Lakonishok, Menno Vermeulen, and Puneet Mansharamani.   Lakonishok is a reasonably famous academic who did some of the groundbreaking work on behavioral finance, then translated that research into actual investment strategies.  His LSV Value Equity Fund (LSVEX) turned $10,000 in $22,000 since launch in 1999; its average peer would have earned $16,200 and the S&P, $14,200. The minimum initial investment is a bracing $100,000. The expense ratio is 0.85%.

SMI Dynamic Allocation Fund

SMI Dynamic Allocation Fund seeks total return through a “dynamic asset allocation investment strategy” in which it invests in the most attractive three of six major asset classes:  U.S. equities, international equities, fixed income securities, real estate, precious metals, and cash.  They’ll look at momentum, asset flows and historical volatility, among other things. The asset allocation and equity sleeve is managed by a team from Sound Mind Investing (Mark Biller, Eric Collier and Anthony Ayers).  The two Sound Mind funds tend to below average returns but low volatility. The fixed income sleeve is managed by Scout Investment’s Reams Asset Management Division.  The Reams team (Mark M. Egan, Thomas M. Fink, Todd Thompson, and  Steven T. Vincent) are really first-rate and were nominated by Morningstar as a 2012 Fixed Income Manager of the Year. The minimum initial investment is $2500. Expenses not yet set.

SPDR SSgA Large Cap Risk Aware ETF

SPDR SSgA Large Cap Risk Aware ETF seeks to provide competitive returns compared to the large cap U.S. equity market and capital appreciation.  I’ll let the managers speak for themselves: “invests in a diversified selection of equity securities included in the Russell 1000 Index that [they] believes are aligned with predicted investor risk preferences. . .  During periods of anticipated high risk, the Adviser will adjust the Portfolio’s composition to be defensive and may increase exposure to value companies.” (The assumption that “value” and “low-risk” are interchangeable seems, to me, to be debatable.)   In low risk periods, they’ll emphasize riskier assets and in periods of moderate risk they’ll look more like the Russell 1000.  The fund is non-diversified.  The fund will be managed by Gary Lowe, Simon Roe and John O’Connell, all of SSgA. Expenses not yet set.

SPDR SSgA Risk Aware ETF

SPDR SSgA Risk Aware ETF seeks to provide competitive returns compared to the broad U.S. equity market and capital appreciation.  I’ll let the managers speak for themselves: “invests in a diversified selection of equity securities included in the Russell 3000 Index that [they] believes are aligned with predicted investor risk preferences. . .  During periods of anticipated high risk, the Adviser will adjust the Portfolio’s composition to be defensive and may increase exposure to large cap and/or value companies.”  In low risk periods, they’ll emphasize riskier assets and in periods of moderate risk they’ll look more like the Russell 3000.  The fund is non-diversified.  The fund will be managed by Gary Lowe, Simon Roe and John O’Connell, all of SSgA. Expenses not yet set.

SPDR SSgA Small Cap Risk Aware ETF

SPDR SSgA Small Cap Risk Aware ETF seeks to provide competitive returns compared to the small cap U.S. equity market and capital appreciation.  I’ll let the managers speak for themselves: “invests in a diversified selection of equity securities included in the Russell 2000 Index that [they] believes are aligned with predicted investor risk preferences. . .  During periods of anticipated high risk, the Adviser will adjust the Portfolio’s composition to be defensive and may increase exposure to value companies.”  In low risk periods, they’ll emphasize riskier assets and in periods of moderate risk they’ll look more like the Russell 2000.  The fund is non-diversified.  The fund will be managed by Gary Lowe, Simon Roe and John O’Connell, all of SSgA. Expenses not yet set.

Stone Toro Relative Value Fund

Stone Toro Relative Value Fund will seek capital appreciation with a secondary focus on current income by investing, primarily, in US stocks.  Up to 40% of the portfolio may be invested in ADRs.  The managers warn us that “The Fund’s investment strategy involves active and frequent trading.”  They don’t say much about what they’re up to and they use a lot of unnecessary quotation marks when they try: “The Adviser employs a unique proprietary process, the Relative Value Process (the ‘Process’), to identify ‘special investment value’.”  The Process is managed by Michael Jarzyna, Founding Partner and CIO of Stone Toro.  He spent a year or so (2008-09) as Associate Portfolio Manager of Blackrock Value Opportunity Fund. From 1998-2006, he managed the technology portions of Merrill Lynch’s small and mid-cap value funds. The minimum initial investment is $1,000.  The expense ratio is 1.57%.

Manager changes, December 2012

By Chip

Because bond fund managers, traditionally, had made relatively modest impacts of their funds’ absolute returns, Manager Changes typically highlights changes in equity and hybrid funds.

Ticker Fund Out with the old In with the new Dt
VERDX Aston/Veredus Small Cap Growth Subadvisor, Todd-Veredus Asset Management, has been fired. Lee Munder will be the new subadvisor and the fund will eventually be merged with the Munder-advised Aston SCG Fund.  In the interim, it’s ASTON Small Cap Fund. 12/12
CSXAX Calvert Social Index Fund David Jones and Eric Lessnau, along with subadvisor, World Asset Management Natalie Trunow 12/12
AAOPX Cavanal Hill Opportunistic S. Bob Rezaee Matt Stephani 12/12
DHOAX Delaware High-Yield Opportunities Kevin Loome Thomas H. Chow, Paul A. Matlack, Craig C. Dembek, and John P. McCarthy 12/12
DPHYX Delaware Pooled High-Yield Bond Kevin Loome and Chuck Devereux Thomas H. Chow, Paul A. Matlack, Craig C. Dembek, and John P. McCarthy 12/12
AAAAX DWS Alternative Asset Allocation Inna Okounkova, who’d been on leave through the end of the year, is no longer listed as a portfolio manager. The rest of the team remains. 12/12
FMAAX Federated Prudent Absolute Return Doug Noland, manager of Prudent Bear, will leave this fund Dana Meissner will remain but the word “Prudent” won’t. 12/12
FGLAX Fidelity Advisor Global Balanced Leon Tucker left the team. Maria Nikishkova joined. 12/12
FGBLX Fidelity Global Balanced Leon Tucker left the team. Maria Nikishkova joined. 12/12
FIGVX First Investors Government No one, but . . . Rodwell Chadehumbe joined as comanager 12/12
ITHAX Hartford Capital Appreciation No one, but . . . In March, Kent Stahl and Gregg Thomas will join as comanagers, as part of the fund’s succession planning 12/12
HFOAX Henderson International Opportunities Michael Wood-Martin is no longer a comanager Vincent Musumeci and Nicholas Cowley have joined the team. 12/12
HMAAX HighMark Tactical Capital Growth Allocation Fund David Goerz Derek Izuel, E. Jack Montgomery, and David Wines are in 12/12
HMRAX HighMark Tactical Growth & Income David Goerz Derek Izuel, E. Jack Montgomery, and David Wines are in 12/12
HDEAX Huntington Disciplined Equity Donald Keller Peter A. Sorrentino 12/12
HIEAX Huntington International Equity Madelynn Matlock Paul Attwood 12/12
IFCAX ING Emerging Equity Dividend, formerly ING Greater China Fund As part of its reorganization ING is bringing fund management in-house while Guy Uding and Oscar Kin Fai Leung have been dispatched to the … uhh, outhouse. Robert Davis, Nicolas Simar, and Manu Vandenbulck are the new co-managers. 12/12
IMOIX ING Growth and Income Core Por In conjunction with the change to the Portfolio’s sub-adviser, Thornburg Investment Management, Edward Maran and Connor Browne will be replaced as co-portfolio managers Christopher F. Corapi and Michael Pytosh of ING Investment Management Co. will begin managing the portfolio. 12/12
IVCAX ING International Value Choice Tradewinds Global Investors, LLC was terminated as sub-adviser, another in a long series of losses for them. Martin Jansen, David Rabinowitz, and Joseph Vultaggio will be the new co-managers 12/12
NAWGX ING International Value Equity Tradewinds Global Investors, LLC was terminated as sub-adviser Martin Jansen, David Rabinowitz, and Joseph Vultaggio will be the new co-managers 12/12
PAVAX ING Value Choice A Tradewinds Global Investors, LLC was terminated as sub-adviser Christopher Corapi and Robert Kloss of ING Investment Management Co. will begin managing the portfolio. 12/12
LGILX Laudus Growth Investors US Large Cap Lawrence Kemp Paul A. Graham, Saverio (Sam) Console and Peter Bye are co-managers of the fund. 12/12
SBEYX Legg Mason Esemplia Emerging Markets Long-Short Aquico Wen Stavros Triantafilidis, Michael Bourke and Eric Curiel got the nod.  Their task might be to stop this from acting like a simple e.m. index fund (its 2012 r-squared is 97). 12/12
MSSFX Litman Gregory Masters Smaller Companies Copper Rock Capital Partners and portfolio manager Tucker Walsh have been fired.  No shame: the fund discharged formerly Masterful investors in 2006, 07, 09, 10, 11 and 12. Frank Sustersic and Turner Investment Partners have been hired to join the rest of the team. 12/12
FGIAX Nuveen Global Infrastructure No one, but . . . Tryg Sarsland joins Jay Rosenberg and John Wenker 12/12
BPFAX PTA Comprehensive Alternatives Fund We didn’t even know the PTA ran a mutual fund.  In any case, no one lost their job though given average annual losses of 5.6% over the past five years perhaps someone should have. Subadvisor Horizon Asset Management, with Murray Stahl, Steven Bregman, and Peter Doyle are added. 12/12
RCAPX RS Capital Appreciation Fund As part of reorganization into RS Growth Fund, Christy Phillips, Larry Coats, and David Carr, of subadvisor Oak Value, are all out. Stephen Bishop, Melissa Chadwick-Dunn, and D. Scott Tracy, are in. 12/12
FSCFX Strategic Advisers Small-Mid Cap No one, but . . . Donald Cobin and Christian McDonald were added as portfolio managers. 12/12
FNAPX Strategic Advisers Small-Mid Cap Multi-Manager No one, but . . . Donald Cobin and Christian McDonald were added as portfolio managers. 12/12
PAMGX Prudential Target Moderate Allocation, renamed Prudential Defensive Equity As part of a change in objective, all existing subadvisors will be out. New subadvisor, Quantitative Management Associates, will be in. 12/12
VEINX Wilmington Large Cap Value NWQ Investment Management Company, with portfolio managers Kevin Hunter and Jon Bosse, is out Andrew Hopkins, Rafael Tamargo, Thomas Neale, and Edward Forrester are in 12/12

 

January 1, 2013

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

We’ve been listening to REM’s “It’s the End of the World (as we know it)” and thinking about copyrighting some useful terms for the year ahead.  You know that Bondpocalypse and Bondmageddon are both getting programmed into the pundits’ vocabulary.  Chip suggests Bondtastrophe and Bondaster.  

Bad asset classes (say, TIPs and long bonds) might be merged in the Frankenfund.  Members of the Observer’s discussion board offered bond doggle (thanks, Bee!), the Bondfire of the Vanities (Shostakovich’s entry and probably our most popular), the New Fed (which Hank thinks we’ll be hearing by year’s end) which might continue the racetodebase (Rono) and bondacious (presumably blondes, Accipiter’s best).  Given that snowstorms now get their own names (on the way to Pittsburgh, my son and I drove through the aftermath of Euclid), perhaps market panics, too?  We’d start of course with Market Crisis Alan, in honor of The Maestro, but we haven’t decided whether that would rightly be followed by Market Crisis Ben, Barack or Boehner.  Hopeful that they couldn’t do it again, we could honor them all with Crash B3 which might defame the good work done by vitamin B3 in regulating sex and stress.

Feel free to join in on the 2013 Word of the Year thread, if only if figure out how Daisy Duke got there.

The Big Bond Bubble Boomnanza?

I’m most nervous when lots of other folks seem to agree with me.  It’s usually a sign that I’ve overlooked something.

I’ve been suggesting for quite a while now that the bond market, as a whole, might be in a particularly parlous position.   Within the living memory of almost the entire investing community, investing in bonds has been a surefire way to boost your portfolio.  Since 1981, the bond market has enjoyed a 31-year bull market.  What too many investors forget is that 1981 was preceded by a 35-year year bear market for bonds.  The question is: are we at or near another turning point?

The number of people reaching that conclusion is growing rapidly.  Floyd Norris of The New York Times wrote on December 28th: “A new bear market almost certainly has begun” (Reading Pessimism in the Market for Bonds).  The Wall Street Journal headlined the warning, “Danger Lurks Inside the Bond Boom amid Corporate-Borrowing Bonanza, Some Money Managers Warn of Little Room Left for Gains” (12/06/2012).  Separately, the Journal warned of “a rude awakening” for complacent bond investors (12/24/2012).  Barron’s warns of a “Fed-inflated bond bubble” (12/17/2012). Hedge fund manager Ray Dalio claims that “The biggest opportunity [in 2013] will be – and it isn’t imminent – shorting bond markets around the world” (our friends at LearnBonds.com have a really good page of links to commentaries on the bond market, on which this is found).

I weighed in on the topic in a column I wrote for Amazon’s Money and Markets page.  The column, entitled “Trees Do Not Grow to the Sky,” begins:

You thought the fallout from 2000-01 was bad?  You thought the 2008 market seizure provoked anguish?  That’s nothing, compared to what will happen when every grandparent in America cries out, as one, “we’ve been ruined.”

In the past five years, investors have purchased one trillion dollars’ worth of bond mutual fund shares ($1.069 trillion, as of 11/20/12, if you want to be picky) while selling a half trillion in stock funds ($503 billion).

Money has flowed into bond mutual funds in 53 of the past 60 weeks (and out of stock funds in 46 of 60 weeks).

Investors have relentlessly bid up the price of bonds for 30 years so they’ve reached the point where they’re priced to return less than nothing for the next decade.

Morningstar adds that about three-quarters of that money went to actively-managed bond funds, a singularly poor bet in most instances.

I included a spiffy graph and then reported on the actions of lots of the country’s best bond investors.  You might want to take a quick scan of their activities.  It’s fairly sobering.

Among my conclusions:  

Act now, not later. “Act” is not investment advice, it’s communication advice.  Start talking with your spouse, financial adviser, fund manager, and other investors online, about how they’ve thought about the sorts of information I’ve shared and how they’ve reacted to it.  Learn, reflect, then act.

We’re not qualified to offer investment advice and we’re not saying that you should be abandoning the bond market. As we said to Charles, one of our regular readers,

I’m very sensitive to the need for income in a portfolio, for risk management and for diversification so leaving fixed-income altogether strikes me as silly and unmanageable.  The key might be to identify the risks your exposing yourself to and the available rewards.  In general, I think folks are most skeptical of long-term sovereign debt issued by governments that are … well, broke.  Such bonds have the greatest interest rate sensitivity and then to be badly overpriced because they’ve been “the safe haven” in so many panics.  

So I’d at the very least look to diversify my income sources and to work with managers who are not locked into very narrow niches. 

MFWire: Stock Fund Flows Are Turning Around

MF Wire recently announced “Stock Funds Turn Around” (December 28, 2012), which might also be titled “Investors continue retreat from U.S. stock funds.” In the last full week of 2012, investors pulled $750 million from US stock funds and added $1.25 billion into international ones.

Forbes: Buy Bonds, Sleep Well

Our take might be, Observer: buy bonds, sleep with the fishes.  On December 19th, Forbes published 5 Mutual Funds for Those Who Want to Sleep Well in 2013.  Writer Abram Brown went looking for funds that performed well in recent years (always the hallmark of good fund selection: past performance) and that avoided weird strategies.  His list of winners:

PIMCO Diversified Income (PDVDX) – a fine multi-asset fund.

MFS Research Bond R3 (MRBHX) – R3 shares are only available through select retirement plans.  The publicly available “A” shares carry a sales load, which has trimmed about a percent a year off its returns.

Russell Strategic Bond (RFCEX) – this is another unavailable share class; the publicly available “A” shares have higher expenses, a load, and a lower Morningstar rating.

TCW Emerging Markets Income (TGEIX) – a fine fund whose assets have exploded in three years, from $150 million to $6.2 billion.

Loomis Sayles Bond (LBFAX) – the article points you to the fund’s Administrative shares, rather than the lower-cost Retail shares (LSBRX) but I don’t know why.

Loomis might illustrate some of the downsides to investing in the past.  Its famous lead manager, Dan Fuss, is now 79 years old and likely in the later stages of his career.  His heir apparent, Kathleen Gaffney, recently left the firm.  That leaves the fund in the hands of two lesser-known managers.

I’m not sure of how well most folks will sleep when their manager’s toting 40-100% emerging markets exposure or 60% junk bonds when the next wave crashes over the market, but it’s an interesting list.

Forbes is, by the way, surely a candidate for the most badly junked up page in existence, and one of the least useful.  Only about a third of the screen is the story, the rest are ads and misleading links.  See also “10 best mutual funds” does not lead to a Forbes story on the subject – it leads to an Ask search results page with paid results at top.

Vanguard: The Past 10 Years

In October we launched “The Last Ten,” a monthly series, running between now and February, looking at the strategies and funds launched by the Big Five fund companies (Fido, Vanguard, T Rowe, American and PIMCO) in the last decade.

Here are our findings so far:

Fidelity, once fabled for the predictable success of its new fund launches, has created no compelling new investment option and only one retail fund that has earned Morningstar’s five-star designation, Fidelity International Growth (FIGFX).  We suggested three causes: the need to grow assets, a cautious culture and a firm that’s too big to risk innovative funds.

T. Rowe Price continues to deliver on its promises.  Of the 22 funds launched, only Strategic Income (PRSNX) has been a consistent laggard; it has trailed its peer group in four consecutive years but trailed disastrously only once (2009).  Investing with Price is the equivalent of putting a strong singles-hitter on a baseball team; it’s a bet that you’ll win with consistency and effort, rather than the occasional spectacular play.

PIMCO has utterly crushed the competition, both in the thoughtfulness of their portfolios and in their performance.  PIMCO has, for example, about three times as many five-star funds – both overall and among funds launched in the last decade – than you’d predict.

The retirement of Gus Sauter, Vanguard’s long-time chief investment officer, makes this is fitting moment to look back on the decade just past.

Measured in terms of the number of funds launched or the innovativeness of their products, the decade has been unremarkable.  Vanguard:

  • Has 112 funds (which are sold in over 278 packages or share classes)
  • 29 of their funds were launched in the past decade
  • 106 of them are old enough to have earned Morningstar ratings
  • 8 of them has a five star rating (as of 12/27/12)
  • 57 more earned four-star ratings.

Morningstar awards five-stars to the top 10% of funds in a class and four-stars to the next 22.5%.  The table below summarizes what you’d expect from a firm of Vanguard’s size and then what they’ve achieved.

 

Expected Value

Observed value

Vanguard, Five Star Funds, overall

10

8

Vanguard, Four and Five Star Funds, overall

34

65

Five Star funds, launched since 9/2002

2

1

Four and Five Star funds, launched since 9/2002

7

18

What does the chart suggest?  Vanguard is less likely to be “spectacular” than the numbers would suggest but more than twice as likely to be “really good.”  That makes a great deal of sense given the nature of Vanguard’s advantage: the “at cost” ethos and tight budget controls means that they enter each year with a small advantage over the market.  With time that advantage compounds but remains modest.

The funds launched in the past decade are mostly undistinguished, in the sense that they incorporate neither unusual combinations of assets (no “emerging markets balanced” or “global infrastructure” here) nor innovative responses to changing market conditions (as with “real return” or “inflation-tuned” ones).   The vast bulk are target-date funds, other retirement income products, or new indexed funds for conventional market segments.

They’ve launched about five new actively-managed retail funds which, as a group, peak out at “okay.”

Ticker

Fund Name

Morningstar Rating

Morningstar Category

Total Assets ($mil)

VDEQX

 Diversified Equity Income

★★★

Large Growth

1180

VMMSX

 Emerging  Markets Select Stock

Diversified Emerging Mkts

120

VEVFX

 Explorer Value

 

Small Blend

126

VEDTX

 Extended Duration Treasury Index

★★

Long Government

693

VFSVX

 FTSE All-World ex-US Small Cap Index

★★

Foreign Small/Mid Blend

1344

VGXRX

 Global ex-US Real Estate

Global Real Estate

644

VLCIX

 Long-Term Corporate Bond

★★★★

Long-Term Bond

1384

VLGIX

 Long-Term Gov’t Bond I

Long Government

196

VPDFX

 Managed Payout Distribution Focused

★★★★

Retirement Income

592

VPGDX

Managed Payout Growth & Distribution Focused

★★★★

Retirement Income

365

VPGFX

Managed Payout Growth Focused

★★★

Retirement Income

72

VPCCX

 PRIMECAP Core

★★★★

Large Growth

4684

VSTBX

 Short-Term Corp Bond Index

★★★★

Short-Term Bond

4922

VSTCX

 Strategic Small-Cap Equity

★★★★

Small Blend

257

VSLIX

 Structured Large-Cap Equity

★★★★

Large Blend

 

507

VSBMX

 Structured Broad Market Index

★★★★

Large Blend

384

VTENX

 Target Retirement 2010

★★★★

Target Date 2000-2010

6327

VTXVX

 Target Retirement 2015

★★★★

Target Date 2011-2015

17258

VTWNX

 Target Retirement 2020

★★★★

Target Date 2016-2020

16742

VTTVX

 Target Retirement 2025

★★★★

Target Date 2021-2025

20670

VTHRX

 Target Retirement 2030

★★★★

Target Date 2026-2030

13272

VTTHX

 Target Retirement 2035

★★★★

Target Date 2031-2035

14766

VFORX

 Target Retirement 2040

★★★★

Target Date 2036-2040

8448

VTIVX

 Target Retirement 2045

★★★★

Target Date 2041-2045

8472

VFIFX

 Target Retirement 2050

★★★★

Target Date 2046-2050

3666

VFFVX

 Target Retirement 2055

Target-Date 2051+

441

VTTSX

 Target Retirement 2060

Target-Date 2051+

50

VTINX

 Target Retirement Income

★★★★★

Retirement Income

9629

VTBIX

 Total Bond Market II

★★

Intermediate-Term Bond

62396

This is not to suggest that Vanguard has been inattentive of their shareholders best interests.  Rather they seem to have taken an old adage to heart: “be like a duck, stay calm on the surface but paddle like hell underwater.”  I’m indebted to Taylor Larimore, co-founder of the Bogleheads, for sharing the link to a valedictory interview with Gus Sauter, who points out that Vanguard’s decided to shift the indexes on which their funds are based.  That shift will, over time, save Vanguard’s investors hundreds of millions of dollars.  It also exemplifies the enduring nature of Vanguard’s competitive advantage: the ruthless pursuit of many small, almost invisible gains for their investors, the sum of which is consistently superior results.

Celebrating Small Cap Season

The Observer has, of late, spent a lot of time talking about the challenge of managing volatility.  That’s led us to discussions of long/short, covered call, and strategic income funds.  The two best months for small cap funds are January and February.  Average returns of U.S. small caps in January from 1927 to 2011 were 2.3%, more than triple those in February, which 0.72%.  And so we teamed up again with the folks at FundReveal to review the small cap funds we’ve profiled and to offer a recommendation or two.

The Fund

The Scoop

2012,

thru 12/29

Three year

Aegis Value (AVALX):

$153 million in assets, 75% microcaps, top 1% of small value funds over the past five years, driven by a 91% return in 2009.

23.0

14.7

Artisan Small Cap (ARTSX)

$700 million in assets, a new management team – those folks who manage Artisan Mid Cap (ARTMX) – in 2009 have revived Artisan’s flagship fund, risk conscious strategy but a growthier profile, top tier returns under the new team.

15.5

13.7

ASTON/River Road Independent Value (ARIVX)

$720 million in assets.  The fund closed in anticipation of institutional inflows, then reopened when those did not appear.  Let me be clear about two things: (1) it’s going to close again soon and (2) you’re going to kick yourself for not taking it more seriously.  The manager has an obsessive absolute-return focus and will not invest just for the sake of investing; he’s sitting on about 50% cash.  He’s really good at the “wait for the right opportunity” game and he’s succeeded over his tenure with three different funds, all using the same discipline.  I know his trailing 12-month ranking is abysmal (98th percentile in small value).  It doesn’t matter.

7.1

n/a

Huber Small Cap Value (HUSIX)

$55 million in assets, pretty much the top small-value fund over the past one, three and five years, expenses are high but the manager is experienced and folks have been getting more than their money’s worth

27.0

19.0

Lockwell Small Cap Value Institutional (LOCSX)

Tiny, new fund, top 16% among small blend funds over the past year, the manager had years with Morgan Stanley before getting downsized.  Scottrade reports a $100 minimum investment in the fund.

17.1

n/a

Mairs and Power Small Cap Fund (MSCFX) –

$40 million in assets, top 1% of small blend funds over the past year, very low turnover, very low key, very Mairs and Power.

27.1

n/a

Pinnacle Value (PVFIX)

$52 million in assets, microcap value stocks plus 40% cash, it’s almost the world’s first microcap balanced fund.  It tends to look relatively awful in strongly rising markets, but still posts double-digit gains.  Conversely tends to shine when the market’s tanking.

18.9

8.4

RiverPark Small Cap Growth (RPSFX)

$4 million in assets and relatively high expenses.  I was skeptical of this fund when we profiled it and its weak performance so far hasn’t given me cause to change my mind.

5.5

n/a

SouthernSun Small Cap Fund (SSSFX)

$400 million, top 1% returns among small blend funds for the past three and five years, reasonable expenses but a tendency to volatility

18.0

21.9

Vulcan Value Partners Small Cap Fund (VVPSX)

$200 million, top 4% among small blend funds over the past year, has substantially outperformed them since inception; it will earn its first Morningstar rating (four stars or five?) at the beginning of February.  Mr. Fitzpatrick was Longleaf manager for 17 years before launching Vulcan and was consistently placed in the top 5% of small cap managers.

24.3

n/a

Walthausen Small Cap Value Fund (WSCVX)

$550 million in assets, newly closed, with a young sibling fund.  This has been consistently in the top 1% of small blend funds, though its volatility is high.

30.6

19.8

You can reach the individual profiles by clicking in the “Funds” tab on our main navigation bar.  We’re in the process of updating them all during January.  Because our judgments embody a strong qualitative element, we asked our resolutely quantitative friends at FundReveal to look at our small caps and to offer their own data-driven reading of some of them. Their full analysis can be found on their blog.

FundReveal’s strategy is to track daily return and volatility data, rather than the more common monthly or quarterly measures.  They believe that allows them to look at many more examples of the managers’ judgment at work (they generate 250 data points a year rather than four or twelve) and to arrive at better predictions about a fund’s prospects.  One of FundReveal’s key measures is Persistence, the likelihood that a particular pattern of risk and return repeats itself, day after day.  In general, you can count on funds with higher persistence. Here are their highlights:

The MFO funds display, in general, higher volatility than the S&P 500 for both 2012 YTD and the past 5 years.  The one fund that had lower volatility in both time horizons is Pinnacle Value (PVFIX).   PVFIX demonstrates consistent performance with low volatility, factors to be combined with subjective analysis available from other sources.

Two other funds have delivered high ADR (Average Daily Return), but also present higher risk than the S&P.  In this case Southern Sun Small Cap (SSSFX) and Walthausen Small Cap (WSCVX) have high relative volatility, but they have delivered high ADR over both time horizons.  From the FundReveal perspective, SSSFX has the edge in terms of decision-making capability because it has delivered higher ADR than the S&P in 10 Quarters and lower ADR in 6 Quarters, while WSCVX had delivered higher ADR than the S&P in 7 Quarters and lower ADR in 7 Quarters.  

So, bottom line, from the FundReveal perspective PVFIX and SSSFX are the more attractive funds in this lineup. 

Some Small Cap funds worthy of consideration:

Small Blend 

  • Schwartz Value fund (RCMFX): Greater than S&P ADR, Lower Volatility (what we call “A” performance) for 2012 YTD and 2007-2012 YTD.  It has a high Persistence Rating (40%) that indicates a historic tendency to deliver A performance on a quarterly basis. 
  • Third Avenue Small-Cap Fund (TVSVX): Greater than S&P ADR, Lower Volatility with a medium Persistence Rating (33%).

Small Growth

  • Wasatch Micro Cap Value fund (WAMVX): Greater than  S&P ADR, Lower Volatility 2007-2012 YTF, with a medium Persistence Rating (30%).  No FundReveal covered Small Growth funds delivered “A” performance in 2012 YTD. (WAMVX is half of Snowball’s Roth IRA.)

Small Value

  • Pinnacle Value Fund (PVFIX): An MFO focus fund, discussed above.  It has a high Persistence Rating (50%).
  • Intrepid Small Cap Fund (ICMAX ): Greater than  S&P ADR, Lower Volatility for 2007-2012 YTF, with a high Persistence Rating (55%). Eric Cinnamond, who now manages Aston River Road Independent Value, managed ICMAX from 2005-10.
  • ING American Century Small-Mid Cap Value (ISMSX): Greater than  S&P ADR, Lower Volatility for 2007-2012 YTF, with a medium Persistence Rating (25%).

If you’re intrigued by the potential for fine-grained quantitative analysis, you should visit FundReveal.  While theirs is a pay service, free trials are available so that you can figure out whether their tools will help you make your own decisions.

Ameristock’s Curious Struggle

Nick Gerber’s Ameristock (AMSTX) fund was long an icon of prudent, focused investing but, like many owner-operated funds, is being absorbed into a larger firm.  In this case, it’s moving into the Drexel Hamilton family of funds.

Or not.  While these transactions are generally routine, a recent SEC filing speaks to some undiscussed turmoil in the move.  Here’s the filing:

As described in the Supplement Dated October 9, 2012 to the Prospectus of Ameristock Mutual Fund, Inc. dated September 28, 2012, a Special Meeting of Shareholders of the Ameristock Fund  was scheduled for December 12, 2012 at 11:00 a.m., Pacific Time, for shareholders to vote on a proposed Agreement and Plan of Reorganization and Termination pursuant to which the Ameristock Fund would be reorganized into the Drexel Hamilton Centre American Equity Fund, a series of Drexel Hamilton Mutual Funds, resulting in the complete liquidation and termination of the Ameristock Fund. The Special Meeting convened as scheduled on December 12, 2012, but was adjourned until … December 27, 2012.   … The Reconvened Special Meeting was reconvened as scheduled on December 27, 2012, but has again been adjourned and will reconvene on Thursday, January 10, 2012 …

Uh-huh. 

Should Old Acquaintance Be Forgot and Never Brought to Mind?

Goodness, no.

How long can a fund be incredibly, eternally awful and still survive?  The record is doubtless held by the former Steadman funds, which were ridiculed as the Deadman funds and eventually hid out as the Ameritor funds. They managed generations of horrible ineptitude. How horrible?  In the last decade of their existence (through 2007), they lost 98.98%.  That’s the transformation of $10,000 into $102. Sufficiently horrible that they became a case study at Stanford’s Graduate School of Business.

In celebrating the season of Auld Lang Syne, I set out to see whether there were any worthy successors on the horizon.  I scanned Morningstar’s database for funds which trailed at least 99% of the peers this year.  And over the past five years.  And 10 and 15 years.

Five funds actually cropped up as being that bad that consistently.  The good news for investors is that the story isn’t quite as bleak as it first appears.

The  Big Loser’s Name

Any explanation?

Delaware Tax-Free Minnesota Intermediate Term, B (DVSBX) and C (DVSCX) shares

Expenses matter.  The fund’s “A” shares are priced at 0.84% and earn a three-star rating.  “C” shares cost 1.69% – that’s close to a third of the bonds’ total return.

DFA Two-Year Global Fixed Income (DFGFX)

DFA is among the fund world’s more exclusive clubs.  Individuals can’t buy the funds nor can most advisors; advisors need to pass a sort of entrance exam just to be permitted to sell them.  Bad DFA funds are rare.  In the case of DFGFX, it’s a category error: it’s an ultra-short bond fund in an intermediate-term bond category. It returns 1-5% per year, never loses money and mostly looks wretched against higher return/higher risk peers in Morningstar’s world bond category.

Fidelity Select Environment and Alternative Energy (FSLEX)

This is a singularly odd result.  Morningstar places it in the “miscellaneous sector” category then, despite a series of 99th percentile returns, gives it a four-star rating.  Morningstar’s description: “this new category is a catchall.”  Given that the fate of “green” funds seems driven almost entirely by politicians’ agendas, it’s a dangerous field.

GAMCO Mathers AAA (MATRX)

Mathers is glum, even by the standards of bear market funds.  The good news can be summarized thus: high management stability (Mr. Van der Eb has been managing the fund since 1974) and it didn’t lose money in 2008.  The bad news is more extensive: it does lose money about 70% of the time, portfolio turnover is 1700%, expenses are higher, Mr. Eb is young enough to continue doing this for years and an inexplicably large number of shareholders ($20 million worth) are holding on.  Mr. Eb and about half of the trustees are invested in the fund.  Mr. Gabelli, the “G” of GAMCO, is not.

Nysa (NYSAX)

This is an entirely conventional little all-cap fund.  Mr. Samoraj is paid about $16,000/year to manage it.  It’s lost 6.8% a year under his watch.  You figure out whether he’s overpaid.  He’s also not invested a penny of his own money in the fund.  Smart man.  Do ye likewise. (The fund’s website doesn’t exist, so you’re probably safe.)

Jaffe’s Year-End Explosion

I’m not sure that Chuck Jaffe is the hardest-working man in the fund biz, but he does have periods of prodigious output.  December is one of those periods.   Chuck ran four features this month worth special note.

  • Farewell to Stupid Investments.  After nearly a decade, Chuck has ended down his “Stupid Investment of the Week” column.  Chuck’s closing columns echoes Cassius, in Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar: “The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, But in ourselves, that we are underlings.”  Or perhaps Pogo, “we have met the enemy and he is us.”
  • 17th Annual Lump of Coal Awards, December 10 and December 17.  This is the litany of stupidity surrounding the fund industry, from slack-wit regulators to venal managers.  One interesting piece discusses Morningstar’s analyst ratings.  Morningstar’s ratings roughly break the universe down into good ideas (gold, silver, bronze), okay ideas (neutral) and bad ideas (negative).  Of the 1000+ funds rated so far, only 5%qualify for negative ratings.  Morningstar’s rejoinder is that there are 5000 unrated funds, the vast bulk of which don’t warrant any attention.  So while the 5% might be the tip of a proverbial iceberg, they represent the funds with the greatest risk of attracting serious investor attention.

    My recommendation, which didn’t make Chuck’s final list, was to present a particularly grimy bit o’ bituminous to the fund industry for its response to the bond mania.  Through all of 2012, the industry closed a total of four funds to new investment while at the same time launching 39 new bond funds.  That’s looks a lot like the same impulse that led to the launch of B2B Internet Services funds (no, I’m not making that up) just before the collapse of the tech bubble in 2000; a “hey, people want to buy this stuff so we’ve got an obligation to market it to them” approach.

  • Tales from the Mutual Fund Crypt, December 26: stories of recently-departed funds.  A favorite: the Auto-Pilot fund’s website drones on, six months after the fund’s liquidation.  It continues to describe the fund as “new,” six years after launch.

    My nominee was generic: more funds are being shut down after 12 – 18 months of operation which smacks of hypocrisy (have you ever heard of a manager who didn’t preach the “long-term investor” mantra yet the firms themselves have a short-term strategy) and incompetence (in fund design and marketing both).

Chuck’s still podcasting, MoneyLife with Chuck Jaffe.  One cool recent interview was with Doug Ramsey, chief investment officer for the Leuthold Funds.

ASTON/River Road Long-Short Conference Call

On December 17, about fifty readers joined us for an hour-long conversation with Matt Moran and Daniel Johnson, managers of ASTON/River Road Long-Short (ARLSX).  For folks interested but unable to join us, here’s the complete audio of the hour-long conversation.  It starts with Morty Schaja, River Road’s president, talking about the fund’s genesis and River Road’s broader discipline and track record: 

The ARLSX conference call

When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded. If the file downloads, instead, you may have to double-click to play it.

If you’d like a preview before deciding whether you listen in, you might want to read our profile of ARLSX (there’s a printable .pdf of the profile on Aston’s website and an audio profile, which we discuss below).  Here are some of the highlights of the conversation:

Quick highlights:

  1. they believe they can outperform the stock market by 200 bps/year over a full market cycle. Measuring peak to peak or trough to trough, both profit and stock market cycles average 5.3 years, so they think that’s a reasonable time-frame for judging them.
  2. they believe they can keep beta at 0.3 to 0.5. They have a discipline for reducing market exposure when their long portfolio exceeds 80% of fair value. The alarms rang in September, they reduce expose and so their beta is now at 0.34, near their low.
  3. risk management is more important than return management, so all three of their disciplines are risk-tuned. The long portfolio, 15-30 industry leaders selling at a discount of at least 20% to fair value, tend to be low-beta stocks. Even so their longs have outperformed the market by 9%.
  4. River Road is committed to keeping the fund open for at least 8 years. It’s got $8 million in asset, the e.r. is capped at 1.7% but it costs around 8% to run. The president of River Road said that they anticipated slow asset growth and budgeted for it in their planning with Aston.
  5. The fund might be considered an equity substitute. Their research suggests that a 30/30/40 allocation (long, long/short, bonds) has much higher alpha than a 60/40 portfolio.

An interesting contrast with RiverPark, where Mitch Rubin wants to “play offense” with both parts of the portfolio. Here the strategy seems to hinge on capital preservation: money that you don’t lose in a downturn is available to compound for you during the up-cycle.

Conference Calls Upcoming: Matthews, Seafarer, Cook & Bynum on-deck

As promised, we’re continuing our moderated conference calls through the winter.  You should consider joining in.  Here’s the story:

  • Each call lasts about an hour
  • About one third of the call is devoted to the manager’s explanation of their fund’s genesis and strategy, about one third is a Q&A that I lead, and about one third is Q&A between our callers and the manager.
  • The call is, for you, free.  Your line is muted during the first two parts of the call (so you can feel free to shout at the danged cat or whatever) and you get to join the question queue during the last third by pressing the star key.

Our next conference call features Teresa Kong, manager of Matthews Asia Strategic Income (MAINX).  It’s Tuesday, January 22, 7:00 – 8:00 p.m., EST.

Matthews is the fund world’s best, deepest, and most experienced team of Asia investors.  They offer a variety of funds, all of which have strong – and occasionally spectacular – long-term records investing in one of the world’s fastest-evolving regions.  While income has been an element of many of the Matthews portfolios, it became a central focus with the December 2011 launch of MAINX.  Ms. Kong, who has a lot of experience with first-rate advisors including BlackRock, Oppenheimer and JPMorgan, joined Matthews in 2010 ahead of the launch of this fund. 

Why might you want to join the call? 

Bonds across the developed world seem poised to return virtually nothing for years and possibly decades. For many income investors, Asia is a logical destination. Three factors support that conclusion:

  1. Asian governments and corporations are well-positioned to service their debts. Their economies are growing and their credit ratings are being raised.
  2. Most Asian debt supports infrastructure, rather than consumption.
  3. Most investors are under-exposed to Asian debt markets. Bond indexes, the basis for passive funds and the benchmark for active ones, tend to be debt-weighted; that is, the more heavily indebted a nation is, the greater weight it has in the index. Asian governments and corporations have relatively low debt levels and have made relatively light use of the bond market. An investor with a global diversified bond portfolio (70% Barclays US Aggregate bond index, 20% Barclays Global Aggregate, 10% emerging markets) would have only 7% exposure to Asia. However you measure Asia’s economic significance (31% of global GDP, rising to 38% in the near future or, by IMF calculations, the source of 50% of global growth), even fairly sophisticated bond investors are likely underexposed.

The question isn’t “should you have more exposure to Asian fixed-income markets,” but rather “should you seek exposure through Matthews?” The answer, in all likelihood, is “yes.” Matthews has the largest array of Asia investment products in the U.S. market, the deepest analytic core and the broadest array of experience. They also have a long history of fixed-income investing in the service of funds such as Matthews Asian Growth & Income (MACSX). Their culture and policies are shareholder-friendly and their success has been consistent. Ms. Kong has outstanding credentials and has had an excellent first year.

How can you join in? 

Click on the “register” button and you’ll be taken to Chorus Call’s site, where you’ll get a toll free number and a PIN number to join us.  On the day of the call, I’ll send a reminder to everyone who has registered.

Would an additional heads up help? 

About a hundred readers have signed up for a conference call mailing list.  About a week ahead of each call, I write to everyone on the list to remind them of what might make the call special and how to register.  If you’d like to be added to the conference call list, just drop me a line.

Podcasts and Profiles

If you look at our top navigation bar, you’ll see a new tab and a new feature for the Observer. We’re calling it our Podcast page, but it’s much more.  It began as a suggestion from Ira Artman, a talented financial services guy and a longtime member of the FundAlarm and Observer community.  Ira suggested that we archive together the audio recordings of our conference calls and audio versions of the corresponding fund profiles. 

Good idea, Ira!  We went a bit further and create a resource page for each fund.  The page includes:

  • The fund’s name, ticker symbols and its manager’s name
  • Written highlights from the conference call
  • A playable/downloadable .mp3 of the call
  • A link to the fund profile
  • A playable/downloadable .mp3 of the fund profile.  The audio profiles start with the print profile, which we update and edit for aural clarity.  Each profile is recorded by Emma Presley, a bright and mellifluous English friend of ours.
  • A link to the fund’s most recent fact sheet on the fund’s website.

We have resource pages for RiverPark Short Term High-Yield, RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity and Aston/River Road Long Short.  The pages for Matthews Asia Strategic Income, Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income, and Cook and Bynum are in the works.

Observer Fund Profiles

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve. This month’s lineup features a single Star in the Shadows:

Bridgeway Managed Volatility (BRBPX): Dick Cancelmo appreciates RiverNorth Dynamic Buy-Write’s strategy and wishes them great success, but also points out that others have been successful using a similar strategy for well over a decade.  Indeed, over the last 10 years, BRBPX has quietly produced 70% of the stock market’s gains with just 40% of its volatility.

BRBPX and the Mystery of the Incredible Shrinking Fund

While it’s not relevant to the merit of BRBPX and doesn’t particularly belong in its profile, the collapse of the fund’s asset base is truly striking.  In 2005, assets stood around $130 million.  Net assets have declined in each of the past five years from $75 million to $24 million.  The fund has made money over that period and is consistently in the top third of long/short funds.

Why the shrinkage?  I don’t know.  The strategy works, which should at least mean that existing shareholders hang on but they don’t.  My traditional explanation has been, because this fund is dull. Dull, dull, dull.  Dull stocks and dull bonds with one dull (or, at least, technically dense) strategy to set them apart.  Part of the problem is Bridgeway.  This is the only Bridgeway fund that targets conservative, risk-conscious investors which means the average conservative investor would find little to draw them to Bridgeway and the average Bridgeway investor has limited interest in conservative funds.  Bridgeway’s other funds have had a performance implosion.  When I first profiled BRBPX, five of the six funds rated by Morningstar had five-star designations.  Today none of them do.  Instead, five of eight rated funds carry one or two stars.  While BRBPX continues to have a four-star rating, there might be a contagion effect. 

Mr. Cancelmo attributes the decline to Bridgeway’s historic aversion to marketing.  “We had,” he reports, “the ‘if you build a better mousetrap’ mindset.  We’ve now hired a business development team to help with marketing.”  That might explain why they weren’t drawing new assets, but hardly explains have 80% of assets walking out the door.

If you’ve got a guess or an insight, I’d love to hear of it.  (Dick might, too.)  Drop me a note.

As a side note, Bridgeway probably offers the single best Annual Report in the industry.  You get a startling degree of honesty, thoughtfulness and clarity about both the funds and their take on broader issues which impact them and their investors.  I was particularly struck by a discussion of the rising tide of correlations of stocks within the major indices.  Here’s the graphic they shared:

 

What does it mean?  Roughly, a generation ago you could explain 20% of the movement of the average stock’s price by broader movements in the market.   As a greater and greater fraction of the stock market’s trades are made in baskets of stocks (index funds, ETFs, and so on) rather than individual names, more and more of the fate of each stock is controlled by sentiments surrounding its industry, sector, peers or market cap.  That’s the steady rise of the line overall.  And during a crisis, almost 80% of a stock’s movement is controlled by the market rather than by a firm’s individual merits.  Bridgeway talks through the significance of that for their funds and encourages investors to factor it into their investment decisions.

The report offers several interesting, insightful discussions, making it the exact opposite of – for example – Fidelity’s dismal, plodding, cookie cutter reports.

Here’s our recommendation: if you run a fund, write such like Bridgeway’s 2012 Annual Report.  If you’re trying to become a better investor, read it!

Launch Alert: RiverNorth/Oaktree High Income (RNHIX, RNOTX)

RiverNorth/Oaktree High Income Fund launched on December 28.  This is a collaboration between RiverNorth, whose specialty has been tactical asset allocation and investing in closed-end funds (CEFs), and Oaktree.  Oaktree is a major institutional bond investor with about $80 billion under management.  Oaktree’s clientele includes “75 of the 100 largest U.S. pension plans, 300 endowments and foundations, 10 sovereign wealth funds and 40 of the 50 primary state retirement plans in the United States.”  Their specialties include high yield and distressed debt and convertible securities.  Until now, the only way for retail investors to access them was through Vanguard Convertible Securities (VCVSX), a four-star Gold rated fund.

Patrick Galley, RiverNorth’s CIO, stresses that this is “a core credit fund (managed by Oaktree) with a high income opportunistic CEF strategy managed by RiverNorth.”  The fund has three investment strategies, two managed by Oaktree.  While, in theory, Oaktree’s share of the portfolio could range from 0 – 100%, as a normal matter they’ll manage the considerable bulk of the portfolio.  Oaktree will have the freedom to allocate between their high-yield and senior loan strategies.  RiverNorth will focus on income-producing CEFs.

For those already invested in RiverNorth funds, Mr. Galley explained the relationship of RNHIX to its siblings:

We are staying true to the name and focusing on income producing closed-end funds, but unlike RNSIX (which focuses on income producing fixed income) and RNDIX (which focuses on income producing equities) and RNCOX (which doesn’t have an income mandate and only distributes once a year), RNHIX will invest across the CEF spectrum (i.e. all asset classes) but with a focus on income without sacrificing/risking total return.

The argument for considering this fund is similar to the argument for considering RiverNorth/DoubleLine Strategic Income.  You’re hiring world-class experts who work in inefficient segments of the fixed-income universe. 

RiverNorth had the risk and return characteristics for a bunch of asset classes charted.

You might read the chart as saying something like: this is a strategy that could offer equity-like returns with more nearly bond-like volatility.  In a world where mainstream, investment-grade bonds are priced to return roughly nothing, that’s an option a reasonable person would want to explore.

The retail expense ratio is capped at 1.60% and the minimum initial investment is $5000.

Funds in Registration

New mutual funds must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they can be offered for sale to the public.  The SEC has a 75-day window during which to call for revisions of a prospectus; fund companies sometimes use that same time to tweak a fund’s fee structure or operating details.  Every day we scour new SEC filings to see what opportunities might be about to present themselves. Many of the proposed funds offer nothing new, distinctive or interesting.  Some are downright horrors of Dilbertesque babble.

Funds in registration this month won’t be available for sale until, typically, the beginning of March 2013. We found 15 funds in the pipeline, notably:

Investors Variable NAV Money Market Fund, one of a series of four money markets managed by Northern Trust, all of which will feature variable NAVs.  This may be a first step in addressing a serious problem: the prohibition against “breaking the buck” is forcing a lot of firms to choose between underwriting the cost of running their money funds or (increasingly) shutting them down.

LSV Small Cap Value Fund is especially notable for its management team, led by Josef Lakonishok is a reasonably famous academic who did some of the groundbreaking work on behavioral finance, then translated that research into actual investment strategies through private accounts, hedge funds, and his LSV Value Equity Fund (LSVEX) fund.

Details on these funds and the list of all of the funds in registration are available at the Observer’s Funds in Registration page or by clicking “Funds” on the menu atop each page.

On a related note, we also tracked down 31 fund manager changes, including a fair number of folks booted from ING funds.

Briefly Noted

According to a recent SEC filing, Washington Mutual Investors Fund and its Tax-Exempt Fund of Maryland and Tax-Exempt Fund of Virginia “make available a Spanish translation of the above prospectus supplement in connection with the public offering and sale of its shares. The English language prospectus supplement above is a fair and accurate representation of the Spanish equivalent.”  I’m sure there are other Spanish-language prospectuses out there, but I’ve never before seen a notice about one.  It’s especially interesting given that tax-exempt bond funds target high income investors. 

Effective January 1, DWS is imposing a $20/year small account service fee for shareholders in all 49 of their funds.  The fee comes on top of their sales loads.  The fee applies to any account with under $10,000 which is regrettable for a firm with a $1,000 minimum initial investment.  (Thanks to chip for having spotted this filing in the SEC’s database.  Regrets for having gotten friends into the habit of scanning the SEC database.)

Closings

Eaton Vance Atlanta Capital SMID-Cap (EAASX) is closing to new investors on Jan. 15.  More has been pouring in (on the order of $1.5 billion in a year); at least in part driven by a top-notch five-year rating.

Walthausen Small Cap Value (WSCVX) closed to new investors at the end of the year.  At the same time, the minimum initial investment for the $1.7 million Walthausen Select Value Investor Class (WSVIX) went from $10,000 to $100,000.  WSCVX closed on January 1 at $560 million which might explain was they’re making the other fund’s institutional share class harder to access.

William Blair International Growth (WBIGX) closed to new investors, effective Dec. 31.

Old Wine in New Bottles

American Century Inflation Protection Bond (APOIX) has been renamed American Century Short Duration Inflation Protection Bond. The fund has operated as a short-duration offering since August 2011, when its benchmark changed to the Barclays U.S. 1-5 Year Treasury Inflation Protected Securities Index.

Federated Prudent Absolute Return (FMAAX) is about to become less Prudent.  They’re changing their name to Federated Absolute Return and removed the manager of the Prudent Bear fund from the management team.

Prudential Target Moderate Allocation (PAMGX) is about to get a new name (Prudential Defensive Equity), mandate (growth rather than growth and income) and management structure (one manager team rather than multiple).  It is, otherwise, virtually unchanged. 

Prudential Target Growth Allocation (PHGAX) is merging into Prudential Jenison Equity Income (SPQAX).

U.S. Global Investors Global MegaTrends (MEGAX) is now U.S. Global Investors MegaTrends and no longer needs to invest outside the U.S. 

William Blair Global Growth (WGGNX) will change its name to William Blair Global, and William Blair Emerging Leaders Growth (WELNX) will change its name to William Blair Emerging Markets Leaders.

Small wins for investors

Cook & Bynum Fund (COBYX), a wildly successful, super-concentrated value fund, has decided to substantially reduce their expense ratio.  President David Hobbs reports:

… given our earlier dialogue about fees, I wanted to let you know that as of 1/1/13 the all-in expense ratio for the fund will be capped at 1.49% (down from 1.88%).  This is a decision that we have been wrestling with for some time internally, and we finally decided that we should make the move to broaden the potential appeal of the fund. . . .  With the fund’s performance (and on-going 5-star ratings with Morningstar and S&P Capital IQ), we decided to take a calculated risk that this new fee level will help us grow the fund.

Our 2012 profile of the fund concluded, “Cook and Bynum might well be among the best.  They’re young.  The fund is small and nimble.  Their discipline makes great sense.  It’s not magic, but it has been very, very good and offers an intriguing alternative for investors concerned by lockstep correlations and watered-down portfolios.”  That makes the decreased cost especially welcome.  (They also have a particularly good website.)

Effective January 2, 2013, Calamos Growth and Income and Global Growth and Income Funds re-opened to new investors. (Thanks to The Shadow for catching this SEC filing.)

ING Small Company (AESAX) has reopened.  It’s reasonably large and not very good, really.

JPMorgan (JPM) launched Total Emerging Markets (TMGGX), an emerging-markets allocation fund.

Fund firms have been cutting expenses of late as they pressure to gather and hold assets builds. 

Fidelity has reduced the minimum investment on its Advantage share class from $100,000 to $10,000.  The Advantage class has lower expense ratios (which is good) and investors who own more than $10,000 in a fund’s retail Investor class will be moved automatically to the less-expensive Advantage class.

Fido also dropped the minimums on nearly two dozen index and enhanced index products from $10,000 to $2,500, which gives a lot more folks access to low-cost passive (or nearly-passive) shares. 

Fido also cut fees on eight Spartan index funds, between one to eight basis points.  The Spartan funds had very low expenses to begin with (10 basis points in some cases), so those cuts are substantial.

GMO Benchmark-Free Allocation (GBMFX) has decreased its expense ratio from 87 basis points down to 81 bps by increasing its fee waiver.  The fund is interesting and important not because I intend to invest in in soon (the minimum is $10 million) but because it represents where GMO thinks that an investor who didn’t give a hoot about other people’s opinions (that’s the “benchmark-free” part) should invest.

Effective January 1, Tocqueville Asset Management L.P. capped expenses for Tocqueville International Value at 1.25% of the fund’s average daily net assets.  Until now investors have been paying 1.56%. 

Also effective January 1, TCW Investment Management Company reduced the management fees for the TCW High Yield Bond Fund from 0.75% to 0.45%.

Vanguard has cut fees on 47 products, which include both ETFs and funds. Some of the cuts went into effect on Dec. 21, while others went into effect on Dec. 27th.  The reductions on eleven ETFs — four stock and seven bond — on December 21. Those cuts range from one to two basis points. That translates to reductions of 3 – 15%.

Off to the Dustbin of History

The board of trustees of Altrius Small Cap Value (ALTSX) has closed the fund and will likely have liquidated it by the time you read this.  On the one hand, the fund only drew $180,000 in assets.  On the other, the members of the board of trustees receive $86,000/year for their services, claim to be overseeing between 97 – 100 funds and apparently have been doing so poorly, since they received a Wells Notice from the SEC in May 2012.  They were bright even not to place a penny of their own money in the fund.  One of the two managers was not so fortunate: he ate a fair portion of his own cooking and likely ended up with a stomach cramp.

American Century will liquidate American Century Equity Index (ACIVX) in March 2013. The fund has lost 75% of its assets in recent years, a victim of investor disillusionment with stocks and high expenses.  ACIVX charged 0.49%, which seems tiny until you recall that identical funds can be had for as little as 0.05% (Vanguard, naturally).

Aston Asset Management has fired the Veredus of Aston/Veredus Small Cap Growth (VERDX) and will merge the fund in Aston Small Cap Growth (ACWDX).  Until the merger, it will go by the name Aston Small Cap.

The much-smaller Aston/Veredus Select Growth (AVSGX) will simply be liquidated.  But were struggling.

Federated Capital Appreciation, a bottom 10% kind of fund, is merging Federated Equity-Income (LEIFX).  LEIFX has been quite solid, so that’s a win.

GMO is liquidating GMO Inflation Indexed Plus Bond (GMIPX).  Uhh, good move.  Floyd Norris, in The New York Times, points out that recently-auctioned inflation-protected bonds have been priced to lock in a loss of about 1.4% per year over their lifetimes.   If inflation spikes, you might at best hope to break even.

HSBC will liquidate two money-market funds, Tax-Tree and New York Tax-Free in mid-January.

ING Index Plus International Equity (IFIAX) has closed and is liquidating around Feb. 22, 2013.  No, I don’t know what the “Plus” was.

Invesco is killing off, in April, some long-storied names in its most recent round of mergers.  Invesco Constellation (CSTGX) and Invesco Leisure (ILSAX) are merging into American Franchise (VAFAX).  Invesco Dynamics (IDYAX) goes into Mid Cap Growth (VGRAX), Invesco High-Yield Securities (HYLAX) into High Yield (AMHYX), Invesco Leaders (VLFAX) into Growth Allocation (AADAX), and Invesco Municipal Bond (AMBDX) will merge into Municipal Income (VKMMX).   Any investors in the 1990s who owned AIM Constellation (I did), Invesco Dynamics and Invesco Leisure would have been incredibly well-off.

Leuthold Global Clean Technology (LGCTX) liquidated on Christmas Eve Day. Steve Leuthold described this fund, at its 2009 launch, as “the investment opportunity of a generation.”  Their final letter to shareholders lamented the fund’s tiny, unsustainable asset base despite “strong performance relative to its comparable benchmark index” and noted that “the Fund operates in a market sector that has had challenging.”  Losses of 20% per year are common for green/clean/alternative funds, so one can understand the limited allure of “strong relative performance.”

Lord Abbett plan to merge Lord Abbett Stock Appreciation (LALCX) into Lord Abbett Growth Leaders (LGLAX) in late spring, 2013.

Munder International Equity (MUIAX) is merging into Munder International Core Equity (MAICX).

Natixis Absolute Asia Dynamic Equity (DEFAX) liquidated in December.  (No one noticed.)

TCW Global Flexible Allocation Fund (TGPLX) and TCW Global Moderate Allocation Fund (TGPOX) will be liquidated on or about February 15, 2013.  Effective the close of business on February 8, 2013, the Funds will no longer sell shares to new investors or existing shareholders.  These consistent laggards, managed by the same team, had only $10 million between them.  Durn few of those $10 million came from the managers.  Only one member of the management team had as much as a dollar at risk in any of TCW’s global allocation funds.  That was Tad Rivelle who had a minimal investment in Flexible.

In Closing …

Thank you all for your support in 2012. There are a bunch of numerical measures we could use. The Observer hosted 78,645 visitors and we averaged about 11,000 readers a month.  Sixty folks made direct contributions to the Observer and many others picked up $88,315.15 worth of cool loot (3502 items) at Amazon.  And a thousand folks viewed something like 1.6 million discussion topics. 

But, in many ways, the note that reads “coming here feels like sitting down with an old friend and talking about something important” is as valuable as anything we could point to. 

So thanks for it all.

If you get a chance and have a suggestion about how to make the Observer better in the year ahead, drop me a note and let me know.  For now, we’ll continue offering (and archiving) our monthly conference calls.  During January we’ll be updating our small cap profiles and February will see new profiles for Whitebox Long Short Equity (WBLSX) and PIMCO Short Asset Investment (PAIUX).

Until then, take care.

With hopes for a blessed New Year,

 

ASTON / River Road Long Short (ARLSX)

By Editor

The fund:

ASTON / River Road Long Short (ARLSX)

Manager:

Matt Moran and Dan Johnson

The call:

Highlights of the call:

In December 2012, we spoke with Matt and Dan about the River Road Long Short Strategy, which is also used in this fund. With regard to the strategy, they noted:

  • they believe they can outperform the stock market by 200 bps/year over a full market cycle. 
  • they believe they can keep beta at 0.3 to 0.5. They have a discipline for reducing market exposure when their long portfolio exceeds 80% of fair value. 
  • risk management is more important than return management, so all three of their disciplines are risk-tuned. 
  • River Road is committed to keeping the strategy open for at least 8 years.
  • The fund might be considered an equity substitute. Their research suggests that a 30/30/40 allocation (long, long/short, bonds) has much higher alpha than a 60/40 portfolio.

podcastThe conference call (When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded.)

The profile:

Long/short investing makes great sense in theory but, far too often, it’s dreadful in practice.  After a year, ARLSX seems to be getting it right and its managers have a pretty cogent explanation for why that will continue to be the case.

The Mutual Fund Observer profile of ARLSX, dated June 2012.

podcastThe ARLSX audio profile

Web:

For information about the Aston mutual fund, subadvised by River Road, please see the following:

Aston Asset Management

2013 Q3 Report

Fact Sheet

ARLSX Profile Sheet

Fund Focus: Resources from other trusted sources

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity Fund (RLSFX)

By Editor

The fund:

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity Fund (RLSFX)RiverPark Logo

Manager:

Mitch Rubin, a Managing Partner at RiverPark and their CIO.

The call:

For about an hour on November 29th, Mitch Rubin, manager of RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity(RLSFX) fielded questions from Observer readers about his fund’s strategy and its risk-return profile.  Nearly 60 people signed up for the call.

The call starts with Morty Schaja, RiverPark’s president, talking about the fund’s genesis and Mr. Rubin talking about its strategy.  After that, I posed five questions of Rubin and callers chimed in with another half dozen. I’d like to especially thank Bill Fuller, Jeff Mayer and Richard Falk for the half dozen really sharp, thoughtful questions that they posed during the closing segment.

Highlights of the conversation:

  • Rubin believes that many long/short mutual fund managers (as opposed to the hedge fund guys) are too timid about using leverage.
  • He believes long/short managers as a group are too skittish.  They obsess about short-term macro-events (the fiscal cliff) and dilute their insights by trying to bet for or against industry groups (by shorting ETFs, for example) rather than focusing on identifying the best firms in the best industries.
  • RiverPark benefits from having followed many of their holdings for nearly two decades, following their trajectory from promising growth stocks (in which they invested), stodgy mature firms (which they’d sold) and now old firms in challenged industries (which they short).

podcastThe conference call (When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded.)

The profile:

All long-short funds have about the same goal: to provide a relatively large fraction of the stock market’s long-term gains with a relatively small fraction of its short-term volatility.  They all invest long in what they believe to be the most attractively valued stocks and invest short, that is bet against, the least attractively valued ones.  Many managers imagine their long portfolios as “offense” and their short portfolio as “defense.”

That’s the first place where RiverPark stands apart.  Mr. Rubin intends to “always play offense.”  He believes that RiverPark’s discipline will allow him to make money, “on average and over time,” on both his long and short portfolios.

The Mutual Fund Observer profile of RLSFX, dated August, 2012

podcastThe audio profile

Web:

RiverPark Funds Website

2013 Q3 Report

RLSFX Fact Sheet

Fund Focus: Resources from other trusted sources

Mutual Funds That Beat The Market

By Charles Boccadoro

From the Mutual Fund Observer discussion board, December 2012, compiled from original five parts

Wise advice by MJG in the recent post “Will you revise your fund holdings going into 2013, regardless of “fiscal cliff”, etc.?” got me thinking…

He said, “The accumulated data finds that only a small percentage of wizards beat their proper benchmarks annually, and that percentage drops precipitously as the time horizon is expanded. Superior performance persistence is almost nonexistent.”

So I dug into it a bit. Here are the results, divided into five sections: Summary, Equity, Asset Allocation, Fixed Income, and Money Market.

Summary

The table below summarizes how many funds have beaten the market since their inception (or since Jan 1962, as far back as my Steele Mutual Fund Expert database goes). I used only whole months in the calculations so that I could be consistent with two market benchmarks, the SP500 total return (since 1970, price only before) and the 30-day Treasury Bill.

1_2013-01-03_1424

Nearly 9000 mutual funds and ETFs were evaluated. I used load adjusted returns and only the oldest share class. I apologize to the bench mark police for using only SP500 and T-Bill. Nonetheless, I find the results interesting.

First, MJG is right. Less than half of all equity funds have beaten the SP500 over their life times; in fact, one in four have not even beaten the T-Bill, which means their Sharpe Ratios are less than zero!

Second, nearly all fixed income funds have beaten T-Bill performance, which is re-assuring, but fuels the perception that you can’t lose money with bonds. The money market comparison is a bit skewed, because many of these funds are tax exempt. Still, expense ratios must be having their negative effect as only one in five such funds beat the T-Bill.

Digging a bit further, I looked at how the funds did by inception date. Here is a result I can’t yet explain and would ask for the good help on MFO to better understand. It seems like the period from 1998 to 2002, which book-end the tech bubble, is a golden age, if you will, for funds, as more than 60% of the funds initiated during this period have beaten the SP500 over their life times. That’s extraordinary, no? I thought maybe that it was because they were heavily international, small cap, or other, but I have not yet found the common thread for the superior performance.

2_2013-01-03_1425

On the other hand, the period from 1973 to 1982 was abysmal for funds, since only one in ten equity funds created during these years have beaten the SP500 over their life times. And it is not much better between 1983 and 1992.

I next broke-out this same performance by type: equity, asset allocation, fixed income, and money market:

3_2013-01-03_1427

4_2013-01-03_1428

5_2013-01-03_1429

6_2013-01-03_1429

Note that fixed income funds helped contribute to the “golden period” as more than a quarter of those incepted between 1998 and 2000 beat the SP500.

Some other interesting points:

  • Relatively few money market funds have been created since the cash bull run of the ’80s.
  • But otherwise, fund creation is alive and well, with nearly 2000 funds established in the past three years, which accounts for one fifth of all funds in existence.
  • Fixed income fund performance has dropped a bit this year with 15 out of 100 losing money.

I next looked at the best and worst performers in their respective time frames.

Best being top three funds, typically, producing highest APR relative to SP500 for equity and asset allocation types and relative to T-Bill for fixed income and money market types, color coded purple. Best also includes funds with highest Sharpe Ratios, color coded blue, when different from top APR funds. Again, I tried to pick three if there were enough funds for the inception period evaluated. Worst being relative APR, color coded yellow.

I included other notables based on David’s fund profiles (there are nearly 70 in the index), suggestions by other MFO folks, a few runner-ups, and some funds of my own interest.

First up, equity funds…

Equity Funds

1_2012-12-29_2117 2_2012-12-29_2118 3_2012-12-29_2119 4_2012-12-29_2120 5_2012-12-29_2121 6_2012-12-29_2122 7_2012-12-29_2123 8_2012-12-29_2123 9_2012-12-29_2124 10_2012-12-29_2125 11_2012-12-29_2126 12_2012-12-29_2127 13_2012-12-29_2132

Some items that jump out:

  • ETFs take top and bottom APR slots in recent years, but their volatility is frighteningly high.
  • If you invested $10,000 in Fidelity Magellan Fund FMAGX in June of 1963 (fourteen years prior to Peter Lynch’s rein), you are looking at more than $15 million today. Can you believe? Of course, to MJG’s point, the fund’s best years were in the ’60’s when it had two 10er years, then again during Lynch’s reign from 1977 to 1990, when it averaged more than 29% APR. Unfortunately, you have less money today than you did in 2000.
  • Oceanstone Fund OSFDX made all its gains in 2009 with an extraordinary 264% return. That said, it avoided the 2008 financial collapse with only a -10% loss versus -37% for the SP500, and it retains the highest Sharpe Ratio of ALL funds five years or older, except PIMCO Equity Series Long/Short Institutional PMHIX. And, the mysterious OSFDX is up about 21% YTD or 7% higher than the SP500.
  • Four notable funds score top life time Sharpe Ratio for their periods, but did not beat the SP500: Calamos Market Neutral Income A CVSIX and Merger MERFX, both 20+ year funds, Gabelli ABC AAA GABCX, a 15+ year fund, and AQR Diversified Arbitrage I ADAIX, a 3+ year fund. I would think all would be considered as alternatives to bond funds. (Note: MERFX and GABCX are both no load and open to new investors.)
  • Similarly, Pinnacle Value PVFIX from the 7+ year class, MainStay Marketfield I MFLDX from the 5+ year class, and The Cook & Bynum Fund COBYX from the 3+ year class all have superior life time Sharpe performance with STDEVs less than SP500.
  • On the other hand, Evermore Global Value A EVGBX is not yet living up to expectations. It was first reviewed on MFO in April 2011. Guinness Atkinson Alternative Energy GAAEX is doing downright terribly. It was first reviewed in FundAlarm in September 2007.

Next up, a review of asset allocation…

Asset Allocation Funds

Asset allocation or so-called balanced funds, of which there are more than 1200 (oldest share class only). This type of fund can hold a mixed portfolio of equities, bonds, cash and/or property.

I followed consistent methodology used for the equity funds.

Again, I realize that balanced funds do not use either SP500 or T-Bill as a benchmark, but nonetheless I find the comparison helpful. More than one in four such funds actually have beaten the SP500 over their life times. It’s a bit re-assuring to me, since these funds typically have lower volatility. And, nearly nine in ten have done better than cash.

In the tabulation below, purple means the fund was a top performer relative to SP500 over its life time, blue represents highest Sharpe (if not already a top APR), and yellow represents worst performing APR. I included other notables based on David’s commentaries, past puts by catch22, scott, and other folks on MFO, and some funds of my own interest.

Here’s the break-out, by inception date:

1_2012-12-30_0535 2_2012-12-30_0537 3_2012-12-30_0537 4_2012-12-30_0538 5_2012-12-30_0539 6_2012-12-30_0540 7_2012-12-30_0542 8_2012-12-30_0543 9_2012-12-30_0544 10_2012-12-30_0544 11_2012-12-30_0545 12_2012-12-30_0546 13_2012-12-30_0546

Some observations:

  • If you invested $10K in Mairs & Power Balanced MAPOX in Jan 1962, you would have more than $1M today and nearly four times more than if you had invested in American Funds American Balanced ABALX. But ABALX has $56B AUM, while the five star MAPOX has attracted less than $300M.
  • Value Line Income & Growth VALIX does not even warrant coverage by M*.
  • 2008 was a really bad year.
  • Some attractive ETFs have started to emerge in this generally moderate fund type, including iShares Morningstar Multi-Asset Income IYLD.
  • Putnam Capital Spectrum A PVSAX, managed by David Glancy, has outperformed just about everybody in this category since its inception mid 2009.
  • RiverNorth Core Opportunity RNCOX, first reviewed on MFO in June 2011, has had a great run since its inception in 2007. Unfortunately, its availability is now limited.

Next up, fixed income funds.

Fixed Income Funds

A review of fixed income funds, which for this post includes funds that invest in government or corporate bonds, loan stock and non-convertible preferred stock. This type of fund has been getting considerable attention lately on MFO with a growing concern that investors could be lulled into false sense of security.

To recap a little, there are about 1880 funds of this type, of which 30% have actually delivered higher life-time returns than the SP500, and more importantly and relevant, 98% have beaten cash.

In the tabulation below, purple means the fund was a top performer relative to T-Bill over its life time, blue represents highest Sharpe (if not already a top APR), and yellow represents worst performing APR. I included other notables based on David’s profiles, numerous suggestions in the various threads by MFO readers (bee, catch22, claimui, fundalarm, hank, Hiyield007, Investor, johnN, MaxBialystock, MikeM, Mona, msf, Old_Joe, scott, Shostakovich, Skeeter, Ted and others), and some of my own interest.

A reminder that I only used oldest share class, so for popular funds like PONDX, you will find PONAX, similarly MAINX is MINCX, etc.

Here’s the break-out, by fund inception date:

1_2012-12-29_1126 2_2012-12-29_1127 3_2012-12-29_1127 4_2012-12-29_1128 5_2012-12-29_1129 6_2012-12-29_1130 7_2012-12-29_1130 8_2012-12-29_1131 9_2012-12-30_0916 10_2012-12-29_1138 11_2012-12-29_1138 12_2012-12-29_1139 13_2012-12-29_1140

Some observations:

  • Every fund listed (5 years or older) with current yields of 6% or more, lost more than 20% of its value in 2008, except three: PIMCO Income A PONAX, which lost only 6.0%; TCW Total Return Bond I TGLMX, which lost only 6.2% (in 1994); and First Eagle High Yield I FEHIX, which lost 15.8%.
  • In fact, of all fixed income funds more than five years or older that have current yields of 6% or more, nearly 3 out of 4 had a down-year of 20% or more. Those yielding 5% or more did not do much better. For what it’s worth, the break point appears to be between 4 and 5%. Funds with less than 4% current yield did much, much better. Here is summary…

14_2012-12-30_0924

  • Just glance over the list…you will see that PIMCO has produced many top performing fixed income funds.
  • Fortunately, again, nearly every fixed income fund existing today has beaten cash over its life time, some 98%. The 44 funds with negative Sharpe actually fall into two distinct categories: First, those with negative Sharpe, but positive life-time APR. These are generally funds with short duration and/or tax exempt funds. Second, those with negative Sharpe and negative life-time APR. There are 25 such funds, but it’s reassuring to find only 3 older than three years old, which presumably means fixed income funds that actually lose money don’t stay around very long. The three enduring poor performers, tabulated below, are: AMF Ultra Short AULTX, SEI Instl Mgd Enhanced Income A SEEAX, and WisdomTree Euro Debt EU.

15_2012-12-31_0911

Both AULTX and EU have less than $10M AUM, but SEEAX is fairly substantial AUM at $170M, which is simply hard to believe…

16_2012-12-31_0916

 

Money Market Funds

The last part – money market funds, which tend to offer lowest risk, but with attendant lowest return over the long run. There have been times, however, when money market or “cash” has ruled, like from 1966 – 1984 when cash provided a strong 7.8% APR. Here’s a reminder from Bond Fund Performance During Periods of Rising Interest Rates:

1_2012-12-08_1027

Some observations up-front:

  • There are only 500 or so money market funds.
  • The earliest inception date is 1972. It belongs to American Century Capital Presv Investor CPFXX. (But it is not one of better offerings.)
  • Few new money market funds have been created in recent years.
  • Few MFO readers discuss them and none have been profiled. M* does not appear to rate them or provide analyst reports of money market funds.
  • No money market funds have loads, but many impose 12b-1 fees. The average EP is 0.5%.
  • Fortunately, none have a negative absolute return over their life times.
  • There are two main categories of money market funds: taxable and tax-free. The latter have existed since 1981 and represent about a third of offerings today. This plot summarizes average performance for the two types compared to the T-Bill:

2_2013-01-01_1218

  • Since 1981, the annualized return for T-Bill is 5.0%. For money market funds, the average APR is 4.6% for the taxable (about the difference in average EP), and 2.9% for tax-free.
  • Only 1 in 3 taxable money market funds have beaten the T-Bill over their life times. And virtually no tax-free funds have beaten, as you would expect.

Because of the strong tax dependency with these funds, I broke out this distinction in the tabulation below. Purple means the fund was a top performer relative to T-Bill over its life time, and yellow represents worst performing APR. (For the money market funds, I did not break-out top Sharpe in blue, since APR ranking relative T-Bill is fairly close to Sharpe ranking.)

Here’s the break-out, by fund inception date:

3_2013-01-01_1211 4_2013-01-01_1142 5_2013-01-01_1143 6_2013-01-01_1143 7_2013-01-01_1148 8_2013-01-01_1148 9_2013-01-01_1149 10_2013-01-01_1150 11_2013-01-01_1150 12_2013-01-01_1151 13_2013-01-01_1152 14_2013-01-01_1152

For those interested, I’ve posted results of this thread in an Excel file Funds That Beat The Market – Nov 12.

Here is link to original thread.

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX)

By Editor

The fund:

RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX)RiverPark Logo

Manager:

David Sherman of Cohanzick Management, LLC

The call:

For about an hour on September 13th, David Sherman of Cohanzick Management, LLC, manager of RiverPark Short Term High Yield (RPHYX) fielded questions from Observer readers about his fund’s strategy and its risk-return profile. Somewhere between 40-50 people signed up for the RiverPark call.

Highlights include:

  1. they expect to be able to return 300 – 400 basis points more than a money market fund
  2. they manage to minimize risk, not maximize return
  3. they do not anticipate significant competition for these assets
  4. expenses are unlikely to move much
  5. NAV volatility is more apparent than real – by any measure other than a money market, it’s a very steady NAV. 

podcastThe conference call (When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded.)

The profile:

People are starting to catch on to RPHYX’s discrete and substantial charms.  Both the fund’s name and Morningstar’s assignment of it to the “high yield” peer group threw off some potential investors.  To be clear: this is not a high yield bond fund in any sense that you’d recognize.

The Mutual Fund Observer profile of RPHYX, updated October, 2012

podcastThe audio profile

Web:

RiverPark Funds Website

2013 Q3 Report

RPHYX Fact Sheet

Fund Focus: Resources from other trusted sources

Bond Fund Performance During Periods of Rising Interest Rates

By Charles Boccadoro

From the Mutual Fund Observer discussion board, December 2012

Current trend on MFO is discussion of negative impact to bond-heavy income and retirement portfolios, if and when rates rise.

In David’s inaugural column on Amazon money and markets “Trees Do Not Grow To The Sky”, he calls attention to: “If interest rates and inflation move quickly up, the market value of the bonds that you (or your bond fund manager) hold can drop like a rock.” And there have been several recent related posts about an impending “Bond Bubble.”

Here’s look back at average intermediate term bond fund performance during the past 50 years:

Intermediate Term Bond Fund Performance

Background uses same 10-year Treasury yield data that David highlights in his guest column. Also plotted is the downside return relative to cash or money-market, since while these funds have held up fairly well on absolute terms, on relative terms the potential for under-performance is quite clear.

More dramatic downside performance can be seen the higher yield (generally quality less than BB) bond funds, where relative and even absolute losses can be 25%:

High Yield Bond Fund Performance

Taking a closer look, the chart below compares performance of intermediate, high-yield, and equities when interest rates rise (note year, 10-year Treasury yield, and rate increase from previous year):

Investment Performance When Rates Rise

I included for comparison 2008 performance. Here declines were not driven by increasing rates, but by the financial crisis, of course. Presumably, such strong relative performance for intermediate bonds in 2008 is what has driven the recent flight to bonds. That said, several previous periods of increasing rates happened during bear markets, like 1974, making alternatives to bonds tough to find.

Over the (very) long run, equities out-perform bonds and cash, as is evident below, but may not be practical alternative to bonds for many investors, because of investment horizon, risk-tolerance, dependence on yield, or all the above.

Long Term Investment Performance

What’s so interesting about this look-back are the distinct periods of “ideal” investments, by which I mean an investment vehicle that both outperformed alternatives and did not incur a sharp decline, as summarized in table below:

 Return Table

In the three years from 1963-65, stocks were the choice. But in the 19 years from 1966-84, cash was king. Followed by the extraordinary 15-year bull run for stocks. Ending with the current period, if you will, where bonds have been king: first, intermediate term bonds from 2000-08, but most recently, alluring high yield bonds since 2009.

Despite its flat-line performance since 2009, cash is often mentioned as a viable alternative (eg, Scout Unconstrained Bond Fund SUBFX and Crescent Fund FPACX are now cash heavy). But until I saw its strong and long-lived performance from 1966-84, I had not seriously considered. Certainly, it has offered healthy growth, if not yield, during periods of rising interest rates.

Here is link to original thread.

December 1, 2012

By David Snowball

Dear friends,

And now, we wait.  After the frenzy of recent months, that seems odd and unnatural.

Will and his minions wait for the holidays, anxious for the last few weeks of school to pass but secure in the knowledge that their folks are dutifully keeping the retail economy afloat.

Campus Beauty

Photo by Drew Barnes ’14, Augustana Photo Bureau

My colleagues at Augustana are waiting for winter and then for spring.  The seemingly endless string of warm, dry weeks has left much of our fall foliage intact as we enter December. As beautiful as it is, we’re sort of rooting for winter, or at least the hope of seasonal weather, to reassert itself. And we’re waiting for spring, when the $13 million renovation of Old Main will be complete and we escape our warren of temporary offices and ersatz classrooms. I’ve toured the half-complete renovation. It’s going to be so cool.

And investors wait. Most of us are waiting for a resolution of “the fiscal cliff” (alternately: fiscal slope, obstacle course, whatchamacallit or, my favorite, Fiscal Clifford the Big Red Dog), half fearful that they won’t find a compromise and half fearful that they will.

Then there are The Two Who Wouldn’t Wait. And they worry me. A lot. We’ve written for a year or so about our concerns that the bond market is increasingly unstable. That concern has driven our search for tools, other than Treasuries or a bond aggregate, that investors might use to manage volatility. In the past month, the urgency of that search has been highlighted by The Two. One of The Two is Jeffrey Gundlach, founder of the DoubleLine funds and widely acknowledged as one of the best fixed-income managers anyway. Gundlach believes that “[d]eeply indebted countries and companies, which Gundlach doesn’t name, will default sometime after 2013” (Bond Investor Gundlach Buys Stocks, Sees ‘Kaboom’ Ahead, 11/30/2012). Gundlach says, “I don’t believe you’re going to get some sort of an early warning. You should be moving now.”  Gundlach, apparently, is moving into fine art.

GMO, the other of The Two, has moved. GMO (Grantham, Mayo, van Otterloo) has an outstanding record for anticipating asset class crashes. They moved decisively in 2000 and again in 2007, knowing that they were likely early and knowing that leaving the party early would cost them billions (one quarter of the firm’s assets) as angry investors left. But when the evidence says “run,” they ran. In a late-November interview with the Financial Times, GMO’s head of asset allocation revealed that, firm-wide, GMO had sold off all of their bond holdings (GMO abandons bond market, 11/26/2012). “We’ve largely given up on traditional fixed income,” Inker says, including government and corporate debt in the same condemnation. They don’t have any great alternatives (high quality US stocks are about the best option), but would prefer to keep billions in cash to the alternatives.

I don’t know whether you should wait. But I do believe that you should acquaint yourself with those who didn’t.

The Last Ten: PIMCO in the Past Decade

In October we launched “The Last Ten,” a monthly series, running between now and February, looking at the strategies and funds launched by the Big Five fund companies (Fido, Vanguard, T Rowe, American and PIMCO) in the last decade.

Here are our findings so far:

Fidelity, once fabled for the predictable success of its new fund launches, has created no compelling new investment option and only one retail fund that has earned Morningstar’s five-star designation, Fidelity International Growth (FIGFX).  We suggested three causes: the need to grow assets, a cautious culture and a firm that’s too big to risk innovative funds.

T. Rowe Price continues to deliver on its promises.  Of the 22 funds launched, only Strategic Income (PRSNX) has been a consistent laggard; it has trailed its peer group in four consecutive years but trailed disastrously only once (2009).  Investing with Price is the equivalent of putting a strong singles-hitter on a baseball team; it’s a bet that you’ll win with consistency and effort, rather than the occasional spectacular play.

And just as you’re about to conclude that large fund companies will necessarily produce cautious funds that can aspire just to “pretty good,” along comes PIMCO.  PIMCO was once known as an almost purely fixed-income investor.  Its flagship PIMCO Total Return Fund has gathered over a quarter trillion dollars in assets and tends to finish in the top 10% of its peer group over most trailing time periods.

But PIMCO has become more.  This former separate accounts managers for Pacific Life Insurance Company now declares, “We continue to evolve. Throughout our four decades we have been pioneers and continue to evolve as a provider of investment solutions across all asset classes.”

Indeed they have.  PIMCO has spent more time thinking about, and talking about, the global economic future than any firm other, perhaps, than GMO.  More than talk about the changing sources of alpha and the changing shape of risk, PIMCO has launched a bunch of unique funds targeting emerging challenges and opportunities that other firms would prefer simply to ignore (or to eventually react to).

Perhaps as a result, PIMCO has created more five-star funds in the last decade than any other firm and, among larger firms, has a greater fraction of their funds earning four- or five-stars than anyone else.  Here’s the snapshot:

    • PIMCO has 84 funds (which are sold in over 536 packages or share classes)
    • 56 of their funds were launched in the past decade
    • 61 of them are old enough to have earned Morningstar ratings
    • 20 of them have five-star ratings (as of 11/14/12)
    • 15 more earned four-star ratings.

How likely this that?  In each Morningstar category, the top 10 percent of funds receive five stars, the next 22.5 percent receive four stars, and the next 35 percent receive three.  In the table below, those are the “expected values.”  If PIMCO had just ordinary skill or luck, you’d expect to see the numbers in the expected values column.  But you don’t.

 

Expected Value

Observed value

PIMCO, Five Star Funds, overall

8

20

PIMCO, Four and Five Star Funds, overall

20

35

Five Star funds, launched since 9/2002

3

9

Four and Five Star funds, launched since 9/2002

11

14

Only their RealRetirement funds move between bad and mediocre, and even those funds made yet be redeemed.  The RealRetirement funds, like PIMCO’s other “Real” funds, are designed to be especially sensitive to inflation.  That’s the factor that poses the greatest long-term risk to most of our portfolios, especially as they become more conservative.  Until we see a sustained uptick in inflation, we can’t be sure of how well the RealRetirement funds will meet their mandates.  But, frankly, PIMCO’s record counsels patience.

Here are all of the funds that PIMCO has launched in the last 10 years, which their Morningstar rating (as of mid-November, 2012), category and approximate assets under management.

All Asset All Authority ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

World Allocation

25,380

CA Short Duration Muni Income

Muni Bond

260

Diversified Income  ★ ★ ★ ★

Multisector Bond

6,450

Emerging Markets Fundamental IndexPLUS TR Strategy ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Emerging Markets Stock

5,620

Emerging Local Bond ★ ★

Emerging Markets Bond

13,950

Emerging Markets Corporate Bond ★ ★

Emerging Markets Bond

1,180

Emerging Markets Currency

Currency

7060

Extended Duration ★ ★ ★ ★

Long Government

340

Floating Income ★ ★

Nontraditional Bond

4,030

Foreign Bond (Unhedged) ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

World Bond

5,430

Fundamental Advantage Total Return ★ ★ ★

Intermediate-Term Bond

2,730

Fundamental IndexPLUS TR ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Large Blend

1,150

Global Advantage Strategy ★ ★ ★

World Bond

5,220

Global Multi-Asset ★ ★

World Allocation

5,280

High Yield Municipal Bond ★ ★

Muni Bond

530

Income ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Multisector Bond

16,660

International StocksPLUS ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Foreign Large Blend

210

International StocksPLUS TR Strategy (Unhedged) ★ ★ ★ ★

Foreign Large Blend

1,010

Long Duration Total Return ★ ★ ★ ★

Long-Term Bond

6,030

Long-Term Credit ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Long-Term Bond

2,890

Real Estate Real Return ★ ★ ★

Real Estate

2,030

Real Income 2019

Retirement Income

30

Real Income 2029 ★ ★ ★ ★

Retirement Income

20

RealRetirement 2020

Target Date

70

RealRetirement 2030

Target Date

70

RealRetirement 2040 ★ ★

Target Date

60

RealRetirement 2050 ★ ★

Target Date

40

RealRetirement Income & Distribution ★ ★

Retirement Income

40

Small Cap StocksPLUS TR ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Small Blend

470

StocksPLUS Long Duration ★ ★ ★ ★ ★

Large Blend

790

Tax Managed Real Return

Muni Bond

70

Unconstrained Bond ★ ★ ★

Nontraditional Bond

17,200

Unconstrained Tax Managed Bond ★ ★

Nontraditional Bond

350

In January, we’ll continue the series of a look at Vanguard.  We know that Vanguard inspires more passion among its core investors than pretty much any other firm.  Since we’re genial outsiders to the Vanguard culture, if you’ve got insights, concerns, tips, kudos or rants you’d like to share, dear Bogleheads, drop me a note.

RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity Conference Call

Volatility is tremendously exciting for many investment managers.  You’d be amazed by the number who get up every morning, hoping for a market panic.  For the rest of us, it’s simply terrifying.

For the past thirty years, the simple, all-purpose answer to unacceptable volatility has been “add Treasuries.”  The question we began debating last spring is, “where might investors look if Treasuries stop functioning as the universal answer?”  We started by looking at long/short equity funds as one possible answer.  Our research quickly led to one conclusion, and slowly to a second.

The quick conclusion: long/short funds, as a group, are a flop. They’re ridiculously expensive, with several dozen charging 2.75% or more plus another 1.5-2% in short interest charges.  They offered some protection in 2008, though several did manage to lose more that year than did the stock market.  But their longer term returns have been solidly dismal.  The group returned 0.15% over the past five years, which means they trailed far behind the stock market, a simple 60/40 hybrid, moderate allocation funds, very conservative short-term bond funds . . . about the only way to make this bunch look good is to compare them to “market neutral” funds (whose motto seems to be, “we can lose money in up markets and down!”).

The slower conclusion: some long-short funds have consistently, in a variety of markets, managed to treat their investors well and a couple more show the real promise of doing so. The indisputable gold standard among such funds, Robeco Long Short (BPLEX) returned 16% annually over the past five years.  The second-best performer, Marketfield (MFLDX) made 9% while funds #3 (Guggenheim Alpha) and #4 (Wasatch Long/Short) made 4%. Sadly, BPLEX is closed to new investors, Guggenheim has always had a sales load and Marketfield just acquired one. Wasatch Long-Short (FMLSX), which we first profiled three years ago, remains a strong, steady performer with reasonable expenses.

Ultimately we identified (and profiled) just three, newer long-short funds worthy of serious attention: Marketfield, RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity (RPLSX) and ASTON/River Road Long Short (ARLSX).

For about an hour on November 29th, Mitch Rubin, manager of RiverPark Long/Short Opportunity(RLSFX) fielded questions from Observer readers about his fund’s strategy and its risk-return profile.  Nearly 60 people signed up for the call.

For folks interested but unable to join us, here’s the complete audio of the hour-long conversation.  It starts with Morty Schaja, RiverPark’s president, talking about the fund’s genesis and Mr. Rubin talking about its strategy.  After that, I posed five questions of Rubin and callers chimed in with another half dozen.

http://78449.choruscall.com/dataconf/productusers/riverpark/media/riverpark121129.mp3
When you click on the link, the file will load in your browser and will begin playing after it’s partially loaded. If the file downloads, instead, you may have to double-click to play it.

If you’d like a preview before deciding whether you listen in, you might want to read our profile of RLSFX (there’s a printable .pdf of the profile on RiverPark’s website).  Here are some of the highlights of the conversation:

Rubin believes that many long/short mutual fund managers (as opposed to the hedge fund guys) are too timid about using the leverage allowed them.  As a result, they’re not able to harvest the full returns potential of their funds.  Schaja describes RLSFX’s leverage as “moderate,” which generally means having investments equal to 150-200% of assets.

The second problem with long/short managers as a group, he believes, is that they’re too skittish.  They obsess about short-term macro-events (the fiscal cliff) and dilute their insights by trying to bet for or against industry groups (by shorting ETFs, for example) rather than focusing on identifying the best firms in the best industries.

One source of RLSFX’s competitive advantage is the team’s long history of long investing.  They started following many of the firms in their portfolio nearly two decades ago, following their trajectory from promising growth stocks (in which they invested), stodgy mature firms (which they’d sold) and now old firms in challenged industries (which are appearing in the short portfolio).

A second source of advantage is the team’s longer time horizon.  Their aim is to find companies which might double their money over the next five years and then to buy them when their price is temporarily low.

I’d like to especially thank Bill Fuller, Jeff Mayer and Richard Falk for the half dozen really sharp, thoughtful questions that they posed during the closing segment.  If you catch no other part of the call, you might zoom in on those last 15 minutes to hear Mitch and the guys in conversation.

Mr. Rubin is an articulate advocate for the fund, as well as being a manager with a decades-long record of success.  In addition to listening to his conversation, there are two documents on the Long/Short fund’s homepage that interested parties should consult.  First, the fund profile has a lot of information about the fund’s performance back when it was a hedge fund which should give you a much better sense of its composition and performance over time.  Second, the manager’s commentary offers an intriguing list of industries which they believe to be ascendant or failing.  It’s sort of thought-provoking.

Conference Calls Upcoming: Great managers on-deck

As promised, we’re continuing our moderated conference calls through the winter.  You should consider joining in.  Here’s the story:

    • Each call lasts about an hour
    • About one third of the call is devoted to the manager’s explanation of their fund’s genesis and strategy, about one third is a Q&A that I lead, and about one third is Q&A between our callers and the manager.
    • The call is, for you, free.  Your line is muted during the first two parts of the call (so you can feel free to shout at the danged cat or whatever) and you get to join the question queue during the last third by pressing the star key.

Our next conference call features Matt Moran and Dan Johnson, co-managers of ASTON / River Road Long Short (ARLSX).   I’ve had several conversations with the team and they strike me as singularly bright, articulate and disciplined.  When we profiled the fund in June, we noted:

The strategy’s risk-management measures are striking.  Through the end of Q1 2012, River Road’s Sharpe ratio (a measure of risk-adjusted returns) was 1.89 while its peers were at 0.49.  Its maximum drawdown (the drop from a previous high) was substantially smaller than its peers, it captured less of the market’s downside and more of its upside, in consequence of which its annualized return was nearly four times as great.

Among the crop of newer offerings, few are more sensibly-constructed or carefully managed that ARLSX seems to be.  It deserves attention.

If you’d like to share your attention with them, our call with ASTON / River Road Long  Short is Monday, December 17, from 7:00 – 8:00 Eastern.  To register for the call, just click on this link and follow the instructions.  I’ll send a reminder email on the day of the call to all of the registered parties.

We’re hoping to start 2013 with a conversation with Andrew Foster of Seafarer Overseas Growth & Income (SFGIX), one of the best of a new generation of emerging markets funds.  We’re also in conversation with the managers of several seriously concentrated equity funds, including David Rolfe of RiverPark/Wedgewood Fund (RWGFX) and Steve Dodson of Bretton Fund (BRTNX).

As a service to our readers, we’ve constructed a mailing list that we’ll use to notify folks of upcoming conference call opportunities.  If you’d like to join but haven’t yet, feel free to drop me a note.

Fidelity’s Advice to Emerging Markets Investors: Avoid Us

Fidelity runs several distinct sets of funds, including Fidelity, Fidelity Advisor, Fidelity Select, and Fidelity Series.  In many ways, the most interesting are their Strategic Adviser funds which don’t even bear the Fidelity name.  The Strategic Adviser funds are “exclusive to clients of Portfolio Advisory Services. . . They allow Strategic Advisers to hire (and fire) sub-advisers as well as to buy, sell, and hold mutual funds and exchange-traded funds (ETFs) within the fund.”  In short, these are sort of “best ideas”  funds, two of which are funds of funds.

Which led to the question: would the smartest folks Fidelity could find, who could choose any funds around which to build a portfolio, choose Fidelity?

In the case of emerging markets, the answer is “uhh … no.”  Here’s the portfolio for Strategic Advisers Emerging Markets Fund of Funds (FLILX).

Total portfolio weights as of

10/2012

03/2012

Aberdeen Emerging Markets

14.7%

11.4%

GMO Emerging Markets V

14.5

13.6

Lazard Emerging Markets Equity

14.2

15.7

Acadian Emerging Markets

13.9

8.2

T. Rowe Price Emerging Markets Stock

10.7

12.9

Fidelity Emerging Markets

10.2

13.4

SSgA Emerging Markets Select

6.9

7.2

Oppenheimer Developing Markets

5.2

4.9

Eaton Vance Parametric Structured Em Mkts

5.0

5.1

Thornburg Developing World

4.14

n/a

Vanguard MSCI Emerging Markets ETF

0.70

n/a

What should you notice?

  1. The fund’s managers seem to find many funds more compelling than Fidelity Emerging Markets, and so it ends up sixth on the list.  Fidelity’s corporate folks seem to agree and they replaced the long-time manager of this one-star fund in mid October, 2012.
  2. Measured against the March 2012 portfolio, Fidelity E.M. has seen the greatest decrease in its weighing (about 3.2%) of any fund in the portfolio.
  3. Missing entirely from the list: Fidelity’s entire regional lineup including China Region, Emerging Asia, Emerging Middle East and Latin America.
  4. For that matter, missing entirely from the list are anything but diversified large cap emerging markets stock funds.

Fidelity does noticeably better in the only other Strategic Advisers fund of funds, the Strategic Advisers® Income Opportunities Fund of Funds (FSADX).

 

% of fund’s
net assets

T. Rowe Price High Yield Fund

24.2

Fidelity Capital & Income Fund

20.5

Fidelity High Income Fund

14.7

PIMCO High Yield Fund

9.6

Janus High-Yield Fund

9.0

BlackRock High Yield Bond Portfolio

8.2

MainStay High Yield Corporate Bond

4.5

Eaton Vance Income Fund of Boston

3.3

Fidelity Advisor High Income Advantage Fund

3.2

Fidelity Advisor High Income Fund

2.8

Why, exactly, the managers have invested in three different classes of the same Fidelity fund is a bit unclear but at least they are willing to invest with Fido.  It may also speak to the continuing decline of the Fidelity equity-investing side of the house while fixed-income becomes increasingly

A Site Worth Following: Learn Bonds

Junior Yearwood, our friend and contributing editor who has been responsible for our Best of the Web reviews, has been in conversation with Marc Prosser, a Forbes contributor and proprietor of the Learn Bonds website.  While the greatest part of Marc’s work focuses broadly on bond investing, he also offers ratings for a select group of bond mutual funds.  He has a sort of barbell approach, focusing on the largest bond fund companies and on the smallest.  His fund ratings, like Morningstar’s analyst ratings, are primarily qualitative and process-focused.

Marc doesn’t yet have data by which to assess the validity of his ratings (and, indeed, is articulately skeptical of that whole venture), so we can’t describe him as a Best of the Web site.  That said, Junior concluded that his site was clean, interesting, and worth investigating.  It was, he concluded, a new and notable site.

Launch Alert: Whitebox Long Short Equity (WBLSX,WBLRX,WBLFX)

On November 1, Whitebox Advisors converted their Whitebox Long Short Equity Partners hedge fund into the Whitebox Long Short Equity Fund which has three share classes.  As a hedge fund, Whitebox pretty much kicked butt.  From 2004 – 2012, it returned 15.8% annually while the S&P500 earned 5.2%.  At last report, the fund was just slightly net-long with a major short against the Russell 2000.

There’s great enthusiasm among the Observer’s discussion board members about Whitebox’s first mutual fund, Whitebox Tactical Opportunities (WBMAX) , which strongly suggests this one warrants some attention, if only from advisors who can buy it without a sales load. The Investor shares carry at 4.5% front load, 2.48% expense ratio and a $5000 minimum initial investment.  You might check the fund’s homepage for additional details.

Observer Fund Profiles

Had I mentioned that we visited RiverNorth?

Each month the Observer provides in-depth profiles of between two and four funds.  Our “Most Intriguing New Funds” are funds launched within the past couple years that most frequently feature experienced managers leading innovative newer funds.  “Stars in the Shadows” are older funds that have attracted far less attention than they deserve.  This month’s lineup features

Artisan Global Equity Fund (ARTHX):  you know a firm is in a good place when the most compelling alternatives to one of their funds are their other funds.  Global, run by Mark Yockey and his team, extends on the long-term success of Artisan International and International Small Cap.

RiverNorth Dynamic Buy Write (RNBWX): one of the most consistently successful (and rarely employed) strategies for managing portfolios in volatile markets is the use of covered calls.  After spending several hours with the RiverNorth team and several weeks reading the research, we may have an answer to a version of the old Ghostbusters question, “who you gonna (covered) call?”

Funds in Registration

New mutual funds must be registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission before they can be offered for sale to the public.  The SEC has a 75-day window during which to call for revisions of a prospectus; fund companies sometimes use that same time to tweak a fund’s fee structure or operating details.  Every day we scour new SEC filings to see what opportunities might be about to present themselves. Many of the proposed funds offer nothing new, distinctive or interesting.  Some are downright horrors of Dilbertesque babble.

Funds in registration this month won’t be available for sale until, typically, the beginning of February 2013. Since firms really like launching by December 31st if they can, the number of funds in the pipeline is modest: seven this month, as compared to 29 last month.  That said, two of the largest fixed-income teams are among those preparing to launch:

DoubleLine Floating Rate Fund, the tenth fund advised or sub-advised by DoubleLine, will seek a high level of current income by investing in floating rate loans and “other floating rate investments.”  The fund will be managed by Bonnie Baha and Robert Cohen.  Ms. Baha was part of Mr. Gundlach’s original TCW team and co-manages Multi-Asset Growth, Low-Duration Bond and ASTON/DoubleLine Core Plus Fixed Income.

PIMCO Emerging Markets Full Spectrum Bond Fund will invest in “a broad range of emerging market fixed income asset classes, such as external debt obligations of sovereign, quasi-sovereign, and corporate entities; currencies, and local currency-denominated obligations of sovereigns, quasi-sovereigns, and corporate issuers.”  The manager has not yet been named but, as we noted in our lead story, the odds are that this is going to be a top-of-class performer.

Details on these funds and the list of all of the funds in registration are available at the Observer’s Funds in Registration page or by clicking “Funds” on the menu atop each page.

On a related note, we also tracked down 40 fund manager changes, down from last month’s bloodbath in which 70 funds changed management.

The Observer in the News

Last month, we ran our annual Honor Roll of Consistently Bearable Funds, which asks the simple question:  “which mutual funds are never terrible?”  Our basic premise is that funds that earn high returns but crash periodically are, by and large, impossible for investors to hold.  And so we offered up a list of funds that have avoided crashing in any of the past ten years.  As it turns out, by managing beta, those funds ended up with substantial alpha.  In English: they made good money by avoiding losing money.

Chuck Jaffe has been looking at a related strategy for years, which led him to talk about and elaborate on our article.  His story, “A fund-picking strategy for nervous investors,” ran on November 19th, ended up briefly (very briefly: no one can afford fifteen minutes of fame any more) on the front page of Google News and caused a couple thousand new folks to poke their heads in at the Observer.

Briefly Noted . . .

Artisan Partners has again filed for an initial public offering.  They withdrew a 2011 filing in the face of adverse market conditions.  Should you care?  Investors can afford to ignore it since it doesn’t appear that the IPO will materially change operations or management; it mostly generates cash to buy back a portion of the firm from outsiders and to compensate some of the portfolio guys.  Competitors, frankly, should care.  Artisan is about the most successful, best run small firm fund that I know of: they’ve attracted nearly $70 billion in assets, have a suite of uniformly strong funds, stable management teams and a palpable commitment to serving their shareholders.  If I were in the business, I’d want to learn a lot – and think a lot – about how they’ve managed that feat.  Sudden access to a bunch more information would help.

One of The Wall Street Journal columnists surveyed “financial advisers, mutual-fund experts and academics” in search of the five best books for beginning investors.  Other than for the fact that they missed Andrew Tobias’s The Only Investment Guide You’ll Ever Need, it’s a pretty solid list with good works from the efficient market and behavioral finance folks.

SMALL WINS FOR INVESTORS

Clipper (CFIMX), Davis New York Venture (NYVTX), and Selected American Shares (SLASX) have waived their 30-day trading restriction for the rest of 2012, in case investors want to do some repositioning in anticipation of higher capital gains tax rates in 2013.

Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small Cap Growth (SSETX) reopened to new investors on Nov. 1.

Victoria 1522 (VMDIX/VMDAX), an emerging markets stock fund, is cutting its expense ratio by 40 basis points. That’s much better news than you think. Glance at Morningstar’s profile of the lower-minimum Advisor shares and you’ll see a two-star fund and move on.  That reading is, for two reasons, short-sighted.  First, the lower expense ratio would make a major difference; the institutional shares, at 25 bps below the Advisor shares, gain a star (as of 11/30/12) and this reduction gives you 40 bps.  Second, the three-year record masks an exceedingly strong four-plus year record.  From inception (10/08) through the end of 11/12, Victoria 1522 would have turned a $10,000 investment into $19,850.  Its peer over the same period would have returned $13,500. That’s partly attributable to good luck: the fund launched in October 2008 and made about 3% in the quarter while its peers dropped nearly 21%.  Even excluding that great performance (that is, looking at 1/09 – 11/12), the fund has modestly outperformed its peer group despite the drag of its soon-to-be-lowered expenses.  ManagerJosephine Jiménez has a long, distinguished record, including long stints running Montgomery Asset Management’s emerging markets division.  (Thanks to Jake Mortell of Candlewood Advisory for the heads up!)

Wells Fargo has reopened the Class A shares of its Wells Fargo Advantage Dow Jones Target funds: Target Today, 2010, 2020, 2030 and 2040.

CLOSINGS

AllianceBernstein Small Cap Growth (QUASX) will close to new investors on January 31, 2013. That’s all I noticed this month.

OLD WINE, NEW BOTTLES

Calvert Enhanced Equity (CMIFX) will be renamed Calvert Large Cap Core in January 2013.

Actually, this one is a little bit more like “old vinegar in new bottles.”  Dominion Insight Growth Fund was reorganized into the Shepherd Large Cap Growth Fund in 2002.  Shepherd LCG changed its name to the Shepherd Fund in 2008. Then Shepherd Fund became Foxhall Global Trends Fund in 2009, and now Foxhall Global Trends has become Fairfax Global Trends Fund (DOIGX). In all of the name changes, some things have remained constant: low assets, high expenses, wretched performance (they’ve finished in the 98th -99th percentile for the trailing one, three, five and ten year periods).

Forward Aggressive Growth Allocation Fund became Forward Multi-Strategy Fund on December 3, 2012, which is just a bit vanilla. The 50 other multi-strategy funds in Morningstar’s database include Dynamic, Ethical, Global, Hedged and Progressive flavors of the marketing flavor du jour.

In non-news, Marathon Value Portfolio (MVPFX) is moving from the Unified Series Trust to  Northern Lights Fund Trust III. That’s their third move and I mention it only because the change causes the SEC to flag MVPFX as a “new” fund.  It isn’t new, though it is a five-star, “Star in the Shadows” fund and worth knowing about.

Wells Fargo Advantage Total Return Bond (MBFAX) will be renamed Wells Fargo Advantage Core Bond sometime in December.

OFF TO THE DUSTBIN OF HISTORY

Geez, the dustbin of history is filling up fast . . .

BNY Mellon Intermediate U.S. Government (MOVIX) is merging into BNY Mellon Intermediate Bond (MIIDX) in February, though the manager is the same for both funds.

Buffalo plans to merge Buffalo China (BUFCX) into Buffalo International (BUFIX) in January, 2013. The fund was originally sub-advised by Jayhawk Capital and I long ago wrote a hopeful profile of the then-new fund. Jayhawk ran it for three years, making huge amounts twice (2007 and 2009), lost a huge amount once (2008), lived in the basement of a highly volatile category and were replaced in 2009 by an in-house management team. The fund has been better but never rose to “good” and never drew assets.

Dreman is killing off five of the six funds: Contrarian International Value (DRIVX), Contrarian Mid Cap Value (DRMVX), Contrarian Value Equity (DRVAX), High Opportunity (DRLVX), and Market Over-Reaction (DRQLX).  Mr. Dreman has a great reputation and had a great business sub-advising load-bearing funds.  Around 2003, Dreman launched a series of in-house, no-load funds.  That experiment, by and large, failed.  The funds were rebranded and repriced, but never earned their way.  The fate of their remaining fund, Dreman Contrarian Small Cap Value (DRSVX), is unknown.

Dreyfus/The Boston Company Small Cap Tax-Sensitive Equity (SDCEX) will liquidate on January 8, 2013 and Dreyfus Small Cap (DSVAX) disappears a week later. Dreyfus is also liquidating a bunch of money market and state bond funds.

Fidelity is pulling a rare 5:1 reverse split by merging Tax Managed Stock (FTXMX), Advisor Strategic Growth (FTQAX), Advisor 130/30 Large Cap (FOATX), and Large Cap Growth (FSLGX) into Fidelity Stock Selector All Cap (FSSKX).

Guggenheim Flexible Strategies (RYBSX) (formerly Guggenheim Long Short Interest Rate Strategies) is slated to merge into Guggenheim Macro Opportunities (GIOAX).

Henderson Global is liquidating their International All Cap Equity (HFNAX) and the Japan Focus (HFJAX) funds in December.

Legg Mason has decided to liquidate Legg Mason Capital Management Disciplined Equity Research (LGMIX), likely on the combination of weak performance and negligible assets.

Munder International Equity (MUIAX) will merge into Munder International Core Equity (MAICX) on Dec. 7.

The board of Northern Funds approved the liquidation of Northern Global Fixed Income (NOIFX) for January 2013.

Pear Tree Columbia Micro Cap (MICRX) just liquidated.  They gave the fund all of one year before declaring it to be a failed experiment.

RidgeWorth plans to merge RidgeWorth Large Cap Core Growth Stock (CRVAX) will be absorbed by RidgeWorth Large Cap Growth Stock (STCIX).

Turner is merging Turner Concentrated Growth (TTOPX) into Turner Large Growth (TCGFX) in early 2013.

Westwood has decided to liquidate Westwood Balanced (WHGBX) less than a year after the departure of longtime lead manager Susan Byrne.

In February, Wells Fargo Advantage Diversified Small Cap (NVDSX) disappears into Wells Fargo Advantage Small Company Growth (NVSCX), Advantage Equity Value (WLVAX) into Advantage Intrinsic Value (EIVAX) and Advantage Small/Mid Cap Core (ECOAX) into Advantage Common Stock (SCSAX).

Well Fargo is also liquidating its Wells Fargo Advantage Core builder Series (WFBGX) in early 2013.

Coming Attractions!

The Observer is trying to help two distinct but complementary groups of folks.  One group are investors who are trying to get past all the noise and hype.  (CNBC’s ratings are dropping like a rock, which should help.)  We’re hoping, in particular, to help folks examine evidence or possibilities that they wouldn’t normally see.  The other group are the managers and other folks associated with small funds and fund boutiques.  We believe in you.  We believe that, as the industry evolves, too much emphasis falls on asset-gathering and on funds launched just for the sake of dangling something new and shiny (uhh … the All Cap Insider Sentiment ETF).  We believe that small, independent funds run by smart, passionate investors deserve a lot more consideration than they receive.  And so we profile them, write about them and talk with other folks in the media about them.

As the Observer has become a bit more financially sustainable, we’re now looking at the prospect of launching two sister sites.  One of those sites will, we hope, be populated with the best commentaries gathered from the best small fund managers and teams that we can find.  Many of you folks write well and some write with grace that far exceeds mine.  The problem, managers tell me, is that fewer people than you’d like find their way to your sites and to your insights.

Our technical team, which Chip leads, thinks that they can create an attractive, fairly vibrant site that could engage readers and help them become more aware of some of the smaller fund families and their strategies.  We respect intellectual property, and so we’d only use content that was really good and whose sharing was supported by the adviser.

That’s still in development.  If you manage a fund or work in support of one and would like to participate in thinking about what would be most helpful, drop Chip a note and we’ll find a way to think through this together.  (Thanks!)

Small cap funds tend to have their best performance in the first six weeks of each year and so we’re planned a smallcapfest for our January issue, with new or revised profiles of the most sensible small cap funds as well as a couple outside perspectives on where you might look.

In Closing . . .

I wanted to share leads on three opportunities that you might want to look in on.  The Observer has no financial stake in any of this stuff but I like sharing word of things that strike me as really first-rate.

QuoteArts.com is a small shop that consistently offers a bunch of the most attractive, best written greeting cards (and refrigerator magnets) that I’ve seen.  Steve Metivier, who runs the site, gave us permission to reproduce one of their images (normally the online version is watermarked):

The text reads “A time to quiet our hearts… (inside) to soften our edges, clear our minds, enjoy our world, and to share best wishes for the season. May these days and all the new year be joyful and peaceful.”  It strikes me as an entirely-worthy aspiration.

Robert CialdiniThe best book there is on the subject of practical persuasion is Robert Cialdini’s Influence: The Psychology of Persuasion (revised edition, 2006).  Even if you’re not impressed that I’ve used the book in teaching persuasion over the past 20 years, you might be impressed by Charlie Munger’s strong endorsement of it.  In a talk entitled “The Psychology of Human Misjudgment,” Munger reports being so impressed with Cialdini’s work that he read the book, gave copies of it to all his children and sent Cialdini (“chawl-dee-nee,” if you care) a share of Berkshire Hathaway in thanks.   Cialdini has since left academe, founded the consulting group Influence at Work and now offers Principles of Persuasion workshops for professionals and the public. While I have not researched the workshops in any depth, I suspect that if I were a small business owner, marketer or financial planner who needed to both attract clients and change their behavior for the better. I’d take a serious look.

Finally, at Amazon’s invitation, I contributed an essay that will be posted at their new “Money and Markets” store from December 5th until about the 12th.  Its original title was, “It’s time to go,” but Amazon’s project director and I ended up settling on the less alarming “Trees don’t grow to the sky.”  If you’ve shopped at, say, Macy’s, you’re familiar with the store-within-a-store notion: free-standing, branded specialty shops (Levenger’s, LUSH, FAO Schwarz) operating within a larger enterprise.  It looks like Amazon is trying an experiment in the same direction and, in November, we mentioned their “Money and Markets” store.  Apparently the Amazonians noticed the fact that some of you folks went to look around, they followed your footprints back here and did some reading of their own.  One feature of the Money and Markets store is a weekly guest column and the writers have included Jack Bogle and Tadas Viskanta, the founder of Abnormal Returns which is one of the web’s two best financial news aggregators.  In any case, they asked if I’d chip in a piece during the second week of December.   We’re not allowed to repost the content for a week or so, but I’ll include it in the January cover essay.  Feel free to drop by if you’re in the area.

In the meanwhile, I wanted to extend sincere thanks from all of the folks here (chip, Anya, Junior, Accipiter and me) for the year you’ve shared with us.  You really do make it all worthwhile and so blessings of the season on you and yours.

As ever,

Artisan Global Equity Fund (ARTHX) – December 2012

By David Snowball

Objective and Strategy

The fund seeks to maximize long-term capital growth.  They invest in a global, all-cap equity portfolio which may include common and preferred stocks, convertible securities and, to a limited extent, derivatives.  They’re looking for high-quality growth companies with sustainable growth characteristics.  Their preference is to invest in firms that benefit from long-term growth trends and in stocks which are selling at a reasonable price.  Typically they hold 60-100 stocks. No more than 30% of the portfolio may be invested in emerging markets.  In general they do not hedge their currency exposure but could choose to do so if they owned a security denominated in an overvalued currency.

Adviser

Artisan Partners of Milwaukee, Wisconsin with Artisan Partners UK LLP as a subadvisor.   Artisan has five autonomous investment teams that oversee twelve distinct U.S., non-U.S. and global investment strategies. Artisan has been around since 1994.  As of 9/30/2012, Artisan Partners had approximately $70 billion in assets under management.  That’s up from $10 billion in 2000. They advise the 12 Artisan funds, but only 5% of their assets come from retail investors.

Manager

Barry P. Dargan is lead portfolio manager and Mark L. Yockey is portfolio manager.  Dargan and Yockey are jointly responsible for management of the fund, they work together to develop investment strategies but Mr. Dargan generally exercises final decision-making authority.  Previously, Mr. Dargan worked for MFS, as an investment analyst from 1996 to 2001 and as a manager of MFS International Growth (MGRAX) from 2001 to 2010.  Mr. Yockey joined Artisan in 1995 and is the lead manager for Artisan International (ARTIX) and Artisan International Small Cap (ARTJX).  The fact that Mr. Dargan’s main charge handily outperformed ARTIX over nearly a decade might have helped convince Artisan to bring him on-board.

Management’s Stake in the Fund

Mr. Dargan has over $1 million invested with the fund, and Mr. Yockey has between $500,000 and $1 million invested.  As of December 31, 2011, the officers and directors of Artisan Funds owned 16.94% of Artisan Global Equity Fund.

Opening date

March 29, 2010

Minimum investment

$1,000, which Artisan will waive if you establish an account with an automatic investment plan.

Expense ratio

1.50%, after waivers, on assets of $16.7 million. There is a 2% redemption fee for shares held less than 90 days.

Comments

Q:   What do you get when you combine the talents of two supremely successful international stock managers, a healthy corporate culture and a small, flexible fund?

A:   Artisan Global Equity.

The argument for considering ARTHX is really straightforward.  First, both managers have records that are both sustained and excellent.  Mr. Dargan managed, or co-managed, six funds, including two global funds, while at MFS.  Those included funds targeting both U.S. and non-U.S. investors.  While I don’t have a precise calculation, it’s clear he was managing more than $3 billion.  Mr. Yockey has famously managed two Artisan international funds since their inception, was once recognized as Morningstar’s International Fund Manager of the Year (1998).  For most trailing time periods, his funds have top 10% returns.  International Small Cap received Morningstar’s highest accolade when it was designated as the only “Gold” fund in its peer group while International was recognized as a “Silver” fund.  Based on head-to-head comparisons from 2001-2010, Mr. Yockey is really first rate and Mr. Dargan might be better.  (Being British, it’s almost certain that he has a cooler accent.)

Second, Artisan is a good steward.  The firm’s managers are divided into five teams, each with a distinctive philosophy and portfolio strategy.  The Global Equity team has four members (including Associate Portfolio Managers Charles Hamker and Andrew Euretig who also co-manage International Small Cap) and their discipline grows from the strategies first employed in ARTIX then extended to ARTJX.  Artisan has a very good record for lowering expenses, being risk conscious, opening funds only when they believe they have the capacity to be category-leaders (and almost all are) and closing funds before they’re bloated.

Third, ARTHX is nimble.  Its mandate is flexible: all sizes, all countries, any industry.  The fund’s direct investment in emerging markets is limited to 30% of the portfolio, but their pursuit of the world’s best companies leads them to firms whose income streams are more diverse than would be suggested by the names of the countries where they’re headquartered.  The managers note:

Though we have outsized exposure to Europe and undersized exposure to the U.S., we believe our relative country weights are of less significance since the companies we own in these developed economies continually expand their revenue bases across the globe.

Our portfolio remains centered around global industry leading companies with attractive valuations. This has led to a significant overweight position in the consumer sectors where many of our holdings benefit from significant exposure to the faster growth in emerging economies.

Since much of the world’s secular (enduring, long-term) growth is in the emerging markets, the portfolio is positioned to give them substantial exposure to it through their Europe and US-domiciled firms.  While the managers are experienced in handling billions, here they’re dealing with only $17 million.

The results are not surprising.  Morningstar believes that their analysts can identify those funds likely to serve their shareholders best; they do this by looking at a series of qualitative factors on top of pure performance.  When they find a fund that they believe has the potential to be consistently strong in the future, they can name it as a “Gold” fund.   Here are ARTHX’s returns since inception (the blue line) against all of Morningstar’s global Gold funds:

Artisan Global Equity versus gold funds

Not to say that the gap between Artisan and the other top funds is large and growing, but it is.

Bottom Line

Artisan Global Equity is an outstanding small fund for investors looking for exposure to many of the best firms from around the global.  The expenses are reasonable, the investment minimum is low and the manager is first-rate.  Which should be no surprise since two of the few funds keeping pace with Artisan Global Equity have names beginning with the same two words: Artisan Global Opportunities (ARTRX) and Artisan Global Value (ARTGX).

Fund website

Artisan Global Equity

© Mutual Fund Observer, 2012. All rights reserved. The information here reflects publicly available information current at the time of publication. For reprint/e-rights contact us.

New and Noteworthy Site

By Editor

LearnBonds Mutual Fund & ETF Ratings

History and Focus

LearnBonds (LB) Mutual Fund & ETF Ratings was launched in December 2011 by its co-founders Marc Prosser and David Waring. Marc Prosser is currently a Forbes contributor; previously he was the Chief Marketing Officer at Forex Capital Markets (FXCM). David Waring was formerly the Managing Director, business development and strategy, at Market Simplified Inc.

Unlike industry heavyweights such as Morningstar and Lipper, LB Ratings focuses on a relatively small number of bond funds in a limited number of categories. They divide funds into categories based on purpose. The categories currently listed are core bond funds, municipal bond funds, short term/low-duration bond funds, high credit risk bond funds and long duration funds. Their belief is that no individual or family should have more than 5 purpose driven funds in their portfolio. This is how David Waring describes their approach:

We have tremendous respect for Morningstar and Lipper’s mutual fund and ETF ratings. LB Ratings will not replace these great tools. However, we recognize many investors find these tools overwhelming and complicated to apply to making investment choices. We are addressing the need for a simplified product which expresses strong views as to which funds an investor should own.

Methodology

LB Ratings does not use a mathematical formula to identify or rate individual funds. Every fund listed on LB ratings was personally chosen and rated by the co-founders.  Instead of mechanical, number-based, quantitative analysis, they use a specific set of criteria to personally select and rate individual funds. Factors include fund performance both long and short term, risk levels, associated fees and quality and tenure of management. Funds are given a rating level between 1 and 5 stars, 1 being the lowest and 5 the highest. The website describes this method as “opinionated ratings.”  They are clear and upfront about their methods and their belief that all fund rating agencies and websites are inherently subjective.   This makes LB’s ratings akin to Morningstar’s Analyst Ratings (the Gold, Silver … designations).

LearnBonds screenshot

Extras

Every fund listed is accompanied by a compact but comprehensive report that outlines its strengths and weaknesses, as well as the rationale behind its rating. In addition to their bond fund and ETF lists, LB Ratings also offers links to bond and fund related articles. Additionally, website visitors can sign up for a daily newsletter, or download the free e-book “How to Invest in Bonds.”

Pros

The website is simple and straightforward, providing shortlists of funds that were hand chosen by experts in the field.  The rating report that accompanies each fund is clear and concise, giving readers information that can be useful to them independent of the rating. Fewer categories and shorter lists may be less stressful to some investors and help to reduce confusion.

Cons

The limited number of categories and funds means that inevitably many strong candidates will be missing. The subjective nature of the ratings will be too abstract for many. The lack of comparative tools – and tools in general – will limit the site’s appeal to investors who need more in-depth coverage. One practical concern we have is that there’s no evidence of predictive validity for the LB ratings; that is, they don’t have proof that their five star funds will perform better in the future than their three star ones.  Here’s Mr. Prosser’s response:

As far as predictive analysis , I would make the argument that at least for actively traded bonds funds we are in a period of time where quantitative analysis is difficult to employ:

Funds have radically changed the profile of the assets they hold and significantly drifted away from their benchmarks. Here are two easy examples; the Templeton World Bond Fund is now a short-duration fund, with a duration two years shorter than its peers. The PIMCO Total Return Fund now is a large holder of munis. which are neither included in its benchmark nor have they ever been a major part of its holdings.  In both cases, these are radical departures from the past . . . and at the same time [might be] temporary positions . . .  As a result, more than ever you’re “betting” on the skill of the fund’s manager.  Or put another way, historically the best performing bond mutual funds had most their returns generated from beta and now they are generating it from alpha. In short, I don’t think the quant models being employed really capture this shift.  [Assessing these funds] requires more qualitative analysis.

Bottom Line

Although the website’s offerings are limited, many investors may prefer a human chosen shortlist of choices over one generated by a computer.  For those who don’t need or likely will not use tools such as screeners and comparative charts, the simple straightforward nature of LB Ratings will be welcome. As the website itself acknowledges though, a fund rating website is built on trust.  Trust is earned over time, and ultimately only time will tell how the “opinionated ratings” approach fares against the tried and tested methods of the industry’s heavyweights in terms of performance.  For now, we conclude that LB has a sensible niche, that it’s interesting, worth watching and potentially useful, so long as you use their ratings as a starting point rather than a final word.

Website

http://www.learnbonds.com/lb-rated-funds/

December 2012, Funds in Registration

By David Snowball

DoubleLine Floating Rate Fund

DoubleLine Floating Rate Fund will seek a high level of current income by investing in floating rate loans and “other floating rate investments.”  The “other” includes “floating rate debt securities; inflation-indexed securities; certain mortgage- and asset-backed securities, including those backed by collateral that carry an adjustable or floating rate of interest, such as adjustable rate mortgages; certain collateralized loan obligations; certain collateralized debt obligations; certain collateralized mortgage obligations; adjustable rate mortgages; floaters; inverse floaters; money market securities of all types; repurchase agreements; and shares of money market and short-term bond funds”.  The fund will be managed by Bonnie Baha and Robert Cohen.  Ms. Baha was part of Mr. Gundlach’s original TCW team.  No word on Mr. Cohen’s background. The minimum initial investment is $2000, reduced to $500 for IRAs. Expenses not yet set.

Epiphany FFV Global Ecologic Fund

Epiphany FFV Global Ecologic Fund will seek long-term capital growth by investing in a global portfolio of common and dividend-paying preferred stocks.  They seek “to encourage environmentally responsible business practices and a cleaner environment by investing … in environmentally responsible and sustainable companies.”  They anticipate holding about 50 names and, they assure us, they’ll invest no more than 5% in “pure play renewable energy.”  The managers will be  Frank Morris, founder and CEO of Ecologic Advisors andSamuel J. Saladino, CEO of Trinity Fiduciary Partners and the manager of Epiphany FFV Fund and Latin America Fund.  The former is a tiny, perfectly respectable US large cap fund.  The latter is new but doing well so far.  FFV refers to Faith and Family Values and represents the underlying theme of the social and moral screening.  The minimum initial investment is $1000, reduced to $100 for accounts set up with an automatic investing plan. The expense ratio is 1.56%.

Lyrical U.S. Value Equity Fund

Lyrical U.S. Value Equity Fund will seek to achieve long-term capital growth by buying “the stocks of companies that the Adviser believes are undervalued, the undervaluation to be temporary, the underlying business to have sufficient quality and durability, and the estimated discount in the stock price to be large enough to compensate for the risks of the investment.”  Good companies temporarily down.  Got it.  The fund will be managed by Andrew Wellington, Chief Investment Officer of Lyrical Asset Management.  The manager ran a hedge fund for a while, managed institutional midcap value money for Neuberger and was a founding member of Pzena Investment Management. The minimum investment is $10,000, reduced to $1,000 for IRAs.  The expense ratio is 1.45%.

Market Vectors High-Yield/Treasury Bond ETF

Market Vectors High-Yield/Treasury Bond ETF will track an index that invests in global high yield bonds and shorts U.S. Treasuries in order “to hedge interest rate sensitivity.”  Michael Mazier and Francis Rodilosso of Van Eck will manage the fund.  Expense not yet set.

MCM All-Cap Growth Fund

MCM All-Cap Growth Fund (MCAEX) will seek capital appreciation by investing in 25-50 smaller cap US growth stocks.  The fund will be managed by Rich Jones and Jonn Wullschleger, both of Mitchell Capital Management.  Their separate account composite, for accounts managed in this style, modestly outperformed the Russell 3000 Growth Index pretty consistently. The minimum initial investment is $2500.  Expenses are capped at 1.0%.

PIMCO Emerging Markets Full Spectrum Bond Fund

PIMCO Emerging Markets Full Spectrum Bond Fund will pursue maximum total return, consistent with prudent investment management. The plan is to invest in “a broad range of emerging market fixed income asset classes, such as external debt obligations of sovereign, quasi-sovereign, and corporate entities; currencies, and local currency-denominated obligations of sovereigns, quasi-sovereigns, and corporate issuers.”  The managers will actively manage both the asset allocation and security selection.  The benchmark asset allocation is 50% JPMorgan Global Bond Index Emerging Markets- Global Diversified, 25% JPMorgan Emerging Markets Bond Index Global and 25% JPMorgan Corporate Emerging Market Bond Index Diversified.  They can implement their allocation plan directly by buying securities or indirectly by investing in funds and ETFs.  The manager has not yet been named.  There will be a $1000 investment minimum for the no-load “D” shares.  Expenses have not yet been set.

Shelton Green Alpha Fund

Shelton Green Alpha Fund will seek a high level of long-term capital appreciation by investing in stocks “in the green economy.”  The prospectus is bereft of potentially useful details, such as what they’ll charge and who’ll manage the fund.  We do know that it’s a no-load fund, that the minimum investment is $1000, and that “green” funds have largely been a disaster for both sponsor and investor.  I wish them well.

Manager changes, November 2012

By Chip

Because bond fund managers, traditionally, had made relatively modest impacts of their funds’ absolute returns, Manager Changes typically highlights changes in equity and hybrid funds.

Ticker Fund Out with the old In with the new Dt
PCDFX Aberdeen Core Fixed Income J. Christopher Gagnier, Oliver Boulind and Timothy Vile have stepped down Existing comanagers, Stephen Cianci and Neil Moriarty will be joined by Michael Degernes, Edward Grant, and Charles Tan. 11/12
AUDIX Aberdeen Ultra-Short Duration Bond Oliver Boulind and Neil Moriarty have stepped down The rest of the team remains. 11/12
AIFLX American Independence Large Cap Growth Robert S. Natale John Christopher Jacobs 11/12
AIFSX American Independence Small Cap Growth Robert S. Natale John Christopher Jacobs 11/12
MDFGX BlackRock Capital Appreciation Jeff Lindsey Lawrence Kemp 11/12
MAFOX BlackRock Focus Growth Jeff Lindsey Lawrence Kemp 11/12
BLDAX BlackRock Low Duration Bond Comanager Stuart Spodek Scott MacLellan joins as a new comanager with Tom Musmanno, who remains. 11/12
DEQAX Dreyfus Global Equity Income No one, but . . . Nick Clay joined James Harries as a comanager 11/12
SNIEX Dreyfus/Newton International Equity No one, but . . . Jeff Munroe joined Paul Markham as a comanager 11/12
EAGMX Eaton Vance Global Macro Absolute Return Mark Venezia will retire The other managers remain. 11/12
FTEAX Forward Tactical Enhanced Christopher J. Guptill, an outsider who was doing a singularly fine job. Jim O’Donnell and Jim Welsh take over as part of an “in-housing” trend at Forward 11/12
GALLX Goldman Sachs Flexible Cap Growth No one, but . . . Warren Fisher was added as a comanager 11/12
IMOIX ING Growth and Income Core Portfolio (formerly, ING Thornburg Value Portfolio) Connor Browne and Edward Maran, as subadvisor Thornburg Investment Management was terminated. Christopher F. Corapi and Michael Pytosh of subadvisor, ING Investment Management 11/12
JMIGX Jacob Micro Cap Growth Jamie Cuellar Ryan Jacob, who bought the former Pinebridge Micro Cap fund in July and has installed himself as manager 11/12
PBSBX Jacob Small Cap Growth Jamie Cuellar Ryan Jacob, same story as with Micro Cap: bought the fund, hired himself, didn’t lower the 3.4% expense ratio. 11/12
PZFVX John Hancock Classic Value No one, but . . . Ben Silver has joined as the fourth comanager. 11/12
LGILX Laudus Growth Investor US Large Cap Growth Lawrence Kemp has retired from UBS, the subadvisor. He’s being replaced by a team of three, Paul Graham, Sam Console, and Peter Bye. 11/12
MFDAX Managers Fixed Income Subadvisor Loomis Sayles is out, along with Dan Fuss.  Fuss is splendid and quite elderly and his heir apparent jumped ship so … Gannett Welsh & Kotler, LLC, is in, with Mary Kane as portfolio manager. 11/12
NCBIX New Covenant Balanced Income John J. McCue Derek Papastrat 11/12
NSAGX Nuveen Santa Barbara Growth James Boothe Robert C. Doll Jr. 11/12
OPMSX Oppenheimer Main Street Small- & Mid-Cap No one, but . . . Raymond Anello is now lead manager, and Joy Budzinski, Kristin Ketner Pak, Magnus Krantz, and Adam Weine were added as comanagers. 11/12
PIGFX Pioneer Fundamental Growth Timothy Mulrenan Paul Cloonan 11/12
PINDX Pioneer Independence Timothy Mulrenan Andrew Acheson continues alone. 11/12
PRIAX Principal International Emerging Markets Michael Ade and Michael Reynal Mohammed Zaidi will join Mihail Dobrinov as a manager 11/12
PPGAX Putnam Global Sector No one, but . . . Isabel Buccellati joins the team, now numbering 14 11/12
PRFRX T. Rowe Price Floating Rate Justin Gerbereux has stepped down Comanager Paul Massaro remains as the sole manager. 11/12
RPIFX T. Rowe Price Institutional Floating Rate Justin Gerbereux has stepped down Comanager Paul Massaro remains as the sole manager. 11/12
TGGEX TCW Growth Equities Husam Nazer and Brendt Stallings will be out by the end of the year Mike Olson and Chang Lee will assume the duties 11/12
TGSCX TCW Small Cap Growth Husam Nazer and Brendt Stallings, who managed a high volatility/low returns style, will be out by the end of the year Mike Olson and Chang Lee will assume the duties 11/12
TGSDX TCW SMID Cap Growth Husam Nazer and Brendt Stallings will be out by the end of the year Mike Olson and Chang Lee will assume the duties 11/12
USGRX USAA Growth & Income Subadvisors Loomis Sayles and UBS Global Asset Management. An in-house team, John Toohey and Wasif Latif, join the other subadvisors. 11/12
USISX USAA Income Stock No one, but . . . They’re adding an internal team to comanage a portion of the fund. The internal team consists of Wasif Latif, John Toohey, Julianne Bass, and Steve Klaffke. The existing subadvisors will remain. 11/12